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25 Different Types of Marriages

Angela Welch is a Licensed Marriage and Family Therapist and Licensed Chemical Dependency Counselor Intern from Valparaiso,IN. She earned her Master of Arts in Marriage and... Read More

Rachael Pace inspires with motivational articles on loving partnerships. She encourages making room for love and facing challenges together.

It’s no secret that marriage in different cultures doesn’t quite mean the same thing as it did just 100 years ago, and not the same as several hundred years ago.

It wasn’t that long ago that different types of marriage and relationships were all about security; in a world with limited opportunity, you wanted to make sure your future had some stability, and marrying was a big part of that. It’s only a recent development that people marry for love . 

Since the purpose of marriages is so diverse and twisted, there are different types of marriages you should know about. Here are 25 different types of marriages you should be aware of. 

25 types of marriages

The types of marriages can differ based on the purpose of the marriage and how the relationship between two people is defined. Here are 25 different types of marriages. 

1. Civil and religious marriage

These are two different types of marriages, often combined into one. Civil marriage is when the marriage is recognized by the state, while a religious marriage is when the recognition is received from a religious body, such as the church.

2. Interfaith marriage

Faith or religion makes up for a major part of ourselves and our lives. Previously, people from the same faiths would prefer to get married. However, as time progressed, people from different religions have also started to come together in a union. When people from two different religions decide to get married, it is called an interfaith marriage. 

3. Common-law marriage

Common-law marriage is a type of marriage when two people have decided that they are married and live together like husband and wife but do not have a certificate of registry.

4. Monogamous marriage

Monogamous marriage is the most common type of marriage people practice all over the world. It is when two people are married to each other without getting emotionally or sexually involved with anyone else outside the marriage.

5. Polygamous marriage

Polygamous marriage, though not as common now , used to be the norm several hundred years ago. It is when people have more than one official spouse. 

Polygamous marriage can be of two types – polygyny marriage and polyandry marriage. Polygyny is when a man has more than one wife, while polyandry is when the woman has more than one husband.

6. Left-handed marriage

Left-handed marriage is when two people from unequal social rankings get together in a union of marriage. It is also called a morganatic marriage. 

7. Secret marriage

As the name suggests, a secret marriage is when the marriage is hidden from society, friends, and family. When two people are secretly married but have not informed their family or friends about the same. 

8. Shotgun marriage

Most people plan their marriage and when they want to get married. However, a shotgun marriage is when a couple decides to get married because of an unplanned pregnancy.

Many cultures and societies look down upon having kids before marriage, and therefore, some people may decide to get married to save their reputation or the embarrassment to their families.

9. Mixed marriage

A mixed marriage is also called an inter-racial marriage. A mixed marriage is another one of the marriage types that is becoming popular lately. Previously, people would only marry in their own race. Now, people from different races also come together in the union of marriage.

10. Same-sex marriage

Same-sex marriages have also become common now. Though not as widely accepted as other types of marriage in sociology, same-sex marriages have been deemed legal in many parts of the world. It is when people who wish to marry people of the same sex come together to get married. 

A man marries a man, and a woman marries a woman – as opposed to the societal construct that only a man and woman can get married.

11. Love marriage

Love marriages are the types of marriages where people get married because they love each other. They meet each other, fall in love, and marriage seems like the next logical step to them. 

12. Arranged marriage

Arranged marriages are the opposite of love marriages. It is when the family finds a suitable match for an eligible bachelor or bachelorette, keeping in mind factors such as race, religion, caste, and any other specifics that they might have.

13. Convenience marriage

As the name suggests, a convenience marriage is when two people get married for reasons that bring convenience to their lives, and not because of love. These reasons can be practical, or financial.

14. Zombie marriage

This is when you both are docile and nice to each other in front of other people, and to them, you are still married. 

However, behind closed doors, you do not share any sort of a relationship. It has come to a point where you are not even sure if you both are really married in the essence of your relationship.

15. Group marriage

Group marriage is when one or more men are married to one or more women. It is different from a polygamous marriage because in this case, a group of people is married to each other, while in a polygamous marriage, a person just has multiple spouses.

16. Parenting marriage

Another one of the different forms of marriage that are very common these days is called parenting marriage. This is when two people decide to stay married to each other for the sake of their kids. 

They wait for the children to grow up, and become independent before they separate or file for a divorce.

17. Safety marriage

Safety marriage is when a marriage occurs because something tangible, mostly materialistic, is decided to be given in return. These terms are decided before marriage.

18. Open marriage

One more type of marriage that has recently become popular is open marriage . It is when two people who are officially married are allowed to see other people outside the marriage. It is a mutual agreement between two spouses.

To understand more about open marriages, watch this video.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nALP-EYOaMc&ab_channel=TODAY

19. Court marriage

A court marriage is when the couple skips the traditional ceremony, and directly applies for a marriage certificate from the court. 

20. Time-bound marriage

This type of marriage is when the agreement of marriage is bound by time. The couple decides that they will only stay married to each other for a specific time period.

21. The Partnership

In this type of marriage or in this form of marriage, the husband and wife act a lot like business partners. They are equals in so many ways. Most likely, they both work full-time jobs and share a lot of the household and child-rearing responsibilities equally.

In these types of marriages, the couples are interested in contributing their half in order to make a more cohesive whole. If you are in this type of relationship, you’ll feel out of balance when the other person isn’t doing the same things you are doing.

So if you feel like you need to have different roles, you’ll need to really dissect it and negotiate until you both feel you are still on equal footing. This applies to all aspects of the marriage—even the romance part. You must both be making equal efforts in this area.

22. The Independents

People who have these types of marriages want autonomy. They more or less live separate lives alongside each other. They don’t feel like they need to agree on everything because each person’s thoughts and feelings are separate from their own and valuable in their own right.

They give each other room to be who they want to be; they may even spend their free time apart. When it comes to doing things around the house, they tend to work separately in their areas of interest and on their timetables.

They may have less physical togetherness than other couples but feel just as fulfilled. People who enjoy these types of marriages will feel stifled if their spouse is too needy or wants to be together all the time. 

Just know that an independent isn’t pulling away because they don’t love you—they just need to have that independent space.

Check out this video of a couple talking about maintaining individuality and independence while being married:

23. The degree seekers

A couple in this type of marriage ceremony are in it to learn something. Many times the husband and wife in this relationship are quite different—even opposites. One could be good at something, and the other not so much, and vice versa.

So they each possess skills the other would like to develop. In essence, marriage is like a school of life. They are constantly learning from each other. They find it very stimulating to watch how the other lives and handles themselves in different situations.

Over time, they begin to pick up on their spouse’s skills and feel good about that process as it unfolds. 

If they ever feel like they are no longer learning anything from their spouse, they may feel disillusioned; so keep things fresh by constantly learning and growing for yourself, and so you can offer something to your degree-seeking spouse.

24. The “traditional” roles

This is the type of marriage depicted in old TV shows. The wife stays at home and takes care of the house and kids; the husband goes to work and comes home and reads the paper or watches TV. 

The wife has clearly defined roles, and the husband has clearly defined roles, and they are different.

In multiple marriages, when the husband and wife find joy in their roles and are supported by the other, it works well. But when the roles aren’t fulfilled, or their roles overlap, there can be resentment or loss of self.

25. The companionship

In this alternative marriage ,  the husband and wife want a life-long friend. Their relationship is familiar and loving. They are really after someone to share their life with—someone to be by their side through everything. 

There is less independence in this marriage, and that’s ok. They appreciate a lot of togetherness.

The bottom line

We hope this article was able to answer the question, “What are the different types of marriages?”

While there are various other types of marriages apart from the ones mentioned here, the truth is that different marriages occur due to different reasons. Marriage types are, therefore, defined based on these reasons. 

There is no definite answer to the question, “How many types of marriage do we have?” but these are the most common types of marriages.

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Rachael Pace is a noted relationship writer associated with Marriage.com. She provides inspiration, support, and empowerment in the form of motivational articles and essays. Rachael enjoys studying the evolution of loving partnerships Read more and is passionate about writing on them. She believes that everyone should make room for love in their lives and encourages couples to work on overcoming their challenges together. Read less

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Marriage Essay for Students and Children

500+ words essay on marriage.

In general, marriage can be described as a bond/commitment between a man and a woman. Also, this bond is strongly connected with love, tolerance, support, and harmony. Also, creating a family means to enter a new stage of social advancement. Marriages help in founding the new relationship between females and males. Also, this is thought to be the highest as well as the most important Institution in our society. The marriage essay is a guide to what constitutes a marriage in India. 

Whenever we think about marriage, the first thing that comes to our mind is the long-lasting relationship. Also, for everyone, marriage is one of the most important decisions in their life. Because you are choosing to live your whole life with that 1 person. Thus, when people decide to get married, they think of having a lovely family, dedicating their life together, and raising their children together. The circle of humankind is like that only. 

Read 500 Words Essay on Dowry System

As it is seen with other experiences as well, the experience of marriage can be successful or unsuccessful. If truth to be held, there is no secret to a successful marriage. It is all about finding the person and enjoying all the differences and imperfections, thereby making your life smooth. So, a good marriage is something that is supposed to be created by two loving people. Thus, it does not happen from time to time. Researchers believe that married people are less depressed and more happy as compared to unmarried people. 

Get the huge list of more than 500 Essay Topics and Ideas

Concepts of Marriage

There is no theoretical concept of marriage. Because for everyone these concepts will keep on changing. But there are some basic concepts which are common in every marriage. These concepts are children, communication , problem-solving , and influences. Here, children may be the most considerable issue. Because many think that having a child is a stressful thing. While others do not believe it. But one thing is sure that having children will change the couple’s life. Now there is someone else besides them whose responsibilities and duties are to be done by the parents. 

Another concept in marriage is problem-solving where it is important to realize that you can live on your own every day. Thus, it is important to find solutions to some misunderstandings together. This is one of the essential parts of a marriage. Communication also plays a huge role in marriage. Thus, the couple should act friends, in fact, be,t friends. There should be no secret between the couple and no one should hide anything. So, both persons should do what they feel comfortable. It is not necessary to think that marriage is difficult and thus it makes you feel busy and unhappy all the time. 

Marriage is like a huge painting where you brush your movements and create your own love story. 

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Marriage and Domestic Partnership

Marriage, a prominent institution regulating sex, reproduction, and family life, is a route into classical philosophical issues such as the good and the scope of individual choice, as well as itself raising distinctive philosophical questions. Political philosophers have taken the organization of sex and reproduction to be essential to the health of the state, and moral philosophers have debated whether marriage has a special moral status and relation to the human good. Philosophers have also disputed the underlying moral and legal rationales for the structure of marriage, with implications for questions such as the content of its moral obligations and the legal recognition of same-sex marriage. Feminist philosophers have seen marriage as playing a crucial role in women’s oppression and thus a central topic of justice. In this area philosophy courts public debate: in 1940, Bertrand Russell’s appointment to an academic post was withdrawn on the grounds that the liberal views expressed in Marriage and Morals made him morally unfit for such a post. Likewise, debate over same-sex marriage has been highly charged. Unlike some contemporary issues sparking such wide interest, there is a long tradition of philosophical thought on marriage.

Philosophical debate concerning marriage extends to what marriage, fundamentally, is; therefore, Section 1 examines its definition. Section 2 sets out the historical development of the philosophy of marriage, which shapes today’s debates. Many of the ethical positions on marriage can be understood as divided on the question of whether marriage should be defined contractually by the spouses or by its institutional purpose, and they further divide on whether that purpose necessarily includes procreation or may be limited to the marital love relationship. Section 3 taxonomizes ethical views of marriage accordingly. Section 4 will examine rival political understandings of marriage law and its rationale. Discussion of marriage has played a central role in feminist philosophy; Section 5 will outline the foremost critiques of the institution.

1. Defining Marriage

2. understanding marriage: historical orientation, 3.1 contractual views, 3.2 institutional views, 4.1 marriage and legal contract, 4.2 the rationale of marriage law, 4.3 same-sex marriage, 4.4 arguments for marriage reform, 5.1 feminist approaches, 5.2 the queer critique, contemporary works, historical works, other internet resources, related entries.

‘Marriage’ can refer to a legal contract and civil status, a religious rite, and a social practice, all of which vary by legal jurisdiction, religious doctrine, and culture. History shows considerable variation in marital practices: polygyny has been widely practiced, some societies have approved of extra-marital sex and, arguably, recognized same-sex marriages, and religious or civil officiation has not always been the norm (Boswell 1994; Mohr 2005, 62; Coontz 2006). More fundamentally, while the contemporary Western ideal of marriage involves a relationship of love, friendship, or companionship, marriage historically functioned primarily as an economic and political unit used to create kinship bonds, control inheritance, and share resources and labor. Indeed, some ancients and medievals discouraged ‘excessive’ love in marriage. The Western ‘love revolution’ in marriage dates popularly to the 18 th century (Coontz 2006, Part 3). The understanding of marriage as grounded in individual choice and romantic love reflects historically and culturally situated beliefs and practices. Most notably, the aspect of consent or voluntary entry - often taken to be crucial to marriage (Cott 2000) - is challenged where practices of forced or child marriage are prevalent (Narayan 1997; Bhandary 2018). Arranged marriage, which is compatible with the consent of the spouses, prioritizes caregiving and economic aspects of the institution over romantic love (Bhandary 2018).

The global variety of marriage practices and law is difficult to encapsulate: notable variations in law include recognition of same-sex marriage, polygamy, and ‘common-law’ marriage, restrictions on marriages between members of the same family or of different social castes, the existence of civil marriage, practices of arranged, forced, or child marriage, and women’s rights within marriage (see Moses 2018 for an entry into the literature on these differences), as well as cultural and religious practices of temporary marriage (Shrage 2013, Nolan 2016) or polyamorous marriage (Brake 2018). Religious, cultural, and philosophical traditions also shape ideals of marriage. For instance, Xiaorong Li writes that “Confucian ideals of family, society, and women’s role” influence expectations of marriage in China (Li 1995, 413). However, scholarship on such differences must be careful to avoid misrepresentation (see for example discussion of misleading Western accounts of ‘sati’ and dowry-murder in India in Narayan 1997).

Ethical and political questions regarding marriage are sometimes answered by appeal to the definition of marriage. But the historical and cultural variation in marital practices has prompted some philosophers to argue that marriage is a ‘family resemblance’ concept, with no essential purpose or structure (Wasserstrom 1974; see also the interesting discussion of whether the many different practices identified by anthropologists as marriage should be counted as marriages in Nolan, forthcoming). If marriage has no essential features, then one cannot appeal to definition to justify particular legal or moral obligations. For instance, if monogamy is not an essential feature of marriage, then one cannot appeal to the definition of marriage to justify a requirement that legal marriage be monogamous. To a certain extent, the point that actual legal or social definitions cannot settle the question of what features marriage should have is just. First, past applications of a term need not yield necessary and sufficient criteria for applying it: ‘marriage’ (like ‘citizen’) may be extended to new cases without thereby changing its meaning (Mercier 2001). Second, appeal to definition may be uninformative: for example, legal definitions are sometimes circular, defining marriage in terms of spouses and spouses in terms of marriage (Mohr 2005, 57). Third, appeal to an existing definition in the context of debate over what the law of marriage, or its moral obligations, should be risks begging the question: in debate over same-sex marriage, for example, appeal to the current legal definition begs the normative question of what the law should be. However, this point also tells against the argument for the family resemblance view of marriage, as the variation of marital forms in practice does not preclude the existence of a normatively ideal form. Thus, philosophers who defend an essentialist definition of marriage offer normative definitions, which appeal to fundamental ethical or political principles. Defining marriage must depend on, rather than precede, ethical and political inquiry.

Setting the agenda for contemporary debate, ancient and medieval philosophers raised recurring themes in the philosophy of marriage: the relation between marriage and the state, the role of sex and procreation in marriage, and the gendered nature of spousal roles. Their works reflect evolving, and overlapping, ideas of marriage as an economic or procreative unit, a religious sacrament, a contractual association, and a relationship of mutual support.

In his depiction of the ideal state, Plato (427–347 BCE) described a form of marriage contrasting greatly with actual marriage practices of his time. He argued that, just as male and female watchdogs perform the same duties, men and women should work together, and, among Guardians, ‘wives and children [should be held] in common’ ( The Republic , ca. 375–370 BCE, 423e–424a). To orchestrate eugenic breeding, temporary marriages would be made at festivals, where matches, apparently chosen by lot, would be secretly arranged by the Rulers. Resulting offspring would be taken from biological parents and reared anonymously in nurseries. Plato’s reason for this radical restructuring of marriage was to extend family sympathies from the nuclear family to the state itself: the abolition of the private family was intended to discourage private interests at odds with the common good and the strength of the state ( ibid ., 449a-466d; in Plato’s Laws , ca. 355–47 BCE, private marriage is retained but still designed for public benefit).

Aristotle (384–322 BCE) sharply criticized this proposal as unworkable. On his view, Plato errs in assuming that the natural love for one’s own family can be transferred to all fellow-citizens. The state arises from component parts, beginning with the natural procreative union of male and female. It is thus a state of families rather than a family state, and its dependence on the functioning of individual households makes marriage essential to political theory ( Politics , 1264b). The Aristotelian idea that the stability of society depends on the marital family influenced Hegel, Rawls, and Sandel, among others. Aristotle also disagreed with Plato on gender roles in marriage, and these views too would prove influential. Marriage, he argued, is properly structured by gender: the husband, “fitter for command,” rules. The sexes express their excellences differently: “the courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman in obeying,” a complementarity which promotes the marital good ( Politics , ca. 330 BCE, 1253b, 1259b, 1260a; Nicomachean Ethics , ca. 325 BCE, 1160–62).

In contrast to the ancients, whose philosophical discussion of sex and sexual love was not confined to marriage, Christian philosophers introduced a new focus on marriage as the sole permissible context for sex, marking a shift from viewing marriage as primarily a political and economic unit. St. Augustine (354–430), following St. Paul, condemns sex outside marriage and lust within it. “[A]bstinence from all sexual union is better even than marital intercourse performed for the sake of procreating,” and the unmarried state is best of all ( The Excellence of Marriage , ca. 401, §6, 13/15). But marriage is justified by its goods: “children, fidelity [between spouses], and sacrament.” Although procreation is the purpose of marriage, marriage does not morally rehabilitate lust. Instead, the reason for the individual marital sexual act determines its permissibility. Sex for the sake of procreation is not sinful, and sex within marriage solely to satisfy lust is a pardonable (venial) sin. As marital sex is preferable to “fornication” (extra-marital sex), spouses owe the “marriage debt” (sex) to protect against temptation, thereby sustaining mutual fidelity ( Marriage and Desire , Book I, ca. 418–19, §7, 8, 17/19, 14/16).

St. Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225–1274) grounded concurring judgments about sexual morality in natural law, explicating marriage in terms of basic human goods, including procreation and fidelity between spouses (Finnis 1997). Monogamous marriage, as the arrangement fit for the rearing of children, “belong[s] to the natural law.” Monogamous marriage secures paternal guidance, which a child needs; fornication is thus a mortal sin because it “tends to injure the life of the offspring.” (Aquinas rejects polygamy on similar grounds while, like Augustine, arguing that it was once permitted to populate the earth.) Marital sex employs the body for its purpose of preserving the species, and pleasure may be a divinely ordained part of this. Even within marriage, sex is morally troubling because it involves “a loss of reason,” but this is compensated by the goods of marriage ( Summa Theologiae , unfinished at Aquinas’ death, II-II, 153, 2; 154, 2). Among these goods, Aquinas emphasizes the mutual fidelity of the spouses, including payment of the “marriage debt” and “partnership of a common life”—a step towards ideas of companionate marriage ( Summa Theologiae, Supp. 49, 1).

Indeed, we see indications of discontent with the economic model of marriage a century earlier in the letters of Héloïse (ca. 1100–1163) to Abelard (1079–1142). Héloïse attacks marriage, understood as an economic transaction, arguing that a woman marrying for money or position deserves “wages, not gratitude” and would “prostitute herself to a richer man, if she could.” In place of this economic relation she praises love, understood on a Ciceronian model of friendship: the “name of wife may seem more sacred or more binding, but sweeter for me will always be the word friend ( amica ), or, if you will permit me, that of concubine or whore” (Abelard and Héloïse, Letters , ca. 1133–1138, 51–2). The relation between love and marriage will continue to preoccupy later philosophers. Do marital obligations and economic incentives threaten love, as Héloïse suggested? (Cave 2003, Card 1996) As Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) dramatically suggests in The Seducer’s Diary , are the obligations of marriage incompatible with romantic and erotic love? Or, instead, does marital commitment uniquely enable spousal love, as Aquinas suggested? (Finnis 1997; cf. Kierkegaard’s Judge William’s defense of marriage [ Either/Or , 1843, vol. 2].)

Questions of the relation between love and marriage emerge from changing understandings of the role of marriage; in the early modern era, further fault lines appear as new understandings of human society conflict with the traditional structure of marriage. For Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas, marriage was unproblematically structured by sexual difference, and its distinctive features explained by nature or sacrament. But in the early modern era, as doctrines of equal rights and contract appeared, a new ideal of relationships between adults as free choices between equals appeared. In this light, the unequal and unchosen content of the marriage relationship raised philosophical problems. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) acknowledged that his arguments for rough equality among humans apply to women: “whereas some have attributed the dominion [over children] to the man only, as being of the more excellent sex; they misreckon in it. For there is not always that difference of strength, or prudence between the man and the woman, as that the right can be determined without war.” Nonetheless, Hobbes admits that men dominate in marriage, which he explains (inadequately) thus: “for the most part commonwealths have been erected by the fathers, not by the mothers of families” ( Leviathan , 1651, Ch. 20; Okin 1979, 198–199, Pateman 1988, 44–50).

Likewise, defending marital hierarchy posed a problem for John Locke (1632–1704). Locke ties his rejection of political patriarchy to a rejection of the patriarchal family, arguing that marriage, like the state, rests on consent, not natural hierarchy; marriage is a “voluntary compact.” But Locke fails to follow this reasoning consistently, for Lockean marriage remains hierarchical: in cases of conflict, “the rule … naturally falls to the man’s as the abler and stronger.” Ceding decision-making power to one party on the basis of a presumed natural hierarchy creates an internal tension in Locke’s views ( The Second Treatise of Government , 1690, §77, 81, 82; Okin 1979, 199–200). This inconsistency prompted Mary Astell’s (1666–1731) response: “If all Men are born free , how is it that all women are born slaves? as they must be if the being subjected to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary Will of Men, be the perfect Condition of Slavery ?” (“Reflections upon Marriage,” 1700, 18) Similar tensions arise for Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), whose treatise on education, Émile , describes the unequal status of Émile’s wife, Sophie. Her education, a template for all women’s, prepares her only to please and serve her husband and rear children. Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1798) attacked Rousseau’s views on women’s nature, education, and marital inequality in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (see also Okin 1979, Chapter 6).

The contractual understanding of marriage prompts the question as to why marital obligations should be fixed other than by spousal agreement. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) combined a contractual account of marriage with an Augustinian preoccupation with sexual morality to argue that the distinctive content of the marriage contract was required to make sex permissible. In Kant’s view, sex involves morally problematic objectification, or treatment of oneself and other as a mere means. The marriage right, a “right to a person akin to a right to a thing,” gives spouses “lifelong possession of each other’s sexual attributes,” a transaction supposed to render sex compatible with respect for humanity: “while one person is acquired by the other as if it were a thing , the one who is acquired acquires the other in turn; for in this way each reclaims itself and restores its personality.” But while these rights, according to Kant, make sex compatible with justice, married sex is not clearly virtuous unless procreation is a possibility ( Metaphysics of Morals , 1797–98, Ak 6:277–79, 6:424–427). Kant’s account of sexual objectification has had wide influence—from feminists to new natural lawyers. More surprisingly, given his views on gender inequality and the wrongness of same-sex sexual activity, Kant’s account of marriage has been sympathetically reconstructed by feminists and defenders of same-sex marriage drawn by Kant’s focus on equality, reciprocity, and the moral rehabilitation of sex within marriage (Herman 1993, Altman 2010, Papadaki 2010). Kant interestingly suggests that morally problematic relationships can be reconstructed through equal juridical rights, but how such reconstruction occurs is puzzling (Herman 1993, Brake 2005). Among other things, it is difficult to see how Kant’s insistence on equal marriage rights can be reconciled with his views on gender inequality (Sticker 2020).

Characteristically, G. W. F. Hegel’s (1770–1831) account of marriage synthesizes the preceding themes. Hegel returns to Aristotle’s understanding of (nuclear) marriage as the foundation of a healthy state, while explicating its contribution in terms of spousal love. Hegel criticized Kant’s reduction of marriage to contract as “disgraceful” because spouses begin “from the point of view of contract—i.e. that of individual personality as a self-sufficient unit— in order to supersede it .” They “consent to constitute a single person and to give up their natural and individual personalities within this union.” The essence of marriage is ethical love, “the consciousness of this union as a substantial end, and hence in love, trust, and the sharing of the whole of individual existence.” Ethical love is not, like sexual love, contingent: “Marriage should not be disrupted by passion, for the latter is subordinate to it” ( Elements of the Philosophy of Right , 1821, §162–63, 163A).

Like his predecessors, Hegel must justify the distinctive features of marriage, and in particular, why, if it is the ethical love relationship which is ethically significant, formal marriage is necessary. Hegel’s contemporary Friedrich von Schlegel had argued that love can exist outside marriage—a point which Hegel denounced as the argument of a seducer! For Hegel, ethical love depends on publicly assuming spousal roles which define individuals as members in a larger unit. Such unselfish membership links marriage and the state. Marriage plays an important role in Hegel’s system of right, which culminates in ethical life, the customs and institutions of society: family, civil society, and the state. The role of marriage is to prepare men to relate to other citizens as sharers in a common enterprise. In taking family relationships as conditions for good citizenship, Hegel follows Aristotle and influences Rawls and Sandel; it is also notable that he takes marriage as a microcosm of the state.

Kant and Hegel attempted to show that the distinctive features of marriage could be explained and justified by foundational normative principles. In contrast, early feminists argued that marital hierarchy was simply an unjust remnant of a pre-modern era. John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) argued that women’s subordination within marriage originated in physical force—an anomalous holdover of the ‘law of the strongest’. Like Wollstonecraft in her 1792 A Vindication of the Rights of Woman , Mill compared marriage and slavery: under coverture wives had no legal rights, little remedy for abuse, and, worse, were required to live in intimacy with their ‘masters’. This example of an inequality based on force had persisted so long, Mill argued, because all men had an interest in retaining it. Mill challenged the contractual view that entry into marriage was fully voluntary for women, pointing out that their options were so limited that marriage was “only Hobson’s choice, ‘that or none’” ( The Subjection of Women , 1869, 29). He also challenged the view that women’s nature justified marital inequality: in light of different socialization of girls and boys, there was no way to tell what woman’s nature really was. Like Wollstonecraft, Mill described the ideal marital relationship as one of equal friendship (Abbey and Den Uyl, 2001). Such marriages would be “schools of justice” for children, teaching them to treat others as equals. But marital inequality was a school of injustice, teaching boys unearned privilege and corrupting future citizens. The comparison of marriage with slavery has been taken up by more recent feminists (Cronan 1973), as has the argument that marital injustice creates unjust citizens (Okin 1994).

Marxists also saw marriage as originating in ancient exercises of force and as continuing to contribute to the exploitation of women. Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) argued that monogamous marriage issued from a “ world historical defeat of the female sex ” (Engels 1884, 120). Exclusive monogamy “was not in any way the fruit of individual sex love, with which it had nothing whatever to do … [but was based on] economic conditions—on the victory of private property over primitive, natural communal property” ( ibid ., 128). Monogamy allowed men to control women and reproduction, thereby facilitating the intergenerational transfer of private property by producing undisputed heirs. Karl Marx (1818–83) argued that abolishing the private family would liberate women from male ownership, ending their status “as mere instruments of production” ( The Communist Manifesto , Marx 1848, 173). The Marxist linking of patriarchy and capitalism, in particular its understanding of marriage as an ownership relation ideologically underpinning the capitalist order, has been especially influential in feminist thought (Pateman 1988, cf. McMurtry 1972).

3. Marriage and Morals

The idea that marriage has a special moral status and entails fixed moral obligations is widespread—and philosophically controversial. Marriage is a legal contract, although an anomalous one (see 4.1); as the idea of it as a contract has taken hold, questions have arisen as to how far its obligations should be subject to individual choice. The contractual view of marriage implies that spouses can choose marital obligations to suit their interests. However, to some, the value of marriage consists precisely in the limitations it sets on individual choice in the service of a greater good: thus, Hegel commented that arranged marriage is the most ethical form of marriage because it subordinates personal choice to the institution. The institutional view holds that the purpose of the institution defines its obligations, taking precedence over spouses’ desires, either in the service of a procreative union or to protect spousal love, in the two most prominent forms of this view. These theories have implications for the moral status of extra-marital sex and divorce, as well as the purpose of marriage.

On the contractual view, the moral terms and obligations of marriage are understood as promises between spouses. Their content is supplied by surrounding social and legal practices, but their promissory nature implies that parties to the promise can negotiate the terms and release each other from marital obligations.

One rationale for treating marital obligations as such promises might be thought to be the voluntaristic account of obligation. On this view, all special obligations (as opposed to general duties) are the result of voluntary undertakings; promises are then the paradigm of special obligations (see entry on Special Obligations). Thus, whatever special obligations spouses have to one another must originate in voluntary agreement, best understood as promise. We will return to this below. A second rationale is the assumption that existing marriage practices are morally arbitrary, in the sense that there is no special moral reason for their structure. Further, there are diverse social understandings of marriage. If the choice between them is morally arbitrary, there is no moral reason for spouses to adopt one specific set of marital obligations; it is up to spouses to choose their terms. Thus, the contractual account depends upon the assumption that there is no decisive moral reason for a particular marital structure.

On the contractual account, not just any contracts count as marriages. The default content of marital promises is supplied by social and legal practice: sexual exclusivity, staying married, and so on. But it entails that spouses may release one another from these moral obligations. For example, extra-marital sex has often been construed as morally wrong by virtue of promise-breaking: if spouses promise sexual exclusivity, extra-marital sex breaks a promise and is thereby prima facie wrong. However, if marital obligations are simply promises between the spouses, then the parties can release one another, making consensual extra-marital sex permissible (Wasserstrom 1974). Marriage is also sometimes taken to involve a promise to stay married. This seems to make unilateral divorce morally problematic, as promisors cannot release themselves from promissory obligations (Morse 2006). But standard conditions for overriding promissory obligations, such as conflict with more stringent moral duties, inability to perform, or default by the other party to a reciprocal promise would permit at least some unilateral divorces (Houlgate 2005, Chapter 12). Some theorists of marriage have suggested that marital promises are conditional on enduring love or fulfilling sex (Marquis 2005, Moller 2003). But this assumption is at odds with the normal assumption that promissory conditions are to be stated explicitly.

Release from the marriage promise is not the only condition for permissible divorce on the contractual view. Spouses may not be obligated to one another to stay married—but they may have parental duties to do so: if divorce causes avoidable harm to children, it is prima facie wrong (Houlgate 2005, Chapter 12, Russell 1929, Chapter 16). However, in some cases divorce will benefit the child—as when it is the means to escape abuse. A vast empirical literature disputes the likely effects of divorce on children (Galston 1991, 283–288, Young 1995). What is notable here, philosophically, is that this moral reason against divorce is not conceived as a spousal, but a parental, duty.

Marriage is widely taken to have an amatory core, suggesting that a further marital promise is a promise to love, as expressed in wedding vows ‘to love and cherish’. But the possibility of such promises has met with skepticism. If one cannot control whether one loves, the maxim that ‘ought implies can’ entails that one cannot promise to love. One line of response has been to suggest that marriage involves a promise not to feel but to behave a certain way—to act in ways likely to sustain the relationship. But such reinterpretations of the marital promise face a problem: promises depend on what promisors intend to promise—and presumably most spouses do not intend to promise mere behavior (Martin 1993, Landau 2004, Wilson 1989, Mendus 1984, Brake 2012, Chapter 1; see also Kronqvist 2011). However, developing neuroenhancement technology promises to bring love under control through “love drugs” which would produce bonding hormones such as oxytocin. While the use of neuroenhancement to keep one’s vows raises questions about authenticity and the nature of love (as well as concerns regarding its use in abusive relationships), it is difficult to see how such technology morally differs from other love-sustaining devices such as romantic dinners—except that it is more likely to be effective (Savulescu and Sandberg 2008).

One objection to the contractual account is that, without appeal to the purpose of the institution, there is no reason why not just any set of promises count as marriage (Finnis 2008). The objection continues that the contractual account cannot explain the point of marriage. Some marriage contractualists accept this implication. According to the “bachelor’s argument,” marriage is irrational: chances of a strongly dis-preferred outcome (a loveless marriage) are too high (Moller 2003). Defenders of the rationality of marriage have replied that marital obligations are rational because they help agents to secure their long-term interests in the face of passing desires (Landau 2004). From the institutional perspective, evaluating the rationality of marriage thus, in terms of fulfilling subjective preferences, clashes with the tradition of viewing it as uniquely enabling certain objective human goods; however, a positive case must be made for the latter view.

Another objection to the contractual view concerns voluntarism. Critics of the voluntarist approach to the family deny that family morality is exhausted by voluntary obligations (Sommers 1989). Voluntarist conceptions of the family conflict with common-sense intuitions that there are unchosen special duties between family members, such as filial duties. However, even if voluntarism is false, this does not suffice to establish special spousal duties. On the other hand, voluntarism alone does not entail the contractual view, for it does not entail that spouses can negotiate the obligations of marriage or that the obligations be subject to release, only that spouses must agree to them. Voluntarism, in other words, need not extend to the choice of marital obligations and hence need not entail the contractual account. The contractual account depends on denying that there is decisive moral reason for marriage to incorporate certain fixed obligations. Let us turn to the case that there is such reason.

The main theoretical alternatives to the contractual view hold that marital obligations are defined by the purpose of the institution and that spouses cannot alter these institutional obligations (much like the professional moral obligations of a doctor; to become a doctor, one must voluntarily accept the role and its obligations, and one cannot negotiate the content of these obligations). The challenge for institutional views is to defend such a view of marriage, explaining why spouses may not jointly agree to alter obligations associated with marriage. Kant confronted this question, arguing that special marital rights were morally necessary for permissible sex. His account of sexual objectification has influenced a prominent contemporary rival to the contractual view—the new natural law view, which takes procreation as essential to marriage. A second widespread approach focuses solely on love as the defining purpose of marriage.

3.2.1 New Natural Law: Marriage as Procreative Union

Like Kant, the new natural law account of marriage focuses on the permissible exercise of sexual attributes; following Aquinas, it emphasizes the goods of marriage, which new natural lawyers, notably John Finnis (cf. George 2000, Grisez 1993, Lee 2008), identify as reproduction and fides —roughly, marital friendship (see entry on The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics). Marriage is here taken to be the institution uniquely apt for conceiving and rearing children by securing the participation of both parents in an ongoing union. The thought is that there is a distinctive marital good related to sexual capacities, consisting in procreation and fides , and realizable only in marriage. Within marriage, sex may be engaged in for the sake of the marital good. Marital sex need not result in conception to be permissible; it is enough that it is open towards procreation and expresses fides . The view does not entail that it is wrong to take pleasure in sex, for this can be part of the marital good.

However, sex outside marriage (as defined here) cannot be orientated toward the marital good. Furthermore, sexual activity not orientated toward this good—including same-sex activity, masturbation, contracepted sex, sex without marital commitment (even within legal marriage)—is valueless; it does not instantiate any basic good. Furthermore, such activity is impermissible because it violates the basic good of marriage. Marital sex is thought to instantiate the good of marriage. By contrast, non-marital sex is thought to treat sexual capacities instrumentally—using them merely for pleasure. (It is here that the account is influenced by Kant.) Non-marital sex violates the good of marriage by treating sexual capacities in a way contrary to that good. Furthermore, for an agent merely to condone non-marital sex damages his or her relation to the marital good, for even a hypothetical willingness to treat sex instrumentally precludes proper marital commitment (Finnis 1997, 120).

As Finnis emphasizes, one feature of the new natural law account of marriage is that the structure of marriage can be fully explained by its purpose. Marriage is between one man and one woman because this is the unit able to procreate without third-party assistance; permanence is required to give children a lifelong family. Finnis charges, as noted above, that accounts which do not ground marriage in this purpose have no theoretical reason to resist the extension of marriage to polygamy, incest, and bestiality (Finnis 1995). As all non-marital sex fails to instantiate basic goods, there is no way morally to distinguish these different relations.

A further point concerns law: to guide citizens’ judgments and choices towards the relationship in which they can uniquely achieve the marital good, the state should endorse marriage, as understood on this view, and not recognize same-sex relationships as marriages. However, it might be asked whether this is an effective way to guide choice, and whether state resources might be better spent promoting other basic human goods. Moreover, as the argument equally implies a state interest in discouraging contraception, divorce, and extra-marital sex, the focus on same-sex marriage appears arbitrary (Garrett 2008, Macedo 1995). This objection is a specific instance of a more general objection: this account treats sex and the marital good differently than it does the other basic human goods. Not only is less attention paid to promoting those goods legally (and discouraging behavior contrary to them), but the moral principle forbidding action contrary to basic human goods is not consistently applied elsewhere—for example, to eating unhealthily (Garrett 2008).

A second objection attacks the claim that non-marital sex cannot instantiate any basic human goods. This implausibly consigns all non-marital sex (including all contracepted sex) to the same value as anonymous sex, prostitution, or masturbation (Macedo 1995, 282). Plausibly, non-marital sex can instantiate goods such as “pleasure, communication, emotional growth, personal stability, long-term fulfillment” (Corvino 2005, 512), or other basic human goods identified by the new natural law account, such as knowledge, play, and friendship (Garrett 2008; see also Blankschaen 2020).

A third objection is related. The view seems to involve a double standard in permitting infertile opposite-sex couples to marry (Corvino 2005; Macedo 1995). The new natural lawyers have responded that penile-vaginal sex is reproductive in type, even if not in effect, while same-sex activity can never be reproductive in type (Finnis 1997, cf. George 2000, Lee 2008). Reproductive-type sex can be oriented towards procreation even if not procreative in effect. But it is unclear how individuals who know themselves to be infertile can have sex for the reason of procreation (Macedo 1995, Buccola 2005). Ultimately, to differentiate infertile heterosexual couples from same-sex couples, new natural lawyers invoke complementarity between men and women as partners and parents. Thus, the defense of this account of marriage turns on a controversial view of the nature and importance of sexual difference (Finnis 1997, Lee 2008).

A related, influential argument focuses on the definition of marriage. This argues that marriage is necessarily between one man and one woman because it involves a comprehensive union between spouses, a unity of lives, minds, and bodies. Organic bodily union requires being united for a biological purpose, in a procreative-type act (Girgis, et al., 2010). Like the new natural law arguments, this has raised questions as to why only, and all, different-sex couples, even infertile ones, can partake in procreative-type acts, and why bodily union has special significance (Arroyo 2018, Johnson 2013).

While much discussion of new natural law accounts of marriage oscillates between attacking and defending the basis in biological sex difference, some theorists sympathetic to new natural law attempt to avoid the Scylla of rigid biological restrictions and the Charybdis of liberal “plasticity” regarding marriage (Goldstein 2011). Goldstein, for one, offers an account of marriage as a project generated by the basic good of friendship; while this project includes procreation as a core feature, the institution of marriage has, on this account, a compensatory power, meaning that the institution itself can compensate for failures such as inability to procreate. Such an account grounds marriage in the new natural law account of flourishing, but it also allows the extension to same-sex marriage without, according to Goldstein, permitting other forms such as polygamy.

3.2.2 Marriage as Protecting Love

A second widespread (though less unified) institutional approach to marriage appeals to the ideal marital love relationship to define the structure of marriage. This approach, in the work of different philosophers, yields a variety of specific prescriptions, on, for example, whether marital love (or committed romantic love in general) requires sexual difference or sexual exclusivity (Scruton 1986, 305–311, Chapter 11, Halwani 2003, 226–242, Chartier 2016). Some, but not all, proponents explicitly argue that the marital love relationship is an objective good (Scruton 1986, Chapter 11, 356–361, Martin 1993). These views, however, all take the essential feature, and purpose, of marriage to be protecting a sexual love relationship. The thought is that marriage helps to maintain and support a relationship either in itself valuable, or at least valued by the parties to it.

On this approach, the structure of marriage derives from the behavior needed to maintain such a relationship. Thus marriage involves a commitment to act for the relationship as well as to exclude incompatible options—although there is controversy over what specific policies these general commitments entail. To take an uncontroversial example, marriage creates obligations to perform acts which sustain love, such as focusing on the beloved’s good qualities (Landau 2004). More controversially, some philosophers argue that sustaining a love relationship requires sexual exclusivity. The thought is that sexual activity generates intimacy and affection, and that objects of affection and intimacy will likely come into competition, threatening the marital relationship. Another version focuses on the emotional harm, and consequent damage to the relationship, caused by sexual jealousy. Thus, due to the psychological conditions required to maintain romantic love, marriage, as a love-protecting institution, generates obligations to sexual exclusivity (Martin 1993, Martin 1994, Scruton 1986, Chapter 11, 356–361, Steinbock 1986). However, philosophers dispute the psychological conditions needed to maintain romantic love. Some argue that casual extra-marital sex need not create competing relationships or trigger jealousy (Halwani 2003, 235; Wasserstrom 1974). Indeed, some have even argued that extra-marital sex, or greater social tolerance thereof, could strengthen otherwise difficult marriages (Russell 1929, Chapter 16), and some polyamorists (those who engage in multiple sex or love relationships) claim that polyamory allows greater honesty and openness than exclusivity (Emens 2004). Other philosophers have treated sexual fidelity as something of a red herring, shifting focus to other qualities of an ideal relationship such as attentiveness, warmth, and honesty, or a commitment to justice in the relationship (Martin 1993, Kleingeld 1998).

Views understanding marriage as protecting love generate diverse conclusions regarding its obligations. But such views share two crucial assumptions: that marriage has a role to play in creating a commitment to a love relationship, and that such commitments may be efficacious in protecting love (Cave 2003, Landau 2004, Martin 1993, Martin 1994, Mendus 1984, Scruton 1986, 356–361). However, both of these assumptions may be questioned. First, even if commitment can protect a love relationship, why must such a commitment be made through a formal marriage? If it is possible to maintain a long-term romantic relationship outside marriage, the question as to the point of marriage re-emerges: do we really need marriage for love? May not the legal and social supports of marriage, indeed, trap individuals in a loveless marriage or themselves corrode love by associating it with obligation? (Card 1996, Cave 2003; see also Gheaus 2016) Second, can commitment, within or without marriage, really protect romantic love? High divorce rates would seem to suggest not. Of course, even if, as discussed in 3.1, agents cannot control whether they love, they can make a commitment to act in ways protective of love (Landau 2004, Mendus 1984). But this returns us the difficulty, suggested by the preceding paragraph, of knowing how to protect love!

Reflecting the difficulty of generating specific rules to protect love, many such views have understood the ethical content of marriage in terms of virtues (Steinbock 1991, Scruton 1986, Chapter 11, 356–361). The virtue approach analyzes marriage in terms of the dispositions it cultivates, an approach which, by its reference to emotional states, promises to explain the relevance of marriage to love. However, such approaches must explain how marriage fosters virtues (Brake 2012). Some virtue accounts cite the effects of its social status: marriage triggers social reactions which secure spousal privacy and ward off the disruptive attention of outsiders (Scruton 1986, 356–361). Its legal obligations, too, can be understood as Ulysses contracts [ 1 ] : they protect relationships when spontaneous affection wavers, securing agents’ long-term commitments against passing desires. Whether or not such explanations ultimately show that marital status and obligations can play a role in protecting love, the general focus on ideal marital love relationships may be characterized as overly idealistic when contrasted with problems in actual marriages, such as spousal abuse (Card 1996). This last point suggests that moral analysis of marriage cannot be entirely separated from political and social inquiry.

4. The Politics of Marriage

In political philosophy, discussions of marriage law invoke diverse considerations, reflecting the theoretical orientations of contributors to the debate. This discussion will set out the main considerations invoked in arguments concerning the legal structure of marriage.

Marriage is a legal contract, but it has long been recognized to be an anomalous one. Until the 1970s in the U.S., marriage law restricted divorce and defined the terms of marriage on the basis of gender. Marking a shift towards greater alignment of marriage with contractual principles of individualization, marriage law no longer imposes gender-specific obligations, it allows pre-nuptial property agreements, and it permits easier exit through no-fault divorce. But marriage remains (at least in U.S. federal law) an anomalous contract: “there is no written document, each party gives up its right to self-protection, the terms of the contract cannot be re-negotiated, neither party need understand its terms, it must be between two and only two people, and [until 2015, when the US Supreme Court decision in Obergefell v. Hodges established same-sex marriage in the US] these two people must be one man and one woman” (Kymlicka 1991, 88).

Proponents of the contractualization, or privatization, of marriage have argued that marriage should be brought further into line with the contractual paradigm. A default assumption for some liberals, as for libertarians, is that competent adults should be legally permitted to choose the terms of their interaction. In a society characterized by freedom of contract, restrictions on entry to or exit from marriage, or the content of its legal obligations, appear to be an illiberal anomaly. Full contractualization would imply that there should be no law of marriage at all—marriage officiation would be left to religions or private organizations, with the state enforcing whatever private contracts individuals make and otherwise not interfering (Vanderheiden 1999, Sunstein and Thaler 2008, Chartier 2016; for a critique of contractualization, see Chambers 2016). The many legal implications of marriage for benefit entitlements, inheritance, taxation, and so on, can also be seen as a form of state interference in private choice. By conferring these benefits, as well as merely recognizing marriage as a legal status, the state encourages the relationships thereby formalized (Waldron 1988–89, 1149–1152). [ 2 ]

Marriage is the basis for legal discrimination in a number of contexts; such discrimination requires justification, as does the resource allocation involved in providing marital benefits (Cave 2004, Vanderheiden 1999). In the absence of such justification, providing benefits through marriage may treat the unmarried unjustly, as their exclusion from such benefits would then be arbitrary (Card 1996). Thus, there is an onus to provide a rationale justifying such resource allocations and legal discrimination on the basis of marriage, as well as for restricting marriage in ways that other contracts are not restricted.

Before exploring some common rationales, it is worth noting that critics of the social contract model of the state and of freedom of contract have used the example of marriage against contractual principles. First, Marxists have argued that freedom of contract is compatible with exploitation and oppression—and Marxist feminists have taken marriage as a special example, arguing against contractualizing it on these grounds (Pateman 1988, 162–188). Such points, as we will see, suggest the need for rules governing property division on divorce. Second, communitarians have argued that contractual relations are inferior to those characterized by trust and affection—again, using marriage as a special example (Sandel 1982, 31–35, cf. Hegel 1821, §75, §161A). This objection applies not only to contractualizing marriage, but more generally, to treating it as a case for application of principles of justice: the concern is that a rights-based perspective will undermine the morally superior affection between family members, importing considerations of individual desert which alienate family members from their previous unselfish identification with the whole (Sandel 1982, 31–35). However, although marriages are not merely an exchange of rights, spousal rights protect spouses’ interests when affection fails; given the existence of abuse and economic inequality within marriage, these rights are especially important for protecting individuals within, and after, marriage (Kleingeld 1998, Shanley 2004, 3–30, Waldron 1988).

As noted, a rationale must be given for marriage law which explains the restrictions placed on entry and exit, the allocation of resources to marriage, and legal discrimination on the basis of it. The next section will examine gender restrictions on entry; this section will examine reasons for recognizing marriage in law at all, allocating resources to it, and constraining property division on divorce.

A first reason for recognizing marriage should be set aside. This is that the monogamous heterosexual family unit is a natural, pre-political structure which the state must respect in the form in which it finds it (Morse 2006; cf. new natural lawyers, Girgis et al. 2010). But, whatever the natural reproductive unit may be, marriage law, as legislation, is constrained by principles of justice constraining legislation. Within most contemporary political philosophy, the naturalness of a given practice is irrelevant; indeed, in no area other than the family is it proposed that law should follow nature (with the possible exception of laws regarding suicide). Finally, such objections must answer to feminist concerns that excluding the family unit from principles of justice, allowing natural affection to regulate it, has facilitated inequality and abuse within it (see section 5).

Let us then begin with the question of why marriage should be recognized in law at all. One answer is that legal recognition conveys the state’s endorsement, guiding individuals into a valuable form of life (George 2000). A second is that legal recognition is necessary to maintain and protect social support for the institution, a valuable form of life which would otherwise erode (Raz 1986, 162, 392–3; Scruton 1986, 356–361; see discussion in Waldron 1988–89). But this prompts the question as to why this form of life is valuable.

It is sometimes argued that traditions, having stood the test of time, have proved their value. Not only is marriage itself such a tradition, but through its child-rearing role it can pass on other traditions (Sommers 1989, Scruton 1986, 356–361, cf. Devlin 1965, Chapter 4). But many marital traditions—coverture, gender-structured legal duties, marital rape exemptions, inter-racial marriage bans—have been unjust. Tradition provides at best a prima facie reason for legislation which may be overridden by considerations of justice. Further, in a diverse society, there are many competing traditions, amongst which this rationale fails to choose (Garrett 2008).

An account of the value of a particular form of marriage itself (and not just qua tradition) is needed. One thought is that monogamous marriage encourages the sexual self-control needed for health and happiness; another is that it encourages the goods of love and intimacy found in committed relationships. State support for monogamous marriage, by providing incentives to enter marital commitments, thus helps people lead better lives (e.g. Macedo 1995, 286). However, this approach faces objections. First, the explanation in terms of emotional goods underdetermines the institution to be supported: other relationships, such as friendships, embody emotional goods. Second, claims about the value of sexual self-control are controversial; objectors might argue that polygamy, polyamory, or promiscuity are equally good options (see 5.2). There is a further problem with this justification, which speaks to a division within liberal thought. Some liberals embrace neutrality, the view that the state should not base law on controversial judgments about what constitutes valuable living. To such neutral liberals, this class of rationales, which appeal to controversial value judgments about sex and love, must be excluded (Rawls 1997, 779). Some theorists have sought to develop rationales consistent with political liberalism, arguing, for instance, that the intimate dyadic marital relationship protects autonomy (Bennett 2003), or that some form of marriage could be justified by its efficiency in providing benefits (Toop 2019) or its role in protecting diverse caring relationships (Brake 2012), fragile romantic love relationships (Cave 2017), or caregivers and children (Hartley and Watson 2012, Toop 2019; see also May 2016, Wedgwood 2016).

It is widely accepted that the state should protect children. If two-parent families benefit children, incentives to marry may be justified as promoting two-parent families and hence children’s welfare. One benefit of two-parent families is economic: there is a correlation between single motherhood and poverty. Another benefit is emotional: children appear to benefit from having two parents (Galston 1991, 283–288). (Moreover, some argue that gender complementarity in parenting benefits children; but empirical evidence does not seem to support this [Lee 2008, Nussbaum 1999, 205, Manning et al ., 2014].)

One objection to this line of argument is that marriage is an ineffective child anti-poverty plan. For one thing, this account assumes that incentives to marry will lead a significant number of parents who would not otherwise have married to marry. But marriage and child-rearing have increasingly diverged despite incentives to marry. Second, this approach does not address the many children outside marriages and in poor two-parent families. Child poverty could be addressed more efficiently through direct anti-child-poverty programs rather than the indirect strategy of marriage (Cave 2004; Vanderheiden 1999; Young 1995). Moreover, there is controversy over the psychological effects of single parenthood, particularly over the causality underlying certain correlations: for instance, are children of divorce unhappier due to divorce itself, or to the high-conflict marriage preceding it? (Young 1995) Indeed, some authors have recently argued that children might be better protected by legally separating marriage from parenting: freestanding parenting frameworks would be more durable than marriage (which can end in divorce), would protect children outside of marriages, and would accommodate new family forms such as three-parent families (Brennan and Cameron 2016, Shrage 2018; see also Chan and Cutas 2012).

A related, but distinct, line of thought invokes the alleged psychological effects of two-parent families to argue that marriage benefits society by promoting good citizenship and state stability (Galston 1991, 283–288). This depends on the empirical case (as we have seen, a contested one) that children of single parents face psychological and economic hurdles which threaten their capacity to acquire the virtues of citizenship. Moreover, if economic dependence produces power inequality within marriage, then Mill’s ‘school of injustice’ objection applies—an institution teaching injustice is likely to undermine the virtues of citizenship (Okin 1994, Young 1995).

Finally, a rationale for restricting the terms of exit from marriage (but not for supporting it as a form of life) is the protection of women and children following divorce. Women in gender-structured marriages, particularly if they have children, tend to become economically vulnerable. Statistically, married women are more likely than their husbands to work in less well-paid part-time work, or to give up paid work entirely, especially to meet the demands of child-rearing. Thus, following divorce, women are likely to have a reduced standard of living, even to enter poverty. Because these patterns of choice within marriages lead to inequalities between men and women, property division on divorce is a matter of equality or equal opportunity, and so a just law of divorce is essential to gender justice (Okin 1989, Chapters 7 and 8; Rawls 1997, 787–794; Shanley 2004, 3–30; Waldron 1988, and see 5.1). However, it can still be asked why a law recognizing marriage as such should be necessary, as opposed to default rules governing property distribution when such gender-structured relationships end (Sunstein and Thaler 2008, Chambers 2017). Indeed, placing these restrictions only on marriage, as opposed to enacting general default rules, may make marriage less attractive, especially to men, and hence be counter-productive, leaving women more vulnerable.

The preceding two rationales are both weakened by the diminished social role of marriage; changing legal and social norms undermine its effectiveness as a policy tool. In the 20 th century, marriage was beset by a “perfect storm”: the expectation that it should be emotionally fulfilling, women’s liberation, and effective contraception (Coontz 2006, Chapter 16). Legally, exit from marriage has become relatively easy since the ‘no-fault divorce revolution’ of the 1970’s. Moreover, cohabitation and child-rearing increasingly take place outside marriage. This reflects the end of laws against unmarried cohabitation and legal discrimination against children on grounds of ‘illegitimacy’, as well as diminishing social stigmas against such behavior. Given such significant changes, marriage is at best an indirect strategy for achieving goals such as protecting women or children (Cave 2004, Sunstein and Thaler 2008, Vanderheiden 1999).

Some theorists have argued, in the absence of a compelling rationale for marriage law, for abolishing marriage altogether, replacing it with civil unions or domestic partnerships. This line of thought will be taken up in 4.4, after an examination of the debate over same-sex marriage.

Many arguments for same-sex marriage invoke liberal principles of justice such as equal treatment, equal opportunity, and neutrality. Where same-sex marriage is not recognized in law, marriage provides benefits which are denied to same-sex couples on the basis of their orientation; if the function of marriage is the legal recognition of loving, or “voluntary intimate,” relationships, the exclusion of same-sex relationships appears arbitrary and unjustly discriminatory (Wellington 1995, 13). Same-sex relationships are relevantly similar to different-sex relationships recognized as marriages, yet the state denies gays and lesbians access to the benefits of marriage, hence treating them unequally (Mohr 2005, Rajczi 2008, Williams 2011). Further, arguments in support of such discrimination seem to depend on controversial moral claims regarding homosexuality of the sort excluded by neutrality (Wellington 1995, Schaff 2004, Wedgwood 1999, Arroyo 2018).

A political compromise (sometimes proposed in same-sex marriage debates) of restricting marriage to different-sex couples and offering civil unions or domestic partnerships to same-sex couples does not fully answer the arguments for same-sex marriage. To see why such a two-tier solution fails to address the arguments grounded in equal treatment, we must consider what benefits marriage provides. There are tangible benefits such as eligibility for health insurance and pensions, privacy rights, immigration eligibility, and hospital visiting rights (see Mohr 2005, Chapter 3), which could be provided through an alternate status. Crucially, however, there is also the important benefit of legal, and indirectly social, recognition of a relationship as marriage. The status of marriage itself confers legitimacy and invokes social support. A two-tier system would not provide equal treatment because it does not confer on same-sex relationships the status associated with marriage .

In addition, some philosophers have argued that excluding gays and lesbians from marriage is central to gay and lesbian oppression, making them ‘second-class citizens’ and underlying social discrimination against them. Marriage is central to concepts of good citizenship, and so exclusion from it displaces gays and lesbians from full and equal citizenship: “being fit for marriage is intimately bound up with our cultural conception of what it means to be a citizen … because marriage is culturally conceived as playing a uniquely foundational role in sustaining civil society” (Calhoun 2000, 108). From this perspective, the ‘separate-but-equal’ category of civil unions retains the harmful legal symbol of inferiority (Card 2007, Mohr 2005, 89, Calhoun 2000, Chapter 5; cf. Stivers and Valls 2007; for a comprehensive survey of these issues, see Macedo 2015).

However, if marriage is essentially different-sex, excluding same-sex couples is not unequal treatment; same-sex relationships simply do not qualify as marriages. One case that marriage is essentially different-sex invokes linguistic definition: marriage is by definition different-sex, just as a bachelor is by definition an unmarried man (Stainton, cited in Mercier 2001). But this confuses meaning and reference. Past applications of a term need not yield necessary and sufficient criteria for applying it: ‘marriage’, like ‘citizen’, may be extended to new cases without thereby changing its meaning (Mercier 2001). As noted above, appeal to past definition begs the question of what the legal definition should be (Stivers and Valls 2007).

A normative argument for that marriage is essentially different-sex appeals to its purpose: reproduction in a naturally procreative unit (see 3.2.a). But marriage does not require that spouses be able to procreate naturally, or that they intend to do so at all. Further, married couples adopt and reproduce using donated gametes, rather than procreating ‘naturally’. Nor do proponents of this objection to same-sex marriage generally suggest that entry to marriage should be restricted by excluding those unable to procreate without third-party assistance, or not intending to do so.

Indeed, as the existence of intentionally childless married couples suggests, marriage has purposes other than child-rearing—notably, fostering a committed relationship (Mohr 2005, Wellington 1995, Wedgwood 1999). This point suggests a second defense of same-sex marriage: exclusive marital commitments are goods which the state should promote amongst same-sex as well as opposite-sex couples (Macedo 1995). As noted above, such rationales come into tension with liberal neutrality; further controversy regarding them will be discussed below (5.2).

Some arguments against same-sex marriage invoke a precautionary principle urging that changes which might affect child welfare be made with extreme caution. But in light of the data available, Murphy argues that the precautionary principle has been met with regard to harm to children. On his view, parenting is a basic civil right, the restriction of which requires the threat of a certain amount of harm. But social science literature shows that children are neither typically nor seriously harmed by same-sex parenting (see Manning et al ., 2014). Even if two biological parents statistically provide the optimal parenting situation, optimality is too high a standard for permitting parenting. This can be seen if an optimality condition is imagined for other factors, such as education or wealth (Murphy 2011).

A third objection made to same-sex marriage is that its proponents have no principled reason to oppose legally recognizing polygamy (e.g. Finnis 1997; see Corvino 2005). One response differentiates the two by citing harmful effects and unequal status for women found in male-headed polygyny, but not in same-sex marriage (e.g. Wedgwood 1999, Crookston 2014, de Marneffe 2016, Macedo 2015). Another response is to bite the bullet: a liberal state should not choose amongst the various ways (compatible with justice) individuals wish to organize sex and intimacy. Thus, the state should recognize a diversity of marital relationships—including polygamy (Calhoun 2005, Mahoney 2008) or else privatize marriage, relegating it to private contract without special legal recognition or definition (Baltzly 2012).

Finally, some arguments against same-sex marriage rely on judgments that same-sex sexual activity is impermissible. As noted above, the soundness of these arguments aside, neutrality and political liberalism exclude appeal to such contested moral views in justifying law in important matters (Rawls 1997, 779, Schaff 2004, Wedgwood 1999, Arroyo 2018). However, some arguments against same-sex marriage have invoked neutrality, on the grounds that legalizing same-sex marriage would force some citizens to tolerate what they find morally abhorrent (Jordan 1995, and see Beckwith 2013). But this reasoning seems to imply, absurdly, that mixed-race marriage, where that is the subject of controversy, should not be legalized. A rights claim to equal treatment (if such a claim can support same-sex marriage) trumps offense caused to those who disagree; the state is not required to be neutral in matters of justice (Beyer 2002; Boonin 1999; Schaff 2004; see also Barry 2011, Walker 2015).

A number of theorists have argued for the abolition or restructuring of marriage. While same-sex marriage became legally recognized throughout the United States following the Supreme Court decision in Obergefell v Hodges 576 U.S. _ (2015) , some philosophers contend that justice requires further reform. Some have proposed that temporary marriage contracts be made available (Nolan 2016, Shrage 2013) and that legal frameworks for marriage and parenting be separated (Brennan and Cameron 2016, Shrage 2018). A more sweeping view, to be discussed in Section 5, is that marriage is in itself oppressive and unjust, and hence ought to be abolished (Card 1996, Fineman 2004, Chambers 2013, 2017). A second argument for disestablishing or privatizing legal marriage holds that, in the absence of a pressing rationale for marriage law (as discussed in 4.2), the religious or ethical associations of marriage law give reason for abolishing marriage as a legal category. Marriage has religious associations in part responsible for public controversy over same-sex marriage. If marriage is essentially defined by a religious or ethical view of the good, then legal recognition of it arguably violates state neutrality or even religious freedom (Metz 2010, but see Macedo 2015, May 2016, Wedgwood 2016).

There are several reform proposals compatible with the ‘disestablishment’ of marriage. One proposal is full contractualization or privatization, leaving marriage to churches and private organizations. “Marital contractualism” (MC) would relegate spousal agreements to existing contract law, eradicating any special legal marital status or rights. Garrett has defended MC as the default position, arguing that state regulation of contracts between spouses and state expenditures on marriage administration and promotion need justification. On his view, efficiency, equality, diversity, and informed consent favor MC; there is no adequate justification for the costly redistribution of taxpayer funds to the married, or for sustaining social stigma against the unmarried through legal marriage (Garrett 2009, see also Chartier 2016).

But marriage confers rights not available through private contract and which arguably should not be eliminated due to their importance in protecting intimate relationships—such as evidentiary privilege or special eligibility for immigration. A second proposal would retain such rights while abolishing marriage; on this proposal, the state ought to replace civil marriage entirely with a secular status such as civil union or domestic partnership, which could serve the purpose of identifying significant others for benefit entitlements, visiting rights, and so on (March 2010, 2011). This would allow equal treatment of same-sex relationships while reducing controversy, avoiding non-neutrality, and respecting the autonomy of religious organizations by not compelling them to recognize same-sex marriage (Sunstein and Thaler 2008). However, neither solution resolves the conflict between religious autonomy and equality for same-sex relationships. Privatization does not solve this conflict so long as religious organizations are involved in civil society—for example, as employers or benefit providers. The question is whether religious autonomy would allow them, in such roles, to exclude same-sex civil unions from benefits. Such exclusion could be defended as a matter of religious autonomy; but it could also be objected to as unjust discrimination—as it would be if, for example, equal treatment were denied to inter-racial marriages.

Another issue raised by such a reform proposal is how to delimit the relationships entitled to such recognition. Recall the new natural law charge that liberalism entails an objectionable “plasticicty” regarding marriage (3.2.1). One question is whether recognition should be extended to polygamous or polyamorous relationships. Some defenders of same-sex marriage hold that their arguments do not entail recognizing polygamy, due to its oppressive effects on women (Wedgwood 1999). However, some monogamous marriages are also oppressive (March 2011), and egalitarian polygamous or polyamorous relationships, such as a group of three women or three men, exist (Emens 2004). Thus, oppressiveness does not cleanly distinguish monogamous from polygamous relationships. Brooks has sought to show that polygamy is distinctively structurally inegalitarian as one party (usually the husband) can determine who will join the marriage, whereas wives cannot (Brooks 2009). However, this overlooks various possible configurations—if a polygamous “sister wife,” for instance, has the legal right to marry outside the existing marriage, there is no structural inequality (Strauss 2012). Most fundamentally, some authors have urged that a politically liberal state should not prescribe the arrangements in which its competent adult members seek love, sex, and intimacy, so long as they are compatible with justice (Calhoun 2005, March 2011). Some philosophers have argued that polygamists and polyamorous people are unjustly excluded from the benefits of marriage, and that legal recognition of plural marriage - or small groups of friends – can preserve equality (Brake 2012, 2014, Den Otter 2015, Shrage 2016). Finally, the history of racialized stigmatization of polygamy gives reason to consider whether anti-polygamous intuitions rest on just foundations (Denike 2010).

Conservatives also charge that the liberal approach cannot rule out incestuous marriage. While this topic has sparked less debate than polygamy, one defender of the civil-unions-for-all proposal has pointed out that civil union status, as justified on politically liberal grounds, would not connote sexual or romantic involvement. Thus, eligibility of adult family members for this status would not convey state endorsement of incest; whether the state should prohibit or discourage incest is an independent question (March 2010).

A further problem arises with the proposal to replace marriage with civil unions on neutrality grounds. Civil unions, if they carry legal benefits similar to marriage, would still involve legal discrimination (between members of civil unions and those who were not members) requiring justification (for a specific example of this problem in the area of immigration law, see Ferracioli 2016). Depending on how restrictive the entry criteria for civil unions were (for example, whether more than two parties, blood relations, and those not romantically involved could enter) and how extensive the entitlements conferred by such unions were, the state would need to provide reason for this discrimination. In the absence of compelling neutral reasons for such differential treatment, liberty considerations suggest the state should cease providing any special benefits to members of civil unions (or intimate relationships) (Vanderheiden 1999, cf. Sunstein and Thaler 2008). As noted in 4.2, some political liberals have sought to provide rationales showing why a liberal state should support certain relationships; these rationales generate corresponding reform proposals. One approach focuses on protecting economically dependent caregivers; Metz proposes replacing civil marriage with “intimate care-giving unions” which would protect the rights of dependent caregivers (Metz 2010; cf. Hartley and Watson 2012). Another approach holds that caring relationships themselves - whether friendships or romantic relationships - should be recognized as valuable by the politically liberal state, and it should, accordingly, distribute rights supporting them equally; the corresponding reform proposal, “minimal marriage,” would provide rights directly supporting relationships, but not economic benefits, without restriction as to sex or number of parties or the nature of their caring relationship (Brake 2012). This would extend marriage not only to polyamorists, but to asexuals and aromantics, as well as those who choose to build their lives around friendships. A third approach proposes that marital rights and status be replaced by “piecemeal directives” which would regulate the various functional contexts to which marriage law now applies (such as cohabitation and co-parenting) (Chambers 2017); this proposal would avoid designating any relationship type as entitled to special treatment.

Many of the views discussed to this point imply that current marriage law is unjust because it arbitrarily excludes some groups from benefits; it follows, on such views, that marrying is to avail oneself of privileges unjustly extended. This seems to give reason for boycotting the institution, so long as some class of persons is unjustly excluded (Parsons 2008).

Before Obergefell , U.S. law was in patchwork regarding marriages involving at least one transgender person — “trans—marriage,” in Loren Cannon’s term. As a transgender person traveled from state to state, both their legal sex and marital status could change (Cannon 2009, 85). While some raised concerns that the political rationales given for recognizing such marriages (such as the possibility of penile-vaginal intercourse) reaffirmed heteronormative assumptions (Robson 2007), to other theorists, the possibility of trans-marriage itself suggests the instability or incoherence of legal gender categories and gendered restrictions on marriage (Cannon 2009, Almeida 2012).

5. Marriage and Oppression: Gender, Race, and Class

Marriage historically played a central role in women’s oppression, meaning economic and political disempowerment and limitation of opportunities. Until the late 19 th century, the doctrine of coverture (in English and U.S. law) suspended a wife’s legal personality on marriage, ‘covering’ it with that of her husband, removing her rights to own property, make a will, earn her own money, make contracts, or leave her husband, and giving her little recourse against physical abuse. Well into the 20 th century, legislatures continued to impose gendered legal roles within marriage (known as ‘head and master laws’), to exempt rape within marriage from criminal prosecution, and to allow—or impose—professional bars on married women (Coontz 2006, 238; Cronan 1973; Kleingeld 1998). John Stuart Mill compared wives’ condition under coverture to slavery (see section 1); while the late 20 th century U.S. saw gender-neutrality in legal marital responsibilities and an end to the marital rape exemption, criticisms of marriage as oppressive persist. Contemporary feminist attention to marriage is focused on spousal abuse—indeed, some U.S. states still exempt spouses from sexual battery charges (Posner and Silbaugh 1996)—, the gendered division of labor in marriage, and the effects of marriage on women’s economic opportunities and power.

While Mill and Engels saw the establishment of monogamous marriage as an ancient defeat of the female sex, Aquinas, Kant, and many others have seen monogamy as a victory for women, securing for them faithful partners, protection, and material support. So Kant writes that “skepticism on this topic [marriage] is bound to have bad consequences for the whole feminine sex, because this sex would be degraded to a mere means for satisfying the desire of the other sex, which, however, can easily result in boredom and unfaithfulness.—Woman becomes free by marriage; man loses his freedom by it” (Kant 1798, 210–211, [309]). However, as a historical thesis about the origin of marriage, the idea that monogamy provided women with needed material support has been debunked. In early hunting-gathering societies, female foraging likely provided more than male hunting, child-care was arranged communally, and, rather than a single male providing for his female partner, survival required a much larger group (Coontz 2006, 37–38). As a thesis about the protection of women by their male partners, the incidence of rape and violence by male partners themselves must be taken into account (e.g., in the contemporary U.S., Tjaden and Thoennes 2000). And as a thesis about sex difference, evolutionary ‘just-so’ stories purporting to show that women are naturally more monogamous have been challenged by feminist philosophers of biology (Tuana 2004).

Marriage law has also been a tool of racial oppression. The majority of American states at one time prohibited inter-racial marriage; the Supreme Court struck down such laws in 1967 (Wallenstein 2002, 253–254). Anti-miscegenation law did not prevent actual sex and procreation between races, but it excluded women of color and their children from the benefits of marriage. It was also a potent symbol of alleged racial difference. Furthermore, African-American marriage patterns were shaped by slavery. Enslaved persons could not legally marry, and slave couples and their children were frequently separated (Cott 2000). Contemporary philosophers of race argue that marriage is still implicated in systemic racism (Collins 1998). For example, historical conditions and structural racism have led to practices of shared child-rearing in some African-American communities. Some theories of marriage imply that such child-rearing practices are inferior to the marital family. Theorists of racial oppression argue that such practices should be recognized as a valuable alternative, and, moreover, that law which excludes such practices from benefits accorded to marriage may be racially unjust (Vanderheiden 1999; cf. Collins 1998, Card 1996). Immigration law has also made women who are dependent on marriage for their immigration status vulnerable to abuse, particularly those women who are also subject to racism or cultural marginalization (Narayan 1995).

Recent work has also highlighted the contemporary class-based marriage gap in the U.S.: wealthier people are more likely to marry (McClain 2013). This suggests a different link between marriage and oppression: one effect of socioeconomic inequality may be to deprive the worse-off of access to marriage (perhaps because poverty impedes the formation of stable relationships) and the further legal benefits marriage can bring. There is arguably a tension, among egalitarian approaches, between feminist criticisms of marriage as inherently oppressive and egalitarian criticisms of barriers to accessing it (Chambers 2013).

A major theme in feminist political philosophy has been the exclusion of the marital family from justice. Political philosophy has tended to relegate family life to natural hierarchy or affection (Okin 1979, 1989). Historically, this meant that the private sphere of marriage, to which women were confined, was also the zone of state non-interference, so that what happened to women there was not subject to norms of justice. Gradually, law and political philosophy have come to recognize that equal rights and liberties should be upheld within the private sphere as outside it, but many political philosophers still resist applying principles of justice directly within the private sphere. However, feminists argue that gender-structured marriage contributes to, or is even the mainstay of, women’s economic inequality and disempowerment, and that justice must therefore regulate its terms—even, perhaps, to the point of interfering with voluntary marital relations (Okin 1989, Ferguson 2016). At the same time, marriage has been a crucial site of socially valuable care work, which often falls disproportionately on women, and recent feminist work has focused on how the state can support that work more equitably (Metz 2010, Bhandary 2018).

As noted above, one persistent rationale for excluding the family from norms of justice is that its natural relations of affection and trust are superior to merely just relations and likely to be threatened by construing the family in terms of justice (Hegel 1821, §75, §161A; Sandel 1982, 31–35). But abuse within marriage and inequality on dissolution are significant problems, the gravity of which should, according to critics, outweigh these finer virtues; rights within marriage protect spouses when affection fails (Waldron 1988, Okin 1989). Moreover, it is not clear that affection and justice must conflict; a commitment to treating one’s spouse justly could be part of marital love (Kleingeld 1998). Finally, marriage is part of the basic structure of society, and thus, at least within Rawlsian liberalism, is subject to principles of justice. This does not determine, however, how principles of justice should constrain marriage; the default liberal presumption is that marriage, as a voluntary association, should be ordered as spouses choose—so long as these choices do not lead to injustice (Rawls 1997, 792). We will return to this below.

Marriage is a focus of feminist concern due to its effects on women’s life chances. Continuing disadvantage accruing to women in marriage has been widely documented, and in some feminist analyses, undergirds gender inequality (rival accounts place greater emphasis on sexual objectification or workplace discrimination). Wives, even those who work full-time outside the home, perform more housework than husbands—this ‘second shift’ affecting their workplace competitiveness. The social assignment of primary responsibility for childcare to women, combined with the difficulty of combining childcare with paid work, also undermine the workplace competitiveness of women with children (Okin 1989, Chapter 7). The gendered division of labor and the fact that ‘women’s work’ is less well-paid than men’s together make it more likely that married women, rather than their husbands, will downgrade their careers, choose part-time work, or stay home to facilitate child-rearing or when the spouses’ careers conflict. These choices make women “vulnerable by marriage”: economic dependence, and dependence on marriage for benefits such as health insurance, fosters power inequality and makes exit difficult, in turn facilitating abuse (Okin 1989, Chapter 7, Narayan 1995, Card 1996, Brake 2016, Ferguson 2016).

As discussed in 4.2, rationales of equality or equal opportunity are given for addressing economic inequalities arising within marriage through divorce law (Okin 1989, Chapters 7 and 8; Shanley 2004, 3–30, Rawls 1997, 787–794). However, divorce law does not address non-economic sources of power imbalances (such as gender role socialization) within on-going marriages, nor does it address the systemic way in which such inequalities arise. Equal opportunity seems to require changing social norms related to marriage in ways which divorce law does not. First, the gendered division of labor within ongoing marriages is costly for women (Kleingeld 1998). Second, power imbalances within marriage limit girls’ expectations and teach children to accept gendered inequality (Okin 1989, Chapter 7, Okin 1994). Third, anticipation of marriage affects women’s investment in their earning ability before marriage (Okin 1989, Chapter 7). (But for an argument that some hierarchy and inequality in marriage is just, see Landau 2012.)

Such social norms could be addressed through education or through media campaigns promoting the equitable division of housework. Legal measures such as requiring all marital income to be held equally could encourage power equality within marriage (Okin 1989, Chapter 8). However, state interference in on-going marriages arguably conflicts with spouses’ liberties (Rawls 1997, 787–794). This seems to raise a theoretical problem for liberal feminism. Recent liberal feminist approaches to marriage focus on how a just law of marriage can protect women’s interests as well as supporting a fairer distribution of care work, which often falls on women (Metz 2010, Brake 2012, Hartley and Watson 2012, Ferguson 2016, Bhandary 2018; see also reform proposals in 4.4 above).

While many feminists have focused on the reform of marriage, others have argued for its abolition as a legal status (Metz 2010, Chambers 2013, 2017). It is sometimes claimed that marriage is inherently structured by sexist social norms, precluding the possibility of feminist reform — and that marriage also reinforces stigma against the unmarried (Chambers 2017). On such views, abolishing marriage is necessary to reshape social expectations and change patterns of choice accompanying it. For example, legal marriage may encourage women’s economic dependence by enabling and providing incentives for it. Thus, the legal structure of marriage, in combination with social norms, is taken to encourage choices which disempower women relative to men. Moreover, legal recognition of marriage itself endorses an ideal of a central, exclusive love relationship which, on the views of some feminists, encourages women to make disadvantageous choices by inculcating an exaggerated valuation of such relationships—at the expense of women’s other aspirations. Thus, in The Second Sex , feminist philosopher Simone de Beauvoir (1908–86) identified the expectations surrounding marriage as one of the primary means by which women are socialized into a femininity which, in her view, was limiting: marriage “is the destiny traditionally offered to women by society” (de Beauvoir 1949 [1989], 425; see also Okin 1989), leading women to focus on their attractiveness as mates—and not on study, career, or other ambitions. For this reason, some feminists have rejected ideals of romantic, exclusive love relationships, arguing that women should choose non-monogamy or lesbian separatism (Firestone 1970; see also Card 1996). The idea that marriage is essentially tied to such an ideal of romantic love will require further examination in the next section.

Just as some feminists argue that marriage is inherently sexist, so some philosophers of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender oppression argue that it is essentially heterosexist. (Some of these philosophers refer to themselves as queer theorists, reclaiming the word “queer” from its earlier, pejorative usage.) Queer theorists have sought to demonstrate that a wide range of social institutions display heteronormativity, that is, the assumption of heterosexuality and of the gender difference that defines it as a norm. Because queer theorists resist the normativity of gender as well as of heterosexuality, there is an overlap between their critiques of marriage and those of some feminists, especially lesbian feminists. For these critics of heteronormativity, same-sex marriage is undesirable because it would assimilate same-sex relationships to an essentially heterosexual marital ideal: “Queer theorists worry that pursuing marriage rights is assimilationist, because it rests on the view that it would be better for gay and lesbian relationships to be as much like traditional heterosexual intimate relationships as possible” (Calhoun 2000, 113). On this view, extending marriage to same-sex marriage will undermine, rather than achieve, gay and lesbian liberation - and, indeed, further marginalize asexuals, aromantics, polyamorists, and those who choose to build their lives around friendships.

Recall that some arguments for same-sex marriage claim that central, exclusive relationships are valuable, and that same-sex marriage would benefit gays and lesbians by encouraging them to enter such relationships (e.g. Macedo 2005; see 3.3). But critics of heteronormativity, drawing on gay and lesbian experience, have argued that the central, exclusive relationship ideal is a heterosexual paradigm. Such critics note that gays and lesbians often choose relationships which are less possessive and more flexible than monogamous marriage. Instead of recognizing the diverse relationships found in the gay and lesbian community, same-sex marriage would assimilate lesbian and gay relationships into the heterosexual model. While some advocates of same-sex marriage argue that marital status would confer legitimacy on same-sex relationships, these critics argue that the state should not confer legitimacy (and hence, implicitly, illegitimacy) on consensual adult relationships, any more than it should so discriminate between children born in or out of wedlock. Such conferrals of legitimacy are thought to discourage diversity. Moreover, same-sex marriage would expose gays and lesbians to the disadvantages, even evils, of marriage: economic incentives to stay in loveless marriages and reduced exit options which facilitate abuse and violence (Card 1996, 2007, Ettelbrick 1989).

Other philosophers of gay and lesbian oppression have responded in defense of same-sex marriage that it not only serves gay liberation, it is essential to it. Excluding gays and lesbians from marriage marks them as inferior, and so same-sex marriage would decrease stigmas against homosexuality. Further, the costs of same-sex marriage must be weighed with benefits such as healthcare, custody and inheritance rights, and tax and immigration status (Calhoun 2000, Chapter 5, Ferguson 2007, Mayo and Gunderson 2000). Finally, in response to worries about gay and lesbian assimilation, defenders of same-sex marriage have argued that marriage can incorporate diversity, rather than suppressing it. Marriage need not entail monogamy; indeed, it is argued that same-sex marriage could perform the liberatory function of teaching heterosexuals that neither gender roles nor monogamy are essential to love and marriage (Mohr 2005, 69–9, cf. Halwani 2003, Chapter 3; but see Brake 2018 for discussion of whether “subversive weddings” can transform social attitudes if they are not recognized as initiating marriages).

The feminist and queer critiques of marriage as essentially sexist, or essentially heterosexist, face the same objection as do other claims about the essence of marriage. Just because marriage has in the past possessed certain features does not entail that they are inherent to it. Thus, rather than reproducing sexist and heterosexist patterns, same-sex marriage could serve women’s and gay liberation by transforming marriage, even, perhaps, opening the door to recognition of a still wider variety of family forms (Ferguson 2007, Mayo and Gunderson 2000, Calhoun 2005, Brake 2012).

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Alternatives to Marriage Project
• 1997 General Accounting Office Report on marriage in U.S. Federal Law

love | Aquinas, Thomas: moral, political, and legal philosophy | Aristotle, General Topics: ethics | Augustine, Saint | Beauvoir, Simone de | civil rights | ethics: natural law tradition | feminist philosophy, interventions: liberal feminism | feminist philosophy, interventions: philosophy of biology | feminist philosophy, interventions: philosophy of law | feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on reproduction and the family | feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on trans issues | Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: social and political philosophy | homosexuality | Kant, Immanuel: social and political philosophy | Mill, John Stuart: moral and political philosophy | obligations: special | parenthood and procreation | personal relationship goods | Plato: ethics and politics in The Republic | Russell, Bertrand: moral philosophy | sex and sexuality | social institutions | Wollstonecraft, Mary

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Eric Cave, Laurence Houlgate, Ann Levey, Mark Migotti, and Nicole Wyatt for their very helpful comments on drafts of this entry. Thanks also to Tina Strasbourg and Patricia Thornton for research assistance.

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Essay on marriage: meaning, functions and forms.

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Here is your essay on marriage, it’s meaning, functions and forms! 

Introduction :

Marriage and family sociologically signifies the stage of greater social advancement. It is indicative of man’s entry into the world of emotion and feeling, harmony and culture. Long before the institution of marriage developed, man and woman may have lived together, procreated children and died unwept and unsung. Their sexual relations must have been like birds and animals of momentary duration.

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Marriage as an institution developed over the time. It may have been accepted as a measure of social discipline and as an expedient to eliminate social stress due to the sex rivalry. The growing sense and sensibility may have necessitated the acceptance of norms for formalising the union between man and woman.

Meaning of Marriage :

Marriage is the most important institution of human society. It is a universal phenomenon. It has been the backbone of human civilisation. Human beings have certain urges like hungers, thirst and sex. Society works out certain rules and regulation for satisfaction of these urges.

The rules and regulations, which deal with regulation of sex life of human beings, are dealt in the marriage institution. We can say that the Marriage is as old as the institution of family. Both these institutions are vital for the society. Family depends upon the Marriage. Marriage regulates sex life of human beings.

Marriage creates new social relationships and reciprocal rights between the spouses. It establishes the rights and the status of the children when they are born. Each society recognises certain procedures for creating such relationship and rights. The society prescribes rules for prohibitions, preferences and prescriptions in deciding marriage. It is this institution through which a man sustains the continuity of his race and attains satisfaction in a socially recognised manner.

Sociologists and anthropologists have given definitions of marriage. Some of the important definitions are given below. Edward Westermark. “Marriage is a relation of one or more men to one or more women which is recognised by custom or law and involves certain rights and duties both in the case of the parties entering the union and in the case of the children born of it.

As B. Malinowski defines, “Marriage is a contract for the production and maintenance of children”.

According H.M. Johnson, “Marriage is a stable relationship in which a man and a woman are socially permitted without loss of standing in community, to have children”.

Ira L. Reiss writes, “Marriage is a socially accepted union of individuals in husband and wife roles, with the key function of legitimating of parenthood”.

William Stephens, the anthropologist, says that marriage is:

(1) A socially legitimate sexual union begun with

(2) A public announcement, undertaken with

(3) Some idea of performance and assumed with a more or less explicit

(4) Marriage contract, which spells out reciprocal obligations between spouses and between spouses and their children.

William J. Goode, the famous family sociologist has tried to combine the two objectives of marriage i.e. to regulate sex life and to recognize the newborn. It was perhaps for this reason that American sociologists came out with the statement that no child should be born without a father.

Although different thinkers have tried to provide definition of marriage, but there is no universally acceptable definition of marriage. There seems to be, however, a consensus that marriage involves several criteria that are found to exist cross-culturally and throughout time. For example, Hindu marriage has three main objectives such as Dharma, Progeny and Sexual Pleasure.

Individual happiness has been given the least importance. It is considered to be sacrament, a spiritual union between a man and a woman in the social status of husband and wife.

In Western countries, marriage is a contract. Personal happiness is given the utmost importance. People enter into matrimonial alliances for the sake of seeking personal happiness. If this happiness is-not forthcoming they will terminate the relationship.

Marriage is thus cultural specific. The rules and regulations differ from one culture to another. We can, however, identify certain basic features of this institution.

(1) A heterosexual union, including at least one male and one female.

(2) The legitimizing or granting of approval to the sexual relationship and the bearing of children without any loss of standing in the community or society.

(3) A public affair rather than a private, personal matter.

(4) A highly institutionalized and patterned mating arrangement.

(5) Rules which determine who can marry whom.

(6) New statuses to man and woman in the shape of husband and wife and father and mother.

(7) Development of personal intimate and affectionate relationships between the spouses and parent and children.

(8) A binding relationship that assumes some performance.

The above discussion helps us to conclude that the boundaries of marriage are not always precise and clearly defined. It is, however, very important institution for the society as it helps in replacement of old and dying population.

Functions of Marriage :

Marriage is an institutionalized relationship within the family system. It fulfills many functions attributed to the family in general. Family functions include basic personality formation, status ascriptions, socialization, tension management, and replacement of members, economic cooperation, reproduction, stabilization of adults, and the like.

Many of these functions, while not requiring marriage for their fulfillment, are enhanced by the marital system”. In fact, evidence suggests marriage to be of great significance for the well-being of the individual. Researchers have shown that compared to the unmarried, married persons are generally happier, healthier, less depressed and disturbed and less prone to premature deaths. Marriage, rather than becoming less important or unimportant, may be increasingly indispensable.

The functions of marriage differ as the structure of marriage differs. ‘For example, where marriage is specially an extension of the kin and extended family system, then procreation, passing on the family name and continuation of property become a basic function. Thus, to not have a child or more specifically, to not have a male child, is sufficient reason to replace the present wife or add a new wife.

Where marriage is based on “free choice,” i.e. parents and kinsmen play no role in selecting the partner, individualistic forces are accorded greater significance. Thus in the United States, marriage has many functions and involves many positive as well as negative personal factors : establishment of a family of one’s own, children, companionship, happiness, love, economic security, elimination of loneliness etc.

The greater the extent to which the perceived needs of marriage are met, and the fewer the alternatives in the replacement of the unmet needs, the greater the likelihood of marriage and the continuation of that marriage. At a personal level, any perceived reason may explain marriage, but at a social level, all societies sanction certain reasons and renounce others.

Forms of Marriage :

Societies evolved mannerism and method for selection of the spouses, according to their peculiar socio-economic and political conditions, and in accordance with their levels of cultural advancement. This explains on the one hand the origin of the various forms, of marriage and on the other the differences in the attitude of societies towards the institution of marriage.

Some have accepted it as purely a contractual arrangement between weds, while others hold it as the sacred union between man, and woman. Forms of marriage vary from society to society. Marriage can be broadly divided into two types, (1) monogamy and (2) polygamy.

1. Monogamy :

Monogamy is that form of marriage in which at a given period of time one man has marital relations with one woman. On the death of the spouse or one of the partners seek divorce then they can establish such relationship with other persons but at a given period of time, one cannot have two or more wives or two or more husbands.

This one to one relationship is the most modern civilized way of living. In most of the societies it is this form, which is found and recognized. It should be noted that on a societal basis, only about 20 per cent of the societies are designated as strictly monogamous, that is, monogamy is the required form.

When monogamy does not achieve stability, certain married persons end their relationship and remarry. Thus, the second spouse, although not existing simultaneously with the first, is sometimes referred to as fitting into a pattern of sequential monogamy, serial monogamy or remarriage.

Advantages:

Keeping in view the advantages of monogamy the world has granted recognition to monogamous form of marriage. The following are its advantages:

1. Better Adjustment:

In this form of marriage men and women have to adjust with one partner only. In this way there is better adjustment between them.

2. Greater Intimacy:

If the number of people in the family will be limited there will be more love and affection in the family. Because of which they will have friendly and deep relations.

3. Better Socialization of Children:

In the monogamy the children are looked after with earnest attention of parents. The development of modes of children will be done nicely. There will be no jealously between the parents for looking after their children.

4. Happy Family:

Family happiness is maintained under monogamy which is completely destroyed in other forms of marriage because of jealousy and other reasons. Thus, in this form of marriage, family is defined as happy family.

5. Equal Status to Woman:

In this form of marriage the status of woman in family is equal. If husband works she looks after the house or both of them work for strengthening the economic condition of the family.

6. Equalitarian way of Living:

It is only under monogamous way of living that husband and wife can have equalitarian way of life. Under this system husband and wife not only share the familial role and obligations but also have joint decisions. The decision making process becomes a joint venture.

7. Population Control:

Some sociologists have the view that monogamy controls the population. Because of one wife children in the family will be limited.

8. Better Standard of Living:

It also affects the standard of living within limited resources. One can manage easily to live a better life. It helps in the development of independent personality without much constraint and pressure.

9. Respect to old Parents:

Old parents receive favouring care by their children but under polygamy their days are full of bitterness.

10. Law is in favour:

Monogamy is legally sanctioned form of marriage while some are legally prohibited.

11. More Cooperation:

In such a family there is close union between the couple and the chances of conflict are reduced and there is cooperation between husband and wife.

12. Stability:

It is more stable form of marriage. There is better division of property after the death of parents.

Disadvantages :

1. Adjustment:

Monogamy is a marriage between one husband and one wife. So if the partner is not of choice then life loses its charm. They have to adjust between themselves but now-a-days divorce is the answer to their problem.

2. Monopoly:

According to Sumner and Keller, “Monogamy is monopoly.” Wherever there is monopoly, there is bound to be both ‘ins and outs’.

3. Childlessness:

Some inpatients can’t have kids or some barren cannot have kids. If one of the partners has some problem couples cannot have children. They have to suffer from childlessness.

4. Economic Factors:

Marriage in monogamy does not play part of income. They have to depend upon their own occupation for living. If they are poor they will remain poor. So monogamy effects the economic condition of man and woman.

5. Better status to Women:

Monogamy provides better status to women in the society. They are counted equal to men. Some people do not like this form of marriage.

6. Adultery:

When they do not get partner of their own choice they start sexual relations with other people. This also leads to the problem of prostitution.

2. Polygamy :

Distinguished from monogamy is polygamy. Polygamy refer to the marriage of several or many. Polygamy is the form of marriage in which one man marries two or more women or one woman marries two or more men or a number of men many a number of women. According to F.N. Balasara, “The forms of marriage in which there is plurality of partners is called polygamy”.

Polygamy, like other forms of marriage is highly regulated and normatively controlled. It is likely to be supported by the attitudes and values of both the sexes. Polygamy itself has many forms and variations. Polygamy is of three types: (i) Polygyny, (ii) Polyandry and (iii) Group marriage.

Let us now discuss forms of polygamy in details,

(i) Polygyny:

Polygyny is a form of marriage in which a man has more than one .wife at a time. In other words it is a form of marriage in which one man marries more than one woman at a given time. It is the prevalent form of marriage among the tribes, Polygyny also appears to be the privilege of the wealthy, in many African societies the rich usually have more than one wife.

This type of marriage is found in Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda. In India, polygyny persisted from the Vedic times until Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Now polygyny is visible among many tribes of India.

Viewing polygyny cross-culturally, poiygynous families evidence specific organisational features:

1. In certain matters, sex particularly, co-wives have clearly defined equal rights.

2. Each wife is set up in a separate establishment.

3. The senior wife is given special powers and privileges.

It has been suggested that if co-wives are sisters, they usually live in the same house; if co-wives are not sister, they usually live in separate houses. It is believed that sibling can better tolerate, suppress and live with a situation of sexual rivalry than can non-siblings.

Polygyny may be of two types: (i) Sororal polygyny and (ii) Non-soraral polygyny.

Sororal polygyny is one in which all the wives are sisters. Non-sororal polygyny means the marriage of one man with many women who are not sisters.

Causes of Polygyny :

1. Disproportion of sexes in the Population:

When in any tribe or society male members are less in number and females are more, then this type of marriage takes place.

2. Out-migration of male Population:

To earn the livelihood male members migrate from one society to another. This way there is a decrease in the number of males than females and polygyny takes place.

3. Hypergamy:

Hypergamy also gives rise to polygyny. Under this system the parents of lower castes or classes want to improve their social status by marrying their daughters in the higher caste or classes.

4. Desire for male Child:

Among the primitive people importance was given to make children than females. Thus man was free to have as many marriages as he liked on the ground to get male children.

5. Social Status:

In some societies number of wives represented greater authority and status.

Particularly the leaders of primitive society increased number of wives in order to prove their superiority. A single marriage was considered a sign of poverty. So where marriage is taken as sign of prestige and prosperity the custom of polygyny is natural.

6. Economic Reason:

Where the people of the poor families were unable to find suitable husbands for their daughters they started marrying their daughters to rich married males.

7. Variety of Sex Relation:

The desire for variety of sex relations is another cause of polygyny. The sexual instincts become dull by more familiarity. It is stimulated by novelty.

8. Enforced Celibacy:

In uncivilized tribes men did not approach the women during the period of pregnancy and while she was feeding the child. Thus long period of enforced celibacy gave birth to second marriage.

9. More Children:

In uncivilized society more children were needed for agriculture, war and status recognition. Moreover, in some tribes the birth rate was low and death rate was high. In such tribes polygyny was followed to obtain more children.

10. Absence of children:

According to Manu, if wife is unable to have children, man is permitted to have more marriages. He further says if a wife takes her husband then he should live with her one year and take another wife.

11. Religious Reasons:

Polygyny was permitted in the past if wife was incapable of forming religious duties in her periodic sickness because religion was given significant place in social life.

12. Patriarchal Society:

Polygyny is found only in the patriarchal society where more importance is given to males and male member is the head of the family.

Advantages :

(1) Better status of children:

In polygyny children enjoy better status. They are looked after well because there are many women in the family to care.

(2) Rapid growth of Population:

In those societies where population is very less and birth rate is almost zero, for those societies polygyny is best suited, as it increases the population at faster rate.

(3) Importance of Males:

In polygyny males occupy higher status. More importance is given to husband by several wives.

(4) Division of Work:

In polygyny there are several wives. Therefore, there is a proper division of work at home.

(5) Variety of Sex Relations:

Instead of going for extra marital relations husband stays at home because his desire for variety of sex relations is fulfilled within polygyny.

(6) Continuity of Family:

Polygyny came into existence mainly because of inability of a wife to produce children. Polygyny provides continuity to the family tree. In absence of one wife other women in the family produce children.

Disadvantage :

1. Lower status of Women:

In this form of marriage women have very low status; they are regarded as an object of pleasure for their husbands. They generally do not have a right to take decisions about their welfare; they have to depend upon their husband for fulfillment of their basic needs.

2. Jealousy as stated by Shakespeare:

“Woman thy name is jealousy”. When several wives have to share one husband, there is bound to be jealousy among co-wives. Jealousy leads to inefficiency in their work. They are not able to socialize their children in a proper manner in such atmosphere.

3. Low Economic Status:

Polygyny increases economic burden on the family because in many cases only husband is the bread winner and whole of the family is dependent on him.

4. Population Growth:

This type of marriage is harmful for developing society and poor nations because they have limited resources Further increase in population deteriorates progress and development of that society.

5. Fragmentation of Property:

In polygyny all the children born from different wives have share in father’s property. Jealousy among mothers leads to property conflicts among children as a result property is divided and income per capita decreases.

6. Uncongenial Atmosphere:

Polygyny does not promise congenial atmosphere for the proper growth and development of children. There is lack of affection among the members. As such families have large number of members. They fail to provide proper attention to all of them. This gives rise to many immoral practices in the society.

(ii) Polyandry :

It is a form of marriage in which one woman has more than one husband at a given time. According to K.M. Kapadia, Polyandry is a form of union in which a woman has more than one husband at a time or in which brothers share a wife or wives in common. This type marriage is prevalent in few places such as tribes of Malaya and some tribes of India like Toda, Khasi and Kota etc. Polyandry is of two types:

(i) Fraternal Polyandry and

(ii) Non-Fratemai Polyandry.

(i) Fraternal Polyandry:

In this form of polyandry one wife is regarded as the wife of all brothers. All the brothers in a family share the same woman as their wife. The children are treated as the offspring of the eldest brother, it is found in some Indian tribes like Toda and Khasis. This type of marriage was popular in Ceylon (Srilanka at present).

(ii) Non-Fraternal Polyandry:

In this type of polyandry one woman has more than one husband who is not brothers. They belong to different families. The wife cohabits with husbands in turn. In case of Fraternal Polyandry, the wife lives in the family of her husbands, while in case of non-fraternal polyandry, the wife continues to stay in the family of her mother. This type of polyandry is found among Nayars of Kerala.

Causes of Polyandry :

1. Lesser number of Women:

According to Westermark, when the number of women is lesser than the number of males in a society, polyandry is found. For example, among Todas of Nilgiri. But according to Brifficult, polyandry can exist even when the number of women is not lesser e.g. in Tibet, Sikkim and Laddakh polyandry is found even though there is not much disparity in the number of men and women.

2. Infanticide:

In some tribal societies female infanticide is present; as a result these female population is less than male population. Further males do not enjoy good status. Therefore, one female is married to a group of brothers and polyandry exists.

3. Matrilineal System:

Just in contrast to above noted point, it has also been argued that polyandry exists in matrilineal system where one woman can have relationship with more than one man and the children instead of getting the name of father are known by mother’s name.

4. Poverty:

Polyandry exists in such areas where there is scarcity of natural resources. It is for this reason many men support one woman and her children.

5. Bride Price:

In societies where there is bridge price, polyandry exists. Brothers pay for one bride who becomes wife of all of them.

6. Division of Property:

To check the division of ancestral property polyandry is favoured. When all the brothers have one wife then the question of division of property does not arise.

7. Production and labour:

Polyandry not only avoids division of property but it also increases production in agriculture. All the brothers work together because they have to support only one family. Thus production and income increases, further there is no expenditure with regard to labour because all the husbands contribute their share of work.

8. Social Custom:

Polyandry exists in some societies mainly because of customs and traditions of that particular society. Generally, polyandry is found in such areas which are situated far away from modern developed areas.

(1) Checks Population Growth:

It checks population growth because all the male members of the family share one wife. As a result population does not increase at that rapid rate, the way in which it occurs in polygyny Therefore, it limits the size of the family.

(2) Economic Standard:

Polyandry helps to unhold the economic standard of the family. It strengthens the economic position of the family because all the members work for the improvement of the family.

(3) Greater Security:

With large number of males working after the family affairs, other members of the family especially women and children feel quite secure. Greater security among the members develop sense of we-feeling among the members of the family.

(4) Property is kept Intact:

In polyandry family does not get divided. The property of the family is held jointly and thus it is kept intact.

(5) Status of Women:

In polyandry one woman is wife of large number of husbands. As a result she gets attention of all the members and thus enjoys a good status in the family. She feels quite secure because in the absence of one husband other males are there to fulfill her basic needs.

Disadvantages:

(1) Jealousy:

When all the men have to share one woman, family quarrels and tensions are ought to be there. Husbands feel jealous of one another which adversely effect congenial atmosphere of the family.

(2) Lack of Model:

When children have large number of fathers they fail to select appropriate model for themselves. This adversely effects their personality configuration.

(3) Health of the Woman:

It adversely effects health of a woman because she has to satisfy several husbands. It not only has negative effect on the physical health but also on mental health of the woman.

(4) Sterility:

According to biologists if the same woman cohabits with several men, it may lead to sterility, further lack of sex gratification give rise to extra-marital relationship of husbands.

(5) Status of Men:

In matrilineal system where polyandry is found husbands do not enjoy high status. They do not give their name to the children.

(6) Lack of Attachment:

In many tribes where polyandry exists husbands do not live permanently with their families. They are visiting husband who visit the family for a specific period. They do not get love and affection of their children because children feel unattached to their fathers.

(7) Less Population:

This form of marriage decreases population growth. In some tribal societies where polyandry continues to exist may get extinct after a gap of few years.

(8) Loose Morality:

This is another outcome of this practice.

(iii) Group Marriage :

Group marriage is that type of marriage in which a group of men marry a group of women. Each man of male group is considered to be the husband of every woman of female group. Similarly, every woman is the wife of every man of male group. Pair bonded or Multilateral marriage are the substitute term for group marriages.

This form of marriage is found among some tribes of New Guinea and Africa. In India group marriage is practised by the Toda Tribe of Nilgiri Hills. Except on an experimental basis it is an extremely rare occurrence and may never have existed as a viable form of marriage for any society in the world.

The Oneida community of New York State has been frequently cited as an example of group marriage experiment. It involved economic and sexual sharing based on spiritual and religious principles. Like most group marriage on record, its time span was limited. Rarely do they endure beyond one or two generations.

Levirate and Sororate:

(i) Levirate:

In levirate the wife marries the brother of the dead husband. If a man dies, his wife marries the brother of her dead husband. Marriage of the widow with the dead husband’s elder brother is called Senior Levirate. But when she marries to the younger brother of the dead husband, it is called Junior Levirate.

(ii) Sororate:

In Sororate the husband marries the sister of his wife. Sororate is again divided into two types namely restricted Sororate and simultaneous Sororate. In restricted sororate, after the death of one’s wife, the man marries the sister of his wife. In simultaneous sororate, the sister of one’s wife automatically becomes his wife.

Concubinage:

Concubinage is a state of living together as husband and wife without being married. It is .cohabitation with one or more women who are distinct from wife or wives. Concubinage is sometimes recognised by various societies as an accepted institution. A concubine has a lower social status than that of a wife. The children of a concubine enjoy a lower status in the society.

Related Articles:

• Forms of Marriage: Polyandry, Polygyny and Monogamy
• Hindu Marriage: Aims, Ideals and Types

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11.4 Marriage and Families across Cultures

Learning outcomes.

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• State the anthropological definition of marriage.
• Provide examples of different forms of marriage across cultures.
• Summarize economic and symbolic dimensions of marriage (marriage compensations).
• Describe how marriage intersects with residence rules.
• Explain the social importance of remarriage obligations.

Anthropological Definition of Marriage

Marriage is the formation of a socially recognized union. Depending on the society, it may be a union between a man and a woman, between any two adults (regardless of their gender), or between multiple spouses in polygamous societies. Marriages are most commonly established to provide a formal structure in which to raise and nurture offspring (whether biological or adopted/fostered), but not all marriages involve reproduction, and marriage can serve multiple functions. One function is to create alliances between individuals, families, and sometimes larger social networks. These alliances may provide political and economic advantages. While there are variations of marriage, the institution itself, with a few notable exceptions, is universal across cultures.

Marriage is an effective means of addressing several common challenges within families. It provides a structure in which to produce, raise, and nurture offspring. It reduces competition among and between males and females. And it creates a stable, long-term socioeconomic household in which the family unit can more adequately subsist with shared labor and resources. All societies practice rules of marriage that determine what groups an individual should marry into (called endogamy rules ) and which groups are considered off limits and not appropriate for marriage partners (called exogamy rules ). These rules are behavioral norms in a society. For example, in the United States, individuals tend to marry within the same generation (endogamy) and usually the same linguistic group, but they marry outside of very close kin (exogamy). Those considered to be too closely related to marry are prohibited by rules of incest , a relationship defined as too close for sexual relations.

Across all cultures, there is an incest taboo , a cultural norm that prohibits sexual relations between parents and their offspring. This taboo sometimes extends to other relations considered too close for sexual relationship. In some societies, this taboo may extend to first cousins. In the United States, first-cousin marriage laws vary across states (see “Cousin Marriage Law in the United States” for current state laws). French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss argued that incest is the original social structure because it naturally separates groups of people into two types—those with whom an individual has family ties (so-called biological ties ) and those with whom an individual can have sexual relations and establish ties.

Defining marriage can be complex. In the southern Andes of Peru and Bolivia, Indigenous people begin marriage with a practice known as servinakuy (with spelling variations). In servinakuy , a man and woman establish their own independent household with very little formal social acknowledgement and live together until the birth of their first child, after which they are formally considered to be a fully married couple. Not a trial marriage and not considered informal cohabitation, servinakuy is, instead, a prolonged marriage process during which family is created over time. Andean legal scholars argue that these unions should carry with them the legal rights and protections associated with a formal marriage from the time the couple begins living together (Ingar 2015).

Like all social institutions, ideas about marriage can adapt and change. Within urban Western societies, the concept of marriage is undergoing a great deal of change as socioeconomic opportunities shift and new opportunities open up for women. In Iceland, in 2016, almost 70 percent of children were born outside of a marriage, usually to committed unmarried couples (Peng 2018). This trend is supported by national social policies that provide generous parental leave for both married individuals and those within a consensual union, but the change is also due to the more fluid nature of family today. As norms change in Iceland across generations, it will be interesting to see if the practiced form of consensual union we see today eventually comes to be considered a sanctioned form of marriage.

Forms of Marriage

Anthropologists group marriage customs into two primary types: a union of two spouses only ( monogamy ) or a union involving more than two spouses ( polygamy ). Monogamy is the socially sanctioned union of two adults. In some societies this union is restricted to a man and a woman, and in other societies it can be two adults of any gender. Monogamy, because it produces an overall smaller family unit, is especially well adapted to postindustrial societies and cultures where family units are highly mobile (such as nomadic foragers). Monogamy also includes same-sex marriage. In June 2015, in Obergefell v. Hodges , the US Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriage in the United States, following earlier legal recognitions in many other Western countries. Today, same-sex marriage is legal in 30 countries. While the movement to legalize same-sex marriage has been long and tumultuous in many of these countries, same-sex marriages and unions have historically played significant roles in both Indigenous and Western societies.

Serial monogamy: Serial monogamy is a form of monogamy in which adults have a series of two-person monogamous marriages over a lifetime. It is increasingly common in Western societies, but it is also practiced in some small-scale societies, such as bands. In serial monogamy, divorce and remarriage are common.

Polygamy : Polygamy is the socially sanctioned union of more than two adults at the same time. In polygamous societies, families usually begin with a two-person marriage between a man and a woman. In some cases, the marriage will remain as a single couple for a long period of time or for the duration of their lives because of lack of resources or availability of partners. Adding partners is frequently a sign of status and is considered an ideal for families in polygamous societies. In some cases, too, polygamy is practiced to address extreme social stress due to things such as warfare or skewed population distributions caused by famine and high mortality rates. In her cross-cultural study of polygamy, cultural anthropologist Miriam Zeitzen (2008) noted a great deal of diversity within polygamy, from de jure unions that are formal, legal contracts (such as is found in Gambia) to de facto polygamy, which may be just as enduring, stable, and acceptable within a society (such as is found in Ivory Coast).

There are two principle kinds of polygamy, depending on the partners involved, as multiple men and multiple women in a single marriage (called group marriage ) is not common. Polygyny , which is the more common form of polygamy, is the marriage of one man to more than one woman. There is often marked age asymmetry in these relationships, with husbands much older than their wives. In polygynous households, each wife commonly lives in her own house with her own biological children, but the family unit cooperates together to share resources and provide childcare. The husband usually “visits” his wives in succession and lives in each of their homes at various times (or lives apart in his own). It is common, also, for there to be a hierarchy of wives based on seniority. Polygyny is found worldwide and offers many benefits. It maximizes the family labor force and the shared resources and opportunities available for family members and creates wide kinship connections within society. Commonly in polygynous societies, larger families are afforded higher social status and they have stronger political and economic alliances.

Polygyny is prevalent in Thailand today, with as many as one in four Thai men between the ages of 30 and 50 having a second wife, called a mia noi (minor wife). In her research in Thailand, cultural anthropologist Jiemin Bao (2008) studied polygyny among a group of lukchin Thai (Thai of Chinese descent). She found that the lukchin practiced polygynous marriages as a joint husband-and-wives economic enterprise, many times sending remittances back to family members still living in China. Bao found that husbands frequently seek their wives’ consent before adding another wife and that the family overall considers polygyny to create greater economic opportunities for all family members because multiple wives create a pool of stable laborers with individual skill sets. Even so, Bao observed turmoil and conflict even within economically successful polygynous families and observed that many marriages were conducted as if they were “cutting a business deal” (151). Gender politics of polygynous marriage among the lukchin often left women with few choices except to work for her husband’s family. Economic success for the family was culturally attributed to the male head of household and not his wives.

A second form of polygamy is polyandry. In polyandry , which is comparatively rare, there is one wife and more than one husband. Polyandrous marriages minimize population growth and may occur in societies where there is a temporary surfeit of males and scarcity of females or scarcity of resources. In fraternal polyandry , brothers marry a single wife. This is the most common in Nepal, where it is practiced by a minority of mainly rural families. Fraternal polyandry offers several benefits for societies like Nepal with scarce resources and dense population. Where there is extreme scarcity of land acreage, it allows brothers to share an inheritance of land instead of dividing it up. It reduces inequality within the household, as the family can thus collectively subsist on the land as a family unit. Also, in areas where land is scattered over large distances, it allows brothers to take turns living away from home to tend herds of animals or fields and then spending time at home with their shared wife. It also minimizes reproduction and population growth in a society where there is a very dense population (Goldstein 1987), as the wife can carry only one pregnancy at a time.

Postmarital Residence Rules

Following marriage, a couple begins a new family and establishes a shared residence, whether as a separate family unit or as part of an already established family group. The social rules that determine where a newly married couple will reside are called postmarital residence rules and are directly related to the descent rules that operate in the society. These rules may be adapted due to extenuating circumstances such as economic need or lack of housing. In the United States today, for example, it is increasingly common for newly married couples to postpone the establishment of a separate household when work, schooling, or children create a need for familial support.

There are five postmarital residence patterns:

• Under neolocal residence , a newly married couple establishes an independent household not connected to either spouse’s family. This pattern of residence is mostly associated with bilateral descent. While this is a norm in our own society, during times of economic stress or familial need, couples in the United States do occasionally live in the household of one spouse’s parents.
• More common worldwide is patrilocal residence , associated with societies practicing patrilineal descent. In patrilocal residence, the newly married couple establishes their new household with or near the groom’s father or the groom’s father’s relatives. What this means is that at marriage the groom remains within his household and/or family group, while the bride leaves her parents. Their future children will belong to the groom’s lineage.
• Matrilocal residence is associated with societies practicing matrilineal descent. In matrilocal residence, the newly married couple establishes their new household with or near the bride’s mother or the bride’s mother’s relatives. At marriage the bride remains within her household and/or family group, while the groom leaves his parents. Their future children will belong to the bride’s lineage.
• Less frequent but also associated with matrilineal descent is avunculocal residence , in which the newly married couple resides with or near the groom’s mother’s brother. In societies that practice avunculocal residence, the groom has commonly had a long-term relationship with his maternal uncle, who is part of his own mother’s matriline. By joining with household of the groom’s maternal uncle, the couple is able to benefit from both the husband’s and the wife’s matrilines.
• Under ambilocal residence , the couple decides which spouse’s family to live with or near. Ambilocal residence is associated with ambilineal descent. In ambilocal residence, the newly married couple will usually have made their decision about which spouse’s family to join with prior to their marriage. Their future children will then trace descent through that particular line.

Marriage Compensation

In all cultures, marriage is a consequential matter not only to the adults immediately involved, but also to their families and to the broader community. In societies that practice unilineal descent, the newly married couple moves away from one family and toward another. This creates a disadvantage for the family that has “lost” a son or daughter. For example, in a patrilineal society, while the wife will remain a member of her birth lineage (that of her father), her children and her labor will now be invested mostly in her husband’s lineage. As a result, in societies practicing unilineal descent, there is a marriage compensation from one family to the other for this perceived loss. Marriage compensation is the transfer of some form of wealth (in money, material goods, or labor) from one family to another to legitimize the marriage as a creation of a new social and economic household. It is not seen as payment for a spouse, but as recognition that the marriage and future children are part of one lineage rather than another (Stone 1998, 77). There are several forms of marriage compensation, each symbolically marked by specific cultural practices.

Bride wealth: Bride wealth (also called bride price ) is the transfer of material and symbolic value from the groom’s to the bride’s family. Depending on the cultural group, this may involve transfer of money, cattle, house goods, jewelry, or even symbolic ritual artifacts. Bride wealth is the most common form of marriage compensation across cultures. In her study of the Thadou Kukis of northeast India, Burma, and Bangladesh, Indian sociologist Hoineilhing Sitlhou (2018) explores how bride wealth has changed over time. Historically, the items exchanged included cows, copper gongs, silver earrings, and ceremonial clothing for the bride’s parents. Today, more contemporary items are offered, such as gold jewelry, cars, furniture, appliances, and land. One practice that has not changed is paying a portion of the bride wealth prior to the marriage ceremony and the remainder at some later point so that the groom remains in respectful debt to the bride’s family. In other societies, bride wealth must be paid in full before the marriage is considered legitimate. If marriages conducted using bride wealth end in divorce, normally the bride wealth (or equivalent value) is returned to the groom’s family to signify the dissolution of the contract.

Bride service : Similar to bride wealth, bride service involves a transfer of something of value from the groom’s to the bride’s family, but in this case the arrangement involves the contracted labor of the groom, whether before or after the marriage. Future grooms may work for months or years for the bride’s family (usually her father’s household) prior to the marriage, or husbands may work for months or years with the bride’s family after the marriage. In the first case, the groom completes his service prior to the marriage and then moves with the bride back to his family after the marriage. In the second case, the newly married couple remains in residence with the bride’s family until the service is concluded. The advantage of the second type of service is that frequently the wife is living with her mother when her first child (or children) is born. While her children are aligned with her husband’s family as far as descent (and inheritance), her parents are able to support the couple and their first child or children for a period of time.

The contractual obligations of bride wealth and bride service are not without conflict. In many unilineal societies, these obligations create a great deal of strife and conflict that can go on for years. What if the marriage is temperamentally difficult? What if the wife is barren or a child dies? What if the husband’s family suffers economic challenges that create a disparity between what he can offer their family of procreation and what the wife’s lineage could offer the children? Each of these situations creates conflict. Sometimes these conflicts between lineages (because marriage is seen as a contract with the larger family) spill over into the larger society and create larger social divisions.

Dowry : Dowry , a third form of marriage compensation, functions differently than bride wealth and bride price. Dowry is a form of material value, such as money, jewelry, house goods, or family heirlooms, that the bride brings into her own marriage to provide her with wealth within her husband’s lineage. In some societies women turn their dowry over to their husbands, but in other societies they retain rights to this wealth as married women. Among Nepalese Brahmans , sons inherit land and property equally at the death of the father, while women receive a dowry of clothing, jewelry, and household utensils from their own patriline at marriage (Stone 1998). They will use this wealth for status within the marriage. In other societies, women create a dual inheritance for their own daughters from their dowry, passing their dowry down through their daughters. Regardless of how the wealth is used, a woman’s most stable route to higher status within a patrilineal society is through the birth of her sons. It is sons within the patriline who will bring wives into their father’s household and increase the size and prominence of the patriline through the birth of their children. In patrilineal societies, women with many sons typically carry a higher social status.

While marriage compensation is most commonly associated with patrilineal societies, it is important to note that almost all marriages represent shared investments of one kind or another. Since marriage is the creation of a new family, spouses most often bring with them into their marriage their skills, traditions, and social networks, all of which carry symbolic weight within societies.

Remarriage Obligations

The many rules and corresponding obligations specific to marriage in unilineal societies (such as residence rules and marriage compensation) are evidence that families and communities invest a great deal in marriages and the formation of new families. So what happens if a young and newly married spouse dies? What about the marriage compensation and the new household? In many unilineal societies (most especially in patrilineal societies), remarriage obligations ensure that in these cases the marriage contract endures. Remarriage obligations require the widowed spouse to remarry someone from the same lineage in order to maintain the stability of the family unit.

There are numerous issues that affect when and how remarriage obligations are enacted. The factors that most affect remarriage obligations are the ages of the spouses and amount of time that has passed since the marriage occurred, the ages of the offspring and whether there are young children within the family unit, and the particular marriage contract and value of the marriage compensation. Cultures (and families) determine how best to enact these rules within their own value systems and based on current need. But the primary underlying purpose of remarriage obligations is to maintain the alliance that was made between the two lineages at the time of the marriage. These are intended to be enduring ties that benefit all members of each lineage.

If the husband dies and there is a surviving wife (now widow), under the levirate remarriage rule she will marry one of her husband’s surviving brothers. While levirate will not be invoked in every case, it is quite common when there are young children remaining within the immediate family unit. Because levirate is usually practiced in societies with polygynous families, a married brother taking an additional wife will not disrupt his existing family, and the new wife and her children will remain within the lineage where the children were born.

The sororate applies to situations in which the wife dies and there is a surviving widower. Under this remarriage rule, the deceased wife’s lineage must provide a replacement female, preferably the former wife’s sister. If her sisters are already married or there are no sisters available, another female from the same lineage can be sent as a replacement. Sororate allows young children from the first marriage to remain with their father in his lineage and also maintain a symbolic and emotional bond with their biological mother’s kindred.

Finally, there is also the highly variable practice of ghost marriage , where a marriage is performed between one or two deceased individuals in order to create an alliance between lineages. Among the Dinka and Nuer of South Sudan, a ghost marriage is similar to the levirate, with the deceased husband’s brother standing in for him in a ghost marriage. Unlike the levirate itself, any children from this second (ghost) marriage will be attributed to the deceased husband and not to the brother or the wider lineage itself. Among Chinese immigrants to Singapore, there are ghost marriage claims in which both spouses may be deceased (Schwartze 2010), continuing a tradition that began generations earlier (Topley 1955).

Arranged Marriages

While all marriages are planned, some are arranged, whether between the spouses involved and/or their families or through a third party. Today, an interesting adaptation of arranged marriages has developed involving online websites and hired marriage brokers to help individuals living in different countries find a suitable spouse from their birth culture. As transnational corporations spread worldwide and individuals become more highly mobile (even nomadic) for work, finding a spouse who shares the same cultural values can be difficult. Although there are marriage brokers for many different cultural groups, there is a proliferation of matchmakers for individuals of Indian nationality or descent. While not all of these sites are reputable, the explosion of marriage brokering businesses reminds us that marriage is, first and foremost, a cultural institution.

Kinship is an adaptive mechanism across cultures. While kinship systems vary, they each address critical elements for a social group. Through families of orientation and procreation and within kinship networks, households are created, offspring are produced, and alliances are established.

Mini-Fieldwork Activity

Kinship interview.

Do a kinship interview with a friend or peer. Collect information about their immediate family and relatives, including information about marriage and descent, being sure to note deceased relatives and any prior marriages. Draw a kinship chart that graphically depicts the information that you collected through the interview. Ask your participant informer to critique your chart, and then make any needed adjustments. Present the results of your project along with a reflection on the highlights of this work. What most challenged you, and how did this work help you better understand your friend/peer? What interesting things did you learn about their life?

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• Book title: Introduction to Anthropology
• Publication date: Feb 23, 2022
• Location: Houston, Texas
• Book URL: https://openstax.org/books/introduction-anthropology/pages/1-introduction
• Section URL: https://openstax.org/books/introduction-anthropology/pages/11-4-marriage-and-families-across-cultures

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• How it works

Essay on Different Types of Marriages

Using the three different representations of marriage presented in the learning block (polyandry, arranged marriages, and walking marriages), fill in the graphic organizer below. In Part A, you will have to first identify the biases you have regarding marriage and their influence on your perspective of marriage. In Part B, you will then take an objective stance and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of these types of marriage. In Part C, you will create a question a social scientist might ask to further the investigation of marriage.

In this first step, do your best to identify three of your biases on marriage due to your culture and religion. The American culture and legal system generally allow only one type of marriage. What type of bias does this embed in us? The religions that people belong to and practice can also impact their biases toward marriage, depending on how their chosen religion defines marriage. How does this influence your perspective of marriage in general? How does this bias influence your perspective on these specific types of marriage?

The inability of the children to identify with their father and the jealousy among the husbands.

Lack of freedom to choose the spouses they truly love.

Possibilities of having more than one partner.

Influence of the Biases

In Polyandry type of marriage, a woman is married to more than one man as her husband as in the case in the video where the woman is married to the three brothers. Often, the children born in polyandry type or marriage are considered to be of the eldest brother. In some cases, the fatherhood of these children is established through a ceremony which in my view, may create a perception in these children that the other fathers may be their biological fathers denying their ceremonial fathers the respect they should be accorded. This kind of marriage also projects jealousy which is common with people in love. In arranged marriages, the spouses are brought together by other people who may be their relatives or friends. In such situations, marriage comes as a product of the opinions of other people but not love. Arranged marriages do not give individuals the opportunity to make informed decisions on the kind of people they want to spend the rest of their lives with. The parents and relatives operate on the assumption that their children are immature and impulsive to make sound choices regarding their spouses. In walking marriages where men stay in their own homes and are invited over, usually during the night hours to the womens bedroom, possibilities of a woman inviting more than one man to exist. The secrecy involved in this kind of marriage also gives room for witch hunt where a man can be interested in a particular woman while the woman is not. Such situations give room for the man to keep track of the man or men invited by such a woman and harm him as a result. Such kind of marriage does also not give room for a collective development as a man is bound to stay with his family all his lifetime.

While it is impossible to check our culture and biases at the door and become objective, we can identify our biases (as you have already done above) and try to ignore them to consider other points of view. In this next step, take a culturally relativistic standpoint (in other words, try to overcome your biases) and consider the tenets of each type of marriage. Why might these other forms of marriage be more successful or advantageous in certain contexts than the Western concept of marriage (based on love and monogamy)? Then, from that same culturally relativistic standpoint, also consider some possible drawbacks to these forms of marriage.

Type of Marriage Advantages Drawbacks

-Polyandry marriage helps in controlling population growth as the number of children that can be born of the woman is limited.

-This type of marriage is cost saving as it distributed the financial burden as well as other chores among the husbands.

-In cases of unity within the husbands and the wife, the family becomes stronger. -Polyandry marriage presents adverse effects to the health of a woman as it exposes her to the risk of acquiring the sexually transmitted infections.

-It also exposes women to psychological and behavioral changes which are common with the menstrual cycle.

-This type of marriage is also a hindrance to the social progress as all the husbands; mostly brothers are bound to one woman.

-Identification of the conceived children is also a drawback.

Arranged Marriages

-Arranged marriages make it easier for the couples to seek financial assistance from parents in their times of need.

-There is joint sharing of burdens between the families involved to lessen misfortunes.

-There are a better inter-family relationship in such cases making it easier to get together. -This type of marriage can create conflicts between families and partners in case of failures.

-Due to high dowry demands by parents, girls may end up unmarried.

-Adjusting to each other in arranged marriages is a problem as the spouses do not sufficient understanding of each others attitude.

Walking Marriages

-In walking marriages, there is a shared duty in taking care of the children.

-This type of marriage presents a stable family structure with no issues such as divorce and marriage conflicts.

-There is no lack of preference for particular gender by parents. -There is swapping of children to maintain gender balance.

-High risks of contracting sexually transmitted diseases.

-Lack of responsibilities by the fathers as some children end up not knowing their fathers.

Create a question: In this learning block, you were given a lot of information about marriage and what marriage means in different cultures. You were also asked to think about what marriage means to you. The next step is to take the information you have been given and create a question a social scientist might ask to further the investigation of marriage. For example, after reading about arranged marriages, you might ask: Are rates of depression higher in women in arranged marriages? Social scientists use existing information to come up with new questions. This is the iterative process of social science research.

What are the effect of polyandry type of marriage on the social and psychological development of the children?

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Home — Essay Samples — Life — Marriage — The Journey of Married Life

The Journey of Married Life

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The foundation of love and commitment, the joys of partnership, the challenges and growth, the fulfillment of family, the importance of continuous investment, conclusion: the ever-evolving journey.

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Pride & Prejudice and the Purpose of Marriage

J ane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice is often lauded as one of the greatest romances in British literature. Its comedic structure entertains readers with the fluctuations of Elizabeth Bennet’s relationship with Mr. Darcy. However, this novel is more than a simple love story. Although almost everyone marries by the end of the novel, some of the women of Elizabeth’s world are not as well-matched with their husbands as she is with hers. Unlike Elizabeth and Darcy’s affectionate relationship, many characters in the story make marriages of convenience. The monetary and social stability that the marriage offers women is more important than the compatibility of the spouses. Austen develops the plot to hint at a more considered view on marriage. Certain formal aspects of the work further inform us on Austen’s opinion of matrimony. In Pride and Prejudice , Jane Austen uses satire, characterization, and narrative voice to explore the vocational nature of marriage for women in her society.

From the first line of Pride and Prejudice , the narrator reveals her satirical approach to matrimony. If it was “a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good fortune, must be in want of a wife” then the women in the novel would not have to struggle so much. i  Mrs. Bennet would not have to actively seek husbands for her five daughters. The marriageable women of the novel would not have to debate between choosing spouses by preference and marrying for financial stability. There would not be any kind of jealousy or competition between Miss Bingley and Elizabeth, or Elizabeth and Miss King. The premise of this first line in the narrative opposes the action in the novel. A more straightforward description of reality would have been that a single woman in possession of no fortune must be in want of a husband. The irony of this initial sentence introduces the novel masterfully. While Austen flips this truth to provide humor in her narrative, she simultaneously sets the tone for the entire novel and tips readers off to her proposition that marriage is a type of career for the women in her society. The opening line of the novel is an especially amusing statement when read in conjunction with Mrs. Bennet’s subsequent scheming to secure Mr. Bingley for one of her daughters, which would be completely unnecessary if he was so desperate for a wife. Austen’s witty reflection on marriage is not confined to the implication that it is women who need husbands; it also indicates that financial situation plays a foremost role in the selection process. Austen wastes no time emphasizing her point that marriage is all about economics.

Furthermore, the idea of marriage being less about one’s heart and more about one’s wallet is repeated throughout the story. The narrator again employs her biting wit in her description of Mrs. Bennet as a woman whose “business of her life was to get her daughters married”. ii  In the context of what the narrative has already revealed of Mrs. Bennet and what will further be revealed of her, this quip seems to criticize the farcical nature of Mrs. Bennet’s life. Nevertheless, her incessant efforts to find suitors for her children are described as a “business.” This description almost begs the question of what one would expect to be her vocation and forces readers to acknowledge that a woman in Mrs. Bennet’s situation would not have any professional options available to her. The narrator encourages readers to laugh at Mrs. Bennet to help them realize the ridiculousness of Mrs. Bennet’s “business” being marrying off her daughters. The negative portrayal of Mrs. Bennet’s preoccupation with beaux reflects the greater tragedy of marriage being the only available means of income for any upper-class woman at this point in England’s history. Mrs. Bennet’s job is presented as frivolous because it is frivolous that it is her only option. There are numerous other instances throughout the novel of Austen’s satire exposing the vocational nature of marriage in her culture. The Bennet women are said to entertain “very lively hopes of Mr. Bingley’s heart” before they even meet him. iii  The rumor of Bingley bringing twelve women with him to his first ball is a point of grief for the ladies of the neighborhood. Mr. Darcy is admired greatly, primarily for his financial situation, until it is obvious that those riches would not benefit any of the ladies present. iv  Mr. Darcy’s disinterest in the women present is so abhorrent to them because it means that he is unlikely to marry any of them and is therefore of no material value to them. In true satirical style, Austen makes readers laugh at something that at the time would have been commonplace.

Another way that Austen exposes the occupational nature of marriage is through her characterization. Again, Mrs. Bennet’s whole life is about marrying off her daughters, and the readers are prompted to disparage her for it. There are several other characters who are presented primarily because of their views or actions concerning marriage, and one prime example is Mr. Collins. He is undeniably a ridiculous character, and it is easy to identify what makes him so absurd. Mr. Collins does not execute social norms properly and is consequently the fool of the story. One of his laughable qualities is his vocalization of implicit social norms, such as his telling Mr. Bennet that he practiced compliments for women before he talked to them. v  He repeats this mistake when he is proposing to Elizabeth. Not only does he attribute his decision to marry as a response to his belief that it is part of his job, but he also claims that perhaps the most important reason for his proposal is that it is the “recommendation of the very noble lady whom I have the honour of calling patroness”. vi  This “very noble lady” is more than Mr. Collins patroness; she is Lady Catherine de Bourgh, Mr. Darcy’s wealthy, condescending aunt. She encourages Mr. Collins to marry as part of his duty as a clergyman and tells him to marry a “useful sort of person…able to make a small income go a good way”. vii  Mr. Collins and Lady Catherine vocally recognize the economics involved in marriage, but their opinions are by no means praised by the narrator (or by Elizabeth). Everything about Mr. Collins—from his letter writing to his disastrous dancing to his incessant discussion of Lady Catherine—is preposterous. His and Lady Catherine’s views on marriage can therefore indicate what Austen considers most ridiculous. He essentially uses matrimony to get ahead in his career and Austen has no sympathy for this attitude. We see that her characterization of Mrs. Bennet and Mr. Collins emphasizes their occupational views of marriage relationships. However, it is unclear whether Austen criticizes them individually for having these views on marriage or commenting on the condition of a society in which this is the reality of the matrimonial state. Perhaps Austen’s opinion can be elucidated through investigation of a positive characterization in the novel.

Charlotte Lucas is characterized favorably as a sensible and thoughtful young woman, worthy to be the best friend of the hero, Elizabeth. Charlotte advises Elizabeth early on about Jane’s behavior toward Bingley being too guarded. She warns that Bingley “may never do more than like her, if she does not help him on”. viii While Elizabeth laughs at Charlotte and tells her that rushing into marriage without knowing much about one’s partner “is not sound,” Charlotte is ultimately proven correct. ix  All of Jane’s misery over Bingley was caused in part by Darcy’s conviction of her indifference toward his friend. x  We see Austen’s admiration for Charlotte in her characterization as a smart woman. In addition to her accuracy in assessing Jane and Bingley’s relationship, Charlotte is successful in her schemes to swindle Mr. Collins. The fact that Mr. Collins is inferior to many other men in the novel does not lessen Charlotte’s accomplishment. She is aware of his shortcomings when she accepts him. Her thoughts at the time are described as “in general satisfactory”. xi  Mr. Collins fills a need for her. She is practical and sees matrimony for what it truly is to her – not an emotionally fulfilling relationship, but a business deal.

While Mr. Collins and Mrs. Bennet’s business-like attitudes toward marriage are laughable, Charlotte’s opinion is sensible. Austen casts these characters in very different lights, even though their sentiments on this subject are somewhat similar. The idea of marriage being a job is a common thread in all three views, but their situations and the implications of their attitudes are significantly different. Mr. Collins is the most negatively portrayed character of the three. Making blunder after social blunder, he is at best silly and at worst slightly malicious. This characterization is connected to how he regards marriage as a career advancement. Mr. Collins inhabits a very different station in society than the women of the novel. He already has a career and is stable and provided for very well. Marriage is not as necessary for men in this world as it is for women. His treatment of marriage as a career move, without any thought to how complimentary or gratifying a match might be, is so odious because it makes light of the reality of marriages of necessity for women. Mrs. Bennet is also portrayed as a ludicrous character, but she is not nearly as loathsome as her husband’s nephew. Her determination to get her daughters suitably married is in fact a determination to provide for them; she can do no better within the restrictions of her society. This is more critical of the culture than of her intellect. She is working within a system that may not be fair, but it is the world she lives in. Similarly, Charlotte does the same thing for herself. Her characterization, although not romanticized or idealized, is positive and flattering. She reflects the best possible reality for many women at the time.

The satirical humor and characterizations that Austen employs in Pride and Prejudice contribute to the novel’s themes. However, Austen influences our perceptions of matrimony by using the narrative voice with devices such as irony, word choice, and free indirect discourse. The narrative voice in this novel is typically ironic rather than serious. This tone betrays the cynical view that the narrator has of marriage. For example, before Mr. Collins and Charlotte marry, they are described as having “a week spent in professions of love and schemes of felicity”. xii  However, readers can easily discern that there is no real affection on either side of such a hasty match. It begs the question of whether courtships of greater length can produce more affection, or if all courtships are “spent in professions of love and schemes of felicity” that mean no more than those of Collins and Charlotte.

Although the tone of the novel is overwhelmingly ironic, there are times when marriage is spoken of in more straightforward and serious terms. The narrator uses unique word choice to reveal the serious nature of marriage. When Mr. Darcy becomes initially attracted to Elizabeth, the narrator tells us that he “really believed, that were it not for the inferiority of her connections, he should be in some danger” and later that he “began to feel the danger of paying Elizabeth too much attention”. xiii  Darcy is in danger of tarnishing his family’s good name and losing out on the opportunity of acquiring greater monetary advantage through marriage if he involves himself with Elizabeth. This concept of marriage being a risky venture recurs throughout the story. Jane is under painful “anxiety” when her hopes for marriage are disturbed. xiv  Losing Bingley’s affection also means losing the security that he can offer her. Mrs. Gardiner, Elizabeth’s aunt, is “suspicious” of Elizabeth’s regard for Wickham and cautions her against entertaining it, since she knows that Elizabeth’s marrying a man who is her equal in monetary deficiency would be highly imprudent. xv  The narrator’s use of words like “danger,” “anxiety,” and “suspicious” indicates to us the risk involved in matrimony. In these instances, the narrator uses serious and straightforward language to describe the nature of matrimony.

Another tactic of Austen’s narration is the use of free indirect discourse. As previously discussed, Charlotte is a positive character in the story and she can at times be a mask the narrator uses to divulge her own opinions. The narrator slips into expressing Charlotte’s thoughts and feelings after she agrees to marry Mr. Collins. It is almost as if the narrator is reflecting with Charlotte when Austen writes:

Mr. Collins to be sure was neither sensible nor agreeable; his society was irksome, and his attachment to her must be imaginary. But still he would be her husband. – Without thinking highly either of men or of matrimony, marriage had always been her object; it was the only honourable provision for well-educated young women of small fortune, and however uncertain of giving happiness, must be their pleasantest preservative from want. This preservative she had now obtained; and at the age of twenty-seven, without having ever been handsome, she felt all the good luck of it. xvi

In many ways, this inner dialogue of Charlotte’s that the narrator relates to us is the book’s central commentary on marriage. Of course, Elizabeth gets the idealized ending with the man who is rich, respectable, and loves her. On the other hand, Charlotte gets the realistic ending. A wedding is not always the heart-warming event some like to imagine, since a wedding at times simply begins a business deal. It is not glamorous or necessarily fulfilling, but it is her “pleasantest preservative from want”. xvii

Pride and Prejudice is inundated with criticism toward the realities of marriage. Elizabeth and Darcy are the model couple in the novel, but there are numerous reminders in the other couples that this goal is seldom achieved. They marry for love, but not everyone has that luxury. Darcy marries Elizabeth because of her merits and his affection for her—instead of marrying to advance his career and economic situation, as Mr. Collins did. Additionally, even while Elizabeth seems unconcerned with Darcy’s wealth when she initially rejects and eventually accepts him, there is no avoiding how advantageous a match it is for her. Not only has she provided for herself, but she is also able to support her sister. It is obvious that Elizabeth is the narrator’s favorite and that her marriage is the ideal. This supremacy of such an unusual marriage for love indicates that this is what Austen wishes could be the reality. However, she is honest enough to emphasize that it is by no means an everyday occurrence—the truth is much bleaker.

Through her satirical tone, Austen displays her skepticism toward the institution of matrimony. Her varied characterizations reveal which views of marriage she finds most repulsive and which are simply unavoidable actualities. The narrative voice that Austen employs vacillates between communicating humorous indictments of and serious reflections on marriage. Additionally, the narrator’s opinions are communicated through the mask of certain characters when Austen uses free indirect discourse. These formal devices undergird an important theme of the novel: marriage—as the only career option for women—results in sensible women being wedded to foolish men and young girls’ thoughtless actions either forever ruining their chances for a stable life or chaining them to men who do not genuinely care for them. Austen exposes and denounces occupational marriage and the limits on females in her society. It is no surprise that this book—filled with such insight and as well as wit—remains a classic.

Bibliography

Austen, Jane. Pride and Prejudice . London: Penguin Books, 2003.

i Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 5.

ii Ibid, 7.

iii Ibid, 11.

iv Ibid, 12.

v Ibid, 67.

vi Ibid, 103.

vii Ibid, 103.

viii Ibid, 23.

ix Ibid, 24.

x Ibid, 192.

xi Ibid, 120.

xii Ibid, 137.

xiii Ibid, 51, 57.

xiv Ibid, 127.

xv Ibid, 140.

xvi Ibid, 120.

xvii Ibid, 120.

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A Life Overtaken by Conspiracy Theories Explodes in Flames as the Public Looks On

Friends of Max Azzarello, who set himself on fire outside Donald J. Trump’s trial, said he was a caring person whose paranoia had led him down a dark path.

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By Michael Wilson ,  Tracey Tully and Jan Ransom

The journey that ended with a man setting himself on fire on Friday outside the Manhattan courthouse where Donald J. Trump was being tried seemed to have begun in Florida, with a series of increasingly bizarre outbursts.

Standing in the afternoon chill, the man, Max Azzarello, 37, of St. Augustine, Fla., threw pamphlets into the air before dousing himself with an accelerant and setting his body ablaze. The police hurried to extinguish the flames, and he was taken to a hospital burn unit, gravely injured. He died on Friday night.

The fire just a block or two from the courthouse appeared calculated to draw widespread attention, horrifying bystanders and temporarily overshadowing the momentous trial of a former president.

But a closer look at the path the man had traveled to this moment of self-destruction revealed a recent spiral into volatility, one marked by a worldview that had become increasingly confusing and disjointed — and appeared to be unattached to any political party. His social media postings and arrest records suggest the immolation stemmed instead from a place of conspiracy theories and paranoia.

Until last summer, Mr. Azzarello seemed to have lived a relatively quiet life. After high school, where he was a member of a bowling team, he graduated from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 2009, with degrees in anthropology and public policy.

As a student at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, N.J., where he received a master’s degree in city and regional planning in 2012, he was known for leaving supportive Post-it notes for classmates in the hallways and for his karaoke performances of Frank Sinatra and Disney tunes, said a former classmate, Katie Brennan.

“He was super curious about social justice and the way things ‘could’ be,” Ms. Brennan said. “He was creative and adventurous.”

He began a career in which, according to his LinkedIn profile, he moved among jobs in marketing, sales and technology. In 2013, he worked on the campaign of Representative Tom Suozzi of Long Island, who was then running for Nassau County executive.

An old friend from high school, Steven Waldman, called Mr. Azzarello one of the smartest people he knew.

“He was a good friend and person and cared about the world,” he said.

But there was cause for concern, too.

By last year, he had apparently settled in St. Augustine, where he lived in a modest apartment near the Matanzas River in that historic city. He was a pleasant if sometimes peculiar neighbor.

“An extremely nice person,” said Larry Altman, the property manager at his apartment building, who added: “He had political views that I would not consider mainstream. He called our government and the world government a Ponzi scheme.”

But there were no signs that he was harboring an urge to harm himself, Mr. Altman said.

“If you met Max, he’d shake your hand, and you’d have a nice conversation,” he said. “He’d treat you with respect.”

He was clearly deeply affected by the loss of his mother, however. Elizabeth Azzarello died on April 6, 2022, near Sea Cliff, N.Y., on Long Island, where she had fought pulmonary disease, Mr. Azzarello wrote on Instagram in April 2022.

“I am immensely proud to say that she navigated the awful challenges of this disease with strength, dignity and spirit through the very end,” he wrote.

After this loss, his old friends saw a change. “That was around the time when he became more outspoken,” Mr. Waldman said. “They were close, and they had a good relationship. He was heartbroken.”

By the following year, the clarity Mr. Azzarello had shown in writing of his grief was gone, and a troubled image emerged.

In March 2023, he listed his profession on LinkedIn as “Research Investigator,” self-employed. In June of that year, he tagged Ms. Brennan and several others to make sure they had seen something he had written. She described it as a “manifesto” and called him immediately and tried to intervene. Eventually she wrote to one of his family members to make sure that they were aware that he was in crisis, she said.

About five months later, in early August 2023, he posted on Facebook about visiting a mental health treatment facility: “Three days in the psych ward, and all I got were my new favorite socks.”

Days later, in picturesque St. Augustine, he went for dinner at the Casa Monica Hotel on Cordova Street. Afterward, Mr. Azzarello walked into the lobby, approached an autograph left by former President Bill Clinton, who had signed the wall several years earlier, and threw a glass of wine at it, the police said. He admitted what he had done to officers, the police said. The episode was most likely written off as one man’s bad night.

Two days later, he was back, standing outside the hotel in just his underwear, ranting and cursing into a bullhorn, the police said. And just three days after that, he vandalized a sign outside a nearby United Way office before climbing into the bed of a stranger’s truck and rifling its contents, the police said.

All these events played out within walking distance of the apartment where even his most far-afield views had only recently been delivered politely.

In the months that followed, Mr. Azzarello promoted his disjointed preoccupations in a document he posted on Facebook. The pages attacked fascism and the general complacency of the public. They espoused general anti-government sentiment but did not seem directed at a discernible political party.

“Like frogs in water coming to a boil, the public didn’t notice the rotten truth behind the illusion of freedom,” the writings state. The man who had written fondly of his mother just a year earlier — “gracious and warm, silly and catty, compassionate and supportive” — and their time together seemed to have disappeared.

His greatest vexation appeared to be cryptocurrency, which he cast as a threat to humanity.

It was unclear when he arrived in New York, taking a room at the Soho 54 Hotel on Watts Street in Lower Manhattan and making his way to the running sideshow outside the downtown criminal courthouse.

The area he chose, Collect Pond Park, has been an on-and-off stage for supporters and opponents of Mr. Trump for months. Mr. Azzarello was there by Thursday, holding a sign and speaking in ways that, perhaps bizarre elsewhere, fit in with the disparate voices of the park.

On Friday, the crowd in the park had thinned. At about 1:35 p.m., people began to scream. A blur followed: a man on fire, bright flames licking his clothing and hair; officers scrambling over barricades; a departing ambulance.

His oldest friends were left struggling to make sense of this act.

“He was kind and a gentle soul,” said Carol Waldman, the mother of his childhood friend. “A real wonderful, terrific young guy. Who had his whole life ahead of him.”

If you are having thoughts of suicide, you can call or text 988 to reach the 988 Suicide and Crisis Lifeline or go to SpeakingOfSuicide.com/resources for a list of additional resources.

Nate Schweber , Stefanos Chen , Nichole Manna , Nicholas Fandos , Chelsia Rose Marcius and Claire Fahy contributed reporting. Susan C. Beachy contributed research.

Michael Wilson , who covers New York City, has been a Times reporter for more than two decades. More about Michael Wilson

Tracey Tully is a reporter for The Times who covers New Jersey, where she has lived for more than 20 years. More about Tracey Tully

Jan Ransom is an investigative reporter on the Metro desk focusing on criminal justice issues, law enforcement and incarceration in New York. More about Jan Ransom

Our Coverage of the Trump Hush-Money Trial

News and Analysis

Donald Trump’s criminal trial in Manhattan is off to an ominous start for the former president, and it might not get any easier  in the days ahead. Here’s why.

The National Enquirer was more than a friendly media outlet  for Trump’s presidential campaign in 2016. It was a powerful, national political weapon that was thrust into the service of a single candidate , in violation of campaign finance law.

As prosecutors argued that Trump had repeatedly broken a gag order , they called one episode “very troubling”  — his sharing of a commentator’s quote disparaging prospective jurors as clandestine operators for the left.

More on Trump’s Legal Troubles

Key Inquiries: Trump faces several investigations  at both the state and the federal levels, into matters related to his business and political careers.

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The Future of Marriage Essay

Marriage is an important stage in the personal life which is discussed in many cultures as a kind of the rite of passage. From this point, persons become ready to create a family when they are mature enough to take responsibility for their family and build strong relations with their partner.

Several decades ago, the family was discussed as the main social institution because society traditionally consisted of many families. Thus, marriage can be presented as the most traditional way to create a family and take a definite position within society. Nevertheless, the future of marriage and its significance for modern people is a debatable issue.

Although today marriage is still a significant stage in the personal life and family is discussed as the fundamental factor for the social development, the role of marriage declines, the rate of divorces increases, and the marriage is often perceived as an insignificant factor to live a vivid and full life.

To understand the future of marriage, it is important to refer to the main reasons for getting married. Americans are inclined to concentrate on the role of tradition, love, definite social and material benefits, and satisfaction of psychological and sexual needs as the major reasons to marry. However, to achieve the mentioned goals and satisfy needs, it is unnecessary to be married.

The position is actively discussed in modern society where the popularity of marriages decreases because of the people’s concentration on their own life and personal and professional development. Today, the family cannot be discussed as the persons’ primary goal.

Emphasizing the fact that marriage is not important for people today and that the tendency can develop, researchers, refer to statistics and divorce rates. Thus, the percentage of adults who are currently divorced, “which was only 1.8 percent for males and 2.6 percent for females in 1960, quadrupled by the year 2000”, moreover, “the percentage of divorce is higher for females than for males primarily because divorced men are more likely to remarry than divorced women” 1 .

From this point, it is possible to speak about the tendency to choose the independent life without the responsibilities of a husband or wife. Moreover, “the national divorce rate is close to 50% of all marriages” 2 . However, it is important to focus on the problem and discuss it from the other perspective. Thus, “for many people, the actual chances of divorce are far below 50/50” 3 .

In spite of the fact the general rate of marriages declines, it is still high in comparison with the rate of divorces. That is why it is impossible to state that the low rate of marriages and the high rate of divorces can affect the Americans and their visions of marriage’s role significantly. Modern people can reject the importance of marriage, but it is rather problematic to change the public’s vision of the traditional family based on marriage in some years because it is a long and challenging process.

People continue to find a kind of security in the traditional form of relations which has deep historic roots. However, it is important to note that the correlation of reasons for getting married changes with references to the development of the persons’ social needs and different global cultural tendencies. According to the latest statistical data, modern young Americans are inclined to choose the partner about his or her social and economic status 4 .

The factor of finances is important today, especially while paying attention to the modern contracts used to regulate marriages. Thus, many people choose marriage because of definite economic benefits. People can marry to improve their social state or gain a higher social status with the help of a spouse. It is possible to consider that future marriages will be more similar to business than to romance.

Marriage lost its legal and social status because those couples who seek for the successful partnership and psychological comfort are inclined to choose relations free from any contracts and duties. From this point, to choose marriage is to choose social security and the public’s approval. However, following the progressive and popular trends, young people choose their private independence 5 .

Modern women are often financially independent and do not discuss marriage as a way to improve their financial and social state. Men choose to marry when they seek for stability and understanding typical for the family relations. The decision-making process which is usual for business operations is performed by many young people today when they choose to marriage or not.

They assess all the possible advantages and disadvantages of marriages. Today, the idea of marriage often depends more on the economic benefits and less on the romantic aspects. Modern representatives of American society choose to get married because they assess all the psychological, emotional, sexual, and social benefits of the process. That is why the future of marriage as a significant stage in personal life is not clear.

Works Cited

Barnet, Sylvan, and Hugo Bedau. Current Issues and Enduring Questions: A Guide to Critical Thinking and Argument with Readings . USA: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2010. Print.

Medved, Diane. Case against Divorce . USA: Random House Publishing Group, 1990. Print.

Popenoe, David and Barbara Whitehead. “The State of Our Unions”. Research and Composition in the Disciplines . Ed. Laurence Behrens and Leonard Rosen. USA: Pearson, 2011. 390-402. Print.

1 David Popenoe and Barbara Whitehead, “The State of Our Unions”, Research and Composition in the Disciplines , Ed. Laurence Behrens and Leonard Rosen (USA: Pearson, 2011), 397.

2 David Popenoe and Barbara Whitehead, “The State of Our Unions,” 398.

3 Ibid., 398.

4 Diane Medved, Case against Divorce (USA: Random House Publishing Group, 1990), 180.

5 Sylvan Barnet and Hugo Bedau, Current Issues and Enduring Questions: A Guide to Critical Thinking and Argument with Readings (USA: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2010).

• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

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IvyPanda . 2020. "The Future of Marriage." March 11, 2020. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-future-of-marriage/.

1. IvyPanda . "The Future of Marriage." March 11, 2020. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-future-of-marriage/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "The Future of Marriage." March 11, 2020. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-future-of-marriage/.

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