reason better an interdisciplinary guide to critical thinking

Reason Better: An Interdisciplinary Guide to Critical Thinking

David Manley

It’s time the standard critical thinking curriculum was rethought. Reason Better: An Interdisciplinary Guide to Critical Thinking does exactly this by combining the most recent findings about reasoning from philosophy, cognitive science, social psychology and behavioral economics in a way that’s practical yet rigorous. The text emphasizes developing a mindset that avoids systematic errors, while also presenting a unified picture of evidence that covers statistical, causal, and best-explanation inferences. Students will come away with a sense of how to assess the strength of evidence for claims, adjust their beliefs accordingly, and recognize the errors they're most prone to making. Reason Better is rich with instructor resources to support delivering a course that will have lasting effects on students’ lives.

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Table of Contents for Reason Better: An Interdisciplinary Guide to Critical Thinking

• Preliminaries
• Chapter 1: Reasoning
• Chapter 2: Mindset
• Chapter 3: Clarity
• Chapter 4: Entailment
• Chapter 5: Evidence
• Chapter 6: Generalizations
• Chapter 7: Causes
• Chapter 8: Updating
• Chapter 9: Decisions
• Chapter 10: Co-thinking
• Instructor's Resources
• Advanced Chapter Materials

Key features

• A new and innovative approach to critical thinking that has greater applicability to students’ lives
• Integrated auto-assessed questions gauge comprehension throughout chapters along with separate supplementary chapter quizzes
• Robust instructor manual includes in-class exercises with insightful tips for conveying chapter material and five problem sets combining material across chapters help connect concepts for students

David Manley

Your Custom Text Here

Below you'll find abstracts and links for some of my work. Click here for my philpapers page. 

The ethics, economics, and demographics of delaying aging, forthcoming in essays on longtermism , eds. greaves & macaskill, oxford university press.

Efforts to slow aging are likely to be under-resourced due to a variety of misconceptions and cognitive errors, as well as social discounting. We argue that the social benefits of delaying aging would be enormous across a wide range of ethical frameworks, because more and better life-years would be lived by the same number of people. For any policymakers or philanthropists undeterred by the uncertain time horizons of such an endeavor, research into potential treatments to slow aging is a valuable and neglected investment.

Reason Better: An Interdisciplinary Guide to Critical Thinking

2nd edition, tophat, 2022.

This text rewrites the standard critical thinking curriculum by combining the most important insights from philosophy, cognitive science, social psychology and behavioral economics. Both practical and rigorous, the text emphasizes developing a mindset that can avoid systematic errors. It also presents a unified picture of evidence that covers statistical, causal, and best-explanation inferences. Students will come away with a sense of how to assess the strength of evidence for claims, adjust their beliefs accordingly, and recognize the errors they're most prone to making. Reason Better is rich with instructor resources to support delivering a course that will have lasting effects on students’ lives.

On Being a Random Sample

Work in progress.

At times we are inclined to reason as though we are random samples from a group of individuals. Sometimes we start with a fact about the group and draw conclusions about ourselves. (I call this reasoning 'inwards.') And sometimes we start with ourselves and work our way out to the group or the world at large. (This is reasoning 'outwards'.) A principled rule for how de se evidence should affect de dicto credences, and vice versa, would help us solve several puzzles in confirmation theory. (For example: Sleeping Beauty, Doomsday, and the question whether the fine-tuning of the universe counts as evidence for the existence of many universes.) This paper looks at three competing rules for reasoning inwards and outwards, each of which replaces the standard conditionalization rule for updating on evidence. 

God and the Bayesian Conception of Evidence

Forthcoming in religious studies.

Evidential arguments for and against the existence of God ask us to do something we are not very good at: set aside our knowledge of some very salient facts in order to reconstruct the hypothetical probability of those facts given competing hypotheses. There may be no alternative, but this process is beset with the danger of cognitive bias. I discuss this problem as it pertains to some well-known arguments for and against the existence of God. 

See also these notes criticizing the theistic fine-tuning argument, from an exchange with Luke Barnes, William Lane Craig, and Neil Manson.  

Dispositions, Conditionals, and Counterexamples

Mind , 120: 1191-1227.

Our earlier paper about dispositions in Mind  elicited three response papers: one by Daniel Bonevac, Josh Dever, and David Sosa; one by Sungho Choi, and one by Barbara Vetter. In this paper, we respond to our critics, focusing on the role of centering and of counterexamples in refuting conditional analyses of dispositions. (Coauthored   with Ryan Wasserman)

Dispositionality: Beyond the Biconditionals

Australasian journal of philosophy, 90(2): 321-334..

Suppose dispositions bear a distinctive connection to counterfactual facts, perhaps one that could be enshrined in a variation on the well-worn schema ‘Necessarily, x is disposed to ϕ in ψ iff x would ϕ in ψ’. Could we exploit this connection to provide an account of what it is to be a disposition? This paper is about four views of dispositionality that attempt to do so. 

In this book, we rethink the semantic phenomenon of reference and the cognitive phenomenon of singular thought. Rejecting any special relation of causal or epistemic acquaintance, we explore a semantic account that unifies definite and indefinite descriptions with names and demonstratives. On our account, all four types of expression are specific existentials,  each with its own presuppositional profile. We argue that many of the phenomena associated with reference are due to the covert use of singular   restrictions on the quantifier domain. 

“ excellent... exemplifies today’s philosophy of language at its best ”

“ one of the most important contributions to the philosophy of language of the past few years ”

“ a wonderful book ”

“ formidable... replete with ingenious and thought- provoking arguments and shows an extraordinary grasp of a wide and very complex literature ”

“ the upshot is a major reconfiguration of what has been known as the theory of reference, with ramifications for cognitive science as well as the semantics of natural language. ”

In   Mind & Language  2014 29(4), with four discussions:

Kent Bach, 'C onsulting The Reference Book '

Michael Devitt, ' Lest Auld Acquaintance Be Forgot '

Genoveva Martí, ' For the Disunity of Semantic s'

James McGilvray, ' Review of The Reference Book '

And our response from that issue:

Hawthorne & Manley, Response to Symposium Critics

Moral Realism and Semantic Plasticity

Work in progess.

Are moral terms semantically plastic—that is, would very slight changes in our patterns of use have shifted their meanings? This is a delicate question for moral realists. A 'yes' answer seems to conflict with the sorts of intuitions that support realism; but a 'no' answer seems to require a semantics that involves hefty metaphysical commitments. This tension can be illustrated by thinking about how standard accounts of vagueness can be applied to the case of moral terms, and also by considering how realists should respond to the Moral Twin Earth problem. I argue that moral realists can accept the semantic plasticity of moral expressions while accounting for contrary intuitions in a way that is nearly cost-free.

Keeping Up Appearances: A Reducer's Guide

Forthcoming in journal of philosophy.

Metaphysicians with reductive theories of reality like to say how those theories account for ordinary usage and belief. A typical strategy is to offer theoretical sentences, often called ‘paraphrases’, to serve in place of various sentences that occur in ordinary talk. But how should we measure success in this endeavor? Those of us who undertake it usually have a vague set of theoretical desiderata in mind, but we rarely discuss them in detail. My purpose in this paper is to say exactly what they are, and why. 

Dispositions Without Teleology

Oxford studies in metaphysics , vol 10.

We argue against accounting for dispositions (and of the progressive aspect) in terms of a fundamentally teleological metaphysics, and we defend our previous conditional account from some novel objections.  (Coauthored with Ryan Wasserman)

The Folk Probably Do Think What You Think They Think

Australasian journal of philosophy , 91(3): 421-441.

Much of experimental philosophy consists of surveying 'folk' intuitions about philosophically relevant issues. Are the results of these surveys evidence that the relevant folk intuitions cannot be predicted from the ‘armchair’? We found that a solid majority of philosophers could predict even results claimed to be 'surprising'. But, we argue, this does not mean that such experiments have no role at all in philosophy. (Co-authored with Billy Dunaway & Anna Edmonds)

Safety, Content, Apriority, Self-Knowledge

Journal of philosophy, 104:403-423.

I motivate a revised version of safety and then use it to (i) challenge traditional conceptions of apriority, (ii) refute ‘strong privileged access’, and (iii) resolve a well-known puzzle about externalism and self-knowledge by showing that it can be treated as any other closure puzzle. Along the way I illustrate why sensitivity is of little use when it comes to certain kinds of closure puzzle. 

When Best Theories Go Bad

Philosophy and phenomenological research, 78(2): 392-405.

It is common for contemporary metaphysical realists to adopt Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment while at the same time repudiating his ontological pragmatism. This paper argues that the resulting approach to meta-ontology is unstable. In particular, if we are metaphysical realists, it may be best to repudiate some of the ontological commitments incurred by our best first-order theories. This version fixes typos in the published version.

A Gradable Approach to Dispositions

The philosophical quarterly , 57:68-75.

We argue that previous theories of the relationship between dispositions and conditionals are unable to account for the fact that dispositions come in degrees. We also propose a fix for this problem which also avoids the familiar problems of finks and masks. (Coauthored with Ryan Wasserman.)

On Linking Dispositions With Conditionals

Mind , 117: 59-84.

Analyses of dispositional ascriptions in terms of conditional statements famously confront the problems of finks and masks. We argue that even conditional analyses of dispositions tailored to avoid finks and masks, face a battery of new difficulties: (i) Achilles' heels, (ii) accidental closeness, (iii) comparatives, (iv) explaining context sensitivity, and (v) absent stimulus conditions. We conclude by offering a proposal that avoids all seven problems. (Coauthored with Ryan Wasserman.)

Properties and Resemblance Classes

Noûs, 36: 75-96.

I examine the competing merits of resemblance-class theories of properties, arguing that the ‘companionship’ and ‘imperfect community’ problems are not avoided by appealing to classes of tropes instead of objects. If I am right, trope theory loses one of its primary selling points, and resemblance nominalists of either type must appeal to certain troublesome remedies. 

A Guided Tour of Metametaphysics

In metametaphysics (oup, 2009)..

In this introductory chapter,  sketch a taxonomy of positions in metametaphysics and present a tentative account of verbal disputes.

Works by David Manley

Reason Better: An Interdisciplinary Guide to Critical Thinking

https://app.tophat.com/e/455176/assigned/ You can access the link without registration choosing Enter as Guest option.

This course or book was created by David Manley. In essence it is a critical thinking online textbook, but with integrated exercises. Other educators, who use the same platform, can change the text according to their purposes. But even if you don’t work to register you can just read it as a regular book.

The book covers a number of topics: how the human mind works, different mindsets and point of view on reasoning, how to achieve clarity with good arguments, how to understand different forms of argument, what to do with evidence and how to apply a probabilistic approach to hypotheses, how to use generalization and what kind of errors may appear during this process, how to understand causation and relate it to evidence, how new information should change our beliefs, how to formulate theories and hypotheses correctly, how to make decisions.

The book also has a list of learning objectives at the beginning of each chapter. It helps to understand what can you learn and decide how to proceed with a chapter.

In a description of his course 1 the author said he wanted to teach only the most useful skill from different fields to create efficient critical thinkers. He also aim to teach useful dispositions, although he called them a mindset. He mostly focuses on inductive logic, which is related to probabilities, than on deductive arguments. He probably did a good job on creating a unified picture of how evidence work in different contexts.

The author proposes the texts mostly as book for teachers who teach critical thinking courses. But I believe it also can be used for self-education. I can recommend this book if you have tried several other books on critical thinking and you are looking for something different. You can also try this book if you want to learn critical thinking from scratch. The book doesn’t require much prior knowledge, and most of the required knowledge can be found online.

1. ^ : http://dailynous.com/2019/05/01/new-kind-critical-thinking-text-guest-post-david-manley/

Published on 2019-07-31

Tags: critical thinking , course review , books review

Short permalink: https://umneem.org/b51/

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Book description

A thoroughly updated introduction to the concepts, methods, and standards of critical thinking, A Practical Guide to Critical Thinking: Deciding What to Do and Believe, Second Edition  is a unique presentation of the formal strategies used when thinking through reasons and arguments in many areas of expertise. Pursuing an interdisciplinary approach to critical thinking, the book offers a broad conception of critical thinking and explores the practical relevance to conducting research across fields such as, business, education, and the biological sciences.

• Numerous real-world examples from many fields of research, which reflect the applicability of critical thinking in everyday life
• New topical coverage, including the nature of reasons, assertion and supposing, narrow and broad definitions, circumstantial reasons, and reasoning about causal claims
• Selected answers to various exercises to provide readers with instantaneous feedback to support and extend the lessons

A Practical Guide to Critical Thinking Deciding What to Do and Believe, Second Edition is an excellent textbook for courses on critical thinking and logic at the undergraduate and graduate levels as well as an appropriate reference for anyone with a general interest in critical thinking skills.

Table of contents

• Preface to First Edition
• Note to Instructors
• 1.1 The Nature of Critical Thinking
• 1.2 Critical Thinking and Knowledge
• 1.3 Knowledge and Truth
• 1.4 Knowledge and Belief
• 1.5 Knowledge and Justification
• 1.6 Good Reasons are Sufficient and Acceptable
• 1.7 When Evidence Conflicts
• 1.8 Critical Thinking and Personal Autonomy
• 1.9 Critical Thinking in Practice
• 2.1 The Place Of Definitions In Critical Thinking
• 2.2 Assertion
• 2.3 The Assertion Test
• 2.4 Constructing And Evaluating Definitions
• 2.5 Give A Slogan
• 2.6 Expand On The Slogan
• 2.7 Give Examples
• 2.8 Identify Contrasting Ideas
• 2.9 Thinking Critically About Frameworks
• 2.10 Clarifying Beliefs And Problems
• 2.11 Technical Definitions
• 2.12 Meaning In Advertisements
• 2.13 Critical Thinking In Practice
• 3.1 Critical Thinking and Arguments
• 3.2 IDentifying Premises and Conclusions
• 3.3 Dependent and Independent Premises
• 3.4 SUB-Arguments
• 3.5 Evaluating Logical Support
• 3.6 Missing Premises
• 3.7 Piling on Independent Premises
• 3.8 Critical Thinking in Practice
• 4.1 Reliable Sources
• 4.2 Undermining and Overriding Evidence
• 4.3 Observation
• 4.5 Testimony
• 4.6 Advertising
• 4.7 News Reports
• 4.8 Measurement
• 4.9 Surveys
• 4.10 Critical Thinking in Practice
• 5.1 Reasoning About Alternatives
• 5.2 The Meaning of Disjunctions
• 5.3 Reasoning by Denying a Disjunct
• 5.4 False Disjunctions
• 5.5 When are Disjunctions Acceptable?
• 5.6 Exclusive Disjunctions
• 5.7 How to Criticize Reasoning About Alternatives
• 5.8 Reasoning About Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
• 5.9 The Meaning of Conditionals
• 5.10 Valid Reasoning About Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
• 5.11 Invalid Forms of Reasoning About Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
• 5.12 Making Necessary and Sufficient Conditions Explicit
• 5.13 When are Claims About Necessary and Sufficient Conditions Acceptable?
• 5.14 Reasoning with Definitions and Standards
• 5.15 Necessary and Sufficient Causal Conditions
• 5.16 Reasoning with Causal Claims
• 5.17 Discovering Causal Conditions
• 5.18 Critical Thinking in Practice
• 6.1 REASONING BY PERFECT ANALOGY
• 6.2 IS REASONING BY PERFECT ANALOGY VALID?
• 6.3 WHEN IS AN ANALOGICAL CLAIM TRUE OR ACCEPTABLE?
• 6.4 REASONING USING REPRESENTATIONAL ANALOGY
• 6.5 REASONING WITH SAMPLES
• 6.6 WHEN ARE SAMPLES REPRESENTATIVE?
• 6.7 REASONING WITH MODELS AND MAPS
• 7.1 Thinking Critically About a Discipline
• 7.2 Identifying a Discipline's Sources of Evidence
• 7.3 Identifying a Discipline's Forms of Reasoning
• 7.4 Critical-Thinking Questions
• 7.5 Thinking Critically in Your Own Decision Making
• 7.6 Thinking Critically in Discussion
• 7.7 From Theory to Practice: Applying What We Have Learned
• Appendix A Critical Thinking Mistakes
• B.1 General Purpose Critical Thinking Strategies
• B.2 Strategies for Being Reflective About Meaning
• B.3 Strategies for Analyzing Reasons and Arguments
• End User License Agreement

Product information

• Title: A Practical Guide to Critical Thinking, 2nd Edition
• Author(s): David A. Hunter
• Release date: October 2014
• Publisher(s): Wiley
• ISBN: 9781118583081

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