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How IKEA Evolved Its Strategy While Keeping Its Culture Constant

If you’re leading your team through big changes, this episode is for you.

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The Swedish furniture maker IKEA found huge success producing quality furniture at affordable prices. But in 2017, the company was at a crossroads. Its beloved founder had died, and the exponential rise of online shopping posed a new challenge.

In this episode, Harvard Business School professors Juan Alcacer and Cynthia Montgomery break down how IKEA developed, selected, and embraced new strategic initiatives, while fortifying its internal culture. They studied how IKEA made big changes for the future and wrote a business case about it.

They explain how the company reworked its franchise agreements to ensure consistency among its global stores. They also discuss how IKEA balanced global growth with localization, developing all-new supply chains.

Key episode topics include: strategy, growth strategy, disruptive innovation, emerging markets, leadership transition, competitive strategy, company culture, succession.

HBR On Strategy curates the best case studies and conversations with the world’s top business and management experts, to help you unlock new ways of doing business. New episodes every week.

• Listen to the original HBR Cold Call episode: IKEA Navigates the Future While Staying True to Its Culture (2021)
• Find more episodes of Cold Call
• Discover 100 years of Harvard Business Review articles, case studies, podcasts, and more at HBR.org .

HANNAH BATES: Welcome to HBR On Strategy , case studies and conversations with the world’s top business and management experts, hand-selected to help you unlock new ways of doing business. The Swedish furniture maker IKEA found huge success producing quality furniture at affordable prices. But in 2017, they were at a crossroads. Their beloved founder had died, and the exponential rise of online shopping posed a new challenge. Today, we bring you a conversation about how to develop, select, and embrace a new strategic initiative – with Harvard Business School professors Juan Alcacer and Cynthia Montgomery. They studied how IKEA made big changes for the future while fortifying its internal culture and its external identity. In this episode, you’ll learn how the company reworked its franchise agreements to create a more managerial and modern culture, and ensure consistency among its global stores. You’ll also learn how they balanced global growth with localization – including new supply chains. This episode originally aired on Cold Call in June 2021. Here it is.

BRIAN KENNY: For some of the world’s most celebrated founders, the entrepreneurial drive kicks off at an early age. Mark Zuckerberg developed Facebook in his Harvard dorm room at the age of 18. Michael Dell made $200,000 upgrading computers in his first year of business, he was 19. Before Jack Dorsey founded Twitter, he created a dispatch routing platform for taxis in his hometown of St. Louis, while he was in middle school. But then there’s Ingvar Kamprad who began selling matches at the age of five to neighbors in his rural Swedish homestead. By the age of seven, he was buying matches in bulk in Stockholm and selling them at a profit back home. Ingvar learned early on that you can sell things at a low price and still make a good profit. A philosophy that fueled the success of his next business venture, IKEA. Today on Cold Call , we welcome professors, Juan Alcacer, and Cynthia Montgomery to discuss their case entitled, “What IKEA Do We Want?” I’m your host, Brian Kenny, and you’re listening to Cold Call on the HBR Presents network. Juan Alcacer’s research focuses on the international strategies of firms in the telecommunications industry and Cynthia Montgomery studies the unique roles leaders play in developing and implementing strategy. They are both members of the Strategy unit at Harvard Business School. And thank you both for joining me today. It’s great to have you on the show.

CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY: Thanks Brian.

JUAN ALCACER: Thank you for having us.

BRIAN KENNY: You’re both here for the first time, so we’ll try and make it painless so we can get you to come back on. I think people are going to love hearing about IKEA and getting an inside view. Most of us have had that experience of being like mice in a maze. When you go into an IKEA store, you are compelled to walk through the whole place. It’s really brilliant, so many of the touches and things that they’ve done. And this case helps to shine a light, I think, on some of those decisions and how they were made. I had no idea how old the company was. So just starting with its history, it’s going to be good to hear about that. Juan, I want you to start, if you could, by telling us what would your cold call be to start this case in the classroom?

JUAN ALCACER: I like to start the case, bringing in the emotions of the students and their relationship with IKEA. So most of our students have had some experience with IKEA. So I’d just start asking how many of you have been in IKEA, and then I’d start asking why? Why did you go to IKEA? And this time telling you all the things that you just mentioned, for instance, walking through the maze, going to eat the meatballs. So they started bringing all these small, decisions that were made through the years, that made IKEA, IKEA.

BRIAN KENNY: Who doesn’t love the meatballs? Cynthia, let me ask you, you’re both in the Strategy unit at Harvard Business School, there’s a lot of strategy underlying this whole case. I’m curious as to what made you decide to look at IKEA and sort of, how does it relate to your scholarship and the things that you think about; the questions you try to answer?

CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY: I’m really interested in the choices firms make about who they will be and why they will matter? The core questions at the identity of a company. In 1976 Kamprad laid out very, very carefully. What IKEA would do, who it would be. He identified its product range. The customers it would serve, the company’s pricing policy, all in a document called, The Testament of a Furniture Dealer. And he described it as, “the essence of our work.” And 45 years later, it was still required reading for all of the IKEA’s employees. It’s probably the most compelling statement of corporate purpose I’ve ever seen.

BRIAN KENNY: Remarkable in a company that’s based on furniture. It was a very, sort of powerful thing. There’s an exhibit in the case that shows the whole Testament. Maybe we can dig a little bit into the history here. I alluded to the fact that it’s been around for a long time. Cynthia, just tell us a little bit about how the company came to be and how it evolved over time.

CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY: IKEA started actually as a mail-order business in Sweden and in the late 1940s Kamprad noticed that despite a lot of demand for furniture, agreements between the furniture manufacturers and retailers were keeping furniture prices real high. He was interested in a different set of customers. And he decided that to attract farmers and working class customers, he needed to be able to offer quality furniture at lower prices.

BRIAN KENNY: What were some of the early challenges that they faced. I’m also curious a little bit about the Swedish culture and how that sort of factors in here. Because there was definitely undertones of that factoring into the way they set this up.

CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY: It’s a virtue to be frugal and to be very careful about how you spend your money. And that made a huge impression, particularly given his background, growing up on a farm for Kamprad, he decided he really wanted to lower the prices of furniture and began to do so. And it turned out that there was a very, very strong response from other furniture manufacturers who basically said that they were going to boycott him. They wouldn’t allow him into their furniture fairs, him personally, as well as his company. And so in turn, what happened was that they also pressured local suppliers not to sell to a IKEA anymore, basically trying to force him out of the market. And what happened was that that actually drove Kamprad to Poland as a source of supply because local firms wouldn’t supply him anymore. And in the process, he discovered that Polish manufacturers could actually make furniture at far, far lower costs than Swedish manufacturers. And that essentially gave IKEA a cost structure that was more like a difference in kind, than a difference in degree. And that proved enormously important to building almost insurmountable competitive advantage for IKEA.

BRIAN KENNY: He was also really keen with innovations early on that things like the restaurant area and the childcare space, what were some of the insights that drove him to make those kinds of decisions?

CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY: One of the things that he decided quite early on is that he wanted to have the stores located out of town. And the reason is because land there was much, much cheaper. So he built these ,as you described earlier, Brian, these gigantic stores on the outskirts of town and they had lots and lots of square footage and lots and lots of merchandise, but you know, it took time to get there. It took time to shop there and what he wanted to do was make it worth it for the customers to make the trip, worth it for them to spend a lot of time in the stores. So he decided to add restaurants and the now famous meatballs, which come in several flavors, actually around the world, and to add childcare centers that would care for young children while the parents shopped. On the low cost front, he was innovative in other ways, he actually borrowed the idea of flat pack from another innovator, but he’s the one that actually brought it to life in such a big way. Then he discovered that if you let the clients go in and pick off the furniture packs themselves, they could even save more money and lower the costs in the store.

BRIAN KENNY: So they have a pretty complicated org structure, when we start to dig into some of the nuance of the case. Juan, could you describe for us, how they’re set up from an org structure standpoint?

JUAN ALCACER: You have to realize that coming from Sweden, which is one of the countries with the highest taxation for corporations in the world. So early on, they decided to find some organization structure and legal structure that would allow them to lower taxes. And that created basically an ownership based on foundations, based in the Netherlands. And they decided, early on, to separate the company into pieces. One is the franchise store, which is basically running the brand and running the management image of the brand. And then the operational part of the company, which is a franchisee. And for many years, those two things were separated. The franchisee was also in charge of manufacturing and so forth. So it was a very strange structure, that was put in place in part by the charisma and the leadership style of Ingvar Kamprad. If I can go back to your question about the Swedish culture. One of the things that, at least for me, is very striking is that when you look at multinationals, there’s a thing called the liability of being a foreigner, which means that when you go to another country, you have some disadvantages. And you try to mitigate that liability of being a foreigner, by pretending to be of that particular country. IKEA went with a totally different approach, they’re totally Swedish. Names of their products are impossible to pronounce. The fact that they have meatballs, they have their Swedish flags all over the place. They embrace the Swedish spirit as a part of the brand. You don’t see many multinationals with that. That makes IKEA what it is today.

BRIAN KENNY: I definitely think that’s part of the appeal here in the US, for sure, is people being exposed to the Swedish culture in a way they never had before. What is the culture of the company like, what’s it like to work there?

JUAN ALCACER: We went to both the Netherlands and to Sweden and we had a great time. It’s a very egalitarian culture. All the VP’s, high-level managers, none of them have an assistant. Only the CEO has an assistant. They don’t have offices, so everybody shares an open space. The whole place is decorated with IKEA furniture, everybody talks to each other by their first name. It’s very collegial, very friendly.

CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY: I would add to that. I think IKEA was incredibly generous to us, in the sense that they shared all kinds of confidential, internal documents and were really willing to talk in a very open and forthright way, about both their strengths and their challenges, which was incredibly refreshing. And as Juan said, that it was very egalitarian, and not surprisingly IKEA was one of the first companies to embrace democratic design. And that spirit was everywhere in the company.

BRIAN KENNY: Cynthia, what would you say are some of the keys to their success over the years?

CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY: I’d say that IKEA basically picked a lane and stuck with it. They had clarified, as I said at the top of the show, very, very carefully about what they wanted to do, who they wanted to be. And what they said is, look, this is what we’re going to be about. We’re going to offer an extensive range of practical, well-designed furnishings at low prices. And we’re going to serve the many, not the few. And the many are those with limited financial resources. When you have such clarity about what you want to do, then you can set out and try to maximize how you approach that. Essentially IKEA built a system, to do exactly that, extremely well and their distinctiveness made them truly an iconic firm. And it’s great when you talk with students about, what’s the purpose of your business?, What are you doing? What’s interesting is that oftentimes they can describe much more carefully what IKEA is doing, than what their own businesses doing. The last thing I would add, is that as Juan one said, they’re really synonymous with Sweden and they put that right out there. It’s almost like the way that Coca-Cola is synonymous with the US. And that has been a big part of their advantage.

BRIAN KENNY: Okay. So we’ve painted a very rosy picture for IKEA, but it’s an HBS case. So there’s tension, inevitably. So let’s dig in a little bit to where the case brings us. I’m going to mispronounce his name. I hope I don’t, but Torbjörn Lööf is that close?

CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY: Yeah.

BRIAN KENNY: He is the protagonist in the case. And he is stepping into a leadership role here really after an iconic leader has stepped back and that’s a challenge. Any time that happens, and a leader has to step in. And as he starts to sort of peek underneath the hood a little bit, he starts to see some of the challenges that IKEA is facing in this now seventh decade, I guess, of their existence. So Juan, maybe you can set that up for us a little bit.

JUAN ALCACER: It’s not only that he is stepping in the shadow of a leader that created the company. It’s that the company is still controlled by the family. So this is not a public firm, this is a private firm. So, he had to basically walk a very, very thin line, trying to take IKEA towards the future, but still preserving the past. And he had basically two main tasks, one is short term, that organization restructure that we were talking about, that was very complicated was created products. As I said before, the franchisee, which is basically the one that was running all the operations, was also the manufacturer. But there were other franchises. So for instance, the operations in Middle East are run by another company. So they wanted to create a system of transparency, that all the franchises are run the same way. When you have a franchisee that has basically represented 80% of your sales, and the ones that are representing 2% or 3%, there is an imbalance of power. So they tried to create a structure that is more managerial, that is more modern, that will allow to create incentives for new franchisees to come into the system. So that transaction was basically transferring production and transferring the functions that were in the franchisee back to the franchisor. There were 25,000 people that have to move from one place to another.

BRIAN KENNY: Wow.

JUAN ALCACER: They didn’t move physically, but in terms of the legal status they shift around. And the second is to bring IKEA to the world. What they observed is that there were some changes in demographics, they were targeting the low-income, what they call the thin wallets of the world, but it turned out that people that would go to IKEA are not thin wallets anymore. These people have already moved towards the middle-class and they also have this whole, to increase the number of consumers to three billion, and that meant that they have to basically grow globally, at a rate that they have never done, before they had two or three markets, like China and India. They also have the issue of eCommerce, to pick up and every retailer in the world is dealing with that. So, it’s two steps. One, getting the house in order, and second one, creating a path for the future for IKEA to become an icon for the next 75 years.

BRIAN KENNY: Yeah. And I also think at some level it’s hard to sustain that original mission that they set out with, when you’re trying to expand so rapidly and bring in a much larger audience. Cynthia, I don’t know if you have other observations about these changes they were facing.

CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY: Absolutely. Because one thing is that you can look at the challenges that came from expanding into new geographies. But the other thing that they found in a large study that they did, is that there were challenges in their core business as well, that the countries they’d been in for a number of years, and what I’ll call the big blue box stores, mostly in developed countries. What they found is that increasingly many of their customers in those markets wanted new conveniences. They wanted stores that were located closer to city centers because a number of people say in their late twenties, early thirties are not driving and don’t have cars. And they found that there was an increasing demand for delivery and assembly services for shopping online. These trends are worrying to a huge number of retailers, but particularly a challenge to IKEA because low price, low, low price, so low that that people can recognize the difference. That being at the heart of their strategy. And customers’ willingness to spend time getting to the store, hauling furniture about, ultimately assembling it. Those are at the very, very heart of their low-cost strategy and their very distinctive value proposition. It was a big challenge within the developed markets as well.

BRIAN KENNY: And depending on where they went in the world, a different set of challenges pops up almost everywhere. Juan, you mentioned earlier that they pushed back against localization, but is that a sustainable strategy? When you’re trying to go into entirely new markets like China and India.

JUAN ALCACER: The beauty of IKEA is that they found a segment across different cultures that was very similar. College students the United States, that needed to have furniture for a few years only, it could be young couples that are opening a new house, in some places it’s immigrants that are moving from one country to another country that need to buy furniture, but they don’t have the money to do so. So there was this very common segment across the world that they were able to then define, that allows them to have basically 80% of their line, of their range, is common across countries. And they have around 10% to 20% that varies by country. Now, when they go to China, and they go to India, they find that the changes have to be of a higher scale for three reasons. One, the tastes are different, also the materials, when you are going to India and you are going to houses that are in a high humidity environment, the type of wood that you can use is different. Now you start, not only changing the look of the product but you also have to change how you made it. And the third big challenge is when you look at what is defined as thin wallet, in these markets, is really thin. It’s not thin wallet in Sweden, it’s not thin wallet in the United States. So, you have to go to prices that are really, really low. And that means that you are already a low cost producer but you have to go even lower. That means that you have to change your supplier, so it starts changing the fundamental parts of the business model that they created through the years.

BRIAN KENNY: And it could probably, pretty easily, get away from you. So this does call for a strategy. Cynthia, can you describe for us what the three roads forward are? This was sort of underpinned their strategy going forward and how they were going to deal with some of these challenges.

CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY: Basically, the three roads, the first was affordability, as Juan said, this isn’t affordability in the way that they, at the level at which they’ve traditionally thought about it. This is affordability for wallets that are either very thin or actually where the willingness to pay just isn’t as high, because they’re accustomed to having goods that are at very low prices. So they wanted to attack affordability for people who could not afford IKEA today. They cared a lot about accessibility. They’ve got to reach and interact with people where they are. And the last is sustainability, and they felt really, really strongly about this. And I think much in line with what you see with a number of other countries in Europe, that they cared a lot about the sustainability of the products and wanted to make a positive impact for people, society and the planet. And they’re taking on all three of these aspirations at once.

BRIAN KENNY: You have written many cases, I’m sure that parallel this, what are some other firms that have faced similar challenges and maybe figured out a way to deal with the same sets of challenges?

JUAN ALCACER: The challenge of going overseas, we didn’t write cases about multinationals for many years. They always have this tension between coordination in headquarters and adaptability in each one of the subsidiaries. So IKEA was very good at playing that game for many, many years. In a way they were going to countries that were somehow similar to Sweden. Now that they are venturing to countries that are farther away in many dimensions, not only physically, but also in terms of economic distribution, in terms of taste. They are seeing this tension to be amplified. We have seen that in many companies, Procter and Gamble has been doing that for years and years, Unilever has been doing that for years and years. IKEA has done it for 75 years. They went overseas very early on. But now the challenge is a little bit higher. The other challenge is that Cynthia also mentioned, which is basically adapting to new technologies and new demographics. Every retailer is facing that. Any supermarket, any chain that has been selling in brick and mortar is facing those challenges. So, what is interesting about IKEA is that they are facing these all at the same time and they’re facing this during the process of transition from the leader that created the company to a new set of managers that are more professional and are not part of the family.

BRIAN KENNY: You mentioned technology. I’m just curious, the role that the internet plays in this, because now everybody can see, you know, through YouTube and other things, what the experience is like from one place to the other, and how important is consistency across all those geographies, versus a little bit of localization to make it feel a little bit more like this is the China version of IKEA versus the European version of IKEA. Cynthia, do you have thoughts on that?

CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY: That’s the real challenge here in the sense that, how do you take this whole model that has been developed over so many years? And it’s very, very hard to imitate, which has given them a lot of strength over the years, but when the environment changes, instead of responding in a piecemeal way to all kinds of external stimuli, it’s how do you take this whole model and evolve it in some coherent way that stays true to the iconic sense of who IKEA is? I really see it fundamentally, as an existential question for IKEA.

BRIAN KENNY: Such a great point. Look, I want to thank both of you. This has been a really interesting discussion about a brand that we all know and have experienced many times firsthand. I have one more question for each of you before we part ways. And that would be if there’s one thing you want people to take away from this case, what would it be? Juan, let’s start with you.

JUAN ALCACER: What I would like listeners to take from this, is we have this mentality of growth, growth, growth, and expanding and doing different things, and when you look at IKEA, you have to wonder, is it better that IKEA stays doing what they do well, or do they have to keep growing and entering all these markets and adapt to overseas. We have this basic assumption that growth at any cost should be the goal. I would like the listeners, when they look at the case and think about the cases, to question that very basic assumption.

BRIAN KENNY: Cynthia?

CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY: One of the things about IKEA that I think it’s really, really important to know is that they really brought something different to the world and they did it in a very compelling way. So at the heart, to do something that’s distinctive, that adds value. It comes through really strong in the IKEA story. At the same time, when the environment changes, how do you evolve, is really challenging. And so the fact that they’re being so open in how they’re confronting this, I think there’s a lot to learn there. It’s a challenge. I think it’s really important to remember what’s at the heart of this company, is that they’re really bringing something that’s very unique and they need to continue to do that.

BRIAN KENNY: Juan Alcacer, Cynthia Montgomery, thank you so much for joining me. The case is called, “What IKEA do we want?” Thanks again.

JUAN ALCACER: Thank you.

HANNAH BATES: You just heard Harvard Business School professors Juan Alcacer and Cynthia Montgomery in conversation with Brian Kenny on Cold Call .  We’ll be back next Wednesday with another hand-picked conversation about business strategy from the Harvard Business Review. If you found this episode helpful, share it with your friends and colleagues, and follow our show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. While you’re there, be sure to leave us a review. We’re a production of the Harvard Business Review. If you want more podcasts, articles, case studies, books, and videos like this, find it all at HBR dot org. This episode was produced by Anne Saini, and me, Hannah Bates. Ian Fox is our editor. Special thanks to Maureen Hoch, Adi Ignatius, Karen Player, Ramsey Khabbaz, Nicole Smith, Anne Bartholomew, and you – our listener. See you next week.

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Published December 9 th 2014

IKEA & The Socializers: Building Social into the Heart of a Global Business

IKEA. One of the most instantly recognizable brands on our planet.

The infamous yellow and blue stores cover the length and breadth of the globe from Slovakia to Singapore and are a mecca to any Swedish meatball fan or first time buyer keen to deck out their new home.

The company continues to flourish, with over 200 stores in the EU alone. In November, Forbes named IKEA as the 40th most valuable brand in the world in their annual list, ahead of other household name powerhouses such as eBay, Nestlé and Mastercard.

With the organization’s motto ‘to build a better everyday life ’ ingrained in everything they do, IKEA have a huge goal to work towards for 2020. They want to make the company ‘twice as good and twice as big’ at the turn of the next decade – a pretty colossal ambition for a company that have already achieved sales of over €28 billion in 2013.

So how does a company already amongst the top 40 most valuable companies in the world look to become twice as successful?

“It is all about finding simple solutions and saving on every method, process or approach adopted – but not on ideas.” – The IKEA business concept

IKEA turned to social media to discover important insights and begin the process.

Embedding social across the enterprise

Already armed with a reputation of providing solid customer service and experiences in-store, social media presented an opportunity for the brand to go even further and forge deeper, more meaningful relationships with its customers.

IKEA embarked upon a programme to connect different business units together and establish social media as a valuable channel across regions, departments and applications in a collaborative and intelligent way.

Tasked with pioneering this positive change, the Digital Development team within Inter IKEA Systems worked with tech-focused agency The Socializers to outline a strategy to morph IKEA into a truly socially intelligent operation.

The goal & the challenge

Being early adopters of digital marketing, with their much-lauded online catalogue being downloaded over 10 million times in 2013, the value of online marketing and social media was always understood at IKEA.

However, despite running social accounts in different departments and even countries, data and important insights often remained siloed and investment in technology to support this hadn’t been a priority.

Many successful and innovative practices being undertaken in some parts of the business were not reaching other departments that would also have benefited from such information.

Inter IKEA Systems needed to find a way to bring real-time social insights into the heart of IKEA, to bring it to the attention of senior management. But not just that – the importance of social needed to be seen throughout the company, at every level.

Introducing The Listening Hub

The Listening Hub, situated within Inter IKEA Systems HQ in The Netherlands, is a space that allows for detecting, sharing and distributing of insights across the organization.

Powered by Brandwatch Vizia , The Listening Hub allows IKEA to visualize valuable consumers insights from across the globe in real-time, allowing insights to be shared throughout different departments, markets and countries. As a result, IKEA are able to be much more agile and proactive in their social activities.

“The Vizia/Brandwatch Listening Hub at Inter IKEA Systems allows key IKEA stakeholders to gain fuller insight into global conversations about the brand. The Brandwatch analytics platform provides senior stakeholders with an effective planning tool for multiple silos and regions.” Hans Garner, Digital Development, Inter IKEA Systems.

Encouraging positive change

The Listening Hub is helping to encourage a positive change across the enterprise .

Thanks to insights and learnings taken from The Listening Hub, understanding within IKEA of the value and importance of social has improved.

Information is being shared and directed to the appropriate departments for action, and a tangible culture of wisdom and experience sharing is emerging.

“The Listening Hub provides stakeholders real insights into life at home for customers who are talking about IKEA online.” Hans Gartner, Digital Development at Inter IKEA Systems B.V, Delft, The Netherlands.

We looked further into how The Listening Hub & Brandwatch Vizia are helping IKEA to become a truly social business, and work toward that goal of becoming twice the brand they are today, in our new case study.

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Exploring digitalisation at IKEA

International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management

ISSN : 0959-0552

Article publication date: 15 March 2022

Issue publication date: 19 December 2022

The paper aims to clarify how an incumbent retail organisation explores digitalisation for its existing business.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper draws from an in-depth case study of home-furnishing retail giant, IKEA conducted with semi-structured interviews, participant observations and document analyses.

In the exploration phase of digitalisation, three major activities – interpreting, interrelating and integrating – illuminate how the exploration process can be organised in practice.

Originality/value

Although digitalisation ranks amongst the most significant ongoing transformations in retail businesses, research on how incumbent retail organisations have engaged in exploring digitalisation in practice has remained scarce. The paper contributes insights into digitalisation processes in retail businesses that may also apply to other trends affecting the retail industry.

• Digitalisation
• Exploration

Hagberg, J. and Jonsson, A. (2022), "Exploring digitalisation at IKEA", International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management , Vol. 50 No. 13, pp. 59-76. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJRDM-12-2020-0510

Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2022, Johan Hagberg and Anna Jonsson

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1. Introduction

Digitalisation , defined as the “integration of digital technologies into everyday life by the digitization of everything that can be digitized” ( Hagberg et al. , 2016 , p. 696), ranks amongst the most significant ongoing transformations in business, one that has introduced new ways of doing business whilst challenging established ones ( Leeflang et al. , 2014 ). As such, digitalisation has been characterised as a disruptive change that tests industries, their accepted logics and even individual businesses (e.g. Verhoef et al. , 2015 ; Hänninen et al. , 2018 ).

In literature addressing retail, digitalisation has received increased attention from both consumers' and retailers' perspectives ( Frasquet et al. , 2021 ), including in terms of omni-channel strategies ( Verhoef et al. , 2015 ), business models ( Jocevski et al. , 2019 ), multi-sided platforms ( Hänninen et al. , 2019 ) and the reconfiguration of retail stores ( Hagberg et al. , 2017 ). Most recently, according to Hänninen et al. (2021) , such research has integrated far more discussion and theorising about digitalisation across the value chain. However, the organisational processes that catalyse the incorporation of digital technologies in retail businesses – in March's (1991) and Winter and Szulanski's (2001) terms, the exploration phase – have received less attention. Therefore, this paper focusses on that very phase – the early stage of digitalisation – to contribute insights into digitalisation in retail ( Hänninen et al. , 2021 ) whilst answering the call for research on “how firms adapt their business models in response to external threats and opportunities” ( Saebi et al. , 2017 , p. 567).

The paper aims to clarify how an incumbent retail organisation explores digitalisation for its existing business, even as potential disruptions, their meanings and their consequences remain uncertain. To that purpose, the paper builds upon an in-depth case study on IKEA, an established firm in today's dynamic retail sector, an environment in which digitalisation especially urges business actors to rethink their ways of doing business and attracting customers ( Hänninen et al. , 2018 ; Blom, 2019 ; Jocevski et al. , 2019 ). It draws upon first-hand experiences with, and insights into, how IKEA has explored digitalisation, even when the concept was relatively elusive and how it would affect IKEA's business. In describing IKEA's exploration phase and what digitalisation has meant for its business, the paper delineates three major activities of that exploratory process: (1) interpreting what digitalisation means, (2) interrelating digitalisation and the existing business and (3) integrating new ideas and solutions in light of digitalisation.

In what follows, we review literature on digitalisation in retail and research focussing on that process's exploration phase and development in businesses. Next, we describe the methodological considerations made for our case study on IKEA. After that, we present our findings in terms of three major activities that guide the exploration phase. We conclude the paper by discussing our findings in relation to the literature and addressing our research's limitations.

2. Literature review: exploring digitalisation in retail

Having significantly impacted retail in recent years, digitalisation has become an important topic in research on the industry ( Hänninen et al. , 2021 ), especially regarding specific applications of digital technology – for example, the use of smartphones in physical retail settings ( Fuentes et al. , 2017 ; Grewal et al. , 2018 ), augmented reality ( Scholz and Duffy, 2018 ; Caboni and Hagberg, 2019 ) and digital signage ( Dennis et al. , 2012 ; Jäger and Weber, 2020 ). Studies on specific technologies have been accompanied by broader frameworks for integrating various digital technologies into retail, not only by turns based upon their usage and retailers' objectives ( Wolpert and Roth, 2020 ), their social presence and consumers' convenience ( Grewal et al. , 2020 ) and their use in relation to shopping behaviour at various stages of the customer's journey ( Rosengren et al. , 2018 ; Blom, 2019 ; Roggeveen and Sethuraman, 2020 ), but also by general frameworks of what digitalisation implies for retail business overall ( Hagberg et al. , 2016 ). In such studies, digitalisation in retail has received sustained attention regarding several aspects of consumer behaviour ( Hure et al. , 2017 ; Pantano and Gandini, 2018 ), the retailer–consumer interface ( Hagberg et al. , 2016 ; Roggeveen and Sethuraman, 2020 ) and retailers' ways of doing business ( Verhoef et al. , 2015 ; Hänninen et al. , 2018 ). The processes in which incumbent retailers develop their businesses in light of digitalisation, however, have received far less attention.

Because digitalisation, understood as the integration of digital technologies, is arguably not a binary shift from one stage to another but an ongoing process without a clear beginning or end ( Hagberg et al. , 2016 ), its exploration in retail warrants a more processual perspective, particularly regarding its influence on how retail organisations alter their businesses (cf. Langley, 1999 ). Along with frameworks addressing how retail businesses can integrate digitalisation in various ways, the actual processes that may result in digital integration need to be explored and modelled. That need directs our attention to the exploratory processes through which retail businesses may approach digitalisation and, more specifically, to how digitalisation consequently influences established business models. Especially for the latter reason, we gave priority to incumbent retailers, whose business models and established ways of conducting business often confront such considerations.

Despite extensive research on what constitutes a business model, understandings differ about how to define, explore and leverage one. In fact, Teece (2018 , p. 41) has estimated that there are probably as many definitions of business model as there are models themselves. According to Ritter and Lettl (2018) , a business model, simply put, is a company's “way of doing business”. In this paper, considering how business models have been discussed in retail settings ( Sorescu et al. , 2011 , p. 4), we broadly understand a company's business model as representing “the firm's distinctive logic for value creation and appropriation”.

Although various external events may necessitate changes to ways of developing and operating businesses, digitalisation itself is not an event but an emergent, comprehensive and uncertain phenomenon. Indeed, digitalisation can span several external and internal aspects of businesses, as well as pose myriad implications for individual business models. To date, though scholars interested in digitalisation have examined different approaches to innovating business models, from making gradual, evolutionary adjustments to radically altering them ( Berends et al. , 2016 ; Inigo et al. , 2017 ; Snihur and Wiklund, 2019 ), how the exploration phase of digitalisation is understood and organised merits further investigation.

Following March's (1991 , p. 71) definition, exploration refers to searching for, innovating and experimenting with something novel. The concept as used by March (1991) is often considered in relation to exploitation, which refers to refinement, efficiency and implementation of “old” routines or certainties in an organisation. As noted by He and Wong (2004 , p. 481), researchers in strategic management, organisation theory and managerial economics have applied the two concepts in order to understand how innovations occur and how an organisation learn and develop dynamic capabilities to meet change. Previous studies either focus on the trade-off between exploration and exploitation or the balancing act between the two as discussed within literature focussing on ambidexterity and means for developing dynamic capabilities (e.g. Benner and Tushman, 2003 ; He and Wong, 2004 ; Vahlne and Jonsson, 2017 ). The two concepts have also been applied in processual research describing the evolution and development of an organisation. Winter and Szulanski (2001) use the two concepts when outlining their theory of replication as strategy and suggest a two-phase model where the organisation first enters the exploration phase “in which the business model is created or refined” (p. 731) and then move on to the exploitation phase. The argument that exploration and exploitation can be understood in terms of different phases of a process has been adopted also by researchers focussing on, for instance, retailers' internationalisation process ( Jonsson and Foss, 2011 ), the transition into retail omni-channel strategies ( Picot-Coupey et al. , 2016 ) and reverse knowledge flows within franchise organisations ( Friesl and Larty, 2018 ). Still, how the exploration phase is organised and how it can be understood remains to be further investigated. To the best of our knowledge, there is a dearth of research focussing specifically on the exploration phase and how it develops in practice. Whilst existing studies do explore the exploration phase, it is also discussed in relation to the exploitation phase with focus on the outcomes rather than the processual aspects of the phase as such. For this paper, we zoom in on and examine the exploration phase and how it can be understood in the context of retail digitalisation. In particular, when emergent trends such as digitalisation, a change process, challenge established business models, more comprehensively re-engaging the exploration phase can become essential.

3. Methodology

Investigating a complex phenomenon such as digitalisation, and given our aim, calls for a qualitative in-depth case study ( Eisenhardt, 1989 ). According to Dyer and Wilkins (1991 , pp. 615–617), case studies aim to “provide a rich description of the social scene”, “describe the context in which events occur” and thus offer opportunities for other researchers to see “phenomena in their own experience and research”. In that sense, rich, explorative case studies provide avenues for future research or, as more broadly conceived by Doz (2011 , p. 588), “offer the opportunity to help move the field forward and assist in providing its own theoretical grounding”.

Our in-depth case study focussed on IKEA, a global home-furnishing retail company, and its work with developing an understanding of digitalisation. IKEA is a particularly interesting case that has attracted practitioners seeking a benchmark in a hitherto successful business model (e.g. Jonsson and Elg, 2006 ; Edvardsson and Enquist, 2011 ; Burt et al. , 2016 ). IKEA has frequently been used as an empirical example in the business models literature (e.g. Hedman and Kalling, 2003 ; Sorescu et al. , 2011 ) and subject to in-depth case studies of the development of specific aspects related to the IKEA business model over time (see e.g. Salzer, 1994 ; Jonsson, 2007 ; Tarnovskaya et al. , 2008 ; Edvardsson and Enquist, 2011 ; Hellström and Nilsson, 2011 ; Burt et al. , 2016 , 2021 ). In addition, there are several studies of various aspects related to digitalisation, including store format development ( Hultman et al. , 2017 ) and comparison of IKEA's digital catalogue and website ( Garnier and Poncin, 2019 ). IKEA has also served as an in-depth case for studies of exploration in relation to exploitation and replication ( Jonsson and Foss, 2011 ; Vahlne and Jonsson, 2017 ). The present study adds to this literature through an in-depth case study of IKEA's digitalisation process in an early explorative phase.

In the ten months from September 2014 to June 2015, we observed IKEA's work on exploring digitalisation and the trend's potential impacts on various parts of the organisation's business model and participated in a project undertaken in support of such exploration. In that form of action research ( Patton, 1980 ), engaging in IKEA's internal exploratory work as researchers allowed us to understand digitalisation's implications by discussing them with representatives at IKEA, which, at the time, considered knowledge of those implications to be important because they, along with digitalisation itself, remained unknown. Using such methods enabled us to contrast findings from interviews with findings from observations and synthesise the results in light of theory ( Ghauri and Grönhaug, 2002 ). In particular, our case study revolved around two ongoing projects and the processes of working within them: IKEA's “E-Commerce Programme”, later named the “Multichannel Transformation Programme”, and a project designed as a pre-study addressing the future role of IKEA's physical stores and the challenges and opportunities that they face amid digitalisation.

We collected data with three overlapping methods: in-depth semi-structured interviews, participant observations and document analyses (for an overview, see Table 1 ). As for the first, we conducted 21 interviews with senior executives with different functions in different departments at IKEA as detailed in Table 1 . Using purposeful sampling, we interviewed IKEA managers and employees working with and/or preparing for the organisation's digitalisation about their experiences with and thoughts on the concept of digitalisation and its implications. The interviews combined retrospective questions about IKEA's business model with questions about current situations experienced by the interviewees and prospective enquiries about IKEA's future in relation to digitalisation. All interviews began with open-ended questions about digitalisation in general and digitalisation at IKEA in particular. As the interviews progressed, questions became more structured and delved into the future role of IKEA stores, the specific challenges that IKEA faces, whether they will affect the IKEA concept and if so, then how. All interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim and translated into English in those cases the interviews were made in Swedish.

Meanwhile, participant observations involved three meetings – before, during and after data collection, respectively – with the project manager of the pre-study to discuss the overall project. Those meetings lasted 11 h and 36 min in all. We also engaged in both in-store observations and meetings, lasting 10 h in total, whilst visiting an IKEA store in the Altona borough of Hamburg, Germany that operates as a test store for new concepts (e.g. urban proximity, technical solutions and delivery solutions). The local managers who accompanied us during our in-store observations also met with us twice: once with five other store managers and once with five employees from different departments. We conducted both meetings as group interviews guided by the same questionnaire used in the individual interviews. During all observations, we took field notes for data about the employees' perspectives and what digitalisation meant in practice. That information was valuable when conducting interviews with IKEA managers responsible for strategic decision-making and for translating digitalisation into IKEA's business model. Last, we also collected documents and visual communication, both public and internal, for analysis. The internal documents contained information about the pre-study, the “E-Commerce Programme”, the “Multichannel Transformation Programme” and the movie “ Shop with Laura ” (see Table 1 ) and public documents included information about the IKEA history, vision and business idea statements. Documents were collected on the basis of their mentioning during the interviews or participant observation sessions. These constituted sources of detailed information preserved from the time in which they were written and less dependent on the informants' memories. Throughout data collection, we facilitated informants' validation of the data on several occasions (cf. Silverman, 2006 ), which afforded us the opportunity to discuss our observations and findings with the participants. Apart from our participant observations, we also hosted two internal workshops with the project manager of the pre-study to discuss our findings.

To analyse the data, we used systematic combining ( Dubois and Gadde, 2002 ) – i.e. alternated focus between our empirical material and theory – whilst developing our case study and the emerging framework. For integrity's sake, we triangulated the three major sources of data – participant observations, interviews and document analysis ( Silverman, 2006 ) – during all four steps of data analysis. First, we coded the transcripts with reference to keywords and phrases related to digitalisation and its consequences for the retail industry in general and IKEA in particular. In that step, we adopted an emic perspective that prioritised the perceptions and understandings of the informants ( McCracken, 1988 ). Second, following Langley's (1999) suggestion, we took a narrative approach to comprehending the process-related data, namely by drafting a general description of the process with illustrative quotations from material collected in the field ( Berends et al. , 2016 ). Third, whilst working abductively between the empirical material and our emerging analytical framework, we used theoretical coding ( Charmaz, 2014 ) to sort, integrate and organise the material to represent a three-phase process. In so doing, we gradually shifted to an etic perspective – i.e. from the informants' perspective to our own perspectives as observers of the empirical material. Fourth and finally, we reorganised the material and wrote a case narrative structured according to the three abovementioned activities as presented next.

4. Exploring digitalising: the IKEA way

In the past 70 years, IKEA has grown from a small, family owned company in Sweden into the world's largest retailer of home furnishings. Arguably, IKEA's rapid international expansion resulted from the three-phase development of a formula that has been replicated in all markets where IKEA has entered an expanded, where the first phase commenced by exploring IKEA's business idea and opening test stores in markets outside Sweden ( Jonsson and Foss, 2011 ).

IKEA's business idea builds upon two concepts – the idea concept and the concept in practice – that together define what, in theoretical terms, could be understood as IKEA's business model. Whereas the idea concept refers to IKEA's vision “to create a better everyday life for the many people”, its philosophy of co-creation (i.e. “We do our part, and you do yours”) and the central role of IKEA stores, the concept in practice refers to IKEA's practices of examining specific sets of variables whilst adjusting to local markets ( Jonsson and Foss, 2011 , p. 1,090). The two concepts are mutually dependent; if the concept in practice does not change, then the practices of the idea concept will eventually become irrelevant and not reach “the many people”.

In 2014, drawing from insights during its internationalisation, IKEA realised that digitalisation could be both a challenge and an opportunity amid its recently declining expansion. For decades, IKEA had experienced outstanding success in replicating its business model: an average yearly increase in sales of approximately 8–10%, the constant meeting of new sales targets and a steady rate of expansion, with 12–14 store openings per year. In 2013, however, IKEA's steady growth declined in some markets, as the rapid worldwide growth of e-commerce in retailing continued to challenge physical stores and change the competition. In response, the company decided to decelerate its international expansion in favour of exploring what digitalisation could mean for their established business model. At IKEA, it was, therefore, considered increasingly important to return to a state of exploration in which key variables describing the idea concept and the established concept in practice would be re-evaluated. Moreover, as increasingly more young employees at IKEA sought new, 21st-century ways of reaching “the many people” – i.e. current and potential customers – both IKEA's employees and customers began looking for digital solutions and new ways of working.

In the following sections, we recount how IKEA engaged in exploring digitalisation in the IKEA way and how it (re)imagined reaching “the many people” in the shifting retail landscape. The story begins when the intersection of digitalisation and IKEA's business model was becoming increasingly apparent but not yet regarded as a phenomenon that would require radical changes, and it ends six months later, when the exploration phase resulted in an understanding and approach that we term the re(in)innovation of IKEA's business idea. In particular, we discuss how IKEA interpreted, interrelated and integrated digitalisation with its established ways of doing business. Although we have structured our discussion in three subsections, each addressing one of those three activities, the activities should not be considered as occurring along a linear path but instead as three aspects of the exploration phase.

For an overview of the activities and related steps, please see Table 2 .

4.1 Interpreting digitalisation

In 2014, aware that IKEA retailers in the USA were witnessing a cannibalising effect on their physical stores because of e-commerce, IKEA took its first steps towards exploring digitalisation. IKEA realised that its E-Commerce Programme launched only a year prior, could not simply be rolled out as initially planned but needed to be informed by a discussion about what e-commerce and digitalisation would mean for sales in IKEA's physical stores. Although digitalisation was becoming a widely discussed concept in retail at the time, it had remained undefined, and it was unclear how, or even whether, it was distinct from e-commerce. Recognising that possibility, IKEA's global expansion manager initiated several internal projects to explore what digitalisation meant and how it might relate to IKEA's business idea.

E-commerce is how we do business electronically, so it's about selling: selling online. But digitalisation is much bigger than that […] It's about the whole company, because it involves, for example, online learning. I think that e-commerce is not just about selling; it's about fulfilment, the buying process. (Development Manager, E-Commerce Programme)

Digitalisation is broader than e-commerce. It's also more about how we approach customers: how we communicate and how we ensure that all of our customers have the same knowledge, whether they're buying things in the store or online. Digitalisation is something that happens in the store. It's how we provide all of the information to our customers: where the products come from, what they do and how you can use them. (Supply Manager, IKEA Supply AG, Logistics)

As that quotation suggests, despite references to what digitalisation might mean and what it truly is, its signification remained vague. Even so, it appears that digitalisation might have generally been understood as offering digital information to customers. Making sense of digitalisation thus involved distinguishing digitalisation from e-commerce to not only explain how the concepts differed but also make digitalisation manageable for and relevant to customers.

So, all of a sudden, the amount of information that we have about people and how they live, move, interact etc. is phenomenal. And it's in combination. It's not urbanisation only; it's urbanisation plus digitalisation that gives us the opportunities. It's an example of how combined trends can become very powerful. (Digital Business Manager, Inter IKEA Systems B.V.)

It is exponential because every new invention in the digital space is built on previous ones. So, it's a combined effect that creates exponential speed. So, ignoring it, as Kodak or Nokia did, will be very dangerous. On the contrary, it can be very powerful, like for Apple, Google, Facebook, etc.

For me, digitalisation is a moving target. Its content is changing all of the time. To some extent, we use a lot of digital technology already—it's just that it’s outdated, right—so we're changing how we digitalise instead of digitalising something that is not digital. (Global Retail Logistics Manager, Retail Logistics IKEA of Sweden)

Gradually, it became clear that digitalisation not only needed to be understood in the sense of selling goods online but would have broader implications for the company. As a case in point, when observing customers who had already developed new shopping behaviours – using mobile phones to search for products from both outside and inside stores, for example – IKEA realised that new mobile solutions had to be integrated with traditional retail logic. As a result, IKEA unveiled the “Future Role of the IKEA Store in a Multichannel Environment” project to emphasise the need to understand and combine related trends. The project was initiated to jumpstart a shift towards what IKEA called a “seamless customer journey”. Consisting of five sub-projects, the project prompted the redefinition of the E-Commerce Programme and later evolved into the Multichannel Transformation Programme.

Digitalisation means nothing, I would say. Because what we want is to secure a solution for when you, the customer, move between the store and the web. It might be a digital solution, but it can also be a physical solution, or something else. The only thing that's important is to solve some sort of need and to learn more about those needs. (Group Retail Manager, Global Retail Services IKEA Group)

The expansion manager also emphasised that instead of simply focussing on defining digitalisation, routines and skills need to be developed for facilitating “disruptive developments” and finding new solutions and ways of testing new ideas. Understanding how various activities were organised and integrated was also considered to be pivotal. The idea addressed in many interviews – namely, that digitalisation both enables and requires the integration of knowledge – was explained as enhancing the focus on customers and their experiences. That perspective marked a shift into the phase in which IKEA began actively exploring what digitalisation meant to its ways of doing business by revisiting the idea concept and the concept in practice.

Altogether, the first activity of the exploration phase, interpreting, refers to ways of understanding and making sense of digitalisation and the changes that it was considered to imply. The process can be described as encompassing three steps: differentiating (i.e. distinguishing and delimiting digitalisation from other concepts), combining (i.e. making connections between digitalisation and other trends and concepts) and concretising (i.e. defining digitalisation and making it actionable). Building upon lessons from that work, IKEA transitioned into the second activity of exploration where it began relating digitalisation more explicitly to IKEA way of doing business.

4.2 Interrelating digitalisation with established business ideas

Whilst interpreting digitalisation, informants increasingly reflected on what it would mean for IKEA's established business ideas. After all, the replication formula was being challenged by not only digitalisation but also urbanisation. Mounting criticism about globalisation and calls for de-growth were also seen as challenging the existing understanding of doing business – i.e. by selling furniture “to the many people” – and concerns for sustainability were identified as needing to be incorporated into understandings of digitalisation.

To ensure that all IKEA employees shared the same interpretation of digitalisation and how it relates to IKEA's established business model, it was considered to be necessary to visualise the future. To convince internal sceptics, it was considered to be especially important to also visualise how digitalisation could generate opportunities for sales and attract a broader customer base and thereby more fully reach “the many people”. It additionally required ideas about urbanisation, sustainability and ways of offering not only furniture but also services, both in terms of continuity and making it easier to shop. Some proposals even conceived collaborating with second-hand retailers or establishing an organisation that would create opportunities to sell recycled and/or used furniture.

We wanted to have a completely different kind of interaction with our customers: a completely different type of conversation, a completely different type of engagement. So, I made a video that I think is very entertaining. […] She [Laura, the protagonist] wants to decorate her children's room, and the videos show her journey until she's satisfied. (Web and Digital Manager, Web and Digital Retail Services)

To develop a “seamless” experience for customers, it was considered to be crucial to introduce multiple perspectives, which seemed to require visualising the journey of customers in order to ensure focus on their experiences. To that end, it was expressed that all perspectives in IKEA's value chain had to be considered, and a consensus was emerging that different perspectives needed to be integrated in order to realise digitalisation. It was also clear that integrating knowledge from various functions in order to avoid a silo mentality would require more effort.

Our model has been built on direct deliveries to our stores, where you [the customer] do your part, we do our part, and then we save money. We need to think about a completely different kind of integration in how we develop and how we lead the overall development. To make that happen, we're now investing billions in new infrastructure—large investments in IT—but that's not what will take us into the future . (Group Retail Manager, Global Retail Services IKEA Group)

It was necessary to look inwards and to involve different views and perspectives, both across different parts of the company and from the outside. The same informant underscored the importance of accessing different perspectives to also “integrate the outside perspective into our structure, so that we do not get too isolated and, in that way, also cultivate our own skills”. The involvement of different functions and external partners prompted discussions about what digitalisation meant in relation to the established retail logic of “You do your part, we do our part (and together we save money)”. As it became clear that digitalisation would inevitably affect IKEA's business model, the question of how that process would unfold increasingly became the topic of discussion.

In sum, the second activity of the exploration phase, interrelating, refers to assessing digitalisation in relation to established ways of doing business in three steps: visualising (i.e. what the future might look like), mapping (i.e. what functions, areas and parts of the business model will be involved) and evaluating (i.e. how digitalisation will affect the business model and current ways of doing business). Based upon insights from that work, IKEA advanced to putting lessons learnt into practice and began the third activity: integrating new knowledge with existing knowledge.

4.3 Integrating digitalisation into a business model

From the internal projects related to efforts of interpreting digitalisation and interrelating it to other trends, IKEA's managers concluded that its established business model needed an update and that the antidote, digitalisation, also offered an opportunity to fully realise the business idea of offering products and services to “the many people”. To that end, testing new ideas, learning from them and making any necessary adjustments were considered to be important tasks. Thus, to be able to integrate digitalisation with the business model, it was necessary to experiment with numerous ideas and solutions as was done at numerous IKEA locations. For example, at IKEA in Altona, new ideas and concepts were tested to see whether they could satisfy a more digital, urban segment of customers. The Altona store was not only constructed differently from the standard global store format, in terms of size and layout, but also to accommodate for trends in urbanisation. It had also been adapted to test new concepts in practice, including new logistics and distribution solutions, and the normal pathway through the IKEA store had been partly removed to attract customers passing by outside. In the United Kingdom, by comparison, as a result of exploring digitalisation and testing new digital solutions, IKEA had launched its first app.

Experiences from testing new ideas and solutions were transferred back to the IKEA Group and Inter IKEA Systems. Thus, an important step was reviewing and learning from those experiences followed by transferring them internally within the organisation. In relation to the Altona store, both IKEA's management team in Germany and the IKEA Group's management team followed the experiences closely. Beyond that, many employees from IKEA worldwide visited the UK and/or Altona stores simply out of curiosity.

That's the essence of IKEA. If you remove everything, then the core is what's left, and that's IKEA… [We] need to develop our concept, take it further and say, “This is how I see IKEA today”. We have to be on track and dare to test and create other formats… So, IKEA has to change; otherwise, it's the beginning of the end. (Group Retail Manager, Global Retail Services IKEA Group)

The concept manager also reflected on how those changes would affect the idea concept and the concept in practice, as well as the latter should not come at the former's expense: “I mean the concept, if we go back to it, and the vision… part of the recipe for success has been just doing things together, engaging people” (IKEA Concept Manager, Inter IKEA Systems B.V.). Thus, integrating digitalisation into IKEA's business also implied reconnecting with IKEA's roots and reflecting on the idea concept as “the core of the core”. After all, although IKEA was changing at the time and continues to change, it remains the same IKEA. In that sense, revising the business model appeared to be quite natural, for though it had always changed in one sense, in another sense it had also always remained intact. The conclusion was that to be able to sustain the idea concept, “the core of the core”, the concept in practice needed to change, which would imply searching for new formats and new solutions to further leverage IKEA's business. IKEA's managers realised that although the basic needs were the same, people had changed and were continuing to change, and the experiences of customers demanded far more focus. For those reasons, a new position, global customer experience manager, was created. The shift implied a return to the core of IKEA's concept and vision – “to provide products and services that are both cost-efficient and innovative” – and that digitalisation had forced IKEA to rethink its processes of achieving those ends. As another informant argued, the entire process of re-evaluating the way of doing business – i.e. the IKEA way – had alerted managers and employees not only to IKEA's strong vision and business model, but also its need to seize the opportunity to fully realise that vision and reach “the many people” both online and offline.

All of the work to prepare IKEA for the digital shift had prompted a return to the company's roots and the questioning of proven solutions, which is indeed one of IKEA's ten values, perhaps best be described as shifting from interpreting digitalisation and interrelating with IKEA's business model into integrating and turning it into practice. That integrative phase also precipitated how IKEA re(in)novated its business model. IKEA's approach of digitalisation could thus be understood as returning to the company's original idea; the understanding of the idea concept will never change, but the concept in practice has to be rethought and new ideas and practices tested and evaluated in order to continue to reach “the many people”. To that end, practising and testing new solutions were crucial strategies for IKEA, not to mention integral to the IKEA concept and its organisational culture.

In all, the third activity of the exploration phase, integrating, refers to the actual digitalisation of the business idea by steps of practising (i.e. developing and trying different solutions to test and learn from them), reviewing (i.e. sharing knowledge within the organisation to learn from practice) and revising (i.e. connecting and evaluating changes to the established business model in order to provide continuity).

5. Conclusion

This paper has sought to illuminate how an incumbent retail organisation approached digitalisation for its existing business at an early, exploratory phase when possible disruptions, their meanings and their consequences remained uncertain. To that aim, we have provided an account based upon our in-depth case study of IKEA and how the company explored digitalisation at an early stage. We have delineated the exploration phase as consisting of three chief activities – interpreting, interrelating and integrating – each of which we have detailed by identifying certain steps therein. Together, and with reference to IKEA's case, those aspects allow an understanding of the exploration phase.

Compared with previous studies on exploration and exploitation (e.g. March 1991 ; Winter and Szulanski, 2001 ) and specifically in the context of retailing ( Jonsson and Foss, 2011 ; Picot-Coupey et al. , 2016 ; Friesl and Larty, 2018 ), our paper contributes with insights on how the exploration phase is understood and organised in practice. The study further contributes to previous literature of IKEA's business model ( Hedman and Kalling, 2003 ; Sorescu et al. , 2011 ) and specific aspects of the IKEA business model (see e.g. Edvardsson and Enquist, 2011 ; Burt et al. , 2016 , 2021 ) by outlining the exploration phase in further detail. Although the activities of the exploration phase – interpreting, interrelating and integrating – stem from a specific case, we believe, following the potential of qualitative in-depth case studies ( Dyer and Wilkins, 1991 ; Doz, 2011 ), that they may provide value for analysing what digitalisation or any other current or future trend means to retail businesses apart from IKEA.

Because our study was performed at a relatively early phase of adapting the business model at IKEA, some of the outcomes of that process were beyond our study's time frame. However, conducting the study during the process afforded the advantage of revealing ambiguities, scepticism and reservations amongst employees and managers, all of which are important for understanding how retail businesses can be transformed in practice due to digitalisation. In hindsight, some of those uncertainties may be expected to fade or fall into oblivion once changes appear as a continuation of their antecedents and become institutionalised in the ordinary course of business, whether such a development occurs and, if so, then how it remains to be investigated. In any case, a key contribution of our study is the understanding of how an organisation such as IKEA, a global retail giant, organises its efforts to explore digitalisation in relation to its existing business. Still, as this study was conducted in a relatively early phase of the digital transformation, we believe that the findings may differ from later implementations when digitalisation has increasingly become a norm rather than an exception and retailers having increased abilities to learn from their and other's previous experiences. An important opportunity for further research would be to study more recent cases of exploration phases in relation to digitalisation as well as comparing incumbents and entrants as well as larger and smaller organisations.

Using a case study to develop an understanding of digitalisation in retail has advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it affords a more profound understanding of how retail businesses are transformed due to digitalisation in practice, as well as detailed insights into the practical work within the company (cf. Saebi et al. , 2017 ). On the other, however, it can be difficult to apply the results of case studies in forming a basis for scientific generalisation ( Yin, 2003 ). Although an analysis based upon a particular case can indeed provide an understanding of the practical process, that process is liable to differ between companies and between industries. In IKEA's case, as an organisation that many companies use as a benchmark due to its long-term success, no precedent construct existed for understanding how digitalisation in retail would look – for example, by relying on normative models – but instead surfaced as an emerging process. A better understanding of how a specific retailer has approached digitalisation complements current understandings of retail's digitalisation in general ( Hagberg et al. , 2016 ; Hänninen et al. , 2021 ). By extension, we believe that the suggested conceptual framework for understanding and organising the exploration phase could be a useful tool for retail managers to explore not only digitalisation, but also any other transformation and the consequences for their businesses.

Types of data sources

Exploring digitalization in relation to an established business model

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Acknowledgements

The authors contributed equally to this work. The paper is part of a research project with financial support from The Swedish Retail and Wholesale Development Council. The authors would like to thank Niklas Egels-Zandén for comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and also colleagues Catrin Lammgård and Malin Sundström who were also part of the research project. In addition, the authors would like to thank the people at IKEA who have contributed with their time and reflections, and in particular, the authors would like to appreciate Martin Hansson and Carole Bates for showing interest in this research and for inviting the authors to participate in the internal work of trying to interpret what retail digitalization means to IKEA.

Corresponding author

About the authors.

Johan Hagberg is professor of business administration specialising in marketing at the School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg. His research revolves around the digitalization of retailing, consumption and markets.

Anna Jonsson is associate professor at Lund University, School of Economics and Management. Her research interests include learning and knowledge sharing in organizations and society. She has conducted research about various industries and organizations, including the retail industry.

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IKEA Case: One Company’s Fight to End Child Labor

A business ethics case study.

In this business ethics case study, Swedish multinational company IKEA faced accusations relating to child labor abuses in the rug industry in Pakistan which posed a serious challenge for the company and its supply chain management goals.

Empty garage with a highlighted walking path in front of an IKEA.

Photo credit: mastrminda/Pixabay

Yuvraj Rao '23 , a 2022-23 Hackworth Fellow at the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics graduated with a marketing major and entrepreneurship minor from Santa Clara University.

Introduction

IKEA is a Swedish multinational company that was founded in 1943 by Ingvar Kamprad. [1] The company mainly provides simple, affordable home furniture and furnishings, and it pioneered DIY, or do it yourself, furniture. Kamprad originally sold binders, fountain pens, and cigarette lighters, but eventually expanded to furniture in 1948. According to the Journal of International Management, in 1953, Kamprad offered products that came as “a self assembled furniture” for the lowest price, which ultimately became a key part of IKEA’s value proposition going forward. In 1961, IKEA started to contact furniture factories in Poland to order chairs from a factory in Radomsko. [2] Outsourcing to Poland was mainly due to other Swedish furniture stores pressuring Swedish manufacturers to stop selling to IKEA. In the mid 1960’s, IKEA continued its supplier expansion into Norway, largely because IKEA didn’t want to “own their own line of production,” [3] and Germany due to its ideal location (downtown, suburban area) to place an IKEA store. Given IKEA’s suppliers were now not just in Sweden, it led to an increased importance on developing strong relationships with its suppliers.

In the following decades, IKEA continued its expansion and solidified its identity as a major retail outlet with parts being manufactured around the world. By the mid 90’s, IKEA was the “world’s largest specialized furniture retailer with their GDP reaching $4.5 billion in August of 1994.” [4] It also worked with 2,300 suppliers in 70 different countries, who supplied 11,200 products and had 24 “trading offices in nineteen countries that monitored production, tested product ideas, negotiated products, and checked quality.” [5] IKEA’s dependence on its suppliers ultimately led to problems in the mid 1990’s. At this time, IKEA was the largest furniture retailer in the world, and had nearly “100 stores in 17 countries.” [6] Also during this time, a Swedish documentary was released that highlighted the use of child labor in the rug industry in Pakistan, which impacted IKEA given it had production there. The rug industry in particular is extremely labor intensive and is one of the largest “export earners for India, Pakistan, Nepal and Morocco.” Here, children are forced to work long hours for very little pay (if there is any pay at all). In some cases, their wages are only enough to pay for food and lodging. In cases where children are not paid, the wages are used by the loom owner to pay the parents and agents who brought the children to the factories. Additionally, the work the children must do comes with a lot of risk. More specifically, children face risks of diminishing eyesight and damaged lungs from “the dust and fluff from the wool used in the carpets.” [7] As a result of these working conditions, many of these children are very sick when they grow up. Despite these terrible conditions, it isn’t that simple for families not to send children to work at these factories. A lot of the parents can’t afford food, water, education, or healthcare, so they are often left with no choice but to send their children to work for an additional source of income. [8]

 IKEA and Child Labor Accusations

The accusations of child labor in the rug industry in Pakistan posed a serious challenge for IKEA and its supply chain management goals. It would need to address the serious issues of alleged injustice for the sake of its reputation and brand image. Additionally, as IKEA also had suppliers in India, it would need to be in compliance with India’s “landmark legislation act against child labor, the Child Labor (Prohibition and Regulation) Act of 1986.” [9]

As a result of these accusations, IKEA ultimately ended its contracts with Pakistani rug manufacturers, but the problem of child labor in its supply chain still persisted in other countries that were supplying IKEA. Marianne Barner, the business area manager for rugs for IKEA at the time, stated that the film was a “real eye-opener…I myself had spent a couple of months in India for some supply chain training, but child labor was never mentioned.” [10] She also added that a key issue was that IKEA’s “buyers met suppliers at offices in the cities and rarely visited the actual production sites.” [11] The lack of visits to the actual production sites made it difficult for IKEA to identify the issue of child labor in these countries.

To make matters worse, in 1995, a German film “showed pictures of children working at an Indian rug supplier... ‘There was no doubt that they were rugs for IKEA,’ says business area manager for textiles at the time, Göran Ydstrand.” [12] In response to these accusations, Barner and her team went to talk to suppliers in Nepal, Bangladesh, and India. They also conducted surprise raids on rug factories and confirmed that there was child labor in these factories. The issue of child labor, along with the accusations of having formaldehyde (a harmful chemical) in IKEA’s best selling BILLY bookcases and the discovery of unsafe working conditions for adults (such as dipping hands in petrol without gloves), led to increased costs and a significantly damaged reputation for the company.

It was later discovered that the German film released in 1995 was fake, and the renowned German journalist who was responsible for this film was involved in “several fake reports about different subjects and companies.” [13] IKEA was now left with three options. First, some members of IKEA management wanted to permanently shut down production of their rugs in South Asia. Another option was to do nothing and proceed with its existing practices now that it was announced that the film was fake. The third option was that the company could attempt to tackle the issue of child labor that was clearly evident in its supply chain, regardless of whether the film was fake or not. IKEA ultimately decided to opt for the third option, and its recent discoveries would eventually help guide the policies the company implemented to address these issues, particularly child labor in India.

Steps Taken to Address Child Labor in the Supply Chain

IKEA took multiple steps to deal with its damaged reputation and issues of child labor in its supply chain. One way in which it did this was through institutional partnerships. One such partnership was with Save the Children, which began in 1994. According to Save the Children’s website, one of the main goals of their partnership is to realize children's “rights to a healthy and secure childhood, which includes a quality education. By listening to and learning from children, we develop long-term projects that empower communities to create a better everyday life for children.” [14] Furthermore, the partnership is intended to “drive sustainable business operations across the entire value chain.” [15] Together, IKEA and Save the Children are focused on addressing the main causes of child labor in India’s cotton-growing areas. [16] Save the Children also advised IKEA to bring in an independent consultant to ensure that suppliers were in compliance with their agreements, which further improved IKEA’s practices in its supply chain. IKEA also partnered with UNICEF to combat child labor in its supply chain. According to the IKEA Foundation, in 2014, IKEA provided UNICEF with six new grants totaling €24.9 million with a focus “on reaching the most marginalized and disadvantaged children living in poor communities and in strengthening UNICEF’s response in emergency and conflict situations.” Additionally, five of the six grants were given to help programs in “Afghanistan, China, India, Pakistan, and Rwanda,” with a “focus on early childhood development, child protection, education, and helping adolescents to improve their lives and strengthen their communities.” [17]

Next, IKEA and Save the Children worked together to develop IWAY, which was launched in 2000. [18] IWAY is the IKEA code of conduct for suppliers. According to the IKEA website, “IWAY is the IKEA way of responsibly sourcing products, services, materials and components. It sets clear expectations and ways of working for environmental, social and working conditions, as well as animal welfare, and is mandatory for all suppliers and service providers that work with IKEA.” [19] In addition, IWAY is meant to have an impact in the following four areas: “promoting positive impacts on the environment,” “securing decent and meaningful work for workers,” “respecting children’s rights”, and “improving the welfare of animals in the IKEA value chain.” [20] IWAY is used as a foundation to collaborate with IKEA’s suppliers and sub-contractors to ensure supply chain transparency.

As mentioned previously, one of the main goals of IKEA’s partnership with Save the Children was to address child labor in India’s cotton-growing areas. To do this, IKEA and Save the Children developed a program that would ultimately help more than 1,800 villages between 2009 and 2014. More specifically, the program moved nearly 150,000 children out of child labor and into classrooms. Also, as a result of this program, more than 10,000 migrant children “moved back into their home communities.” [21] Last but not least, the program trained almost 2,000 teachers and 1,866 Anganwadi workers (whose duties include teaching students and educating villagers on healthcare [22] ) in order to provide each village with a community leader. This was to ensure that the community had a skilled leader to assist in educating the villagers. In 2012, the IKEA Foundation and Save the Children announced that they would expand with new programs in Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan. This joint program illustrates IKEA’s commitment to improving communities in addition to helping children go to school.

Conclusion & Looking Ahead

IKEA has taken numerous steps to ensure that suppliers abide by the IWAY Code of Conduct. Companies around the world can learn from the policies IKEA has put in place to ensure that each company has control and complete oversight over their supply chains, which can lead to a more transparent and ethical supply chain. According to The IKEA WAY on Purchasing Products, Materials and Services, one way in which IKEA does this is by requiring all suppliers to share the content of the code to all co-workers and sub-suppliers, thus leading to more accountability among the company's suppliers. IKEA also believes in the importance of long term relationships with its suppliers. Therefore, if for some reason, a supplier is not meeting the standards set forth by the code, IKEA will continue to work with the supplier if the supplier shows a willingness to improve its practices with actionable steps to complete before a specified period of time. [23]

Additionally, during the IWAY implementation process, IKEA monitors its suppliers and service providers. To do this, IKEA has a team of auditors who conduct audits (both announced and unannounced) at supplier facilities. The auditors are also in charge of following up on action plans if suppliers are failing to meet the agreed upon standards specified by IWAY. Along with this, “IKEA…has the Compliance and Monitoring Group, an internal independent group that is responsible for independent verification of implementation and compliance activities related to IWAY and Sustainability.” [24] IKEA also has independent third party teams who conduct inspections on behalf of IKEA. [25] By conducting audits and putting together teams to ensure cooperation from suppliers throughout the supply chain, companies can be better equipped to prevent unethical practices in the production of goods and services. In Ximeng Han’s Analysis and Reflection of IKEA’s Supply Chain Management, Han highlights IWAY’s importance in maintaining links with IKEA’s suppliers. [26] Therefore, IWAY plays a crucial role in ensuring supply chain transparency and in building a more ethical and sustainable supply chain.

In addition to all of the policies IKEA has put in place to address issues in its supply chain, the company has also donated a lot of money to combat child labor in India. More specifically, according to an IKEA Foundation article written in 2013, “Since 2000, the IKEA Foundation has committed €60 million to help fight child labour in India and Pakistan, aiming to prevent children from working in the cotton, metalware and carpet industries.” [27] Furthermore, in 2009, the company announced that it would donate $48 million to UNICEF to “help poor children in India.” [28]

IKEA’s goal to completely eliminate child labor from its supply chain is an ongoing battle, and it is still committed to ensuring that this is ultimately the case. More specifically, it is extremely difficult to completely eliminate child labor from a company’s supply chain because of the various aspects involved. According to a report published in 2018 by the International Labour Organization, these aspects include a legal commitment, building and “extending” social protection systems (including helping people find jobs), “expanding access to free, quality public education,” addressing supply chain issues, and providing more protection for children in general. [29] Furthermore, Han points out the potential downsides that could arise as a result of having a global supply chain like IKEA does. Given IKEA is an international retailer, the company “has to spend a lot of time, money and manpower to enter new markets due to the different cultures, laws and competitive markets in different regions, and there is also a significant risk of zero return.” [30] Han also argues that the COVID-19 pandemic showed IKEA’s and many other companies’ inability to respond to “fluctuations in supply and demand,” primarily due to inflexible supply chains. [31] This information points out the various aspects that need to align in order to completely end the issue of child labor throughout the world, as well as the difficulties of having a global supply chain, which is why child labor is so difficult to completely eliminate.

Specific to IKEA’s actions, in 2021, IKEA announced three key focus areas for its action pledge: “Further integrating children’s rights into the existing IKEA due diligence system (by reviewing IWAY from a child rights’ perspective in order to strengthen the code),” “accelerating the work to promote decent work for young workers,” and partnering “up to increase and scale efforts.” [32] IKEA’s fight to end child labor in India highlights the importance of supply chain transparency and putting policies in place that ensures cooperation from suppliers and all parties involved. Additionally, in a Forbes article written in 2021, “According to the data from the OpenText survey…When asked whether purchasing ethically sourced and/or produced products matters, 81 percent of respondents said yes.” [33] Steve Banker, who covers logistics and supply chain management, also adds, “What is interesting is that nearly 20 percent of these survey respondents said that it has only mattered to them within the last year, which indicates that the Covid pandemic, and some of the product shortages we have faced, has made consumers re-evaluate their stance on ethical sourcing.” [34] These results confirm that customers are now considering how a product was sourced in their purchasing decisions, which makes it even more important for IKEA to be transparent about its efforts to eliminate child labor from its supply chain. Furthermore, the company’s open commitment to eliminating child labor and helping communities in India is beneficial in maintaining a positive relationship with its stakeholders.

The increase in globalization has made it even more essential for companies to monitor their supply chains and have complete oversight over business practices. IKEA is one of the companies leading the way in building a more ethical and sustainable supply chain, but more companies need to follow suit and implement policies similar to IWAY that holds all parties in the supply chain accountable for their actions. Through supply chain transparency and accountability, companies will likely be better equipped to handle issues that arise throughout their respective supply chains. Furthermore, by implementing new policies, conducting audits, and maintaining close communication with suppliers, companies can work to eliminate child labor in their supply chains and put children where they belong: in school.

Reflection Questions:

• What does this case teach you about supply chain ethics?
• What are some of the ways in which management/leaders can ensure compliance of the standards set forth by a company in terms of supplier behavior and ethical sourcing?
• Who is primarily responsible for ensuring ethical behavior throughout the supply chain? Is it the company? The suppliers? Both?
• How can companies utilize the various platforms and technologies that exist today to better understand and oversee their supply chains? 
• IKEA has taken numerous steps to address child labor in its supply chain. Do you think every business working in a context that may involve child labor has a duty to act in a similar way? Why or why not?

Works Cited 

“ About Ikea – Our Heritage .” IKEA.

“ Anganwadi Workers .” Journals Of India , 16 June 2020. 

Banker, Steve. “ Do Consumers Care about Ethical Sourcing? ” Forbes , 9 Nov. 2022.

Bharadwaj , Prashant, et al. Perverse Consequences of Well-Intentioned Regulation ... - World Bank Group .

“ Child Labor in the Carpet Industry Rugmark: Carpets: Rugs: Pakistan .” Child Labor in the Carpet Industry RugMark |Carpets | Rugs | Pakistan .

“ Creating a Sustainable IKEA Value Chain with Iway. ” Sustainability Is Key in Our Supplier Code of Conduct .

“ Ending Child Labour by 2025 - International Labour Organization .” International Labour Organization .

“ Film on Child Labour Is Eye-Opener for IKEA .” IKEA Museum , 31 Mar. 2022.

Foundation , ECLT. “ Why Does Child Labour Happen? Here Are Some of the Root Causes. ” ECLT Foundation , 17 May 2023.

Han, Ximeng. “ Analysis and Reflection of IKEA’s Supply Chain Management. ” Analysis and Reflection of IKEA’s Supply Chain Management | Atlantis Press , 27 Dec. 2022.

“ Human Rights and Global Sourcing: IKEA in India. ” Journal of International Management , 13 May 2011.

“ IKEA and IKEA Foundation .” Save the Children International .

“ IKEA Foundation Contributes €24.9 Million to UNICEF to Help Advance Children’s Rights. ” IKEA Foundation , 26 May 2020.

“ IKEA Foundation Helps Fight the Roots Causes of Child Labour in Pakistan .” IKEA Foundation , 18 Feb. 2013.

“ Ikea Gives $48 Million to Fight India Child Labor .” NBC News , 23 Feb. 2009.

“ IKEA Supports 2021 as the UN International Year for the Elimination of Child Labour. ” About IKEA.

The Ikea Way on Purchasing Products , Materials and Services .

Jasińska, Joanna, et al. “ Flat-Pack Success: IKEA Turns to Poland for Its Furniture. ” – The First News .

Thomas , Susan. “ IKEA Foundation Tackles Child Labor in India’s Cotton Communities .” Boston College Center for Corporate Citizenship , 15 July 2014.

[1] “About Ikea – Our Heritage.” IKEA .

[2] Jasińska, Joanna, et al. “Flat-Pack Success: IKEA Turns to Poland for Its Furniture.” – The First News .

[3] “Human Rights and Global Sourcing: IKEA in India.” Journal of International Management , 13 May 2011.

[4] “Human Rights and Global Sourcing: IKEA in India.” Journal of International Management , 13 May 2011.

[5] “Human Rights and Global Sourcing: IKEA in India.” Journal of International Management , 13 May 2011.

[6] “Film on Child Labour Is Eye-Opener for IKEA.” IKEA Museum , 31 Mar. 2022.

[7] “Child Labor in the Carpet Industry Rugmark: Carpets: Rugs: Pakistan.” Child Labor in the Carpet Industry RugMark |Carpets | Rugs | Pakistan .

[8] Foundation , ECLT. “Why Does Child Labour Happen? Here Are Some of the Root Causes.” ECLT Foundation , 17 May 2023.

[9] Bharadwaj , Prashant, et al. Perverse Consequences of Well-Intentioned Regulation ... - World Bank Group .

[10] “Film on Child Labour Is Eye-Opener for IKEA.” IKEA Museum , 31 Mar. 2022.

[11] “Film on Child Labour Is Eye-Opener for IKEA.” IKEA Museum , 31 Mar. 2022.

[12] “Film on Child Labour Is Eye-Opener for IKEA.” IKEA Museum , 31 Mar. 2022.

[13] “Film on Child Labour Is Eye-Opener for IKEA.” IKEA Museum , 31 Mar. 2022.

[14] “IKEA and IKEA Foundation.” Save the Children International .

[15] “IKEA and IKEA Foundation.” Save the Children International .

[16] “IKEA and IKEA Foundation.” Save the Children International .

[17] “IKEA Foundation Contributes €24.9 Million to UNICEF to Help Advance Children’s Rights.” IKEA Foundation , 26 May 2020.

[18] “IKEA and IKEA Foundation.” Save the Children International .

[19] “Creating a Sustainable IKEA Value Chain with Iway.” Sustainability Is Key in Our Supplier Code of Conduct .

[20] “Creating a Sustainable IKEA Value Chain with Iway.” Sustainability Is Key in Our Supplier Code of Conduct .

[21] Thomas, Susan. “IKEA Foundation Tackles Child Labor in India’s Cotton Communities.” Boston College Center for Corporate Citizenship , 15 July 2014.

[22] “Anganwadi Workers.” Journals Of India , 16 June 2020.

[23] The Ikea Way on Purchasing Products, Materials and Services .

[24] The Ikea Way on Purchasing Products, Materials and Services .

[25] The Ikea Way on Purchasing Products, Materials and Services .

[26] Han, Ximeng. “Analysis and Reflection of IKEA’s Supply Chain Management.” Analysis and Reflection of IKEA’s Supply Chain Management | Atlantis Press , 27 Dec. 2022.

[27] “IKEA Foundation Helps Fight the Roots Causes of Child Labour in Pakistan.” IKEA Foundation , 18 Feb. 2013.

[28] “Ikea Gives $48 Million to Fight India Child Labor.” NBC News , 23 Feb. 2009.

[29] “Ending Child Labour by 2025 - International Labour Organization.” International Labour Organization .

[30] Han, Ximeng. “Analysis and Reflection of IKEA’s Supply Chain Management.” Analysis and Reflection of IKEA’s Supply Chain Management | Atlantis Press , 27 Dec. 2022.

[31] Han, Ximeng. “Analysis and Reflection of IKEA’s Supply Chain Management.” Analysis and Reflection of IKEA’s Supply Chain Management | Atlantis Press , 27 Dec. 2022.

[32] “IKEA Supports 2021 as the UN International Year for the Elimination of Child Labour.” About IKEA .

[33] Banker, Steve. “Do Consumers Care about Ethical Sourcing?” Forbes , 9 Nov. 2022.

[34] Banker, Steve. “Do Consumers Care about Ethical Sourcing?” Forbes , 9 Nov. 2022.

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• IKEA Global
• Our business
• How we work

IKEA culture and values

We have a strong set of values. They are the compass that guides us in everything we do. Our culture is formed when we put these values into action.

The IKEA values were shaped during a time in Sweden when the living conditions were harsh. People had to get by with what they had. This fostered a culture of entrepreneurship and hard work, and made people more pragmatic and mindful of resources. A lot has changed since the early days of the IKEA brand. Today we have grown into a global business with the size and reach to create positive change, not only for people but also for the planet. But on the inside, not a lot has changed.

We are straightforward, innovative, creative and common-sense problem-solvers. We’re constantly trying to find better ways to get things done and to bring out the best in ourselves and others. We strive for a nurturing environment that encourages the entrepreneurs in us. We’re passionate about innovation and finding new solutions.

We’re constantly trying to find better ways to get things done and to bring out the best in ourselves and others.

The 8 IKEA Key Values

Togetherness.

Togetherness is at the heart of the IKEA culture. We are strongest when we trust each other, pull in the same direction and have fun together.

Caring for people and planet

We want to be a force for positive change. We have the possibility to make a significant and lasting impact — today and for the generations to come.

Cost-consciousness

As many people as possible should be able to afford a beautiful and functional home. We constantly challenge ourselves and others to make more from less without compromising on quality.

A simple, straightforward and down-to-earth way of being is part of our Smålandic heritage. It is about being ourselves and staying close to reality. We are informal, pragmatic and see bureaucracy as our biggest enemy.

Renew and improve

We are constantly looking for new and better ways forward. Whatever we are doing today, we can do better tomorrow. Finding solutions to almost impossible challenges is part of our success and a source of inspiration to move on to the next challenge.

Different with a meaning

We are not like other companies and we don’t want to be. We like to question existing solutions, think in unconventional ways, experiment and dare to make mistakes - always for a good reason.

Give and take responsibility

We believe in empowering people. Giving and taking responsibility are ways to grow and develop as individuals. Trusting each other, being positive and forward-looking inspires everyone to contribute to development.

Lead by example

We see leadership as an action, not a position. We look for people’s values before competence and experience. People who ‘walk the talk’ and lead by example. It is about being our best self and bringing out the best in each other.