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What are John Locke’s most famous works?
What contributions did John Locke make to epistemology?
What contributions did John Locke make to political theory?
How did John Locke influence the design of U.S. government?

Aristotle (384-322 BC), Ancient Greek philosopher and scientist. One of the most influential philosophers in the history of Western thought, Aristotle established the foundations for the modern scientific method of enquiry. Statue

A Letter Concerning Toleration

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A Letter Concerning Toleration , in the history of political philosophy , an important essay by the English philosopher John Locke , originally written in Latin ( Epistola de Tolerantia ) in 1685 while Locke was in exile in Holland and first published anonymously in both Latin and English (in a translation by William Popple) upon Locke’s return to England in 1689. A Letter Concerning Toleration greatly influenced the development of the modern concept of the separation of church and state , which is entrenched in a number of modern constitutions .

A Letter Concerning Toleration advocated for greater religious toleration during a period marked by dramatic and often violent religious and sectarian strife in Europe. In Locke’s England, Roman Catholics and Protestant dissenters were effectively barred from holding political office by the Test Act of 1673 (which conditioned public office on the reception of Holy Communion according to the rites of the Church of England ), despite efforts by supporters of James II —the king of England, Scotland, and Ireland from 1685 to 1688—to have it repealed. Across the English Channel , in France, the rights of the Huguenots (French Protestants) were severely curtailed by King Louis XIV ’s revocation in 1685 of the Edict of Nantes , which had previously recognized Protestants’ civil rights and freedom of conscience .

According to Locke, religious intolerance and persecution result from a lack of understanding of the distinction between the realms of religion (the proper domain of the church) and civil affairs (the proper domain of government). The government should not encroach upon religious liberty, just as religious leaders and believers should not seek to use the power of the state to resolve spiritual disagreements.

Locke argued in A Letter Concerning Toleration that the proper realm of government concerns “civil interests,” or the preservation of peace, order, and the people’s earthly well-being (in his own words, “life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like”). The citizenry, in a hypothetical compact, has entrusted the state (and the legitimate government in power) with this responsibility, along with the right to use force and coercion when necessary. For Locke, the government’s purview extends only to these civil interests and not to religious affairs. Therefore, the government should not discriminate based on religious belief or make laws specific to religious institutions. A Letter Concerning Toleration contrasts the civil interests that are the proper concern of government with the care of immortal souls and their guidance to salvation , which are the proper concern of religion. It is important to note that Locke did not oppose the right of members of government to express religious opinions: they can do so as individuals seeking to influence others through uncoerced persuasion, he argued, but they can not do so through laws or state power.

Locke’s defense of toleration is not grounded in ethical relativism . He recognized only “one truth, one way to heaven” but argued that this path is to be pursued by following one’s conscience , not through state power and coercion. A church, for Locke, is a free and voluntary association seeking salvation through collective worship. Although a person could be forced to make religious statements or perform religious rituals, such coercion would not advance—but would rather impede—the religious pursuit of salvation, since dishonest worship, unmoved by the “inward and full persuasion of the mind,” would be unacceptable to God. Because freedom of conscience is at the core of every genuine religious pursuit for Locke, toleration represents not only a dividing line between the realms of religion and government but also the chief distinguishing characteristic of the “true Church.” The distinction between the legitimate realms of government and religion is founded not only on their different purposes (civil interests versus salvation) but also on the different types of power they can rely upon (coercion versus persuasion of the mind).

Locke’s defense of religious toleration is not unconditional or without exception. A Letter Concerning Toleration specifically excludes two groups: Roman Catholics and atheists . Such exclusion or intolerance is justified, according to Locke, only when religious beliefs, or the absence thereof, pose a challenge to civil authority or are antithetical to the very existence of civil society . In the case of Roman Catholics, their submission to the authority of the pope (a spiritual but also political authority) was regarded by Locke as a direct challenge to the authority of secular rulers. As for atheists, Locke was convinced that their disbelief in God means that they can not be trusted to uphold any promise or covenant .

As a defense of religious freedom, A Letter Concerning Toleration is aligned with Locke’s other major works, which address the theme of human freedom as it pertains to other areas of life—namely, political freedom in the Two Treatises of Government (1689) and economic freedom in Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest, and Raising the Value of Money (1692).

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An essay concerning toleration : and other writings on law and politics, 1667-1683

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John Locke’s “A Letter Concerning Toleration” and the Liberal Regime

The political situation in the United States offers an excellent and necessary opportunity to examine our ideas concerning toleration. We should turn to John Locke, who presents an argument for toleration worth pondering in a time when few are giving toleration, let alone free speech, freedom of association, or liberty, serious thought.

The political situation in the United States offers an excellent and necessary opportunity to examine what is toleration, why is it necessary, and what are its limits. This is necessary for several reasons: the role of the media in elections looms large in the coming 2020 election; online technology companies such as Google, Facebook, and Apple influence what and how millions receive information; and the bounds of acceptable discourse are seemingly being redefined. John Locke presents an argument for toleration worth pondering in our time because few are giving toleration, let alone free speech, freedom of association, or liberty, serious thought.

Christianity and Toleration

Locke’s doctrine of toleration begins with true Christianity, the purpose of the church, and the ends of civil society. He states that what is needed is not another edict of toleration or comprehension bill, but, rather, true toleration. His essay begins with the assertion that all men are orthodox to themselves— a heretical claim in his era.[2] Men think that their own beliefs are the orthodox ones and that all those who differ with them are the real heretics. Later, he remarks that toleration is the chief mark of Christianity. Locke clarifies that rather than a commitment to true Christian doctrine and a concern for human souls, it is self-interest that is at the base of most persecution. He wrote that such persecutions and violence “are much rather Marks of Men striving for Power and Empire over one another, than of the Church of Christ.”[3] It is telling that men suffer all manner of vices and commit sins that clearly contradict the teaching of Scripture while focusing on ceremonies.[4] He finds the torment and death of those deemed heretics troubling because it does nothing to change their minds while simultaneously condemning them to damnation. This behavior stands in contrast to the early church, whose members proselytized the world through their behavior and witness. Persecution for religious belief is irrational because it is used for selfish ends, ignores sin, and condemns the souls of men to Hell. It is also contrary to the example of Christ and his disciples, and ignores the different purposes of the commonwealth and church. Locke presents arguments for toleration consistent with the health of society to limit the power of throne and altar.

Argument for Toleration

Locke presents five arguments for toleration. First, the purpose of civil government differs from the purpose of the church. Second, coercion does not convince anyone. Third, no man knows the true religion, and all have diverse opinions of what it is. Fourth, in practice, coercion is used in service of men’s passion for greed and dominion. Fifth, truth will ultimately prevail.

The ends for which governments are instituted among men are limited. Men compact for the protection of their property: life, health, liberty, and estates. Locke writes, “The Commonwealth seems to me to be a Society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing of their own Civil Interests .”[5] In the state of nature, man has certain individual natural rights and government is established to protect them. The state of nature, while peaceable, is prone to descend into a state of war best described by Thomas Hobbes in which there is “continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short,” and without any of the benefits of civilization.[6] Three things are lacking in the state of nature: promulgated laws, impartial judges, and the power of the sword to enforce the first two. In order to escape the scarcity and irrationality of the state of nature, men consent to give conditionally some of their power to government in order to better secure their natural rights. David J. Lorenzo writes,

Under Natural Law in the State of Nature we all enjoy a complete freedom from subjection and exercise all rights. Under human law, duly-authorized magistrates exercise the rights we give up to government, while the rights of ordinary citizens are set by the limits on the powers of the magistrate that flow from the terms of our consent, Natural Law, and the tasks of government.”[7]

In the state of nature men have two primary duties: self-preservation and, when possible, the preservation of others. The natural law and natural rights shape the limits of government and define its purpose.

The commonwealth is created to alleviate the problems of the state of nature and requires an organizing structure with the appropriate rulers and government officials to run it. Magistrates have the duty “by the impartial Execution of equal Laws, to secure unto all the People in general, and to every one of his Subjects in particular, the just Possession of these things belonging to his life.”[8] Law guards against the force and fraud of others; it cannot extend to the salvation of men’s souls. Therefore, the magistrate cannot use the force of the political regime to force the salvation of souls. Locke provides three reasons for this.

First, the magistrate was not given the care of the subjects’ souls, neither by God or the consent of the people. It is impossible that man would so endanger his eternal soul as to entrust it to another fallible man. Second, the magistrate can only use force to coerce outward action. He cannot change the soul or persuade men to believe that to which they cannot rationally assent. Third, there is a wide difference of opinion regarding which religion is the right religion, even within Christianity.[9] Therefore, the civil power must concern itself solely with the civil interests of this world, leaving spiritual matters to the care of individuals.

The magistrate has limited duties; Locke indicates that he must “only . . . take care that the Commonwealth receive no prejudice, and that there be no Injury done to any man, either in Life or Estate.”[10] The magistrate possesses the force of the commonwealth. He may only use it in accordance with the purpose of government and the health of society. While the magistrates ensure the execution of the laws, priests and parsons have the care of souls. Religious authorities may preach and exhort, but they do not have the power of the sword. In addition, clergy have the same civic obligations as magistrates and private persons. They must obey the law and not engage in violence or the seizure of material goods. Clergymen should admonish their parishioners “of the Duties of Peace and Good-will towards all men.”[11] Love and charity should be the chief marks of leaders of the church, not violence, ambition, and the desire to dominate others.

Rights of Association

The church governs a separate sphere from the political realm because it has a separate purpose from politics. Locke defines the church as “a voluntary Society of Men, joining themselves together of their own accord, in order to the publick worshipping of God, in such a manner as they judge acceptable to him, and effectual to the Salvation of their Souls.”[12] A man must personally care for his eternal soul and must individually determine how best to secure it. Due to the wide theological diversity within Christianity, it is dangerous to allow another to command one in spiritual affairs. This, coupled with the varying ability of men to use their reason in religious matters, makes it necessary for men to be able to choose whatever church organization seems best to them. Therefore, wide freedom is necessary for men to associate as they deem fit to secure their salvation.

The church, like other voluntary associations, possesses the right to associate consistent with the good of society. Locke writes,

Forasmuch as no Society, how free soever, or upon whatsoever slight occasion instituted, (whether of Philosophers of Learning, of Merchants for Commerce, or of men of leisure for mutual Conversation and Discourse,) No Church or Company, I say, can in the least subsist and hold together, but will presently dissolve and break to pieces, unless it be regulated by some Laws, and the Members all consent to observe some Order. Place, and time of meeting must be establisht [ sic ]; Distinction of Officers, and putting things into a regular Course, and such like, cannot be omitted. But since the joyning [ sic ] together of several Members into this Church-Society, as has already been demonstrated, is absolutely free and spontaneous, it necessarily follows, that the Right of making its Laws can belong to none but the Society itself, or at least (which is the same thing) to those whom the Society by common consent has authorized thereunto.[13]

Men may associate for any ends that do not injure the public good or harm men in their rights. Private and voluntary associations have the power to set membership criteria, and to govern themselves by their own rules and discipline members according to them. Because members voluntarily enter into an association and consent to its rules, no one outside the association can make rules for them. However, they cannot harm members in their civil goods.[14]

Four Things Not to Be Tolerated

Locke’s toleration provides for wide freedom of association and belief so long as it is consistent with the minimal conditions necessary to sustain the regime. This includes the protection of morals and man’s property: his life, liberty, estate, and the things necessary to secure these. Eric Claeys rightly notes,

Locke’s liberalism recognizes in citizens the rights to think, believe, and associate as they please, but only to the extent that such rights threaten neither the basic material interests that government protects nor the moral and political consensus that makes liberalism possible.[15]

Few men are able to use their reason to conduct their lives in accordance with their best interests. Liberal regimes require citizens of a certain type because they are given more freedom than those under an absolute government. A certain character and predisposition must be inculcated in the citizenry. In The Essay Concerning Human Understanding , Locke writes about three factors that help to shape men’s behavior: religious prescription, civil law, and the mores of the people.[16] All three have potential punishment attached to them. The first, the punishment of God, the second, the punishment of the civil authority, and the third, the punishment that comes from shame and disdain from one’s fellows. These factors need to be harmonious to contribute to a stable civil polity. Therefore, doctrines or actions that jeopardize the regime may be policed. Locke lists four things government should not tolerate: (1) no doctrines deleterious to society may be engaged in or propagated; (2) claiming peculiar prerogative for private societies; (3) subjection and loyalty to a foreign prince; and (4) denial of the existence of a deity. These four standards preserve the freedom of the private sphere while maintaining the conditions necessary to sustain a liberal regime. The government provides the minimal level of policing consistent with the freedom necessary for men to flourish and the ends for which government was formed.

Doctrines detrimental to society may not be engaged in or propagated. Locke seems concerned with how doctrines manifest themselves in outward actions that may be harmful to society. These actions and the doctrines behind them may be prohibited. He writes, “No Opinions contrary to human society, or to those moral Rules which are necessary to the preservation of Civil Society, are to be tolerated by the Magistrate.”[17] The magistrate must prevent injury to the citizen’s life or estate. Locke uses the example of forbidding the killing of cows in order to increase herds after a disease has killed many of them. Following this logic, government would be justified in the regulation of the killing and disposal of livestock to prevent the spread of disease or in refusing to allow the incorporation of a territory as a state until they outlaw polygamy. Laws of general applicability and for the good of the people may restrain the actions of citizens when consistent with the public good.

Special privileges or exemptions from the law may not be tolerated. Private associations who contend that they are not subject to the civil authorities or law endanger the peace and security of men’s civil goods. Locke specifically attacks Roman Catholics who would argue that a ruler who has been excommunicated has forfeited his rule or Protestants who contend government rule should be founded upon the doctrine of grace. In the political realm, both of these attack the liberty and goods of subjects and the authority of the government. Implicitly, churches and associations who do not attack the law or the proper rule of the government may be tolerated.

Subjects may not give their loyalty to a foreign prince. Any church or association grounded upon such a doctrine cannot be tolerated. Divided loyalty endangers justice, the operations of government, and the safety of the regime. While Locke uses the example of a Mohammedan subject to a Christian ruler but loyal to the Mufti of Constantinople, an equally relevant situation in England at the time would have been Roman Catholics loyal to the Pope instead of the civil government.[18] In a war between Protestant England and any number of Catholic countries on the Continent, a private association could harm the war effort and act as a fifth column. Their divided loyalty jeopardizes the continuance of the regime and therefore cannot be allowed.

Atheists per Locke cannot be tolerated because they attack the base of society. Men must be able to trust other men for society to function and flourish. Atheists who deny God remove one of the prime reasons men obey the law, keep their word, and comply with contracts—fear of God’s punishment and eternal damnation. When men do not obey the law, crime spreads; trust between citizens is necessary for daily life; and contracts must be kept for commerce to flourish. Religion is critical to moderating the passions of men and encouraging them to live in a manner consistent with the freedom of a liberal regime. Because atheists undermine all religion, they cannot plead religious belief as a ground for toleration.[19] Logically, atheists who keep their opinions to themselves, respect religion, and abide by the laws may be tolerated because men may be left alone in their speculative opinions.

Religion does not provide grounds for harming men in their life, liberty, or property. The church and the state operate in different spheres because they have different purposes—the church is dedicated to the salvation of men’s souls, and the state secures natural rights. The government must leave men alone in their conscience and to the free exercise of religion within the broad bounds of toleration set forth. Consequently, “No body therefore, in fine, neither single Persons, nor Churches, nay, nor even Commonwealths, have any just Title to invade the Civil Rights and Worldly Goods of each other, upon pretence of Religion.”[20] Under this kind of toleration, the religious persecution that occurred in Locke’s lifetime would be unacceptable. While the government is restricted in this manner, officials may still praise their religion. Magistrates are not obliged to cast off their concern for their fellow man or their Christian duty but may freely use speech and reason in order to persuade men.[21]

Toleration is necessary for the peace of the community and the salvation of souls. The church and the state have different purposes, and thus, differing spheres of authority. The magistrate does not inerrably know the way to heaven, was not given authority over men’s souls, and cannot use coercion to bring men to faith. The purpose of the church is the salvation of souls. Because of the wide variety of opinions, men must be allowed the freedom to choose what religion and sect seems most likely to achieve that end. The right to association is critical for religious purposes: the freedom to voluntarily form societies, set membership criteria, and establish governing rules. Government may only pass laws for the public good and may not impose outward forms of worship or invade speculative opinions, but it may suppress vice and prevent doctrines harmful to society. Magistrates may only govern for the public good, defined by Locke as “the Rule and Measure of all Law-making.”[22] The magistrate does not have power to impose outward rites and ceremonies upon churches, nor may he forbid rites and ceremonies unless they conflict with laws made for the public good.

Locke’s theory of toleration is not blind to the effect that certain doctrines and the practices of private associations that follow them may have upon a liberal regime. Because the regime offers its subjects the freedom to determine the best way to attain happiness, the commonwealth must police the minimum behaviors necessary for the continuance of the regime. This stands in stark contrast to modern multiculturalism which fails to distinguish between what is honorable and dishonorable, what contributes to the stability of the regime and what should not be allowed. As Publius makes clear in The Federalist Papers , men are not angels nor are they demons.[23] They require government to protect their rights while allowing men freedom to use their reason in order to make choices to achieve personal happiness. Modern America should carefully evaluate whether the blind toleration and even praise that is now afforded to perverse doctrines and harmful actions is consistent with the continuation of the Republic.

Works Cited:

Claeys, Eric. “ The Private Society and the Liberal Public Good in John Locke’s Thought .” George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper no. 07-43. Accessed November 1, 2017.pdf.

Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison. The Federalist . Edited by George W. Carey and James McClellan with an Introduction, Reader’s Guide, Constitutional Cross-reference, Index, and Glossary. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001.

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1688 . Edited by Edwin Curley. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1994.

Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding . Edited by Peter H. Nidditch. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.

_____. A Letter Concerning Toleration . Edited by James H. Tully. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1983.

Lorenzo, David J. “Tradition and Prudence in Locke’s Exceptions to Toleration.” American Journal of Political Science 47, no. 2 (2003): 248-58.

Myers, Peter C. “Locke on Reasonable Christianity and Reasonable Politics.” In Piety and Humanity: Essays in Religion and Early Modern Political Philosophy , edited by Douglas Kries, 145-180. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997.

[1] Peter C. Myers, “Locke on Reasonable Christianity and Reasonable Politics,” in Piety and Humanity: Essays in Religion and Early Modern Political Philosophy , ed. Douglas Kries (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 147.

[2] John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration , ed. James H. Tully (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1983), 23.

[3] Ibid., 23.

[4] Ibid., 24.

[5] Ibid., 26.

[6] Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1688 , ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), 76.

[7] David D. Lorenzo, “Tradition and Prudence in Locke’s Exceptions to Toleration,” American Journal of Political Science 47, no. 2 (April, 2003), 254.

[8] Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration , 26.

[9] Ibid., 26-28.

[10] Ibid., 42.

[11] Ibid., 34.

[12] Ibid., 28.

[13] Ibid., 28-29.

[14] Ibid., 31.

[15] Eric Claeys, “The Private Society and the Liberal Public Good in John Locke’s Thought,” George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper no. 07-43, 3, accessed November 1, 2017, https://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/07-43.pdf

[16] John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding , ed. Peter H Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), bk. 2, chap. 28, sec. 11.

[17] Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration , 49.

[18] Ibid., 50-51.

[19] Ibid., 51.

[20] Ibid., 33.

[21] Ibid., 27.

[22] Ibid., 39.

[23] James Madison, “The Federalist No. 51,” in The Federalist , ed. George W. Carey and James McClellan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 2001), 269.

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An amazing essay! A great read to help gain further insight into the matters discussed in Locke’s Letter of Toleration. It me helped greatly with my assignment. Thank you!

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The first amendment, historic document, a letter concerning toleration (1689) and two treatises on government (1690).

John Locke | 1689

Lithograph by de Fonroug of John Locke, head-and-shoulders portrait.

John Locke (1632-1704) was the author of A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690), Two Treatises on Government (1690), and other works. In the period stretching from 1760 to 1800, his works on government and religious toleration made him, after Montesquieu and Blackstone, the most cited secular author in America. In the run-up to the Revolution, even the Tories looked to him for guidance regarding natural rights and the right to revolution; and after 1776, he was frequently cited by the proponents of religious freedom.

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Professor of History and Charles O. Lee and Louise K. Lee Chair in the Western Heritage at Hillsdale College

Jeffrey Rosen

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Professor of Politics at the Arizona State University School of Civic and Economic Thought and Leadership

A Letter concerning Toleration

Since you are pleased to inquire what are my thoughts about the mutual toleration of christians in their different professions of religion, I must needs answer you freely, that I esteem that toleration to be the chief characteristical mark of the true church. For whatsoever some people boast of the antiquity of places and names, or of the pomp of their outward worship; others, of the reformation of their discipline; all, of the orthodoxy of their faith, for everyone is orthodox to himself: these things, and all others of this nature, are much rather marks of men’s striving for power and empire over one another, than of the church of Christ. . . .

Why then does this burning zeal for God, for the church, and for the salvation of souls; burning, I say, literally, with fire and faggot; pass by those moral vices and wickednesses, without any chastisement, which are acknowledged by all men to be diametrically opposite to the profession of christianity; and bend all its nerves either to the introducing of ceremonies, or to the establishment of opinions, which for the most part are about nice and intricate matters, that exceed the capacity of ordinary understandings? . . .

I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion, and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other. If this be not done, there can be no end put to the controversies that will be always arising between those that have, or at least pretend to have, on the one side, a concernment for the interest of men’s souls, and on the other side, a care of the commonwealth.

The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing of their own civil interests.

Civil interests I call life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like. . . .

[T]he whole jurisdiction of the magistrates reaches only to these civil concernments; and . . . all civil power, right, and dominion is bounded and confined to the only care of promoting these things; and . . . it neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended to the salvation of souls. . . .

Where they have not the power to carry on persecution and to become masters, there they desire to live upon fair terms and preach up toleration. When they are not strengthened with the civil power, then they can bear most patiently, and unmovedly, the contagion of idolatry, superstition, and heresy in their neighbourhood; of which, on other occasions, the interest of religion makes them to be extremely apprehensive. . . .

Second Treatise on Government

Chapter 2: “Of the State of Nature”:

Sect. 4: TO understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.

A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty. . . .

Sect. 6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence: though man in that state have an uncontroulable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another’s pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another’s uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for our’s. Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another. . . .

Chapter 5, “Of Property”:

Sect. 26: God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience. The earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the support and comfort of their being. And tho’ all the fruits it naturally produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of nature; and no body has originally a private dominion, exclusive of the rest of mankind, in any of them, as they are thus in their natural state: yet being given for the use of men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other, before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular man. . . .

Sect. 27. Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others. . . .

Chapter 8, “Of the Beginning of Political Societies”:

Sect. 95: MEN being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that are not of it. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the liberty of the state of nature. When any number of men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest.

Sect. 96. For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority: for that which acts any community, being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way; it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority: or else it is impossible it should act or continue one body, one community, which the consent of every individual that united into it, agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority. And therefore we see, that in assemblies, impowered to act by positive laws, where no number is set by that positive law which impowers them, the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course determines, as having, by the law of nature and reason, the power of the whole.

Sect. 97. And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation, to every one of that society, to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or else this original compact, whereby he with others incorporates into one society, would signify nothing, and be no compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties than he was in before in the state of nature. For what appearance would there be of any compact? what new engagement if he were no farther tied by any decrees of the society, than he himself thought fit, and did actually consent to? This would be still as great a liberty, as he himself had before his compact, or any one else in the state of nature hath, who may submit himself, and consent to any acts of it if he thinks fit. . . .

Chapter 19, “Of the Dissolution of Government”:

Sect. 222: The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of their property; and the end why they chuse and authorize a legislative, is, that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the properties of all the members of the society, to limit the power, and moderate the dominion, of every part and member of the society: for since it can never be supposed to be the will of the society, that the legislative should have a power to destroy that which every one designs to secure, by entering into society, and for which the people submitted themselves to legislators of their own making; whenever the legislators endeavour to take away, and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience, and are left to the common refuge, which God hath provided for all men, against force and violence. Whensoever therefore the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society; and either by ambition, fear, folly or corruption, endeavour to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other, an absolute power over the lives, liberties, and estates of the people; by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have a right to resume their original liberty, and, by the establishment of a new legislative, (such as they shall think fit) provide for their own safety and security, which is the end for which they are in society. What I have said here, concerning the legislative in general, holds true also concerning the supreme executor, who having a double trust put in him, both to have a part in the legislative, and the supreme execution of the law, acts against both, when he goes about to set up his own arbitrary will as the law of the society. He acts also contrary to his trust, when he either employs the force, treasure, and offices of the society, to corrupt the representatives, and gain them to his purposes; or openly preengages the electors, and prescribes to their choice, such, whom he has, by sollicitations, threats, promises, or otherwise, won to his designs; and employs them to bring in such, who have promised before-hand what to vote, and what to enact. Thus to regulate candidates and electors, and new-model the ways of election, what is it but to cut up the government by the roots, and poison the very fountain of public security? for the people having reserved to themselves the choice of their representatives, as the fence to their properties, could do it for no other end, but that they might always be freely chosen, and so chosen, freely act, and advise, as the necessity of the commonwealth, and the public good should, upon examination, and mature debate, be judged to require. This, those who give their votes before they hear the debate, and have weighed the reasons on all sides, are not capable of doing. To prepare such an assembly as this, and endeavour to set up the declared abettors of his own will, for the true representatives of the people, and the law-makers of the society, is certainly as great a breach of trust, and as perfect a declaration of a design to subvert the government, as is possible to be met with. . . .

Sect. 223. To this perhaps it will be said, that the people being ignorant, and always discontented, to lay the foundation of government in the unsteady opinion and uncertain humour of the people, is to expose it to certain ruin; and no government will be able long to subsist, if the people may set up a new legislative, whenever they take offence at the old one. To this I answer, Quite the contrary. People are not so easily got out of their old forms, as some are apt to suggest. They are hardly to be prevailed with to amend the acknowledged faults in the frame they have been accustomed to. And if there be any original defects, or adventitious ones introduced by time, or corruption; it is not an easy thing to get them changed, even when all the world sees there is an opportunity for it. This slowness and aversion in the people to quit their old constitutions, has, in the many revolutions which have been seen in this kingdom, in this and former ages, still kept us to, or, after some interval of fruitless attempts, still brought us back again to our old legislative of king, lords and commons: and whatever provocations have made the crown be taken from some of our princes heads, they never carried the people so far as to place it in another line.

Sect. 224. But it will be said, this hypothesis lays a ferment for frequent rebellion. To which I answer, . . . No more than any other hypothesis: for when the people are made miserable, and find themselves exposed to the ill usage of arbitrary power, cry up their governors, as much as you will, for sons of Jupiter; let them be sacred and divine, descended, or authorized from heaven; give them out for whom or what you please, the same will happen. The people generally ill treated, and contrary to right, will be ready upon any occasion to ease themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon them. They will wish, and seek for the opportunity, which in the change, weakness and accidents of human affairs, seldom delays long to offer itself. . . .

Sources: https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/locke-the-works-vol-5-four-letters-concerning-toleration , https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/hollis-the-two-treatises-of-civil-government-hollis-ed

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A Letter concerning Toleration and Other Writings

John Locke (author)
Mark Goldie (editor)

Part of the Thomas Hollis Library published by Liberty Fund. This volume contains A Letter Concerning Toleration, excerpts of the Third Letter, An Essay on Toleration, and various fragments.

EBook PDF This text-based PDF or EBook was created from the HTML version of this book and is part of the Portable Library of Liberty.
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A Letter concerning Toleration and Other Writings, edited and with an Introduction by Mark Goldie (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2010).

The copyright to this edition, in both print and electronic forms, is held by Liberty Fund, Inc.

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Rousseau was a French social contract theorist whose political writings challenged Locke’s conceptions of society, equality, and liberty. His Social Contract briefly discusses censorship.

Mill is one of the most prominent defenders of freedom of thought, discussion, and expression. His essay On Liberty argues that these freedoms are essential to the discovery of truth and fraud.

An Anglican clergyman, Proast disagreed with Locke’s religious tolerance and exchanged several letters with Locke on the subject.

Critical Responses

John C. Laursen & Cary J. Nederman

Connected Readings

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Two Treatises of Government explains Locke’s conception of political society as a result of a social contract.

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In this podcast, Professors Paul Carrese and Michael Zuckert discuss the context, arguments, and implications of Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration.

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5. John Locke (1632-1704), Letter on Toleration, 1686 1

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1 The English philosopher John Locke wrote his Letter on Toleration (1686) in Latin and sent it to a friend who published it. We reproduce here, unmodernised, William Popple’s 1689 English translation. Locke is arguing for religious toleration and also for a clear separation of power between the State – whose aim is to promote the ‘common wealth’ of its citizens – and the church – whose focus is the salvation of their souls.

Portrait of John Locke by Godfrey Kneller (1697)

Image 100000000000012C0000016AF02E4944.jpg

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2 That any man should think fit to cause another man—whose salvation he heartily desires—to expire in torments, and that even in an unconverted state, would, I confess, seem very strange to me, and I think, to any other also. But nobody, surely, will ever believe that such [conduct] can proceed from charity, love, or goodwill. If anyone maintain that men ought to be compelled by fire and sword to profess certain doctrines, and conform to this or that exterior worship, without any regard had unto their morals; if anyone endeavour to convert those that are erroneous unto the faith, by forcing them to profess things that they do not believe and allowing them to practise things that the Gospel does not permit, it cannot be doubted indeed but such a one is desirous to have a numerous assembly joined in the same profession with himself; but that he principally intends by those means to compose a truly Christian Church is altogether incredible. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at if those who do not really contend for the advancement of the true religion, and of the Church of Christ, make use of arms that do not belong to the Christian warfare. If, like the Captain of our salvation, they sincerely desired the good of souls, they would tread in the steps and follow the perfect example of that Prince of Peace, who sent out His soldiers to the subduing of nations, and gathering them into His Church, not armed with the sword, or other instruments of force, but prepared with the Gospel of peace and with the exemplary holiness of their conversation. This was His method. Though if infidels were to be converted by force, if those that are either blind or obstinate were to be drawn off from their errors by armed soldiers, we know very well that it was much more easy for Him to do it with armies of heavenly legions than for any son of the Church, how potent soever, with all his dragoons.

3 The toleration of those that differ from others in matters of religion is so agreeable to the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and to the genuine reason of mankind, that it seems monstrous for men to be so blind as not to perceive the necessity and advantage of it in so clear a light. I will not here tax the pride and ambition of some, the passion and uncharitable zeal of others. These are faults from which human affairs can perhaps scarce ever be perfectly freed; but yet such as nobody will bear the plain imputation of, without covering them with some specious colour; and so pretend to commendation, whilst they are carried away by their own irregular passions. But, however, that some may not colour their spirit of persecution and un-Christian cruelty with a pretence of care of the public weal and observation of the laws; and that others, under pretence of religion, may not seek impunity for their libertinism and licentiousness; in a word, that none may impose either upon himself or others, by the pretences of loyalty and obedience to the prince, or of tenderness and sincerity in the worship of God; I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other. If this be not done, there can be no end put to the controversies that will be always arising between those that have, or at least pretend to have, on the one side, a concernment for the interest of men’s souls, and, on the other side, a care of the commonwealth.

Read the free original text online (facsimile), 1689 edition : https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=bOxiAAAAcAAJ&printsec=frontcover

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1 John Locke, Letter on Toleration, London: A. Churchill, 1689.

Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence Creative Commons - Attribution 4.0 International - CC BY 4.0 . Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.

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An Exiles Writings

John locke – a letter concerning toleration.

Writing on the matter of religious toleration, it may seem Locke was simply interested in advocating for the rights or liberties of religious minorities. Yet, during a time when monarchs asserted their devine right to rule, such writings were far from being narrow in nature.

Introduction by Rachel Edmonston

John Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration was written in Latin in 1685, while the author was in exile in Holland. Locke had fled to Holland following the exposure of the so-called “Rye House Plot.” Though historians now doubt the extent to which the Plot was real, many of Locke’s close associates were implicated for treason in connection to the Plot, prompting him to flee England for his personal safety. He would not return until after the Glorious Revolution of 1689, when William of Orange and his wife Mary Stuart replaced the deposed James II as the king and queen of England. A Letter Concerning Toleration was first published in 1689, in both English and Latin, following the ascent of William and Mary to the throne of England.

Locke’s Letter urged religious toleration during a crucial time. In 1685, the same year that Locke penned the Letter , Catholic King Louis XIV of France had revoked the Edict of Nantes, which had granted limited rights and protections to Huguenots (French Protestants). As a result of this revocation, thousands of French protestants fled the country, and those that remained were subjected to intense persecutions. In 1689, the year the Letter was published in England, the English Parliament ruled in favor of “The Act of Toleration,” a statutory toleration for Protestant dissenters. Locke’s ideas about toleration argued against government involvement in matters of religion, advocated for a separation of Church and state and rejected absolutism. Below are several excerpts from Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration in which Locke rejects the government’s involvement in religion. Does Locke believe that there is any one true religion? If so, does this affect his position on religious toleration? How might Locke have felt about Catholicism? What connections can be drawn between Catholicism and Absolutism?

Background Goes Here

Tolerance is more than putting up with things – it’s a moral virtue

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Rivka T. Witenberg received funding from Large ARC SPIRT Grant; Department of Psychology Research Support Scheme, University of Melbourne and Australian Catholic University; Centre for Education for Human Values and Tolerance, Bar Ilan University, Tel Aviv, Israel; The University of Melbourne Collaborative research Grant.

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We hear a lot about tolerance these days.

Tolerance is a moral virtue best placed within the moral domain – but unfortunately it is often confounded with prejudice. Much of the psychological research about tolerance generally and about the development of children’s understanding of tolerance of others who are different from them has been examined through research about prejudice – and not through the moral domain. The assumption made is that absence of prejudice by default means a person is tolerant.

Prejudice and tolerance are actually theoretically different concepts – and not the opposite of each other. In fact, they coexist in most of us.

Tolerance is difficult to define, which may have led to limiting the study of tolerance in psychology in favour of studying prejudice. But, unlike prejudice, tolerance can be grounded in the moral domain which offers a positive approach to examining relationships between groups of people who are different from each other.

Based on its Latin origin, tolerance, or toleration as philosophers often refer to it, is most commonly viewed negatively as “putting up with” something we dislike or even hate. If a person is prepared to “put up with” something – along the lines of, I do not like the colour of your skin but I will still serve you not to lose your custom – that person is someone who does not discriminate but remains intolerant in thoughts and beliefs.

Besides, who wants to be tolerated or be “put up with”?

At the same time tolerance cannot be indiscriminate. Indiscriminate acceptance in its most extreme form could lead to recognition of questionable practice and human rights violations – for instance, child marriages and neo-Nazi propaganda.

Tolerance as a moral virtue

An alternative way for us to think of tolerance is to place it within the moral domain and recognise that it is what it is, a moral virtue.

Many recent philosophers have linked tolerance with respect, equality and liberty. Those such as Michael Dusche , John Rawls and Michael Walzer among others, argue that we should regard tolerance as a positive civic and moral duty between individuals, irrespective of colour, creed or culture.

In other words, it is a moral obligation or duty which involves respect for the individual as well as mutual respect and consideration between people. Tolerance between people makes it possible for conflicting claims of beliefs, values and ideas to coexistence as long as they fit within acceptable moral values.

So while different marriage practices fit in within acceptable moral values, sexual abuse of children is immoral and cannot be tolerated. I believe tolerance is an essential component in social unity and a remedy to intolerance and prejudice.

The idea that tolerance is a moral duty had been acknowledged by earlier civil libertarians, such as John Locke, Baruch Spinoza, John Stuart Mill and others. They argue that tolerant people value the individual, his or her independence and freedom of choice.

When tolerance is placed within the moral domain relating to fairness, justice and respect and avoiding causing harm to others, it can only be viewed as a positive moral virtue.

Psychological research supports the idea that tolerance is better placed within the moral domain. My own research with my students shows the best indicators and predictors of tolerance to human diversity are fairness and empathy.

Fairness and empathy are also very closely connected to moral development and reasoning. They are fundamental to any coherent moral philosophy.

Empathy and morality

Psychologists such as Johnathan Haidt believe empathy is the most important motivator for moral behaviour. Others such as Martin Hoffman argue empathy is a motivator of prosocial and altruistic or unselfish behaviour.

Empathic people are sensitive to the thoughts, feelings and experiences of others. They are able to place themselves in someone else’s shoes or understand how it would feel to be treated badly. Placing oneself in someone else’s shoes is the essence of tolerance.

My research shows that people of all ages including children have a strong sense of fairness and empathy towards others different from them in colour, creed or culture. They reject prejudice and intolerance between 70% and 80% of the time affirming tolerance based on fairness and empathy.

Moral values such as fairness, justice, empathy, tolerance and respect are shared, if not universal, values relevant to dealing with human diversity

Tolerance examined as separate concept could have unique implications for education and social policy. Education aimed at promoting a harmonious society could do well to focus more on the relationship between morality and tolerance. Grounding tolerance in theories of morality allows for an alternative educational approach to promote harmonious intergroup relationships.

Part of this education would involve developing a strong sense of fairness and justice and the ability to empathise with the plight of others who are different in racial characteristics, ethnicity or nationality.

This article is part of a series on public morality in 21st-century Australia.

Morality series

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The term “toleration”—from the Latin tolerare : to put up with, countenance or suffer—generally refers to the conditional acceptance of or non-interference with beliefs, actions or practices that one considers to be wrong but still “tolerable,” such that they should not be prohibited or constrained. There are many contexts in which we speak of a person or an institution as being tolerant: parents tolerate certain behavior of their children, a friend tolerates the weaknesses of another, a monarch tolerates dissent, a church tolerates homosexuality, a state tolerates a minority religion, a society tolerates deviant behavior. Thus for any analysis of the motives and reasons for toleration, the relevant contexts need to be taken into account.

1. The Concept of Toleration and its Paradoxes

2. four conceptions of toleration, 3. the history of toleration, 4. justifying toleration, 5. the politics of toleration, other internet resources, related entries.

It is necessary to differentiate between a general concept and more specific conceptions of toleration (see also Forst 2013). The former is marked by the following characteristics. First, it is essential for the concept of toleration that the tolerated beliefs or practices are considered to be objectionable and in an important sense wrong or bad. If this objection component (cf. King 1976, 44–54 on the components of toleration) is missing, we do not speak of “toleration” but of “indifference” or “affirmation.” Second, the objection component needs to be balanced by an acceptance component , which does not remove the negative judgment but gives certain positive reasons that trump the negative ones in the relevant context. In light of these reasons, it would be wrong not to tolerate what is wrong, to mention a well-known paradox of toleration (discussed below). The said practices or beliefs are wrong, but not intolerably wrong. Third, the limits of toleration need to be specified. They lie at the point where there are reasons for rejection that are stronger than the reasons for acceptance (which still leaves open the question of the appropriate means of a possible intervention); call this the rejection component . All three of those reasons can be of one and the same kind—religious, for example—yet they can also be of diverse kinds (moral, religious, pragmatic, to mention a few possibilities; cf. Newey 1999, 32–34 and Cohen 2014).

Furthermore, it needs to be stressed that there are two boundaries involved in this interpretation of the concept of toleration: the first one lies between (1) the normative realm of those practices and beliefs one agrees with and (2) the realm of the practices and beliefs that one finds wrong but can still tolerate; the second boundary lies between this latter realm and (3) the realm of the intolerable that is strictly rejected. There are thus three, not just two normative realms in a context of toleration.

Finally, one can only speak of toleration where it is practiced voluntarily and is not compelled, for otherwise it would be a case of simply “suffering” or “enduring” certain things that one rejects but against which one is powerless. It is, however, wrong to conclude from this that the tolerant need to be in a position to effectively prohibit or interfere with the tolerated practices, for a minority that does not have this power may very well be tolerant in holding the view that if it had such power, it would not use it to suppress other parties (cf. Williams 1996).

Based on these characteristics, we can identify three paradoxes of toleration that are much discussed in philosophical analyses of the concept, and each one refers to one of the components mentioned above. First, there is the paradox of the tolerant racist , which concerns the objection component. Sometimes people argue that someone who believes that there are “inferior races” the members of which do not deserve equal respect should be “more tolerant.” Thus the racist would be called tolerant if he curbed his desire to discriminate against the members of such groups, say, for strategic reasons. Thus if (and only if) we considered tolerance to be a moral virtue, the paradox arises that an immoral attitude (to think of other “races” in such way) would be turned into part of a virtue. What is more, the racist would be more “tolerant” the stronger his racist impulses are if only he did not act on them (cf. Horton 1996). Hence, seen from a moral perspective, the demand that the racist should be tolerant has a major flaw: it takes the racist objection against others as an ethical objection that only needs to be restrained by adding certain reasons for acceptance. It thus turns an unacceptable prejudice into an ethical judgment. From this it follows that the reasons for objection must be reasonable in a minimal sense; they cannot be generally shareable, of course, but they must also not rest on irrational prejudice and hatred. The racist, therefore, can neither exemplify the virtue of tolerance nor should he be asked to be tolerant; what is necessary is that he overcome his racist beliefs. This shows that there are cases in which tolerance is not the solution to intolerance.

Second, we encounter the paradox of moral tolerance , which arises in connection with the acceptance component (for various analyses of this paradox, see Ebbinghaus 1950, Raphael 1988, Mendus 1989, Horton 1994). If both the reasons for objection and the reasons for acceptance are called “moral,” the paradox arises that it seems to be morally right or even morally required to tolerate what is morally wrong. The solution of this paradox therefore requires a distinction between various kinds of “moral” reasons, some of which must be reasons of a higher order that ground and limit toleration.

Third, there is the paradox of drawing the limits , which concerns the rejection component. This paradox is inherent in the idea that toleration is a matter of reciprocity and that therefore those who are intolerant need not and cannot be tolerated, an idea we find in most of the classical texts on toleration. But even a brief look at those texts, and even more so at historical practice, shows that the slogan “no toleration of the intolerant” is not just vacuous but potentially dangerous, for the characterization of certain groups as intolerant is all too often itself a result of one-sidedness and intolerance. In a deconstructivist reading, this leads to a fatal conclusion for the concept of toleration (cf. Fish 1997): If toleration always implies a drawing of the limits against the intolerant and intolerable, and if every such drawing of a limit is itself a (more or less) intolerant, arbitrary act, toleration ends as soon it begins—as soon as it is defined by an arbitrary boundary between “us” and the “intolerant” and “intolerable.” This paradox can only be overcome if we distinguish between two notions of “intolerance” that the deconstructivist critique conflates: the intolerance of those who lie beyond the limits of toleration because they deny toleration as a norm in the first place, and the lack of tolerance of those who do not want to tolerate a denial of the norm. Tolerance can only be a virtue if this distinction can be made, and it presupposes that the limits of toleration can be drawn in a non-arbitrary, justifiable way.

The discussion so far implies that toleration is a normatively dependent concept . This means that by itself it cannot provide the substantive reasons for objection, acceptance, and rejection. It needs further, independent normative resources in order to have a certain substance, content, and limits—and in order to be regarded as something good at all. In itself, therefore, toleration is not a virtue or value; it can only be a value if backed by the right normative reasons.

The following discussion of four conceptions of toleration is not to be understood as the reconstruction of a linear historical succession. Rather, these are different, historically developed understandings of what toleration consists in that can all be present in society at the same time, so that conflicts about the meaning of toleration may also be understood as conflicts between these conceptions (cf. Forst 2013).

1. The first one I call the permission conception . According to it, toleration is a relation between an authority or a majority and a dissenting, “different” minority (or various minorities). Toleration then means that the authority gives qualified permission to the minority to live according to their beliefs on condition that the minority accepts the dominant position of the authority or majority. So long as their being different remains within certain limits, that is, in the “private” realm, and so long as the minority groups do not claim equal public and political status, they can be tolerated on pragmatic or principled grounds—on pragmatic grounds because this form of toleration is the least costly of all possible alternatives and does not disturb civil peace and order as the dominant party defines it (but rather contributes to it); and on principled grounds because one may think it is morally problematic to force people to give up certain deep-seated beliefs or practices.

The permission conception is a classic one that we find in many historical writings and in instances of a politics of toleration (such as the Edict of Nantes in 1598) and that—to a considerable extent—still informs our understanding of the term. According to this conception, toleration means that the authority or majority, which has the power to interfere with the practices of a minority, nevertheless “tolerates” it, while the minority accepts its inferior position. The situation or the “terms of toleration” are hierarchical: one party allows another party certain things on conditions specified by the first one. Toleration is thus understood as permissio negativa mali : not interfering with something that is actually wrong but not “intolerably” harmful. It is this conception that Goethe (1829, 507, transl. R.F.) had in mind when he said: “Tolerance should be a temporary attitude only: it must lead to recognition. To tolerate means to insult.”

2. The second conception, the coexistence conception , is similar to the first one in regarding toleration as the best means toward ending or avoiding conflict and toward pursuing one’s own goals. What is different, however, is the relationship between the subjects and the objects of toleration. For now the situation is not one of an authority or majority in relation to a minority, but one of groups that are roughly equal in power, and who see that for the sake of social peace and the pursuit of their own interests mutual toleration is the best of all possible alternatives (the Augsburg Peace Treaty of 1555 is a historical example). They prefer peaceful coexistence to conflict and agree to a reciprocal compromise, to a certain modus vivendi . The relation of tolerance is no longer vertical but horizontal: the subjects are at the same time the objects of toleration. This may not lead to a stable social situation in which trust can develop, for once the constellation of power changes, the more powerful group may no longer see any reasons for being tolerant (cf. Rawls 1987, 11, Fletcher 1996).

3. Different from this, the third conception of toleration—the respect conception —is one in which the tolerating parties respect one another in a more reciprocal sense (cf. Weale 1985, Scanlon 1996). Even though they differ fundamentally in their ethical beliefs about the good and true way of life and in their cultural practices, citizens recognize one another as moral-political equals in the sense that their common framework of social life should—as far as fundamental questions of rights and liberties and the distribution of resources are concerned—be guided by norms that all parties can equally accept and that do not favor one specific ethical or cultural community (cf. Forst 2002, ch. 2).

There are two models of the “respect conception,” that of “formal equality,” and that of “qualitative equality.” The former operates on a strict distinction between the political and the private realm, according to which ethical (i.e., cultural or religious) differences among citizens of a legal state should be confined to the private realm, so that they do not lead to conflicts in the political sphere. This version is clearly exhibited in the “secular republicanism” of the French authorities who held that headscarves with a religious meaning have no place in public schools in which children are educated to be autonomous citizens (cf. Galeotti 1993).

The model of “qualitative equality,” on the other hand, recognizes that certain forms of formal equality favor those ethical-cultural life-forms whose beliefs and practices make it easier to accommodate a conventional public/private distinction. In other words, the “formal equality” model tends to be intolerant toward ethical-cultural forms of life that require a public presence that is different from traditional and hitherto dominant cultural forms. Thus, on the “qualitative equality” model, persons respect each other as political equals with a certain distinct ethical-cultural identity that needs to be respected and tolerated as something that is (a) especially important for a person and (b) can provide good reasons for certain exceptions from or general changes in existing legal and social structures. Social and political equality and integration are thus seen to be compatible with cultural difference—within certain (moral) limits of reciprocity.

4. In discussions of toleration, one finds alongside the conceptions mentioned thus far a fourth one which I call the esteem conception . This implies an even fuller, more demanding notion of mutual recognition between citizens than the respect conception does. Here, being tolerant does not just mean respecting members of other cultural life-forms or religions as moral and political equals, it also means having some kind of ethical esteem for their beliefs, that is, taking them to be ethically valuable conceptions that—even though different from one’s own—are in some way ethically attractive and held with good reasons. For this still to be a case of toleration, the kind of esteem characteristic of these relations is something like “reserved esteem,” that is, a kind of positive acceptance of a belief that for some reason you still find is not as attractive as the one you hold. As valuable as parts of the tolerated belief may be, it also has other parts that you find misguided, or wrong (cf. Raz 1988, Sandel 1989).

To answer the question which of these conceptions should be the guiding one for a given society, two aspects are most important. The first one requires an assessment of the conflicts that require and allow for toleration, given the history and character of the groups involved; and the second requires an adequate and convincing normative justification of toleration in a given social context. It is important to keep in mind that the (normatively dependent) concept of toleration itself does not provide such a justification; this has to come from other normative resources. And the list of such resources, speaking both historically and systematically, is long.

In the course of the religious-political conflicts throughout Europe that followed the Reformation, toleration became one of the central concepts of political-philosophical discourse, yet its history reaches much further back into antiquity (for the following, see esp. Forst 2013, part 1; cf. also Besier and Schreiner 1990, Nederman 2000, Zagorin 2003, Creppel 2003, Kaplan 2007 and Bejan 2017). In stoic writings, especially in Cicero, tolerantia is used as a term for a virtue of endurance, of suffering bad luck, pain and injustice of various kinds in a proper, steadfast manner. But already in early Christian discourse, the term is applied to the challenge of coping with religious difference and conflict. The works of Tertullian and Cyprianus are most important in that respect.

Within the Christian framework, a number of arguments for toleration have been developed, based on charity and love for those who err, for example, or on the idea of the two kingdoms and of limited human authority in matters of religious truth, i.e., in matters of the divine kingdom. The most important and far-reaching justification of toleration, however, is the principle credere non potest nisi volens , which holds that only faith based on inner conviction is pleasing to God, and that such faith has to develop from within, without external compulsion. Conscience therefore must not be and cannot be forced to adopt a certain faith, even if it were the true one. Yet, Augustine who defends these arguments in his earlier writings, later (when confronted with the danger of a schism between Roman Catholics and the so-called Donatists) came to the conclusion that the same reasons of love, of the two kingdoms and of the freedom of conscience could also make intolerance and the use of force into a Christian duty, if it were the only way to save the soul of another (esp. Augustine 408, letter # 93). He cites numerous examples of reconverted Catholics to substantiate his position that the proper use of force combined with the right teaching can shake men loose from the wrong faith and open up their eyes so as to accept the truth—still “from within.” Accordingly, individual conscience can and sometimes must be subjected to force. Christian arguments thus both form the core of many modern justifications of toleration and yet are janus-faced, always bound by the superior aim to serve the true faith. Similar to Augustine, Thomas Aquinas later developed a number of reasons for limited and conditional toleration, drawing especially strong limits against tolerating any form of heresy.

The question of peaceful coexistence of different faiths—Christian, Jewish and Muslim—was much discussed in the Middle Ages, especially in the 12 th century. Abailard and Raimundus Lullus wrote inter-religious dialogues searching for ways of defending the truth of Christian faith while also seeing some truth—religious or at least ethical—in other religions. In Judaism and Islam, this was mirrored by writers such as Maimonides or Ibn Rushd (Averroes), whose defense of philosophical truth-searching against religious dogma is arguably the most innovative of the period (see esp. Averroes 1180).

Nicolas of Cusa’s De Pace Fidei (1453) marks an important step towards a more comprehensive, Christian-humanist conception of toleration, though in the conversations among representatives of different faiths his core idea of “one religion in various rites” remains a Catholic one. Still, the search for common elements is a central, increasingly important topic in toleration discourses. This is much further developed in Erasmus of Rotterdam’s humanist idea of a possible religious unity based on a reduced core faith, trying to avoid religious strife about what Erasmus saw as non-essential questions of faith ( adiaphora ).

In contrast with this “irenic” humanist approach, Luther defended the protestant idea of the individual conscience bound only to the word of God, which marks the limits of the authority of the church as well as of the secular powers of the state (Luther 1523). The traditional arguments of free conscience and of the two kingdoms were radicalized in this period. The protestant humanist Sebastian Castellio (1554) attacks the intolerance of both Catholic and Calvinist practices and argues for the freedom of conscience and reason as prerequisites of true faith. In this period, decisive elements of early modern toleration discourse were formed: the distinction between church authority and individual religious conscience on the one hand and the separation of religious and secular authority on the other.

Jean Bodin’s work is important for the further development of modern ideas of toleration in two ways. In his Six Books of a Commonweal (1576), he develops a purely political justification of toleration, following the thought of the so-called Politiques , whose main concern was the stability of the state. For them, the preservation of political sovereignty took primacy over the preservation of religious unity, and toleration was recommended as a superior policy in a situation of religious plurality and strife. This, however, does not amount to the (late modern) idea of a fully secular state with general religious liberty. More radical still is Bodin’s religious-philosophical work on the Colloquium of the Seven (1593), a discourse among representatives of different faiths who disagree about fundamental religious and metaphysical issues. For the first time in the tradition of religious discourse, in Bodin’s work there is no dominant position, no obvious winners or losers. The agreement that the participants in the conversation find is based on respect for the others and on the insight that religious differences, even though they can be meaningfully discussed, cannot be resolved in a philosophical discourse by means of reason alone. Religious plurality is seen here as an enduring predicament of finite and historically situated human beings, not as a state to be overcome by the victory of the one and only true faith.

Marked by bitter religious conflicts, the 17 th century brought forth a number of toleration theories, among them three paradigmatic classics: Baruch de Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670), Pierre Bayle’s Commentaire Philosophique (1686) and John Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689). In his historical critique of biblical religions Spinoza locates their core in the virtues of justice and love and separates it from both contested religious dogmas and from the philosophical search for truth. The state has the task of realizing peace and justice, thus it has the right to regulate the external exercise of religion. The natural right to freedom of thought and judgment and to “inner” religion cannot, however, be entrusted to the state; here political authority finds the factual limits of its power.

Bayle’s Commentaire is the most comprehensive attempt to refute the arguments for the duty of intolerance that go back to Augustine (and especially his interpretation of the parable “compel them to come in,” where the master orders his servants to force those who were invited to the prepared supper but did not attend to come in; see Luke 14, 15ff.). In his elaborate argument against the use of force in matters of religion, Bayle does not primarily take recourse to the idea that religious conscience must not and cannot be forced, for he was aware of the powerful Augustinian arguments against both points (cf. Forst 2008 and Kilcullen 1988). Rather, Bayle argued that there is a “natural light” of practical reason revealing certain moral truths to every sincere person, regardless of his or her faith, even including atheists. And such principles of moral respect and of reciprocity cannot be trumped by religious truths, according to Bayle, for reasonable religious faith is aware that ultimately it is based on personal faith and trust, not on apprehensions of objective truth. This has often been seen as a skeptical argument, yet this is not what Bayle intended; what he suggested, rather, was that the truths of religion are of a different epistemological character than truths arrived at by the use of reason alone. Connecting moral and epistemological arguments in this way, Bayle was the first thinker to try to develop a universally valid argument for toleration, one that implied universal toleration of persons of different faiths as well as of those seen as lacking any faith.

In important respects, this is a more radical theory than the (much more popular and influential) one developed by Locke, who distinguishes between state and church in an early liberal perspective of natural individual rights. While it is the duty of the state to secure the “civil interests” of its citizens, the “care of the soul” cannot be its business, this being a matter between the individual and God to whom alone one is responsible in this regard. Hence there is a God-given, inalienable right to the free exercise of religion. Churches are no more than voluntary associations without any right to use force within a legitimate political order based on the consent of the governed. Locke draws the limits of toleration where a religion does not accept its proper place in civil society (such as Catholicism, in Locke’s eyes) as well as where atheists deny any higher moral authority and therefore destroy the basis of social order.

In the 18 th century, the conception of a secular state with an independent basis of authority and the distinction between the roles of citizen and believer in a certain faith were further developed, even though Locke’s thought that a stable political order did require some common religious basis persisted (with a few exceptions, such as the French materialists). In the course of the American and the French Revolutions a basic “natural” right to religious liberty was recognized, even though the interpretations of what kind of religious dissent could be tolerated differed.

Thinkers of the French Enlightenment argued for toleration on various grounds and, as in Bodin, there was a difference between a focus on political stability and a focus on religious coexistence. In his On the Spirit of the Laws (1748), Montesquieu argues for the toleration of different religions for the purpose of preserving political unity and peace, yet he warns that there is a limit to the acceptance of new religions or changes to the dominant one, given the connection between a constitution and the morality and habits of a people. In his Persian Letters (1721), however, he had developed a more comprehensive theory of religious pluralism. The difference between the two perspectives—political and inter-religious—is even more notable in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s writings. In his Social Contract (1762), he tries to overcome religious strife and intolerance by institutionalizing a “civic religion” that must be shared by all, while in his Emile (1762) he argues for the primacy of individual conscience as well as for the aim of a non-dogmatic “natural religion.”

The idea of a “religion of reason” as an alternative to established religions for the sake of overcoming the quarrels between them was typical for the Enlightenment, and is found in thinkers such as Voltaire, Diderot and Kant. In his parable of the rings (which goes back to medieval precursors) in the play Nathan the Wise (1779), G. E. Lessing offers a powerful image for the peaceful competition of established religions that both underlines their common ancestry as well as their differences due to multiple historical traditions of faith. Since there is no objective proof as to their truth for the time being, they are called upon to deliver such proof by acting morally and harmoniously until the end of time.

John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty (1859) marks the transition to a modern conception of toleration, one that is no longer occupied with the question of religious harmony and does not restrict the issue of toleration to religious differences. In Mill’s eyes, in modern society toleration is also required to cope with other forms of irreconcilable cultural, social and political plurality. Mill offers three main arguments for toleration. According to his “harm principle,” the exercise of political or social power is only legitimate if necessary to prevent serious harm done to one person by another, not to enforce some idea of the good in a paternalistic manner. Toleration towards opinions is justified by the utilitarian consideration that not just true, but also false opinions lead to productive social learning processes. Finally, toleration towards unusual “experiments of living” is justified in a romantic way (following Wilhelm von Humboldt), stressing the values of individuality and originality.

The story of toleration would have to be continued after Mill up to the present, yet this short overview might suffice to draw attention to the long and complex history of the concept and to the many forms it took as well as the different justifications offered for it. Seen historically, toleration has been many things: An exercise of love for the other who errs, a strategy of preserving power by offering some form of freedom to minorities, a term for the peaceful coexistence of different faiths who share a common core, another word for the respect for individual liberty, a postulate of practical reason, or the ethical promise of a productive pluralistic society.

Many of the systematic arguments for toleration—be they religious, pragmatic, moral or epistemological—can be used as a justification for more than one of the conceptions of toleration mentioned above (section 2). The classic argument for freedom of conscience, for example, has been used to justify arrangements according to the “permission conception” as well as the “respect conception.” Generally speaking, relations of toleration are hierarchically ordered according to the first conception, quite unstable according to the conception of “coexistence,” while the “esteem conception” is the most demanding in terms of the kind of mutual appreciation between the tolerating parties. In each case, the limits of toleration seem either arbitrary or too narrow, as in the esteem conception, which only allows toleration of those beliefs and practices that can be ethically valued.

Accordingly, in current philosophical discussions of toleration in multicultural, modern societies, the “respect conception” is often seen as the most appropriate and promising. Yet in these discussions, toleration as “respect” can be justified in different ways. An ethical-liberal, neo-Lockean justification argues that respect is owed to individuals as personally and ethically autonomous beings with the capacity to choose, possibly revise and realize an individual conception of the good. This capacity is to be respected and furthered because it is seen as a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for attaining the good life (cf. Kymlicka 1995). Hence the argument presupposes a specific thesis about the good life—i.e., that only an autonomously chosen way of life can be a good life—which can, however, reasonably be questioned. One may doubt whether such a way of life will necessarily be subjectively more fulfilling or objectively more valuable than one adopted in a more traditional way, without the presence of a range of options to choose from. Apart from that, the ethical-liberal theory could lead to a perfectionist justification of policies designed to further individual autonomy that could have a paternalistic character and lack toleration for non-liberal ways of life. In other words, there is the danger of an insufficient distinction between the components of objection and rejection mentioned above (section 1).

Thus, an alternative, neo-Baylean justification of the respect conception seeks to avoid a particular conception of the good life, relying instead on the discursive principle of justification which says that every norm that is to be binding for a plurality of persons, especially norms that are the basis of legal coercion, must be justifiable with reasons that are reciprocally acceptable to all affected as free and equal persons. Such persons have a basic “right to justification” (Forst 2012a) which gives them the power to reject one-sided ethical or religious justifications for general norms. For a complete argument for toleration, however, this normative component has to be accompanied by an epistemological component which says that ethical or religious reasons, if reciprocally contested, cannot be sufficient to justify the exercise of force, since their validation depends on a particular faith that can reasonably be rejected by others who do not share it; its validity reaches into a realm “beyond reason,” as Bayle said (see also similar arguments by Rawls 1993, ch. 2, and Larmore 1996, ch. 7). Thus toleration consists of the insight that reasons of ethical objection , even if deeply held, cannot be valid as general reasons of rejection so long as they are reciprocally rejectable as belonging to a conception of the good or true way of life that is not and need not be shareable. While such a distinction between ethical reasons for objection and stronger, morally justifiable reasons for rejection tries to overcome the “paradox of moral tolerance” (see section 1 above), the “paradox of drawing the limits” would be solved by seeing as tolerable all such views or practices that do not violate the principle of justification itself (see Forst 2013).

With such a reflexive turn in the debate about toleration, a number of questions arise as to the alleged superior validity of the principle of justification and the plausibility of a neo-Baylean epistemology distinguishing between faith and knowledge. Can there be an impartial justification that is not in the same way a “party” to the contest of ethical truths and world-views? Might there be the possibility, using a phrase John Rawls (1993) coined in the context of his theory of justice, of a “tolerant” theory of toleration that is at the same time substantive enough to ground and limit toleration?

Any concrete use of the concept of toleration is always situated in particular contexts of normative and political conflict, especially in societies that are transforming towards increased religious, ethical and cultural pluralism – even more so when societies are marked by an increased awareness of such pluralism, with some cultural groups raising new claims for recognition and others looking at their co-citizens with suspicion, despite having lived together for some time in the past. These social conflicts always involve group-based claims for recognition, both in the legal and in the social sphere (see generally Patten 2014, Galeotti 2002). Contemporary debate has focused on questions of respecting particular religious practices and beliefs, ranging from certain manners of dress, including the burka, to certain demands to be free from blasphemy and religious insults (Laborde 2008, Newey 2013, Nussbaum 2012, Leiter 2014, Taylor and Stepan 2014, Modood 2013, Forst 2013, ch. 12). The general questions raised here include: What is special about religious as opposed to other cultural identities (Laborde and Bardon 2017)? When is equal respect called for and what exactly does it imply with respect to, for example, norms of gender equality (see Okin et al. 1999, Song 2007)? What role do past injustices play in weighing claims for recognition, and how much room can there be for autonomous forms of life in a deeply pluralistic society (Tully 1995, Williams 2000)?

Other connected and intensely debated issues of toleration include free speech and “hate speech,” (Butler 1997, Waldron 2012, Gerstenfeld 2013) as well as the ways in which new forms of digital communication change the nature of social and political discourse (Barnett 2007).

Finally, in light of Goethe’s remark that to tolerate also means to insult, those working from the perspective of a critical theory of toleration discuss how power can be exercised not only by denying toleration but also by disciplining when granting toleration (Brown 2006, Brown and Forst 2014). As much as a politics of toleration aims to express mutual respect, it also involves disagreement, mutual criticism, and rejection. We still face the challenge of examining the grounds and forms of a politics of toleration as an emancipatory form of politics.

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Philosopher John Locke & His Letters Concerning Toleration

Portrait of John Locke by Sir Godfrey Kneller, 1697.

British Enlightenment philosopher, physician, and civil servant John Locke—later influential to the American Founders and the Declaration of Independence—was a relatively early proponent of religious tolerance and freedom of belief. While known as a secular thinker of the Enlightenment era, Locke asserted a remarkably similar, Bible-based position as American colonizers Roger Williams, who wrote The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution for the Cause of Conscience in 1644, and William Penn, who wrote The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience Debated and Defended by the Authority of Reason, Scripture, and Antiquity in 1670, on the issues of freedom of belief and religious tolerance.

Locke, who attended Oxford University in England, favored the use of man’s reason to search for and understand truth in life and society. This rational search was, he believed, part of man’s God-given purpose. His sensible views may have influenced his support for tolerance as necessary in man’s search for truth.

In 1669, Locke wrote the constitution for the colony of Carolina in America which notably allowed for freedom of belief despite having an official state church. Carolina’s state church was more tolerant than those in other colonies like Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Virginia. Alongside the tolerant colonies of Rhode Island (founded by Roger Williams in 1643), Maryland (founded by George and Cecil Calvert in 1634), and Pennsylvania (founded by William Penn in 1681); Carolina demonstrated a more moderate but important move toward tolerance in early America.

A Letter Concerning Toleration , 1689, by John Locke

In the wake of the Protestant Reformation and religious persecution in England and Europe, Locke wrote a series of letters supporting toleration—his 1689 Letter Concerning Toleration , 1690 Second Letter Concerning Toleration , and 1692 Third Letter Concerning Toleration —in defense of religious tolerance from a Bible-based viewpoint. He argued that freedom of belief was a God-given, natural right and that regulation of religion should be outside the realm of civil government. Since only God can ascertain religious truth and judge a person’s faith, government’s imposition on religious belief and practice is unauthorized and ineffective. Moreover, freedom is the only means by which people can arrive at genuine Christian faith. Locke notably believed that truth—in his mind, the Christian Gospel—can prevail amidst other ideas. In his 1707 Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul , he defended tolerance as an aspect of Christian charity or love. In his 1695 The Reasonableness of Christianity , he argued that the teachings of Christianity are compatible with reason.

Locke’s Bible-based writings on freedom of belief and religious tolerance, so reminiscent of Williams and Penn, influenced the views of many in England and colonial America. His first Letter likely influenced the English Toleration Act of 1689 which gave freedom of worship to Protestant non-conformists who dissented from the Church of England yet pledged allegiance to Britain. Locke’s first Letter was also studied by many American Founders and informed their approach to and support for religious freedom in the new nation of the United States.

Contributed by AHEF and Angela E. Kamrath.

—–

Source for more information: Kamrath, Angela E. The Miracle of America: The Influence of the Bible on the Founding History and Principles of the United States of America for a People of Every Belief . Second Edition. Houston, TX: American Heritage Education Foundation, 2014, 2015.

Additional Reading/Handout: Why Religious Freedom Became an Unalienable Right & First Freedom in America by Angela E. Kamrath, American Heritage Education Foundation. Paper available to download from member resources, americanheritage.org .

Related posts/videos: 1. An Introduction t o Popular Sovereignty 2. Challenges in the Early Puritan Colonies: The Dilemma of Religious Laws and Dissent 3. The Two Kingdoms Doctrine : Religious Reformers Recognize the Civil and Spiritual Kingdom 4. The First Experiments in Freedom of Belief & Religious Tolerance in America 5. Roger Williams: His Quest for Religious Purity and Founding of Rhode Island 6. Roger Williams: First Call for Separation of Church and State in America 7. William Penn and His “Holy Experiment” in Religious Tolerance 8. Early Americans supported Religious Tolerance based on God as Judge of Conscience 9. Early Americans opposed Religious Persecution as contrary to the Biblical Teachings of Christ . 10. Early Americans argued Religious Coercion opposes Order of Nature 11. Early Americans Believed Religious Coercion Opposes Reason 12. Early Americans Supported Religious Tolerance within Civil Peace and Order 13. The Religious Landscape of the Thirteen Colonies in Early 1700s America

Activity: Miracle of America High School Teacher Course Guide, Unit 4, Part 2 of 2, Activity 7: A Closer Look at Locke, p. 147-8. MS-HS.

A Closer Look at Locke

Purpose/Objective: Students learn about the arguments & works of John Locke who influenced the tolerant colony of Carolina and the views/arguments of the American Founders in support of religious freedom in the United States.

Suggested Readings: 1) Chapter 4 of Miracle of America sourcebook/text. Students read sections 4.1, 4.5, 4.6, 4.8, 4.10, 4.12, 4.15, 4.18. 2) Letters Concerning Toleration by John Locke (three letters). 3) Paper/handout titled Why Religious Freedom Became an Unalienable Right & First Freedom in America by Angela E. Kamrath (AHEF). Paper available to download from member resources, americanheritage.org . 4) Related Blog: What were the first experiments in freedom of belief and religious tolerance in America?

Activity: 1) Text Analysis. Students read selected excerpt(s) from Miracle of America text and Locke’s Letters Concerning Toleration . Students working individually or in pairs, recap in writing the main ideas and Biblical references in the selections. They may use an outline format, two-column notes, or graphic organizer as needed/directed. The teacher may prepare students for the reading with a review of vocabulary/terms in reading. As an alternative, additional text analysis, have students rephrase and discuss two or more quotes from Locke. For example:

“The care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his power consists only in outward force. True and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God. Such is the nature of understanding, that it cannot be compelled by outward force.”

2) Short Paragraph Test. Students think about, write on, and/or discuss the following questions below in small groups/whole class. Students may use this activity as test preparation for a short-answer test on the same or similar questions: a. What main points from the Bible and other sources were used by Locke to argue against religious coercion and in support of religious tolerance and freedom of belief? b. How does Locke argue that religious coercion opposes reason?

To download this whole unit, sign up as an AHEF member (no cost) to access the “resources” page on americanheritage.org . To order the printed binder format of the course guide with all the units, go to the AHEF bookstore .

Dr. Danilo Petranovich is an Advising Scholar for AHEF. Dr. Petranovich is the Director of the Abigail Adams Institute at Harvard University in Cambridge, MA. Previously, he taught political science at Duke University and Yale University. His scholarly expertise is in nineteenth-century European and American political and social thought, with a special emphasis on American culture and Abraham Lincoln. He has authored a number of articles on Lincoln and is currently writing a book on nationalism and the North in antebellum America. He is a member of Harvard’s Kirkland House. He holds a B. A. from Harvard and a Ph. D. in Political Science from Yale University.

Dr. Richard J. Gonzalez (1912-1998) is Co-Founder of AHEF. Dr. Gonzalez served as Chief Economist and a member of the Board of Directors for Humble Oil and Refining Company (later Exxon Mobil) in Houston, Texas, for 28 years. Later, he served as an economic consultant to various federal agencies and studies including the Department of Defense and the National Energy Study.

He consulted with the Petroleum Administration for Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization. In 1970, he was appointed by the U. S. Secretary of the Interior to the National Energy Study. In addition, Gonzalez chaired and directed many petroleum industry boards and committees. He served as director of the National Industrial Conference Board, chairman of the Economics Advisory Committee-Interstate Oil Compact Commission, and chairman of the National Petroleum Council Drafting Committee on National Oil Policy. Gonzalez also held visiting professorships at the University of Texas, University of Houston, University of New Mexico, Stanford University, and Northwestern University. From 1983-1991, he was a Senior Research Fellow at the University of Texas IC2 Institute (Innovation, Creativity, and Capital).

Gonzalez authored many articles and papers on topics ranging from energy economics to the role of progress in America. His articles include “Economics of the Mineral Industry” (1976), “Energy and the Environment: A Risk Benefit Approach” (1976), “Exploration and Economics of the Petroleum Industry” (1976), “Exploration for U. S. Oil and Gas” (1977), “National Energy Security” (1978), and “How Can U.S. Energy Production Be Increased?” (1979).

Born in San Antonio, Texas, Gonzalez earned his B.A. in Mathematics, M.A. in Economics, and Ph.D. in Economics (Phi Beta Kappa with highest honors) from the University of Texas at Austin. He was and still is the youngest candidate ever to earn his Ph.D. from UT-Austin at the age of 21 in 1934.

In 1993, Dr. and Mrs. Gonzalez were recognized by the National Society of the Sons of the American Revolution (NSSAR) with the Bronze Good Citizenship Medals for “Notable Services on Behalf of American Principles.”

Selected Articles: 1. “What Makes America Great? An Address before the Dallas Chapter Society for the Advancement of Management” (1951) 2. “Power for Progress” (1952) 3. “Increasing Importance of Economic Education” (1953) 4. “Federal Spending and Deficits Must Be Controlled to Stop Inflation” (1978) 5. “What Enabled Americans to Achieve Great Progress? Keys to Remarkable Economic Progress of the United States of America” (1989) 6. “The Establishment of the United States of America” (1991)

Eugenie Gonzalez is Co-Founder of AHEF. Mrs. Gonzalez was elected to the Houston Independent School District (HISD) Board of Trustees with Dr. Herman Barnett III and David Lopez from 1972-1976 and was a key designer and advocate for HISD’s Magnet School program. With HISD and AHEF in 1993, she designed and implemented HISD’s annual American Heritage Month held every November throughout HISD.

Jeannie was recognized in 1993 by the National Society of the Sons of the American Revolution (NSSAR) for “Notable Services on Behalf of American Principles” with the Bronze Good Citizenship Medal and in 2011 by the National Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution (NSDAR) for “Outstanding Achievement through Education Pursuits” with the Mary Smith Lockwood Medal. In 2004, she was honored to receive HISD’s first American Heritage Month Exemplary Citizenship Award.

Jeannie was a volunteer, participant, and supporter of M. D. Anderson Cancer Hospital, St. Luke’s United Methodist Church, Gethsemane United Methodist Church, Houston Grand Jury Association (board member), League of Women Voters, Houston Area Forum, the Mayor’s Charter Study Committee, Vision America, Houston Parks Department, and Houston Tennis Association. She was instrumental in the founding of the Houston Tennis Association and Houston Tennis Patrons.

In her youth, Jeannie was the leading women’s tennis player in the Midwest Section of the US Lawn Tennis Association and competed at the U. S. National Championships. She attended by invitation and became the first women’s tennis player at the University of Texas at Austin. In 1932, 1933, and 1934, Jeannie was women’s finalist at the Houston Invitational Tennis Tournament which became the River Oaks Invitational Tennis Tournament and is now the USTA Clay Court Championships. She was instrumental in bringing some of the nation’s top amateur tennis players to that event. Jeannie became the first teaching tennis professional at Houston Country Club and River Oaks Country Club, starting active junior programs at each. Jeannie and her father, Jack Sampson, were jointly inducted into the Texas Tennis Hall of Fame in 2012.

Claudine Kamrath is Outreach Coordinator, Office Manager, and Resource Designer for AHEF. She oversees outreach efforts and office administration. She also collaborates on educational resource formatting and design. She has served as an Elementary Art Teacher in Texas as well as a Communications and Design Manager for West University United Methodist Church in Houston. She also worked as a childrens’ Camp Counselor at St. Luke’s United Methodist Church in Houston. She holds a B.A. in Art and a Bachelor of Fine Art from the University of Texas at Austin as well as Texas Teacher Certification from the University of Houston. She has served in various children’s and student ministries.

Dr. Brian Domitrovic is an Advising Scholar for AHEF. Dr. Domitrovic is a Senior Associate and the Richard S. Strong Scholar at the Laffer Center for Supply-Side Economics. He is also Department Chair and Professor of History at Same Houston State University. He teaches American and European History and Economics. His specialties also include Economic History, Intellectual History, Monetary Policy, and Fiscal Policy. He has written articles, papers, and books–including Econoclasts –in these subjects. He is a board member of the Center for Western Civilization, Thought & Policy at the University of Colorado-Boulder and a trustee of the Philadelphia Society. He has received several awards including the Director’s Award from Intercollegiate Studies Institute and fellowship grants from Earhart Foundation, Krupp Foundation, Princeton, Texas A&M, and SHSU. He holds a B. A. in History & Mathematics from Columbia University, an M. A. in History from Harvard University, and a Ph. D. in History, with graduate studies in Economics, from Harvard University.

Jack Kamrath is Co-Founder and Vice-President of AHEF. A Texas state champion and nationally-ranked tennis player during his high school and college years, Kamrath is the Co-Founder and Principal of Tennis Planning Consultants (TPC) in Houston, Texas, since 1970. TPC is the first, oldest, and most prolific tennis facility design and consulting firm in the United States and world. Mr. Kamrath is also the founder and owner of Kamrath Construction Company and has owned and managed various real estate operating companies. He worked with Brown and Root in construction and human resources in Vietnam during the Vietnam War from 1966-1970. He holds a Bachelor of Business Administration from the University of Texas at Austin. He is a member of St. Luke’s United Methodist Church in Houston. In 2008, AHEF President Mr. Kamrath and AHEF received the Distinguished Patriot Award from the Society of the Sons of the American Revolution (NSSAR) for leadership in preserving America’s heritage and the teaching of good citizenship principles.

Essays: 1. 1776: From Oppression to Freedom 2. FUPR: The Formula for the American Experiment 2. In Support of Our Pledge of Allegiance 3. A Summation of America’s Greatest Ever Threat to Its Survival and Perpetuation 4. A Brief Overview: The Moral Dimension of Rule of Law in the U. S. Constitution (editor)

Dr. Michael Owens is Director of Education of AHEF. He has served as a Presenter/Trainer of AHEF teacher training workshops. Owens has taken on a number of administration leadership roles in Texas public education throughout his career–including Superintendent in Dripping Springs ISD, Assistant Superintendent in Friendswood ISD, and Associate Executive Director of Instruction Services for Region IV Education Service Center. He has also served as Director of Exemplary Programs for the Texas Education Agency, Director of Curriculum and Instruction for College Station ISD, and Director of Elementary and Secondary Education for College Station ISD. Owens has led many professional development worships for the Texas School Boards Association, Texas Assessment, Texas Education Agency, and others. He has specialization in educational technology systems and educational assessments, and has Texas teaching experience. He currently serves as Texas Technology Engineering Literacy (TEL) test administrator for the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) for part of Texas. He holds a B.S. and a M.Ed. from Stephen F. Austin State University and a Ed.D. from the University of North Texas. He retired in 2021.

Angela E. Kamrath is President and Editorial Director of AHEF. She is the author of the critically-acclaimed The Miracle of America: The Influence of the Bible on the Founding History and Principles of the United States of America for a People of Every Belief . She is editor and co-contributor of AHEF’s widely-distributed teacher resources, America’s Heritage: An Adventure in Liberty , America’s Heritage: An Experiment in Self-Government , and The Miracle of America High School Teacher Course Guide . In addition, she is editor and contributor for The Founding Blog and AHEF websites. Kamrath has taught, tutored, and consulted in writing and research at the University of Houston, Belhaven College, and Houston Christian University. She also served as a Secondary English Teacher in Texas and as a Communications Assistant for St. Luke’s United Methodist Church in Houston. She served as a Research Assistant intern in the Office of National Service during the George H. W. Bush administration. She holds a B.A. in Government from the University of Texas at Austin, a M.A. in Journalism from Regent University, and a M.Ed. in Curriculum and Instruction as well as Texas Teacher Certification from the University of Houston. She has served in various children’s and student ministries.

Dr. Steve Balch is an Advising Scholar for AHEF. Dr. Balch is the Principal Founder and former President of the National Association of Scholars (NAS). He served as a Professor of Government at City University of New York from 1974-1987. Dr. Balch has co-authored several NAS studies on education curriculum evolution and problems including The Dissolution of General Education: 1914-1993 , The Dissolution of the Curriculum 1914-1996 , and The Vanishing West . He is the author of Economic and Political Change After Crisis: Prospects for Government, Liberty and Rule of Law and numerous articles relating to issues in academia. Dr. Balch has also founded and/or led many education organizations including the Institute for the Study of Western Civilization at Texas Tech University, Alexander Hamilton Institute for the Study of Western Civilization, Association for the Study of Free Institutions, American Academy for Liberal Education, Philadelphia Society, Historical Society, and Association of Literary Scholars. He has also served on the National Advisory Board of the U. S. Department of Education’s Fund for the Improvement of Post-Secondary Education (FIPSE), Educational Excellence Network, and New Jersey State Advisory Committee to the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights. Dr. Balch was awarded the National Humanities Medal by President George W. Bush in 2007, and the Jeanne Jordan Kirkpatrick Academic Freedom Award by the Bradley Foundation and American Conservative Union Foundation in 2009. He holds a B. A. in Political Science from City University of New York and a M. A. and Ph. D. in Political Science from the University of California-Berkeley.

Dr. Rob Koons is an Advising Scholar for AHEF. Dr. Koons is a Professor of Philosophy and Co-Founder of The Western Civilization and American Institutions Program at The University of Texas at Austin. He teaches ancient, medieval, contemporary Christian, and political philosophy as well as philosophy of religion. He has authored/co-authored countless articles and several books including Realism Regained , The Atlas of Reality, Fundamentals of Metaphysics, and Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science . He has been awarded numerous fellowships and is a member of the American Philosophical Association, Society of Christian Philosophers, and American Catholic Philosophical Association. He holds a B. A. in Philosophy from Michigan State University, an M. A. in Philosophy and Theology from Oxford University, and a Ph. D. in Philosophy from the University of California-Los Angeles (UCLA).

Dr. Mark David Hall is an Advising Scholar for AHEF. Dr. Hall is a Professor of Political Science in the Robertson School of Government at Regent University and a Senior Research Fellow in the Center for Religion, Culture & Democracy at First Liberty Institute. He is also a Distinguished Scholar of Christianity & Public Life at George Fox University, Associate Faculty in the Center for the Study of Law and Religion at Emory University, and Senior Fellow in the Institute for Studies of Religion at Baylor University. His teaching interests include American Political Theory, Religion and Politics, Constitutional Law, and Great Books. Dr. Hall is a nationally recognized expert on religious freedom and has written or edited a dozen books on religion and politics in America including Proclaim Liberty Throughout All the Land: How Christianity Has Advanced Freedom and Equality for All Americans , Did America Have a Christian Founding? Separating Modern Myth from Historical Truth , Great Christian Jurists in American History , America’s Wars: A Just War Perspective , Faith and the Founders of the American Republic , The Sacred Rights of Conscience , The Founders on God and Government , and The Political and Legal Philosophy of James Wilson . He writes for the online publications Law & Liberty and Intercollegiate Studies Review and has appeared regularly on a number of radio shows, including Jerry Newcomb’s Truth in Action, Tim Wildman’s Today’s Issues, the Janet Mefferd Show, and the Michael Medved Show. He has been awarded numerous fellowships and the Freedom Project Award by the John Templeton Foundation in 1999 and 2000. He holds a B. A. in Political Science from Wheaton College and a Ph. D. in Government from the University of Virginia.

John Locke: The Empirical Educator

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John Locke is known as the founder of the philosophical school of empiricism. This school of thought is that knowledge must be gained through experience. In addition to this seminal philosophical work, Locke’s treatise on liberty and the role of government was a fundamental building block used by the American founding fathers such as Madison and Jefferson. What is less known is Locke’s thoughts concerning how to set up an educational system to teach individuals how to be a functioning and contribution member of civil society. Together, this triad of philosophy: understanding knowledge, setting up a government that protects liberty, and creating an educational system that teaches and passes on knowledge for maintaining a civil society continues to drive governments in the present day.

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Jordan, J.B. (2023). John Locke: The Empirical Educator. In: Geier, B.A. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Educational Thinkers . Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81037-5_51-1

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DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81037-5_51-1

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A Letter Concerning Toleration
A Letter Concerning Toleration (Epistola de tolerantia) by John Locke was originally published in 1689. Its initial publication was in Latin, and it was immediately translated into other languages.Locke's work appeared amidst a fear that Catholicism might be taking over England, and responds to the problem of religion and government by proposing religious toleration as the answer.
A Letter Concerning Toleration
A Letter Concerning Toleration, in the history of political philosophy, an important essay by the English philosopher John Locke, originally written in Latin (Epistola de Tolerantia) in 1685 while Locke was in exile in Holland and first published anonymously in both Latin and English (in a translation by William Popple) upon Locke's return to England in 1689.
An essay concerning toleration
The persecution of the Japanese Christians -- C. Peers mentioned in a letter from a person of quality -- Textual introduction -- I. History and description of the texts -- An essay concerning toleration -- Writings on church and state, 1668-1674 -- A letter from a person of quality, to his friend in the country -- The selection of juries ...
John Locke's "A Letter Concerning Toleration" and the Liberal Regime
John Locke presents an argument for toleration worth pondering in our time because few are giving toleration, let alone free speech, freedom of association, or liberty, serious thought. Christianity and Toleration. Locke's doctrine of toleration begins with true Christianity, the purpose of the church, and the ends of civil society.
A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689) and Two Treatises on Government
John Locke (1632-1704) was the author of A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690), Two Treatises on Government (1690), and other works. In the period stretching from 1760 to 1800, his works on government and religious toleration made him, after Montesquieu and Blackstone, the most cited secular author in America.
PDF and A Letter Concerning Toleration
341. ncerning TolerationTo the ReaderThe ensuing letter concerning Toleration, first printed in Latin this very year, in Holland, has already been tra. slated both into Dutch and French. So general and speedy an approbation may therefore bespeak it. fa-vourable reception in England. I think indeed there is no nation under heaven, in which so ...
A Letter concerning Toleration and Other Writings
A Letter concerning Toleration and Other Writings. John Locke (author) Mark Goldie (editor) Part of the Thomas Hollis Library published by Liberty Fund. This volume contains A Letter Concerning Toleration, excerpts of the Third Letter, An Essay on Toleration, and various fragments. Read Now.
PDF A Letter Concerning Toleration and Other Writings
remains an essay in evangelical tolerance, penned by a devout Christian, albeit one whom contemporaries suspected of theological heterodoxy and who thereby himself needed—or, in his enemies' eyes, did not deserve— the blessings of toleration. Separating Church from State Locke's Letter oﬀ ers three principal arguments for toleration ...
PDF The Online Library of Liberty
An Essay Concerning Toleration Fragments On Toleration John Locke Online Library of Liberty: A Letter concerning Toleration and Other Writings ... "Tolerance," after all, denotes forbearance, not approval, and Locke defends rather than applauds religious diversity. Moreover, he does not offer
PDF A Letter Concerning Toleration John Locke
A Letter Concerning Toleration John Locke. translated by William Popple. 1689. Honoured Sir, Since you are pleased to inquire what are my thoughts about the mutual toleration of Christians in their different professions of religion, I must needs answer you freely that I esteem that toleration to be the chief characteristic mark of the true Church.
Locke, Rationality and Persecution
Locke J. (2006) 'An Essay Concerning Toleration', in Milton J. R. and Milton P. (eds), An Essay Concerning Toleration and other Writings on Law and Politics, 1667 ... Pevnick R. (2009) 'The Lockean Case for Religious Tolerance: The Social Contract and the Irrationality of Persecution', Political Studies, 57 (4), 846-65. Crossref. ISI.
PDF Locke on Toleration
viii Introduction A Letter Concerning Toleration is an English translation of a Latin work, the Epistola de Tolerantia, that John Locke wrote towards the end of the year , while living - often in hiding - in the Dutch Republic. The Epistola was not however published until , after Locke's return to England, and the English translation followed very shortly after.
Toleration
The heart of tolerance is self-control. When we tolerate an activity, we resist our urge to forcefully prohibit the expression of activities that we find unpleasant. ... Somewhat different versions of Spinoza's basic insights can be found in Locke's famous Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), an essay that was written during Locke's exile ...
Locke'S Political Arguments for Toleration
Government, ed. P. Abrams (Cambridge, 1968); Locke, 'Essay on Toleration', reprinted in D. Wootton, Political Writings of John Locke (Harmondsworth, 1993); Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (also known by its initial Latin name Epistola de Tolerantia), ed. J. Tully (Indianapolis, 1983) (hereafter Letter); and Locke's 'Second' and 'Third Letters
Tolerance
The English philosopher John Locke wrote his Letter on Toleration (1686) in Latin and sent it to a friend who published it. We reproduce here, unmodernised, William Popple's 1689 English translation. Locke is arguing for religious toleration and also for a clear separation of power between the State - whose aim is to promote the 'common wealth' of its citizens - and the church ...
John Locke
Introduction by Rachel Edmonston . John Locke's A Letter Concerning Toleration was written in Latin in 1685, while the author was in exile in Holland. Locke had fled to Holland following the exposure of the so-called "Rye House Plot." Though historians now doubt the extent to which the Plot was real, many of Locke's close associates were implicated for treason in connection to the Plot ...
Project MUSE
John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration and Other Writings (review) John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration and Other Writings, ed. and introd. Mark Goldie. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2010. Pp. xlvii + 208. $14.50 (paper). Although Locke was by no means the first person to argue in favor of religious toleration, he seems to have been the ...
Locke on Toleration, (In)Civility and The Quest for Concord
ended, the real work of tolerance has just begun. 1 University of Oxford, Dept. of Politics and International Relations, Manor Road, Oxford 0X1 3UQ. Email: [email protected] ... arguments in favour of toleration in An Essay Concerning Toleration (1667), and finally to his mature views expounded in the Letter and its many
Tolerance is more than putting up with things
They argue that tolerant people value the individual, his or her independence and freedom of choice. When tolerance is placed within the moral domain relating to fairness, justice and respect and ...
Toleration (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Toleration. The term "toleration"—from the Latin tolerare: to put up with, countenance or suffer—generally refers to the conditional acceptance of or non-interference with beliefs, actions or practices that one considers to be wrong but still "tolerable," such that they should not be prohibited or constrained.
Philosopher John Locke & His Letters Concerning Toleration
In the wake of the Protestant Reformation and religious persecution in England and Europe, Locke wrote a series of letters supporting toleration—his 1689 Letter Concerning Toleration, 1690 Second Letter Concerning Toleration, and 1692 Third Letter Concerning Toleration—in defense of religious tolerance from a Bible-based viewpoint. He argued that freedom of belief was a God-given, natural ...
John Locke: The Empirical Educator
Locke's philosophical foundation of Essay, Two Treatises, and A Letter Concerning Tolerance, and Some Thoughts Concerning Education forms the path to engagement on how we should educate and engage ourselves to maintain a civil society (Arcenas, 2022). Engagement, civil or otherwise, is an expression of an individual's decision resulting in ...