respect values essay

Respect Essay for Students and Children

500+ words essay on respect.

Respect is a broad term. Experts interpret it in different ways. Generally speaking, it is a positive feeling or action expressed towards something. Furthermore, it could also refer to something held in high esteem or regard. Showing Respect is a sign of ethical behavior . Unfortunately, in the contemporary era, there has been undermining of the value of Respect. Most noteworthy, there are two essential aspects of Respect. These aspects are self-respect and respect for others.

Self-Respect

Self-Respect refers to loving oneself and behaving with honour and dignity. It reflects Respect for oneself. An individual who has Self-Respect would treat himself with honour. Furthermore, lacking Self-Respect is a matter of disgrace. An individual who does not respect himself, should certainly not expect Respect from others. This is because nobody likes to treat such an individual with Respect.

Self-Respect is the foundation of a healthy relationship . In relationships, it is important to respect your partner. Similarly, it is equally important to Respect yourself. A Self-Respecting person accepts himself with his flaws. This changes the way how others perceive the individual. An individual, who honours himself, would prevent others from disrespecting him. This certainly increases the value of the individual in the eyes of their partner.

Lacking Self-Respect brings negative consequences. An individual who lacks Self-Respect is treated like a doormat by others. Furthermore, such an individual may engage in bad habits . Also, there is a serious lack of self-confidence in such a person. Such a person is likely to suffer verbal or mental abuse. The lifestyle of such an individual also becomes sloppy and untidy.

Self-Respect is a reflection of toughness and confidence. Self-Respect makes a person accept more responsibility. Furthermore, the character of such a person would be strong. Also, such a person always stands for his rights, values, and opinions.

Self-Respect improves the morality of the individual. Such an individual has a good ethical nature. Hence, Self-Respect makes you a better person.

Self-Respect eliminates the need to make comparisons. This means that individuals don’t need to make comparisons with others. Some people certainly compare themselves with others on various attributes. Most noteworthy, they do this to seek validation of others. Gaining Self-Respect ends all that.

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Respect of Others

Everyone must Respect fellow human beings. This is an essential requirement of living in a society. We certainly owe a basic level of Respect to others. Furthermore, appropriate Respect must be shown to people who impact our lives. This includes our parents, relatives, teachers, friends, fellow workers, authority figures, etc.

One of the best ways of showing respect to others is listening. Listening to another person’s point of view is an excellent way of Respect. Most noteworthy, we must allow a person to express his views even if we disagree with them.

Another important aspect of respecting others is religious/political views. Religious and cultural beliefs of others should be given a lot of consideration. Respecting other people’s Religions is certainly a sign of showing mature Respect.

Everyone must Respect those who are in authority. Almost everyone deals with people in their lives that hold authority. So, a healthy amount of Respect should be given to such people. People of authority can be of various categories. These are boss, police officer, religious leader, teacher, etc.

In conclusion, Respect is a major aspect of human socialization. It is certainly a precious value that must be preserved. Respectful behaviour is vital for human survival.

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May 4, 2023

Essays on Respect: Delving into the Core Values and Implications for Society

Respect is not just a word, it's a powerful force that can change the world. Struggling to write an essay on respect? These examples are here to guide you!

Have you ever noticed how a simple act of respect, like holding the door open for someone or saying 'thank you,' can brighten someone's day and make the world feel a little kinder? Respect is a fundamental value that we all need to thrive, yet it can sometimes feel in short supply in our fast-paced, competitive world. 

That's why in this series of essays, we're diving deep into the topic of respect: what it means, why it matters, and how we can cultivate it in our daily lives. We'll explore the power of reverence, examining how showing respect can be a transformative act that creates connection, understanding, and empathy. We'll also delve into the role of respect in relationships, discussing how treating others with dignity and kindness can be a foundation for healthy connections and flourishing communities. And, of course, we'll discuss the practical applications of respect, including how it can enhance communication and lead to more productive, satisfying interactions. 

By the end of this blog post, we hope you'll come away with a renewed appreciation for the value of respect and a host of tools and strategies for practicing it in your daily life. Join us on Jenni.ai to learn more and gain access to a wealth of resources for essay writing and more. Let's dive in!

Examples of Essays on Respect

The Importance of Respect in Building Healthy Relationships

Respect is an essential ingredient for any healthy relationship to thrive. When two people treat each other with respect, they can build a strong and lasting bond that withstands the test of time. Respect is not just about being polite or courteous to one another, but it's also about acknowledging and appreciating each other's unique qualities and differences. In this article, we'll explore the importance of respect in building healthy relationships and how it can help you maintain a happy and fulfilling connection with your partner.

What is respect?

Respect is a feeling of deep admiration for someone or something elicited by their abilities, qualities, or achievements. In the context of relationships, respect means treating your partner with dignity, recognizing their worth, and valuing their opinions and feelings. It involves listening to them, being considerate of their needs, and acknowledging their boundaries.

Why is respect important in relationships?

Respect is the foundation on which healthy relationships are built. Without respect, a relationship can quickly deteriorate into a toxic and unhealthy dynamic where one partner dominates the other or both partners constantly belittle each other. Respect is what allows two people to trust each other, communicate effectively, and build a strong emotional connection. Here are some reasons why respect is crucial in building healthy relationships:

It fosters trust and intimacy

When two people respect each other, they can trust each other to be honest and transparent. This trust allows them to open up and be vulnerable with each other, leading to a deeper emotional connection and intimacy. Trust and intimacy are essential for any healthy relationship to thrive, and respect is the foundation on which they are built.

It promotes effective communication

Respectful communication involves listening actively, being mindful of each other's feelings, and avoiding hurtful language or behaviors. When two people communicate respectfully, they can resolve conflicts in a constructive and healthy manner, leading to a stronger and more fulfilling relationship.

It builds a sense of safety and security

When two people respect each other, they feel safe and secure in each other's company. They know that they can rely on each other and that their partner will always have their back. This sense of safety and security is essential for building a healthy and long-lasting relationship.

It helps to maintain individuality

Respect is not just about acknowledging your partner's worth, but also about respecting their individuality and unique qualities. When two people respect each other, they can appreciate each other's differences and allow each other to grow and develop as individuals. This helps to maintain a healthy balance between dependence and independence in the relationship.

How to show respect in a relationship?

Showing respect in a relationship involves a combination of behaviors and attitudes. Here are some ways you can show respect to your partner:

Listen actively

One of the most important ways to show respect is to listen actively to your partner. This means paying attention to what they are saying, asking questions, and responding with empathy and understanding.

Be considerate of their feelings

Respect also means being considerate of your partner's feelings. Avoid saying or doing things that might hurt them or make them feel uncomfortable.

Acknowledge their achievements

Respect involves acknowledging and appreciating your partner's achievements and successes. Celebrate their accomplishments and encourage them to pursue their goals and dreams.

Respect their boundaries

Respect also means respecting your partner's boundaries. Avoid pressuring them to do things they are uncomfortable with and always seek their consent before engaging in any intimate activities.

Avoid criticizing or belittling them

Respectful communication also involves avoiding hurtful language or behaviors. Avoid criticizing or belittling your partner, and instead focus on expressing your concerns in a constructive and respectful manner.

Show appreciation and gratitude

Showing appreciation and gratitude is another important way to demonstrate respect in a relationship. Let your partner know that you value and appreciate them, and express your gratitude for the things they do for you.

Be honest and transparent

Honesty and transparency are crucial components of respectful communication. Be truthful with your partner, and avoid hiding things from them or being deceitful in any way.

Take responsibility for your actions

Respect also means taking responsibility for your actions and acknowledging when you make mistakes. Apologize when you've done something wrong, and work together with your partner to find a solution.

How to handle disrespect in a relationship?

Disrespectful behavior can have a significant impact on a relationship and can quickly lead to conflict and tension. Here are some ways to handle disrespect in a relationship:

Communicate your concerns

The first step in addressing disrespect in a relationship is to communicate your concerns to your partner. Let them know how their behavior is making you feel, and work together to find a solution.

Set boundaries

Setting boundaries is an important part of respecting yourself in a relationship. Let your partner know what you will and won't tolerate, and be prepared to enforce these boundaries if necessary.

Seek outside help

If you're struggling to handle disrespect in your relationship, consider seeking outside help from a therapist or counselor. They can provide you with the tools and support you need to navigate the situation.

Respect is an essential ingredient for building healthy and fulfilling relationships. When two people treat each other with respect, they can develop a strong emotional connection based on trust, intimacy, and mutual appreciation. By listening actively, being considerate of each other's feelings, and communicating respectfully, you can show your partner that you value and respect them. Remember that respect is a two-way street, and it's essential to treat your partner the way you would like to be treated.

Cultivating Respect: Strategies for Fostering a Culture of Civility

Respect is a fundamental aspect of human interactions. It is essential to creating a positive and productive workplace culture. Unfortunately, respect is often in short supply in many organizations, leading to negative outcomes such as high turnover rates, low employee engagement, and poor job satisfaction. In this article, we will explore strategies for cultivating respect in the workplace to foster a culture of civility.

Introduction

The workplace is a complex environment that involves the interaction of various individuals with diverse backgrounds and personalities. This diversity often results in conflicts that can negatively impact the work environment. Therefore, fostering a culture of civility is critical to ensuring a healthy and productive workplace. Civility refers to respectful behavior and polite communication, even in situations where there is disagreement or conflict.

The Importance of Respect in the Workplace

Respect is vital to creating a positive and productive work environment. It promotes employee engagement, job satisfaction, and overall well-being. Respectful interactions also encourage collaboration, creativity, and innovation. When employees feel respected, they are more likely to share ideas, provide feedback, and take risks.

Strategies for Fostering a Culture of Civility

Lead by Example: The behavior of leaders sets the tone for the entire organization. Leaders should model respectful behavior and communicate clear expectations for civility in the workplace.

Communication: Encourage open and honest communication by creating a safe and supportive environment. Ensure that all employees have an opportunity to share their thoughts and ideas.

Education: Provide training on conflict resolution, effective communication, and cultural awareness. This will equip employees with the necessary skills to navigate difficult conversations and work collaboratively with diverse individuals.

Policies and Procedures: Establish clear policies and procedures for addressing conflicts and promoting respectful behavior. Ensure that all employees are aware of these policies and understand the consequences of violating them.

Recognition: Recognize and reward employees who demonstrate respectful behavior and contribute to a positive work environment. This will encourage others to follow suit and foster a culture of civility.

Challenges and Solutions

Cultivating respect and promoting civility in the workplace is not always easy. There are several challenges that organizations may face, including resistance to change, lack of resources, and differing perspectives. However, these challenges can be overcome by implementing the following solutions:

Address Resistance: Address resistance to change by communicating the benefits of cultivating respect and promoting civility. Explain how it will benefit the organization, employees, and customers.

Allocate Resources: Allocate the necessary resources to promote respectful behavior, such as training programs, policies and procedures, and recognition programs.

Understand Differences: Encourage employees to understand and respect cultural and individual differences. This will help to foster an environment of inclusivity and respect.

Cultivating respect and promoting civility in the workplace is essential to creating a positive and productive work environment. It requires leadership, communication, education, policies, and recognition. Organizations that prioritize respect and civility will benefit from increased employee engagement, job satisfaction, and overall well-being. By implementing the strategies discussed in this article, organizations can create a culture of civility that fosters respect, collaboration, and innovation.

In conclusion, cultivating respect and promoting civility in the workplace is critical to creating a positive and productive work environment. It requires the commitment and effort of all employees, starting with leadership. By implementing the strategies discussed in this article, organizations can create a culture of civility that fosters respect, collaboration, and innovation. By doing so, they will benefit from increased employee engagement, job satisfaction, and overall well-being, leading to greater success and growth.

Understanding Empathy: The Key to Building Respectful Connections

Empathy is the ability to understand and share the feelings of others. It is a powerful tool that helps us connect with people and build healthy relationships. In this article, we will explore the meaning of empathy, its importance in building respectful connections, and how to cultivate empathy in our daily lives.

What is Empathy?

Empathy is the ability to understand and share the feelings of others. It involves putting yourself in someone else's shoes and seeing the world from their perspective. Empathy helps us connect with people and build healthy relationships by creating a sense of mutual understanding and respect.

The Different Types of Empathy

There are three different types of empathy: cognitive empathy, emotional empathy, and compassionate empathy.

Cognitive Empathy

Cognitive empathy is the ability to understand someone's thoughts and feelings intellectually. It involves seeing the world from their perspective and understanding their needs and concerns.

Emotional Empathy

Emotional empathy is the ability to share someone's feelings and emotions. It involves feeling what they feel and experiencing their emotions alongside them.

Compassionate Empathy

Compassionate empathy is the ability to feel someone's emotions and take action to help them. It involves understanding their needs and concerns and taking steps to address them.

How to Cultivate Empathy

Cultivating empathy requires practice and effort. Here are some strategies you can use to cultivate empathy in your daily life:

Active Listening

Active listening involves fully concentrating on what someone is saying and actively engaging with them. It involves asking questions, providing feedback, and demonstrating that you are fully present and engaged.

Putting Yourself in Someone Else's Shoes

Putting yourself in someone else's shoes involves imagining how they are feeling and seeing the world from their perspective. It involves suspending judgment and taking the time to understand their needs and concerns.

Practicing Self-Reflection

Practicing self-reflection involves taking the time to reflect on your own thoughts and feelings. It involves being honest with yourself about your biases and assumptions and actively working to challenge them.

Practicing Empathy Exercises

Practicing empathy exercises involves actively seeking out opportunities to practice empathy. These exercises may involve volunteering, practicing active listening, or engaging in role-playing activities.

Empathy is a crucial tool for building respectful connections with others. It allows us to understand and share the feelings of others, creating a sense of mutual understanding and respect. By practicing empathy in our daily lives, we can build stronger relationships, enhance our communication skills, and improve our overall well-being.

Respect and Communication: How Listening and Dialogue Can Build Bridges

Communication is the foundation of any relationship, be it personal or professional. However, communication isn't just about talking; it also involves listening actively and with respect. In this article, we will explore how respect and communication can build bridges and help create strong relationships.

Definition of communication

Importance of communication

Communication challenges

Building Bridges through Communication

Communication is a powerful tool that can be used to create and maintain bridges between people. By communicating effectively, we can connect with others on a deeper level and build trust and respect. Here are some ways to build bridges through communication:

Active listening is the key to effective communication. When we listen actively, we give the other person our undivided attention, and we try to understand their perspective without interrupting or judging them.

Empathy is the ability to understand and share the feelings of another person. When we empathize with others, we put ourselves in their shoes, and we try to see things from their perspective. This helps us to communicate more effectively and build stronger relationships.

Respect is essential in any relationship. When we respect others, we treat them with dignity and honor their views and opinions, even if we disagree with them. This creates a safe space for communication and encourages people to share their thoughts and feelings openly.

Open Communication

Open communication is critical for building bridges. When we communicate openly, we share our thoughts and feelings honestly and transparently, and we encourage others to do the same. This helps to build trust and creates a deeper connection between people.

Communication Challenges

Effective communication isn't always easy, and there are many challenges that can arise. Here are some of the most common communication challenges:

Language Barriers

Language barriers can make communication difficult, especially when there are cultural differences. It's essential to be patient and to try to understand the other person's perspective, even if there are language barriers.

Emotional Triggers

Emotions can often get in the way of effective communication. When we feel triggered, we may become defensive or angry, which can create a barrier to communication. 

Power Imbalances

Power imbalances can make communication difficult, especially in a professional setting. When one person has more power or authority than the other, it can be challenging to communicate effectively. 

Effective communication is critical for building bridges and creating strong relationships. By listening actively, empathizing, showing respect, and communicating openly, we can overcome communication challenges and build bridges that last. Remember to be patient, kind, and understanding, and always approach communication with an open mind and heart.

The Power of Reverence: How Respect Can Shape Our Lives

Respect is an essential aspect of our lives that plays a crucial role in shaping our personalities and building meaningful relationships. When we show respect to others, we create a positive environment that allows everyone to thrive. The power of reverence goes beyond basic etiquette; it influences our behavior, decisions, and outlook on life. In this article, we will explore the importance of respect and how it can shape our lives.

Understanding Respect

Respect is defined as a feeling of deep admiration for someone or something elicited by their abilities, qualities, or achievements. It is an attitude that acknowledges the worth of another person or thing. Respect is a fundamental aspect of human interaction that creates a positive environment for everyone. It is essential in building trust, maintaining healthy relationships, and promoting cooperation.

Respect in Personal Relationships

Respect is an essential ingredient in creating meaningful personal relationships. It is the foundation on which all relationships are built. When we show respect to our partners, friends, and family members, we create an environment of trust, empathy, and mutual understanding. Respect allows us to communicate effectively, express our opinions, and solve conflicts in a healthy manner. It is also the key to maintaining healthy boundaries and creating a safe space for everyone involved.

Respect in Professional Relationships

Respect is equally important in professional relationships. It is the key to building trust, fostering collaboration, and creating a positive work environment. When we show respect to our colleagues, supervisors, and subordinates, we promote teamwork, productivity, and job satisfaction. Respectful communication allows for the sharing of ideas, constructive feedback, and the creation of a supportive work culture.

The Benefits of Respect

The power of reverence has numerous benefits that can positively impact our lives. Respect promotes empathy, understanding, and cooperation, allowing us to build healthy relationships with others. It creates a positive environment that fosters personal and professional growth, leading to increased productivity, job satisfaction, and overall well-being. Showing respect also improves our self-esteem, allowing us to feel more confident and empowered.

The Consequences of Disrespect

On the other hand, disrespect can have severe consequences that negatively impact our lives. Disrespectful behavior can damage relationships, erode trust, and create a hostile work environment. It can lead to misunderstandings, conflicts, and even legal issues in extreme cases. Disrespectful behavior can also damage our self-esteem, leading to feelings of inadequacy and insecurity.

Cultivating Respect

Cultivating respect is an ongoing process that requires mindfulness and conscious effort. It involves acknowledging the worth of others, recognizing their contributions, and treating them with dignity and kindness. Cultivating respect also means recognizing our own worth and treating ourselves with kindness and compassion. When we cultivate respect, we create a positive environment that allows everyone to thrive.

In conclusion, the power of reverence is an essential aspect of our lives that can positively impact our personal and professional relationships. Respect allows us to build healthy relationships, promotes empathy and understanding, and fosters personal and professional growth. It is the key to creating a positive environment that allows everyone to thrive. Cultivating respect is an ongoing process that requires mindfulness and conscious effort, but the benefits are worth it.

In conclusion, these essays have explored the multifaceted concept of respect, examining its core values and societal implications. We have seen how respect can foster healthy relationships, promote empathy and understanding, and facilitate productive communication. Through examples from literature, history, and contemporary events, we have gained insights into the power of reverence and the importance of cultivating a culture of civility.

If you are a student looking to improve your essay writing skills, Jenni.ai can help. With our AI-powered tools and resources, you can streamline your writing process, generate new ideas, and refine your work for maximum impact. Sign up for a free trial today to discover the benefits of Jenni.ai and take your writing to the next level.

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121 Respect Essay Topic Ideas & Examples

Inside This Article

Respect is a fundamental value that plays a crucial role in our society. It is the foundation of healthy relationships, effective communication, and a harmonious community. Teaching and practicing respect is essential for creating a positive and inclusive environment where everyone feels valued and accepted.

One way to promote respect is through essay writing. By encouraging students to explore and reflect on different aspects of respect, we can help them develop a deeper understanding of its importance and impact on our daily lives. To inspire students, here are 121 respect essay topic ideas and examples:

• The meaning of respect and its significance in our lives
• How can respect improve relationships with others?
• The role of respect in creating a positive work environment
• Respecting cultural differences and diversity
• The importance of self-respect and self-esteem
• Respect for authority figures and elders
• How does respect contribute to a peaceful society?
• Respecting the environment and nature
• The impact of disrespectful behavior on individuals and communities
• Teaching respect to children and young adults
• Respecting others' opinions and beliefs
• How can respect improve communication skills?
• Respect in the digital age: online etiquette and cyberbullying
• Respecting privacy and boundaries
• The connection between respect and empathy
• Respecting different perspectives and viewpoints
• Cultural norms and practices related to respect
• Respecting traditions and customs
• The role of respect in conflict resolution
• The importance of respecting yourself before others
• Respecting animals and wildlife
• The impact of disrespectful language and behavior in schools
• How can respect help build trust and loyalty?
• Respecting authority figures in law enforcement and government
• The role of respect in sportsmanship and fair play
• Respecting the rights and dignity of others
• The connection between respect and equality
• The impact of disrespectful behavior on mental health
• Respecting boundaries in relationships
• The importance of mutual respect in friendships
• Respecting cultural heritage and traditions
• The role of respect in promoting social justice
• Respecting the contributions of others
• How can respect foster creativity and innovation?
• The impact of disrespectful behavior on academic performance
• Respecting the rights of marginalized communities
• The connection between respect and self-discipline
• Respecting the autonomy and independence of others
• The role of respect in building strong communities
• Respecting the beliefs and practices of different religions
• The importance of respecting the environment for future generations
• How can respect promote cooperation and collaboration?
• Respecting the boundaries of consent
• Respecting diversity in the workplace
• The connection between respect and emotional intelligence
• Respecting the contributions of volunteers and activists
• The role of respect in promoting social change
• Respecting the rights of individuals with disabilities
• The importance of respecting the elderly and vulnerable populations
• How can respect improve conflict resolution skills?
• Respecting the boundaries of confidentiality and trust
• The impact of disrespectful behavior on community cohesion
• Respecting the rights of indigenous peoples
• The connection between respect and leadership
• Respecting the sacrifices of military personnel and veterans
• The role of respect in promoting human rights
• Respecting the autonomy and agency of individuals
• The importance of respecting the privacy of others
• How can respect foster a sense of belonging and inclusion?
• Respecting the contributions of artists and creators
• Respecting diversity in the media and entertainment industry
• The connection between respect and conflict resolution
• Respecting the boundaries of consent and bodily autonomy
• The role of respect in promoting gender equality
• Respecting the rights of LGBTQ+ individuals
• The importance of respecting the perspectives of marginalized communities
• How can respect promote social justice and equity?
• Respecting the contributions of immigrants and refugees
• The impact of disrespectful behavior on political discourse
• Respecting diversity in educational settings
• The connection between respect and emotional well-being
• Respecting the boundaries of professional relationships
• The role of respect in promoting environmental sustainability
• Respecting the rights of future generations
• The importance of respecting the cultural heritage of indigenous peoples
• How can respect foster intercultural understanding and empathy?
• Respecting the contributions of frontline workers and essential personnel
• The impact of disrespectful behavior on community engagement
• Respecting diversity in the healthcare industry
• The connection between respect and mental health
• Respecting the boundaries of personal space and comfort
• The role of respect in promoting social cohesion
• Respecting the rights of animals and wildlife
• The importance of respecting the privacy of individuals
• How can respect foster a sense of belonging and community?
• The impact of disrespectful behavior on social relationships

In conclusion, respect is a fundamental value that should be cultivated and practiced in all aspects of our lives. By exploring these respect essay topic ideas and examples, students can gain a better understanding of the importance of respect and how it can contribute to a more harmonious and inclusive society. Let's continue to promote respect and create a world where everyone is treated with dignity and kindness.

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Respect has great importance in everyday life. As children we are taught (one hopes) to respect our parents and teachers, school rules and traffic laws, family and cultural traditions, other people’s feelings and rights, our country’s flag and leaders, the truth and people’s differing opinions. And we come to value respect for such things; when we’re older, we may shake our heads (or fists) at people who seem not to have learned to respect them. We develop great respect for people we consider exemplary and lose respect for those we discover to be clay-footed; we may also come to believe that, at some level, all people are worthy of respect. We may learn that jobs and relationships become unbearable if we receive no respect in them; in certain social milieus we may learn the price of disrespect if we violate the street law: “Diss me, and you die.” Calls to respect this or that are increasingly part of public life: environmentalists exhort us to respect nature, foes of abortion and capital punishment insist on respect for human life, members of racial and ethnic minorities and those discriminated against because of their gender, sexual orientation, age, religious beliefs, or economic status demand respect both as social and moral equals and for their cultural differences. And it is widely acknowledged that public debates about such demands should take place under terms of mutual respect. We may learn both that our lives together go better when we respect the things that deserve to be respected and that we should respect some things independently of considerations of how our lives would go.

We may also learn that how our lives go depends every bit as much on whether we respect ourselves. The value of self-respect may be something we can take for granted, or we may discover how very important it is when our self-respect is threatened, or we lose it and have to work to regain it, or we have to struggle to develop or maintain it in a hostile environment. Some people find that finally being able to respect themselves is what matters most about finally standing on their own two feet, kicking a disgusting habit, or defending something they value; others, sadly, discover that life is no longer worth living if self-respect is irretrievably lost. It is part of everyday wisdom that respect and self-respect are deeply connected, that it is difficult both to respect others if we don’t respect ourselves and to respect ourselves if others don’t respect us. It is increasingly part of political wisdom both that unjust social institutions can devastatingly damage self-respect and that robust and resilient self-respect can be a potent force in struggles against injustice.

The ubiquity and significance of respect and self-respect in everyday life largely explains why philosophers, particularly in moral and political philosophy, have been interested in these two concepts. They turn up in a multiplicity of philosophical contexts, including discussions of justice and equality, injustice and oppression, autonomy and agency, moral and political rights and duties, moral motivation and moral development, cultural diversity and toleration, punishment and political violence, and a host of applied ethics contexts. Although a wide variety of things are said to deserve respect, contemporary philosophical interest in respect has overwhelmingly been focused on respect for persons, the idea that all persons should be treated with respect simply because they are persons. This focus owes much to the 18 th century German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, who argued that all and only persons and the moral law they autonomously legislate are appropriate objects of the morally most significant attitude of respect. Although honor, esteem, and prudential regard played important roles in moral and political theories before him, Kant was the first major Western philosopher to put respect for persons, including oneself, at the very center of moral theory, and his insistence that persons are ends in themselves with an absolute dignity who must always be respected has become a core ideal of modern humanism and political liberalism. In recent years many people have argued that moral respect ought also to be extended to things other than persons, such as nonhuman living beings and the natural environment.

Despite the widespread acknowledgment of the importance of respect and self-respect in moral and political life and theory, there is no settled agreement in either everyday thinking or philosophical discussion about such issues as how to understand the concepts, what the appropriate objects of respect are, what is involved in respecting various objects, and what the scope is of any moral requirements regarding respect and self-respect. This entry will survey these and related issues.

1.1 Elements of respect

1.2 kinds of respect, 2.1 some important issues, 2.2 kant’s account of respect for persons, 2.3 further issues, developments, and applications, 3. respect for nature and nonhuman beings, 4.1 the concept of self-respect, 4.2 treatment of self-respect in moral and political philosophy, 5. conclusion, philosophical works chiefly on respect and related concepts, philosophical works chiefly on self-respect and related concepts, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the concept of respect.

Philosophers have approached the concept of respect with a variety of questions. (1) One set concerns the nature of respect, including (a) What sort of thing is respect? Philosophers have variously identified it as a mode of behavior, a form of treatment, a kind of valuing, a type of attention, a motive, an attitude, a feeling, a tribute, a principle, a duty, an entitlement, a moral virtue, an epistemic virtue: are any of these categories more central than others? (b) Are there different kinds of respect? If so, is any more basic than others? (c) Are there different levels or degrees of respect? (d) What are the distinctive elements of respect, or a specific kind of respect? What beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and motives does (a specific kind of) respect involve, and what ways of acting and forbearing to act express or constitute or are regulated by it? (e) To what other attitudes, actions, valuings, duties, etc., is respect (or a specific kind) similar, and with what does it contrast? In particular, how is respect similar to, different from, or connected with esteem, honor, love, awe, reverence, recognition, toleration, dignity, contempt, indifference, discounting, denigration, and so on? (2) A second set of questions concerns objects of respect, including (a)What sorts of things can be reasonably be said to warrant respect? (b) What are the bases or grounds for respect, i.e., the features of or facts about objects in virtue of which it is reasonable and perhaps obligatory to respect them? (c) Must every appropriate object always be respected? Can respect be forfeited, can lost respect be regained? (3) A third set of questions focuses on moral dimensions of respect, including (a) Are there moral requirements to respect certain types of objects, and, if so, what are the scope and grounds of such requirements? (b) Why is respect morally important? What, if anything, does it add to morality over and above the conduct, attitudes, and character traits required or encouraged by various moral principles or virtues? (c) What does respect entail morally for how we should treat one another in everyday interactions, for issues in specific contexts such as health care and the workplace, and for fraught issues such as abortion, racial and gender justice, and global inequality?

It is widely acknowledged that there are different forms or kinds of respect. This complicates the answering of these questions, since answers concerning one form or kind of respect can diverge significantly from those about another. Much philosophical work has gone into explicating differences and links among the various kinds.

One general distinction concerns respect simply as behavior and respect as an attitude or feeling that may or may not be expressed in or signified by behavior. When we speak of drivers respecting the speed limit, hostile forces respecting a cease fire agreement, or the Covid-19 virus not respecting national borders, we can be referring simply to behavior which avoids violation of or interference with some boundary, limit, or rule, without any reference to attitudes, feelings, intentions, or dispositions, and even, as in the case of viruses, without imputing agency (Bird 2004). In such cases the behavior is regarded as constitutive of respecting. Where respect is conceived of as a duty or an entitlement, a certain kind of behavior or treatment may be all that is owed. Similarly, respect as a tribute could be just a certain mode of behavior, such as bowing or standing in silence. In other cases, however, we take respect to be or to express or signify an attitude or feeling, as when we speak of having respect for someone or of certain behaviors as showing respect or disrespect. Here, actions and modes of treatment count as respect insofar as they either manifest an attitude of respect or are of the sort through which the attitude is characteristically expressed; a principle of respect is one that necessarily must be adopted by someone with the attitude of respect or that prescribes the attitude or actions that express it (Frankena 1986; Downie and Telfer 1969); a moral virtue of respect involves having the attitude as a settled aspect of one’s way of being toward appropriate objects. Most discussions of respect for persons take attitude to be central. In what follows, I will focus chiefly on respect as attitude. There are, again, several different attitudes to which the term “respect” refers. Before looking at differences, however, it is useful first to note some elements common among varieties.

An attitude of respect is, most generally, a relation between a subject and an object in which the subject responds to the object from a certain perspective in some appropriate way. Respect necessarily has an object: respect is always directed toward, paid to, felt about, shown for some object. While a very wide variety of things can be appropriate objects of one kind of respect or another, the subject of respect (the respecter) is typically a person, that is, a conscious rational being capable of recognizing objects, intentionally responding to them, having and expressing values with regard to them, and being accountable for disrespecting or failing to respect them. Respect and disrespect can also be expressed or instantiated by or through things that are not persons, such as guidelines, rules, laws, and principles, systems, and institutional organizations and operations. So, we can say that laws that prohibit torture express respect for persons while the institution of slavery is profoundly disrespectful of human beings.

Ordinary discourse about respect as a responsive relation identifies several key elements, including attention, deference, judgment, valuing, and behavior. First, as its derivation from the Latin respicere , (to look back at, look again) suggests, respect is a form of regard: a mode of attention to and acknowledgment of an object as something to be taken seriously. Respecting something contrasts with being oblivious or indifferent to it, ignoring or quickly dismissing it, neglecting or disregarding it, or carelessly or intentionally misidentifying it. Respect is also perspectival: we can respect something from a moral perspective, or from prudential, evaluative, social, or institutional perspectives. From different perspectives, we might attend to different aspects of the object in respecting it or respect it in different ways. For example, one might regard another human individual as a rights-bearer, a judge, a superlative singer, a trustworthy person, or a threat to one’s security, and the respect one accords her in each case will be different. It is in virtue of this aspect of careful attention that respect is sometimes thought of as an epistemic virtue.

As responsive, respect is as much object-based as subject-generated; certain objects call for, claim, elicit, deserve, are owed respect. We respect something not because we want to but because we recognize that we have to respect it (Wood 1999); respect involves “a deontic experience”—the experience that one must pay attention and respond appropriately (Birch 1993). It thus is motivational: it is the recognition of something “as directly determining our will without reference to what is wanted by our inclinations” (Rawls 2000, 153). In this way respect differs from, for example, liking and fearing, which have their sources in the subject’s interests or desires. When we respect something, we heed its call, accord it its due, acknowledge its claim. Thus, respect involves deference, in the most basic sense of yielding to the object’s demands.

The idea that the object “drives” respect, as it were, is involved in the view that respect is an unmediated emotional response (Buss 1999b). But respect is typically treated as also an expression of the agency of the respecter: respect is deliberate, a matter of directed rather than grabbed attention, of reflective consideration and judgment. On this view, respect is reason-governed: we cannot respect a particular object for just any old reason or no reason at all. Rather, we respect something for the reason that it has, in our judgment, some respect-warranting characteristic, that makes it the kind of object that calls for that kind of response (Cranor 1975; Pettit 2021). And these reasons are both objective, in the sense that their weight or stringency does not depend on the respecter’s interests, goals, or desires, and categorical, in the sense that acting against these reasons, other things equal, is wrong (Raz 2001). Respect is thus both subjective and objective. It is subjective in that the subject’s response is constructed from her understanding of the object and its characteristics and her judgments about the legitimacy of its call and how fittingly to address the call. The objectivity of respect means that an individual’s respect for an object can be inappropriate or unwarranted, for the object may not have the features she takes it to have, or the features she takes to be respect-warranting might not be, or her idea of how properly to treat the object might be mistaken. Moreover, the logic of respect is the logic of objectivity and universality, in several ways. In respecting an object, we respond to it as something whose significance is independent of us, not determined by our feelings or interests. Our reasons for respecting something are, logically, reasons for other people to respect it (or at least to endorse our respect for it from a common point of view). Respect is thus, unlike erotic or filial love, an impersonal response to the object. And if F is a respect-warranting feature of object O, then respecting O on account of F commits us, other things equal, to respecting other things with feature F.

There are many different kinds of objects that can reasonably be respected and many different reasons why they warrant respect. Thus, warranted responses can take different forms. Some things are dangerous or powerful; respecting them can involve fear, awe, self-protection, or submission. Other things have authority over us and the respect they are due includes acknowledgment of their authority and perhaps obedience to their authoritative commands. Other forms of respect are modes of valuing, appreciating the object as having worth or importance that is independent of, perhaps even at variance with, our desires or commitments. Thus, we can respect things we don’t like or agree with, such as our enemies or someone else’s opinion. Valuing respect is kin to esteem, admiration, veneration, reverence, and honor, while regarding something as utterly worthless or insignificant or disdaining or having contempt for it is incompatible with respecting it. Respect also aims to value its object appropriately, so it contrasts with degradation and discounting. The kinds of valuing that respect involves also contrast with other forms of valuing such as promoting or using (Anderson 1993, Pettit 1989). Indeed, regarding a person merely as useful (treating her as just a sexual object, an ATM machine, a research subject) is commonly identified as a central form of disrespect for persons, and many people decry the killing of endangered wild animals for their tusks or hides as disrespectful of nature.

Finally, attitudes of respect typically have a behavioral component. In respecting an object, we often consider it to be making legitimate claims on our conduct as well as our thoughts and feelings and so we are disposed to behave appropriately. Appropriate behavior includes refraining from certain treatment of the object or acting only in particular ways in connection with it, ways that are regarded as fitting, deserved by, or owed to the object. And there are very many ways to respect things: keeping our distance from them, helping them, praising or emulating them, obeying or abiding by them, not violating or interfering with them, destroying them only in some ways, protecting or being careful with them, talking about them in ways that reflect their worth or status, mourning them, nurturing them. One can behave in respectful ways, however, without having respect for the object, as when a teen who disdains adults behaves respectfully toward her friend’s parents in a scheme to get the car, manipulating rather than respecting them. To be a form or expression of respect, behavior has to be motivated by one’s acknowledgment of the object as rightly calling for that behavior. On the other hand, certain kinds of feelings would not count as respect if they did not find expression in behavior or involved no dispositions to behave in appropriate ways, and if they did not spring from perceptions or judgments that the object is worthy of or calls for such behavior.

The attitudes of respect, then, have cognitive dimensions (beliefs, acknowledgments, judgments, commitments), affective dimensions (emotions, feelings, ways of experiencing things), and conative dimensions (motivations, dispositions to act and forbear from acting); some forms also have valuational dimensions. One last dimension is normative: the attitudes and actions of respect are governed by norms that set standards of success or failure in responding to respect-worthy-objects. Some norms are moral, grounded in moral principles or morally important characteristics of respect-worthy objects and both endorsable by and authoritative for all moral agents. Other norms are social, arising from dimensions of social life, grounded in socially significant characteristics of objectives, and authoritative or applicable (only) for participants in that form of sociality.

That it is the nature of the object that determines its respect-worthiness, and that there are different kinds of objects calling for correspondingly different responses, have led many philosophers to argue that there are different kinds of respect. In what follows, three sets of distinctions will be discussed.

Speculating on the historical development of the idea that all persons as such deserve respect, and using terms found in Kant’s writings on Achtung (the German word usually translated as “respect”), Feinberg (1975) identifies three concepts for which “respect” has been the name. (1) Respekt , is the “uneasy and watchful attitude that has ‘the element of fear’ in it” (1975, 1). Its objects are dangerous or powerful things. It is respekt that woodworkers are encouraged to have for power tools, a new sailor might be admonished to have for the sea, and a child might have for an abusive parent. Respekt contrasts with contemptuous disregard; it is shown in conduct that is cautious, self-protective, other-placating. (2) The second concept, observantia , is the moralized analogue of respekt. It involves regarding the object as making a rightful claim on our conduct, as deserving moral consideration in its own right, independently of considerations of personal well-being. It is observantia , Feinberg maintains, that historically was extended first to classes of non-dangerous but otherwise worthy people and then to all persons as such, regardless of merit or ability. Observantia encompasses both the respect said to be owed to all humans equally and the forms of polite respect and deference that acknowledge different social positions. On Kant’s account, observantia is the kind of respect we have an inviolable moral duty to give every person, both by acknowledging their claim to moral equality with us and by never treating persons as if they have little or no worth compared with ourselves (Kant 1797, 6:499). (3) Reverentia , the third concept, is the special feeling of profound awe and respect we involuntarily experience in the presence of something extraordinary or sublime, a feeling that both humbles and uplifts us. On Kant’s account, the moral law and people who exemplify it in morally worthy actions elicit reverentia from us, for we experience the law or its exemplification as “something that always trumps our inclinations in determining our wills” (Feinberg 1975, 2). Feinberg sees different forms of power as underlying the three kinds of respect; in each case, respect is the acknowledgment of the power of something other than ourselves to demand, command, or make claims on our attention, consideration, and deference. (See further discussion of Kant’s account in section 2.2.)

Hudson (1980) draws a four-fold distinction among kinds of respect, according to the bases in the objects. Consider the following examples: (a) respecting a colleague highly as a scholar and having a lot of respect for someone with “guts”; (b) a mountain climber’s respect for the elements and a tennis player’s respect for her opponent’s strong backhand; (c) respecting the terms of an agreement and respecting a person’s rights; and (d) showing respect for a judge by rising when she enters the courtroom and respecting a worn-out flag by burning it rather than tossing it in the trash. The respect in (a), evaluative respect , is similar to other favorable attitudes such as esteem and admiration; it is earned or deserved (or not) depending on whether and to the degree that the object is judged to meet certain standards. Obstacle respect , in (b), is a matter of regarding the object as something that, if not taken proper account of in one’s decisions about how to act, could prevent one from achieving one’s ends. The objects of (c) directive respect are directives: things such as requests, rules, advice, laws, or rights claims that may be taken as guides to action. One respects a directive when one’s actions intentionally comply with it. The objects of (d) institutional respect are social institutions or practices, positions or roles in an institution or practice, and persons or things that occupy positions in or represent the institution. Institutional respect is constituted by behavior that conforms to rules that prescribe certain conduct as respectful. These four forms of respect differ in several ways. Each identifies a quite different kind of feature of objects as the basis of respect. Each is expressed in action in quite different ways, although evaluative respect need not be expressed at all. Evaluative respect centrally involves having a favorable attitude toward the object, while the other forms do not. Directive respect does not admit of degrees (one either obeys the rule or doesn’t), but the others do (we can have more evaluative respect for one person than another). Hudson uses this distinction to argue that respect for persons is not a unique kind of respect but should be conceived rather as involving some combination or other of these four.

To Hudson’s four-fold classification, Dillon (1992a) adds a fifth form, care respect , which draws on feminist ethics of care. Care respect, which is exemplified in an environmentalist’s deep respect for nature, involves both regarding the object as having profound and perhaps unique value and so cherishing it, and perceiving it as fragile or calling for special care and so acting or forbearing to act out of felt benevolent concern for it.

Darwall (1977) distinguishes two kinds of respect: recognition respect and appraisal respect . Recognition respect is the disposition to give appropriate weight or consideration in one’s practical deliberations to some fact about the object and to regulate one’s conduct by constraints derived from that fact. (Frankena 1986 and Cranor 1982, 1983 refer to this as “consideration respect.”) A wide variety of objects can be objects of recognition respect, including laws, dangerous things, someone’s feelings, social institutions, nature, the selves individuals present in different contexts, people occupying certain social roles or positions, and persons as such. Appraisal respect, by contrast, is an attitude of positive appraisal, the “thinking highly of” kind of respect that we might have a great deal of for some individuals, little of for others, or lose for those whose clay feet or dirty laundry becomes apparent. Appraisal respect involves a grading assessment of a person in light of some qualitative standards that they can meet or not to greater and lesser degrees. It differs from the more widely grounded esteem and admiration in that it is concerned specifically with the moral quality of people’s character or conduct, or with other characteristics that are relevant to their moral quality as agents.

The recognition/appraisal distinction has been quite influential and is widely regarded as the fundamental distinction. Indeed, evaluative respect is similar to appraisal respect, while respekt , obstacle respect, observantia , directive respect, institutional respect, and care respect could be analyzed as forms of recognition respect. Some philosophers, however, have found the recognition/appraisal distinction to be inadequate, inasmuch as it seems to have no room for reverentia , especially in the form of the felt experience of the sublimity of the moral law and of persons as such (e.g., Buss 1999b), and it seems to obscure the variety of valuings that different modes of respect can involve. Much philosophical work has involved refining the recognition/appraisal distinction.

In the rest of this article, I will discuss respect and self-respect using Darwall’s term “recognition respect,” Hudson’s term “evaluative respect,” and Feinberg’s “reverential respect” (the last for the valuing feeling that is involuntary motivational without being deliberative), specifying the valuing dimensions as necessary.

In everyday discourse, respect most commonly refers to one of two attitudes or modes of conduct. The first is the kind of respect individuals show (or should show) others because of the latter’s social role or position. For example, children should respect their parents by listening and courtroom spectators should respect the judge. by rising upon her entrance. This is a social form of recognition respect that is, typically, structured by social institutions whose norms are authoritative for participants in the institutions and that need not involve any positive valuing of the object. “Respect” is also commonly used, second, in a valuing sense, to mean thinking highly of someone: having a lot of respect for someone who has overcome adversity or losing all respect for a betrayer. This is evaluative respect. However, philosophical attention to respect has tended to focus on recognition respect that acknowledges or values the object from a moral point of view, which we can call “moral recognition respect.” These discussions tend to relate such respect to the concepts of moral standing or moral worth. Moral standing, or moral considerability, is the idea that certain things matter morally in their own right and so are appropriate objects of direct fundamental moral consideration or concern (Birch 1993; P. Taylor 1986). Alternatively, it is argued that certain things have a distinctive kind of intrinsic moral worth, often called “dignity,” in virtue of which evoke reverential respect or ought to be accorded some valuing form of moral recognition respect. In modern philosophical discussions, humans are universally regarded as the paradigm objects of moral respect. Although some theorists argue that nature (or, all living beings, species, ecosystems) or societies (or, cultures, traditions) also warrant the moral consideration and valuing of moral recognition respect, most philosophical discussion of respect has focused on moral recognition respect for persons.

2. Respect for Persons

People can be the objects or recipients of different forms of respect. We can (directive) respect a person’s legal rights, show (institutional) respect for the president by calling her “Ms. President,” have a healthy (obstacle) respect ( respekt ) for an easily angered person, (care) respect someone by cherishing her in her concrete particularity, (evaluatively) respect an individual for her commitment to a worthy project, and accord one person the same basic moral respect we think any person deserves. Thus, the idea of respect for persons is ambiguous. Because both institutional respect and evaluative respect can be for persons in roles or position, the phrase “respecting someone as an R” might mean either having high regard for a person’s excellent performance in the role or behaving in ways that express due consideration or deference to an individual qua holder of that position. Similarly, the phrase “respecting someone as a person” might refer to appraising her as overall a morally good person, or acknowledging her standing as an equal in the moral community, or attending to her as the particular person she is as opposed to treating her like any other human being. In the literature of moral and political philosophy, the notion of respect for persons commonly means a kind of respect that all people are owed morally just because they are persons, regardless of social position, individual characteristics or achievements, or moral merit.

In times past, it was taken for granted that respect for human beings was a hierarchical notion; some humans, it was thought, have a higher moral standing and a greater moral worth than others and so are morally entitled to greater recognition respect. (Not just in times past – this is still the core of racism, sexism, and other forms of bigotry.) However, the modern understanding of respect for persons rests on the idea that all persons as such have a distinctive moral status in virtue of which we have unconditional obligations to regard and treat them in ways that are constrained by certain inviolable limits. This is sometimes expressed in terms of rights: all persons, it is said, have a fundamental moral right to respect simply because they are persons. Connected with this is the idea that all persons are fundamentally equal, despite the very many things that distinguish one individual from another. All persons, that is, have the moral standing of equality in the moral community and are equally worthy of and owed respect. Respect acknowledges the moral standing of equal persons as such and is also the key mode of valuing persons as persons.

But which kind of respect are all persons owed? It is obvious that we could not owe every individual evaluative respect, let alone equal evaluative respect, since not everyone acts morally correctly or has an equally morally good character. Moreover, since reverential respect is an involuntary emotional response to something that is “awesome,” but we can’t have a moral obligation to experience an emotion, reverential respect can’t be the kind we owe all persons. So, if it is true that all persons are owed or have a moral right to respect just as persons, then the concept of respect for person has to be analyzed as some form or combination of forms of moral recognition respect. One analysis takes moral recognition respect for a person as a person to involve recognizing that this being is a person, appreciating that persons as such have a distinctive moral standing and worth, understanding this standing and worth as the source of moral constraints on one’s attitudes, desires, and conduct, and viewing, valuing, and treating this person only in ways that are appropriate to and due persons (Dillon 1997, 2010).

It is controversial, however, whether we do indeed have a moral obligation to respect all persons regardless of merit, and if so, why. There are disagreements, for example, about the scope of the claim, the grounds of respect, and the justification for the obligation. There is also a divergence of views about the kinds of treatment that are respectful of persons.

One source of controversy concerns the scope of the concept of a person. Although in everyday discourse the word “person” is synonymous with “human being,” some philosophical discussions treat it as a technical term whose range of application might not be coextensive with the class of human beings (just as, for legal purposes, business corporations are regarded as persons). This is because some of the reasons that have been given for respecting persons entail both that some non-human things warrant the same respect on the very same grounds as humans and that not all humans do. Consequently, one question an account of respect for persons has to address is: Who or what are persons that are owed respect? Different answers have been offered, including all human beings; all and only those humans who are themselves capable of respecting persons; all beings capable of rational activity, or of sympathy and empathy, or of valuing, whether human or not; all beings capable of functioning as moral agents, whether human or not; all beings capable of participating in certain kinds of social relations, whether human or not. The second, third, and fourth answers would seem to exclude deceased humans and humans who lack sufficient mental capacity, such as the profoundly mentally disabled, the severely mentally ill and senile, those in persistent vegetative states, the pre-born, and perhaps very young children. The third, fourth, and fifth answers might include humans with diminished capacities, artificial beings (androids, sophisticated robots), spiritual beings (gods, angels), extraterrestrial beings, and certain animals (apes, dolphins).

In trying to clarify who or what we are obligated to respect, we are naturally led to a question about the ground or basis of respect: What is it about persons that makes them matter morally in such a way as to make them worthy of respect? One common way of answer this question is to look for some morally valuable natural qualities or capacities that are common to all beings that are noncontroversially owed respect (for example, all normal adult humans). Even regarding humans, there is a question of scope: Are all humans owed respect? If respect is something to which all human beings have an equal claim, then, it has been argued, the basis has to be something that all humans possess equally or in virtue of which humans are naturally equal, or a threshold quality that all humans possess, with variations above the threshold ignored. Some philosophers have argued that certain capacities fit the bill; others argue that there is no quality actually possessed by all humans that could be a plausible ground for a moral obligation of equal respect. Some draw from this the conclusion that respect is owed not to all but only to some human beings, for example, only morally good persons (Dean 2014). Another view is that the search for valuable qualities possessed by all humans that could ground universally owed moral recognition respect gets things backwards: rather than being grounded in some fact about humans, respect confers moral standing and worth on them (Sensen 2017; Bird forthcoming). But the last view still leaves the questions: why should this morally powerful standing and worth be conferred on humans? And is it conferred on all humans? Yet another question of scope is: Must persons always be respected? One view is that individuals forfeit their claim to respect by, for example, committing heinous crimes of disrespect against other persons, such as murder in the course of terrorism or genocide. Another view is that there are no circumstances under which it is morally justifiable to not respect a person, and that even torturers and child-rapists, though they may deserve the most severe condemnation and punishment and may have forfeited their rights to freedom and perhaps to life, still remain persons to whom we have obligations of respect, since the grounds of respect are independent of moral merit or demerit (Hill 2000b).

There is a further question of justification to be addressed, for it is one thing to say that persons have a certain valuable quality, but quite another thing to say that there is a moral obligation to respect persons (Hill 1997). So, we must ask: What reasons do we have for believing that the fact that persons possess quality X entails that we are morally obligated to respect persons by, for example, treating them in certain ways? Another way of asking a justification question seeks not a normative connection between qualities of persons and moral obligation, but an explanation for our belief that humans (and perhaps other beings) are owed respect, for example: What in our experience of other humans or in our evolutionary history explains the development and power of this belief? On some accounts, our actual felt experiences of reverential respect play a significant role (Buss 1999b). In other accounts, what justifies accepting our experience of respect for humans (or other beings) as grounds for an obligation is its coherence with our other moral beliefs (Hill 2000b; Margalit 1996; Gibbard 1990).

Other questions concern what respecting persons requires of us. Some philosophers argue that the obligation to respect person functions as a negative constraint: respect involves refraining from regarding or treating persons in certain ways. For example, we ought not to treat them as if they were worthless or had value only insofar as we find them useful or interesting, or as if they were mere objects or specimens, or as if they were vermin or dirt; we ought not to violate their basic moral rights, or interfere with their efforts to make their own decisions and govern their own conduct, or humiliate them, or treat them in ways that flout their nature and worth as persons. Other theorists maintain that we also have positive duties of respect: we ought, for example, to try to see each of them and the world from their own points of view, or help them to promote their morally acceptable ends, or protect them from their own self-harming decisions. And some philosophers note that it may be more respectful to judge someone’s actions or character negatively or to punish someone for wrongdoing than to treat them as if they were not responsible for what they did, although requirements of respect would impose limits on how such judgments may be expressed and how persons may be punished. Another question concerns equality of respect. While most theorists agree that moral recognition respect is owed equally to all persons and that it requires treating persons as equals (as all having the same basic moral worth and status), there is disagreement about whether respect requires that persons be treated equally (whatever is done or not done for or to one person must be done or not done for or to everyone). One view is that equal treatment would fail to respect important differences between individuals (Frankfurt 1999). Perhaps, however, as regards respect as a negative constraint, it is appropriate to treat all persons the same: no one should be treated like worthless garbage (just as no U.S. citizen should be compelled to incriminate themselves), while as regards respect as a positive duty, it may be more respectful of each person to treat individuals with different needs, aims, and circumstances differently (as a loving parent might allow her older children but not the younger ones to have social media accounts).

The most influential account of respect for persons is found in the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1785, 1788, 1793, 1797). Indeed, most contemporary discussions of respect for persons explicitly claim to rely on, develop, or challenge some aspect of Kant’s ethics. Central to Kant’s ethical theory is the claim that all persons, regardless of personal qualities or achievements, social position, or moral track-record, are owed respect just because they are persons, that is, beings with rational and autonomous wills. To be a person is to have a status and worth unlike that of any other kind of being: it is to be an end in itself with dignity. And the only appropriate response to such a being is respect. Moreover, respect for persons is not only appropriate but also unconditionally required: persons must always be respected. Because we are all too often inclined not to respect each other, one formulation of the Categorical Imperative, which is the supreme principle of morality, commands that our actions express due respect for persons: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or the person of any other, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end” ( Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten ( Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals) (1785, 4:429). Although commentators disagree about how precisely to understand this imperative, one common view is that it defines our fundamental moral obligation as respect all persons, including ourselves, and thus defines morally right actions as those that express respect for persons as ends in themselves and morally wrong actions as those that express disrespect or contempt for persons (Wood 1999). (On other readings, respect is one of our fundamental duties, but there are others, such as love, justice, and moral self-improvement.) In addition to this general commandment, Kant argues that there are also more specific duties of respect for other persons and self-respect, to which we’ll return. For now, we must address the question, What is it to be an end in itself and to possess dignity?

An end, for Kant, is anything for the sake of which we act. Kant identifies two kinds of ends. The first are subjective ends, which are things we want, which we pursue or promote through means we think will help us to get or advance them. The value of subjective ends is conditional on or relative to the desire or interests of the individual who values them. The other kind of end is objective. These are ends in themselves, ends whose value is not dependent on any interests or desires but is absolute and unconditional, grounded solely in what they are. Kant maintains that all and only rational beings are ends in themselves. The technical term “persons” delineates the category of beings whose rational nature “already marks them out as ends in themselves…and an object of respect” ( Groundwork 4: 428).

To act for the sake of persons as ends in themselves, to respect them, is not to pursue or promote them, but to value them as the unconditionally valuable beings they are. It is also to acknowledge that there are constraints on our treatment of persons, for to be an end in itself is also to be a limit--just as the end of the road puts a limit on our travels, so an end in itself puts an absolute limit on the subjective ends we may set, the means we may use to pursue them, and, very importantly, on how we may treat ends in themselves. Such beings must never be used as if they were merely means, as if they were nothing more than tools that we may use however we want to advance our ends. Note, however, that it is not wrong to treat persons as means to our ends; indeed, we could not get along in life if we could not make use of the talents, abilities, service, and labor of other people. What we must never do is treat persons as mere means to our ends, to treat them as if the only value they have is what derives from their usefulness to us. Rather, we must always treat them “as the same time as an end.”

Kant holds that persons, as ends in themselves, have dignity ( Die Metaphysik der Sitten ( The Metaphysics of Morals ) (1797), 6: 435). But what is dignity? Until the last century or so, “dignity” (from the Latin dignitas , worthiness) referred to a high social status associated with the aristocracy, offices of power, and high church positions. Dignity thus distinguished socially important people from the hoi polloi , who had no dignity (Debes 2017). Kant’s view that every person has dignity thus marks a revolution in valuation (but see Dean 2014 and Hay 2012 for the view that only morally good people have dignity). Commentators disagree about how to understand what Kant means by dignity (cf. Sensen 2017, 2011; Cureton 2013; Darwall 2008). But the most common interpretation is that dignity is a distinctive kind objective worth that is absolute (not conditional on anyone’s needs, desires, or interests, and a value that everyone has an overriding reason to acknowledge); intrinsic or inherent (not bestowed or earned and not subject to being lost or forfeited); incomparable and the highest form of worth (a being with dignity cannot rationally be exchanged for or replaced by any other valued object, and is infinitely valuable, we might say, rather than worth $5 or $5 million).

In arguing for respect for the dignity of persons, Kant explicitly rejects two other conceptions of human value: the aristocratic idea of honor that individuals differentially deserve according to their social rank, individual accomplishments, or moral virtue (on the aristocratic dimensions of honor, see Darwall 2013; Berger 1983), and the view, baldly expressed by Hobbes, that:

… the value or worth of a man is, as of all other things, his price—that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power—and therefore is not absolute but a thing dependent on the need and judgment of another. (Hobbes 1651, 79)

In The Metaphysics of Morals , Kant agrees with Hobbes that if we think of humans as merely one kind of animal among others “in the system of nature,” we can ascribe a price to them, an extrinsic value that depends on their usefulness. But, he argues,

a human being regarded as a person, that is, as the subject of morally practical reason, is exalted above all price…as an end in himself he possesses a dignity by which he exacts respect for himself from all other beings in the world. ( MM , 6: 434–435)

Against the aristocratic view Kant argues that although individuals as members of some social community or other may have or lack meritorious accomplishment or status or may deserve honor or evaluative respect to different degrees or not at all, and some people deserve social recognition respect based on their socially significant features or positions, all persons as members of the moral community, i.e., the community of all and only ends in themselves, are owed the same moral recognition respect, for the dignity that they possesses as rational is unconditional and independent of all distinguishing facts about or features of them.

As the Categorical Imperative indicates, in virtue of the humanity in them that persons are, and so ought to be treated as, ends in themselves. Commentators generally identify humanity (that which makes us distinctively human beings and sets us apart from all other animal species) with two closely related aspects of rationality: the capacity to set ends and the capacity to be autonomous, both of which are capacities to be a moral agent (for example, Wood 1999; Hill 1997; Korsgaard 1996). The capacity to set ends, which is the power of rational choice, is the capacity to value things through rational judgment: to determine, under the influence of reason independently of antecedent instincts or desires, that something is valuable or important, that it is worth seeking or valuing. It is also, thereby, the capacity to value ends in themselves, and so it includes the capacity for respect (Velleman 1999). The capacity to be autonomous is the capacity to be self-legislating and self-governing, that is, (a) the capacity to legislate moral laws that are valid for all rational beings through one’s rational willing by recognizing, using reason alone, what counts as a moral obligation, and (b) the capacity then to freely resolve to act in accordance with moral laws because they are self-imposed by one’s own reason and not because one is compelled to act by any forces external to one’s reason and will, including one’s own desires and inclinations. The capacity to be autonomous is thus also the capacity to freely direct, shape, and determine the meaning of one’s own life, and it is the condition for moral responsibility. It is then, not as members of the biological species homo sapiens that human beings have dignity and so are owed moral recognition respect, but as rational beings who are capable of moral agency.

There are several important consequences of the Kantian view of the scope of moral recognition respect for persons as persons. First, while all normally functioning human beings possess the rational capacities that ground recognition respect, there can be humans in whom these capacities are altogether absent and who therefore, on this view, are not persons and are not owed respect. Second, these capacities could, in principle, be possessed by beings who are not biologically human, and such beings would also be persons with dignity whom we are morally obligated to respect. Third, because dignity does not depend on how well or badly the capacities for moral agency are exercised, on whether a person acts morally or has a morally good character or not, dignity is not a matter of degree and cannot be diminished or lost through vice or morally bad action or increased through virtue or morally correct action. Thus, the morally worst person has the same dignity as the morally best, although the former, we might say, fail to live up to their dignity. Likewise, moral recognition respect is not something individuals have to earn or might fail to earn, so even the morally worst individuals must still be regarded as ends in themselves and treated with respect. Of course, wrongdoing may call for punishment and may be grounds for forfeiting certain rights, but it is not grounds for losing dignity, for being regarded as worthless scum, or denied all respect (Hill 2000b). What grounds dignity is something that all persons have in common, not something that distinguishes one individual from another. Thus, each person is to be respected as an equal among equals, without consideration of individual achievements or failures, social rank, moral merit or demerit. However, the equality of all rational beings does not entail that persons cannot also be differentially evaluated and valued in other ways for their particular qualities, accomplishments, merit, or usefulness, although such valuing and treatment must always be constrained by the moral requirement to accord recognition respect to persons as ends in themselves.

In The Metaphysics of Morals , Kant develops the implications of this view of persons as ends in themselves. His doctrine of justice holds that the fundamental freedom and equality of persons is the basis of the legitimate state, that freedom of choice must be respected and promoted, that persons are bearers of fundamental rights and that the moral status of persons imposes limits on permissible legal punishment. In his doctrine of virtue, Kant discusses specific moral duties of recognition respect for other persons, as well as duties of recognition self-respect, to which we’ll return below. Here, Kant explicitly invokes the notion of respect as observantia . We have no moral duty to feel respect for others; rather, the respect we owe others is “to be understood as the maxim of limiting our self-esteem by the dignity of humanity in another person, and so as respect in the practical sense” ( MM , 6:449). This duty of recognition respect owed to others requires two things: first, that we adopt as a regulating policy a commitment to control our own desire to think well of ourselves (this desire being the main cause of disrespect), and, second, that we refrain from treating others in the following ways: treating them merely as means (valuing them as less than ends in themselves), showing contempt for them (denying that they have any worth), treating them arrogantly (demanding that they value us more highly than they value themselves), making them look like worthless beings by defaming them by publicly exposing their faults, and ridiculing or mocking them.

Subsequent work in a Kantian vein on the duty of respect for others has expanded the list of ways that we are morally required by respect to treat persons. In particular, although Kant says that the duties of recognition respect are strictly negative, consisting in not engaging in certain conduct or having certain attitudes, many philosophers have argued that respecting others involves positive actions and attitudes as well. The importance of autonomy and agency in Kant’s moral philosophy has led many philosophers to highlight respect for autonomy. Thus, we respect others as persons (negatively) by doing nothing to impair or destroy their capacity for autonomy, by not interfering with their autonomous decisions and their pursuit of the (morally acceptable) ends they value, and by not coercing or deceiving them or treating them paternalistically. We also respect them (positively) by protecting them from threats to their autonomy (which may require intervention when someone’s current decisions seem to put their autonomy at risk) and by promoting autonomy and the conditions for it (for example, by allowing and encouraging individuals to make their own decisions, take responsibility for their actions, and control their own lives). Some philosophers have highlighted Kant’s claim that rationality is the ground for recognition respect, arguing that to respect others is to engage with them not as instruments or obstacles but as persons who are to be reasoned with. The importance of the capacity to set ends and value things has been taken by some philosophers to entail that respect also involves helping others to promote and protect what they value and to pursue their ends, provided these are compatible with due respect for other persons, and making an effort to appreciate values that are different from our own. Kant’s emphasis in the doctrine of justice on the fundamental rights that persons have has led still others to view the duty of recognition respect for persons as the duty to respect the moral rights they have as persons; some have claimed that the duty to respect is nothing more than the duty to refrain from violating these rights (Benn 1988; Feinberg 1970).

Finally, it is worth noting that on Kant’s account, both the moral law and morally good people--those who do what is right out of respect for the moral law--are also objects of respect. The respect here is reverentia , the inescapable felt consciousness of the unconditional authority of the law and compelling examples of obedience to it, a consciousness of one’s mind “bowing,” as it were, in submission. Reverentia can give rise both to recognition respect of the law and persons as such and to evaluative respect for good people. (See discussions in kant’s Groundwork (4:401n); Metaphysics of Morals (6:399–418); Kritik der praktischen Vernunft ( Critique of Practical Reason ) (1788) (5:72–76); and Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft ( Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason ) (1793) (6:21–23); and in Stratton-Lake 200; Grenberg 1999; Wood 1999; Hill 1998; McCarty 1994).

Philosophical discussions of respect since Kant have tended, on the one hand, to develop or apply various aspects of it, or on the other, to take issue with it or develop alternative accounts of respect. Some of the discussions have focused on more theoretical issues. For example, Kant gives the notion of respect for persons a central and vital role in moral theory. One issue that has since concerned philosophers is whether respect for persons is the definitive focus of morality, either in the sense that moral rightness and goodness and hence all specific moral duties, rights, and virtues are explainable in terms of respect or in the sense that the supreme moral principle from which all other principles are derived is a principle of respect for persons. Some philosophers have developed ethical theories in which a principle of respect for persons is identified as the fundamental and comprehensive moral requirement (for example, Donagan 1977; Downie and Telfer 1969). Others (for example, Hill 1993; Frankena 1986; Cranor 1975) argue that while respect for persons is surely a very important moral consideration, it cannot be the principle from which the rest of morality is deduced. They maintain that there are moral contexts in which respect for persons is not an issue and that there are other dimensions of our moral relations with others that seem not to reduce to respect. Moreover, they argue, such a principle would seem not to provide moral grounds for believing that we ought to treat mentally incapacitated humans or nonhuman animals decently, or would (as Kant argues) make a duty to respect such beings only an indirect duty—one we have only because it is a way of respecting persons who value such beings or because our duty to respect ourselves requires that we not engage in activities that would dull our ability to treat persons decently—rather than a direct duty to such beings ( Metaphysics of Morals , 6:443).

Some theorists maintain that utilitarianism, a moral theory generally thought to be a rival to Kant’s theory, is superior with regard to this last point. A utilitarian might argue that it is sentience rather than the capacity for rational autonomy that is the ground of moral recognition respect, and so would regard mentally incapacitated humans and nonhuman animals as having moral standing and so as worthy of at least some moral respect in themselves. Another issue, then, is whether utilitarianism (or more generally, consequentialism) can indeed accommodate a principle of respect for persons. In opposition to the utilitarian claim, some Kantians argue that Kant’s ethics is distinguishable from consequentialist ethics precisely in maintaining that the fundamental demand of morality is not that we promote some value, such as the happiness of sentient beings, but that we respect the worth of humanity regardless of the consequences of doing so (Wood 1999; Korsgaard 1996). Thus, some philosophers argue that utilitarianism is inconsistent with respect for persons, inasmuch as utilitarianism, in requiring that all actions, principles, or motives promote the greatest good, requires treating persons as mere means on those occasions when doing so maximizes utility, whereas the very point of a principle of respect for persons is to rule out such trading of persons and their dignity for some other value (Benn 1988, Brody 1982). In opposition, other theorists maintain not only that a consequentialist theory can accommodate the idea of respect for persons (Cummiskey 2008, 1990; Pettit 1989; Gruzalski 1982; Landesman 1982; Downie and Telfer 1969), but also that utilitarianism is derivable from a principle of respect for persons (Downie and Telfer 1969) and that consequentialist theories provide a better grounding for duties to respect persons (Pettit 1989).

In addition to the debate between Kantian theory and utilitarianism, theoretical work has also been done in developing the role of respect for persons in Habermasian communicative ethics (Young 1997; Benhabib 1991) and in exploring respect in the ethics of other philosophers, including ancient Greek poets (Giorgini 2017), Plato (Rowe 2017), Aristotle (Thompson 2017; Weber 2017; Rabbås 2015; Jacobs 1995; Preus 1991), Hobbes (2017), Hegel (Laitinen 2017; Moland 2002), and Mill (Loizides 2017). Cross-cultural explorations include discussions of similarities and differences between western (Kantian) views of respect for persons and Indian (Ghosh-Dastidar 1987), Confucian (Liu 2019; Lu 2017; Chan 2006; Wawrytko 1982), and Taoist views (Wong 1984). Several theorists have developed distinctively feminist account of respect for persons (Farley 1993; Dillon 1992a).

Other philosophical discussions have been concerned with clarifying the nature of the respect that is owed to persons and of the persons that are owed respect. Some of these discussions aim to refine and develop Kant’s account, while others criticize it, or offer alternatives. One significant non-Kantian account is Pettit’s conversive theory of respect for persons (Pettit 2021, 2015). An influential development of the Kantian account is Darwall’s second-personal account (2021, 2015, 2008, 2006, 2004), according to which the regulation of conduct that moral recognition respect involves arises from our directly acknowledging each other as equal persons who have the moral authority to address moral demands to one another that each of us is morally obligated to accept. The reciprocal relations of persons as authoritative claims-makers and mutually accountable claims-responders is, in Darwall’s view, one way of understanding what Kant calls in the Groundwork a “kingdom of ends.”

Another area of interest has been the connections between respect and other attitudes and emotions, especially love and between respect and virtues such as trust. For example, Kant argues that we have duties of love to others just as we have duties of respect. However, neither the love nor the respect we owe is a matter of feeling (or, is pathological, as Kant says), but is, rather, a duty to adopt a certain kind of maxim, or policy of action: the duty of love is the duty to make the ends of others my own, the duty of respect is the duty to not degrade others to the status of mere means to my ends ( Metaphysics of Morals , 6: 449–450). Love and respect, in Kant’s view, are intimately united in friendship; nevertheless, they are in tension with one another and respect seems to be the morally more important of the two. Critics object to what they see here as Kant’s devaluing of emotions, maintaining that emotions are morally significant dimensions of persons both as subjects and as objects of both respect and love. In response, some philosophers contend that respect and love are more similar and closely connected in Kant’s theory than is generally recognized (Bagnoli 2003; Velleman 1999; Baron 1997; R. Johnson 1997). Others have developed accounts of respect that is or incorporates a form of love (agape) or care (Dillon 1992a; Downie and Telfer 1969; Maclagan 1960), and some have argued that emotions are included among the bases of dignity and that a complex emotional repertoire is necessary for Kantian respect (Wood 1999; Sherman 1998a; Farley 1993). In a related vein, some philosophers maintain that it is possible to acknowledge that another being is a person, i.e., a rational moral agent, and yet not have or give respect to that being. What is required for respecting a person is not simply recognizing what they are but emotionally experiencing their value as a person (Thomas 2001a; Buss 1999b; Dillon 1997). Other attitudes, emotions, and virtues whose connections with respect have been discussed are toleration (for example, Carter 2013; Deveaux 1998; Addis 2004), forgiveness (for example, Holmgren 1993), good manners (Stohr 2012; Buss 1999a), esteem (for example, Brennan and Pettit 1997), reverence (Woodruff 2003, 2001), honor (Darwall 2015), and appreciation (Hill 2021). Work has also been done on attitudes and emotions that are (usually taken to be) opposed to respect, such as arrogance (Dillon 2003) and contempt (Miceli and Castelfranci 2018; Mason 2017; Bell 2013).

Another source of dissatisfaction with Kant’s account has been with his characterization of persons and the quality in virtue of which they must be respected. In particular, Kant’s view that the rational will which is common to all persons is the ground of respect is thought to ignore the moral importance of the concrete particularity of each individual, and his emphasis on autonomy, which is often understood to involve the independence of one person from all others, is thought to ignore the essential relationality of human beings (for example, Noggle 1999; Farley 1993; Dillon 1992a; E. Johnson 1982). Rather than ignoring what distinguishes one person from another, it is argued, respect should involve attending to each person as a distinctive individual and to the concrete realities of human lives, and it should involve valuing difference as well as sameness and interdependence as well as independence. Other critics respond that respecting differences and particular identities inevitably reintroduces hierarchical discrimination that is antithetical to the equality among persons that the idea of respect for persons is supposed to express (for example, Bird 2004). Identity and difference may, however, be appropriate objects of other forms of consideration and appreciation.

The ideas of mutual respect or disrespect and respect for particularity and relationality has also become an important topic in moral and political philosophy. Helm has argued that a “community of respect” is essential to understanding what a person is (Helm 2017). Margalit argues that humiliation, both disrespect and the result of being disrespected, is a form of exclusion of individuals from the good of community (Margalit 1996). One issue is how persons ought to be respected in multicultural liberal democratic societies (for example, Balint 2006; Tomasi 1995; C. Taylor 1992; Kymlicka 1989). Respect for persons is one of the basic tenets of liberal democratic societies, which are founded on the ideal of the equal dignity of all citizens and which realize this ideal in the equalization of rights and entitlements among all citizens and so the rejection of discrimination and differential treatment. Some writers argue that respecting persons requires respecting the traditions and cultures that permeate and shape their individual identities (Addis 1997). But as the citizenry of such societies becomes increasingly more diverse and as many groups come to regard their identities or very existence as threatened by a homogenizing equality, liberal societies face the question of whether they should or could respond to demands to respect the unique identity of individuals or groups by differential treatment, such as extending political rights or opportunities to some cultural groups (for example, Native Americans, French Canadians, African-Americans) and not others. Some of these discussions are carried out in terms of recognition rather than of respect, although some theorists contrast recognition and respect (McBride 2013). Honneth develops a broader, critical account of recognition that argues for a harmonious relationship among universal (recognition) respect, esteem, and love, arguing that each is essential for the development of positive relations towards ourselves (Honneth 2007, 1995).

The idea that all persons are owed respect has been applied in a wide variety of contexts. For instance, some philosophers employ it to justify various positions in normative ethics, such as the claim that persons have moral rights (Benn 1971; Feinberg 1970; Downie and Telfer 1969) or duties (Fried 1978; Rawls 1971), or to argue for principles of equality (Williams 1962), justice (Narveson 2002a, 2002b; Nussbaum 1999), and education (Andrews 1976). Others appeal to respect for persons in addressing a wide variety of practical issues such as abortion, racism and sexism, rape, punishment, physician-assisted suicide, pornography, affirmative action, forgiveness, terrorism, sexual harassment, cooperation with injustice, treatment of gays and lesbians, sexual ethics, and many others. In political philosophy, respect for persons has been used to examine issues of global inequality (e.g., Moellendorf 2010). One very important application context is biomedical ethics, where the principle of respect for autonomy is one of four basic principles that have become “the backbone of contemporary Western health care ethics” (Brannigan and Boss 2001, 39; see also Beauchamp and Childress 1979/2001 and, for example, Kerstein 2021; Munson 2000; Beauchamp and Walters 1999). The idea of respect for patient autonomy has transformed health care practice, which had traditionally worked on physician-based paternalism, and the principle enters into issues such as informed consent, truth-telling, confidentiality, respecting refusals of life-saving treatment, the use of patients as subjects in medical experimentation, and so on.

Although persons are the paradigm objects of moral recognition respect, it is a matter of some debate whether they are the only things that we ought morally to respect. One serious objection raised against Kant’s ethical theory is that in claiming that only rational beings are ends in themselves deserving of respect, it licenses treating all things which aren’t persons as mere means to the ends of rational beings, and so it supports domination and exploitation of all nonpersons and the natural environment. Taking issue with the Kantian position that only persons are respect-worthy, many philosophers have argued that humans who are not agents or not yet agents, human embryos, nonhuman animals, sentient creatures, plants, species, all living things, biotic communities, the natural ecosystem of our planet, and even mountains, rocks, and viruses have (full or perhaps just partial) moral standing or worth and so are appropriate objects of or are owed moral recognition respect. Of course, it is possible to value such things instrumentally insofar as they serve human interests, but the idea is that such things matter morally and have a claim to respect in their own right, independently of their usefulness to humans.

A variety of different strategies have been employed in arguing for such respect claims. For example, the concept of moral recognition respect is sometimes stripped down to its essentials, omitting much of the content of the concept as it appears in respect for persons contexts. The respect that is owed to all things, it can be argued, is a very basic form of attentive contemplation of the object combined with a prima facie assumption that the object might have intrinsic value (Birch 1993). Another strategy is to argue that the true grounds for moral worth and recognition respect are other than or wider than rationality. One version of this strategy (employed by P. Taylor 1986) is to argue that all living things, persons and nonpersons, have equal inherent worth and so equally deserve the same kind of moral respect, because the ground of the worth of living things that are nonpersons is continuous with the ground of the worth for persons. For example, we can regard all living things as respect-worthy in virtue of being quasi-agents and centers of organized activity that pursue their own good in their own unique way. I

A third strategy, which is employed within Kantian ethics, is to argue that respect for persons logically entails respect for nonpersons. For example, one can argue that rational nature is to be respected not only by respecting humanity in someone’s person but also by respecting things that bear certain relations to rational nature, for example, by being fragments of it or necessary conditions of it. Respect would thus be owed to humans who are not persons and to animals and other sentient beings (Foreman 2017; Rocha 2015; Wood 1998). Another strategy argues against Kant that we can both acknowledge that rational moral agents have the highest moral standing and worth and are owed maximal respect, and also maintain that other beings have lesser but still morally significant standing or worth and so deserve less but still some respect. So, although it is always wrong to use moral agents merely as means, it may be justifiable to use nonpersons as means (for example, to do research on human embryos or kill animals for food) provided their moral worth is also respectfully acknowledged (Meyer and Nelson, 2001). Much philosophical work has been done, particularly in environmental ethics, to determine the practical implications of the claim that things other than persons are owed respect (e.g., Corral 2015; Foreman 2015; Schmidtz 2011; Bognar 2011; Connolly 2006; Wiggins 2000; Westra 1989).

4. Self-Respect

While there is much controversy about respect for persons and other things, there is surprising agreement among moral and political philosophers about at least this much concerning respect for oneself: self-respect is something of great importance in everyday life. Indeed, it is regarded both as morally required and as essential to the ability to live a satisfying, meaningful, flourishing life—a life worth living—and just as vital to the quality of our lives together. Saying that a person has no self-respect or acts in a way no self-respecting person would act, or that a social institution undermines the self-respect of some people, is generally a strong moral criticism. Nevertheless, as with respect itself, there is philosophical disagreement, both real and merely apparent, about the nature, scope, grounds, and requirements of self-respect. Self-respect is often defined as a sense of worth or as due respect for oneself; it has been analyzed in various ways: it is treated as a moral duty connected with the duty to respect all persons, as something to which all persons have a right and which it would be unjust to undermine, as a moral virtue essential to morally good living, and as something one earns by living up to demanding standards. Self-respect is frequently (but not always correctly) identified with or compared to self-esteem, self-confidence, dignity, self-love, a sense of honor, self-reliance, pride, and it is contrasted (but not always correctly) with servility, shame, humility, self-abnegation, arrogance, self-importance. Understanding how, if at all, self-respect is connected with and different from these other attitudes and stances is important to having a good understanding of self-respect and the other things.

In addition to the questions philosophers have addressed about respect in general, other questions have been of particular concern to those interested in self-respect, such as: (1) What is self-respect, and how is it connected to or different from related notions such as self-esteem, self-confidence, pride, and so on? How are respect for persons and respect for oneself alike and unalike? (2) How is self-respect related to such things as moral rights, virtue, autonomy, integrity, and identity? (3) Is there a moral duty to respect ourselves as there is a duty to recognition respect others? (4) Are there objective conditions—for example, moral standards or correct judgments—that a person must meet in order to have self-respect, or is self-respect a subjective phenomenon that gains support from any sort of self-valuing without regard to correctness or moral acceptability? (5) Does respecting oneself conceptually entail or causally require or lead to respecting other persons (or anything else)? And how are respect for other persons and respect for oneself alike and unalike? (6) What features of an individual’s psychology and experience, what aspects of the social context, and what modes of interactions with others support or undermine self-respect? (7) Are social institutions and practices to be judged just or unjust (at least in part) by how they affect self-respect? Can considerations of self-respect help us to better understand the nature and wrongness of injustices such as oppression and to determine effective and morally appropriate ways to resist or end them?

Self-respect is a form of self-regard, a moral relation of persons (and only persons) to themselves that concerns their own important worth. Self-respect is thus essentially a valuing form of respect. It is, moreover, a normative stance--it is due regard for oneself, proper regard for the dignity of one’s person or position (as the O.E.D. puts it). Like respect for others, self-respect is a complex of multilayered and interpenetrating phenomena; it involves all those aspects of cognition, valuation, affect, expectation, motivation, action, and reaction that compose a mode of being in the world at the heart of which is an appropriate appreciation of oneself as having significant worth. Unlike some forms of respect, self-respect is not something one has only now and again or that might have no effect on its object. Rather, self-respect has to do with the structure and attunement of an individual’s identity and of her life, and it reverberates throughout the self, affecting the configuration and constitution of the person’s thoughts, desires, values, emotions, commitments, dispositions, and actions. As expressing or constituting one’s sense of worth, it includes an engaged understanding of one’s worth, as well as a desire and disposition to protect and preserve it. Accounts of self-respect differ in their characterizations of the beliefs, desires, affects, and behaviors that are constitutive of it, chiefly because of differences concerning both the aspects or conception of the self insofar as it is the object of one’s respect and also the nature and grounds of the worth of the self or aspects of the self.

Most theorists agree that as there are different kinds of respect, so there are different kinds of self-respect. However, we clearly cannot apply all kinds of respect to ourselves: it makes no sense to talk of directive respect for oneself, for instance, and although one might regard oneself or some of one’s characteristics as obstacles (“I’m my own worst enemy”), this would not generally be considered a form of self-respect. Because the notion of self-worth is the organizing motif for self-respect, and because in the dominant Western tradition two kinds of worth are ascribed to persons, two kinds of self-respect can be distinguished.

One way of expressing the distinction is to focus on the kinds of self-worth around which it is oriented. One kind of worth has to do with what the individual is: occupant of a social role, member of a certain class, group, or people, someone with a certain place in a social hierarchy, or simply a human person. Kantian dignity is one form, but not the only form, of this kind of worth. Such status- or identity-grounded worth entails both entitlements to due treatment from others and responsibilities for the individual in virtue of being the kind of thing that is rightly the object of respect. Recognition self-respect centers on this kind of worth. (Bird calls this “entitlement self-respect” (Bird 2010); Schemmel calls it “standing self-respect” (Schemmel 2019)). The censuring question, “Have you no self-respect?”, the phrase “No self-respecting person would ...,” and the idea that everyone has a right to self-respect concern recognition self-respect. Another kind of self-respect depends not on what one is but on the kind of person one is making of oneself, on the extent to which one’s character and conduct meet standards of worthiness. Evaluative self-respect has to do with this second kind of worth, an acquired worth that we can call “merit,” which is based on the quality of one’s character and conduct. (Darwall (1997) calls this “appraisal self-respect”; Bird and Schemmel call it “standards self-respect,” since merit is a function of the standards to which one holds oneself and by which one evaluates or appraises oneself.) We earn or lose merit, and so deserve or don’t deserve evaluative self-respect, through what we do or become. Although they are different, recognition self-respect and evaluative self-respect are related. The former involves, among other things, recognizing certain norms as entailed by one’s identity-based worth and valuing oneself appropriately by striving to live in accord with them. The latter involves regarding oneself as having merit because one is or is becoming the kind of person who does live in accord with what one regards as appropriate norms or standards.

Individuals have numerous identities and so worth bases for different forms of recognition self-respect. While self-respect based on one’s social role or position can be quite important to the individual and how she lives her life as a self-respecting chef, rabbi, mother, teacher, Hindu, or member of the aristocracy, most philosophical discussions, heavily influenced by Kant, focus on dignity-based respect for oneself as a person, that is, on moral recognition self-respect. Recognition respect for oneself as a person, then, involves living in light of an understanding and appreciation of oneself as having dignity and moral status just in virtue of being a person, and of the moral constraints that arise from that dignity and status. All persons are morally obligated or entitled to have this kind of self-respect. Because the dominant Kantian conception of persons grounds dignity in three things—equality, agency, and individuality—we can further distinguish three kinds of recognition self-respect. The first is respect for oneself as a person among persons, as a member of the moral community with a status and dignity equal to every other person (see, for example, Thomas 1983a; Boxill 1976; Hill 1973). This involves having some conception of the kinds of treatment from others that would count as one’s due as a person and treatment that would be degrading or beneath one’s dignity, desiring to be regarded and treated appropriately, and resenting and being disposed to protest disregard and disrespectful treatment. Thinking of oneself as having certain moral rights that others ought not to violate is part of this kind of self-respect; servility (regarding oneself as the inferior of others) and arrogance (thinking oneself superior to others) are among its opposites.

The second kind of recognition self-respect involves an appreciation of oneself as an agent, a being with the ability and responsibility to act autonomously and value appropriately (see, for example, G. Taylor 1985; Telfer 1968). Persons who respect themselves as agents take their responsibilities seriously, especially their responsibilities to live in accord with their dignity as persons, to govern themselves fittingly, and to make of themselves and their lives something they believe to be good. So, self-respecting persons regard certain forms of acting, thinking, desiring, and feeling as befitting them as persons and other forms as self-debasing or shameful, and they expect themselves to adhere to the former and avoid the latter. They take care of themselves and seek to develop and use their talents and abilities in pursuit of their plans, projects, and goals. Those who are shameless, uncontrolled, weak-willed, self-consciously sycophantic, chronically irresponsible, slothfully dependent, self-destructive, or unconcerned with the shape and direction of their lives may be said to not respect themselves as agents.

A third kind of recognition self-respect involves the appreciation of the importance of being autonomously self-defining. One way a self-respecting individual does this is through having, and living in light, of a normative self-conception, i.e., a conception of being and living that she regards as worthy of her as the particular person she is. Such a self-conception both gives expression to ideals and commitments that shape the individual’s identity, and also organizes desires, choices, pursuits, and projects in ways that give substance and worth to the self. Self-respecting people hold themselves to personal expectations and standards the disappointment of which they would regard as unworthy of them, shameful, even contemptible (although they may not apply these standards to others) (Hill 1982). People who sell out, betray their own values, live inauthentic lives, let themselves be defined by others, or are complacently self-accepting lack this kind of recognition self-respect.

To these three Kantian kinds of recognition self-respect, we can add a fourth, which has to do with the fact that it is not just as abstract human beings or as agents with personal and universalizable moral goals and obligations that individuals can, do, or should respect themselves but also as concrete persons embedded in particular social structures and occupying various social positions with status-related responsibilities they must meet to be self-respecting (Middleton 2006). This last kind also has political implications, as discussed below.

Evaluative self-respect, which expresses confidence in one’s merit as a person, rests on an appraisal of oneself in light of the normative self-conception that structures recognition self-respect. Recognition self-respecting persons are concerned to be the kind of person they think it is good and appropriate for them to be and they try to live the kind of life such a person should live. Thus, they have and try to live by certain standards of worthiness by which they are committed to judge themselves. Indeed, they stake themselves, their value and their identities, on living in accord with these standards. Because they want to know where they stand, morally, they are disposed to reflectively examine and evaluate their character and conduct in light of their normative vision of themselves. And it matters to them that they are able to “bear their own survey,” as Hume says (1739, 620). Evaluative self-respect contains the judgment that one is or is becoming the worthy kind of person one seeks to be, and, more significantly, that one is not in danger of becoming an unworthy kind of person (Dillon 2004). Evaluative self-respect holds, at the least, the judgment that one “comes up to scratch,” as Telfer (1968) puts it. Those whose conduct is unworthy or whose character is shameful by their own standards do not deserve their own evaluative respect. However, people can be poor self-appraisers and their standards can be quite inappropriate to them or to any person, and so their evaluative self-respect, though still subjectively satisfying, can be unwarranted, as can the loss or lack of it. Interestingly, although philosophers have paid scant attention to evaluative respect for others, significant work has been done on evaluative self-respect. This may reflect an asymmetry between the two: although our evaluative respect for others may have no effect on them, perhaps because we don’t express it or they don’t value our appraisal, our own self-evaluation matters intensely to us and can powerfully affect our self-identity and the shape and structure of our lives. Indeed, an individual’s inability to stomach herself can profoundly diminish the quality of her life, even her desire to continue living.

Some philosophers have contended that a third kind of self-valuing underlies both recognition and evaluative self-respect. It is a more basic sense of worth that enables an individual to develop the intellectually more sophisticated forms, a precondition for being able to take one’s qualities or the fact that one is a person as grounds of positive self-worth. It has been called “basic psychological security” (Thomas 1989), “self-love” (Buss 1999), and “basal self-respect” (Dillon 1997). Basal self-valuing is our most fundamental sense of ourselves as mattering and our primordial interpretation of self and self-worth. Strong and secure basal self-respect can immunize an individual against personal failing or social denigration, but damage to basal self-respect, which can occur when people grow up in social, political, or cultural environments that devalue them or “their kind,” can make it impossible for people to properly interpret themselves and their self-worth, because it affects the way in which they assess reality and weigh reasons. Basal self-respect is thus the ground of the possibility of recognition and evaluative self-respect.

There are also non-deontological accounts of moral recognition self-respect. Utilitarians, for example, can treat self-respect as of paramount importance to a flourishing or happy life, and thereby justifying moral constraints on the treatment of others (Scarre 1992). Similarly, one could give a virtue-theoretical account of recognition self-respect, especially the agentic form (Dillon 2015), although this avenue has been relatively unexplored

It is common in everyday discourse and philosophical discussion to treat self-respect and self-esteem as synonyms. It is evaluative self-respect, typically, with which self-esteem is conflated (Dillon 2013). Evaluative self-respect and (high) self-esteem are both forms of positive self-regard concerned with one’s worth, both involve having a favorable view of oneself in virtue of one’s activities and personal qualities, and a person can have or lack either one undeservedly. Nevertheless, many philosophers have argued that the two attitudes are importantly different (for example, Dillon 2004, 2013; Harris 2001; Chazan 1998; Sachs 1981; Darwall 1977), although some theorists treat the evaluative stance as a form of self-esteem (“mortal self-esteem”). The main difference between the two is that evaluative self-respect is a normative stance and self-esteem is not: the former calls for justification in light of standards one has good reason to regard as appropriate, while the latter arises from beliefs about oneself whose justification need not matter to one and that need not involve standards-based self-assessment. Many philosophers agree that evaluative self-respect is morally important, which makes sense inasmuch as it is in the service of the moral demands of dignity, worthy character, agency, and one’s moral commitments, and so is a motivation for morally appropriate living. Self-esteem--having a good opinion of oneself or feeling good about oneself--is one of the most extensively studied phenomena in psychology and social psychology; it is generally regarded by social scientists as central to healthy psychological functioning and well-being, although they note that it has no necessary connection to moral values, is central to such negative states as narcissism, and can lead to serious disrespect of others and harm unless appropriately constrained (Baumeister et al 1996). (But see Keshen (2017) on the value of reasonable self-esteem.) One way of distinguishing evaluative self-respect and self-esteem is by their grounds and the points of view from which they are appraised. Evaluative self-respect involves an assessment from a moral point of view of one’s character and conduct in light of standards one regards as implied by one’s moral worth as an agent and a person. Self-esteem, as popularly and scientifically understood, is based both on whatever qualities or activities one prizes or thinks others prize, and on the esteem one believes one gets from others whose esteem one values. It does not essentially concern morally significant worth, appropriate self-valuing, or self-assessment from a moral point of view, and it can be based on features wholly unrelated to or even opposed to good character. For example, one can have a good opinion of oneself in virtue of being a good joke-teller or for having won an important sports competition and yet not think one is a good person because of it (Darwall 1977). And depending on what serves one’s psychological needs or suits one’s companions, one can derive high self-esteem from successful thuggery as from being honest and kind. To have self-esteem is to feel good about oneself; to have evaluative self-respect is to feel justified, to be able to hold one’s head up, look others in the eye, face oneself in the mirror. Another way of distinguishing them focuses on what it is to lose them: to lose evaluative respect for oneself is to find oneself to be shameful, contemptible, or intolerable; to lose self-esteem is to think less well of oneself, to be downcast because one believes one lacks qualities that would add to one’s luster (Harris 2001) or that others think less well of one.

Self-respect is also often identified with pride, although the two are rather different (Morton 2017). Just as there are different kinds of self-respect so, there are different kinds of pride, which are complexly related. In one sense, pride is the pleasure or satisfaction taken in one’s achievements, possessions, or associations; this kind of pride can be an affective element of either evaluative self-respect or self-esteem. In another sense, pride is inordinate self-esteem or vanity, an excessively high opinion of one’s qualities, accomplishments, or status that can make one arrogant and contemptuous of others. This kind of pride contrasts with both well-grounded evaluative self-respect and the interpersonal kind of moral recognition self-respect. But pride can also be a claim to and celebration of a status worth or to equality with others, especially other groups (for example, Black Pride), which is interpersonal recognition self-respect (Thomas 1993a, 1978–79). Pride can also be “proper pride,” which is a sense of one’s dignity that prevents one from doing what is unworthy; this is the agentic dimension of recognition self-respect. Pride’s opposites, shame and humility, are also closely related to self-respect. A loss of evaluative self-respect may be expressed in shame, but shameless people manifest a lack of recognition self-respect; and although humiliation can diminish or undermine recognition self-respect and evaluative self-respect, humility is an appropriate dimension of the evaluative self-respect of any imperfect person.

One issue with which contemporary philosophers have been concerned is whether self-respect is an objective concept or a subjective one. If it is the former, then there are certain beliefs, attitudes, and dispositions a person must have to be self-respecting. A person who thought of herself as a lesser sort of being whose interests and well-being are less important than those of others would not count as having moral recognition self-respect, no matter how appropriate she regards her stance. If self-respect is a subjective concept, then a person counts as having self-respect if, for example, she believes she is not tolerating treatment she regards as unworthy or behaving in ways she thinks is beneath her, regardless of whether her judgments about herself are accurate or her standards or sense of what she is due are judged by others to be reasonable or worthy (Massey 1983a). Psychologists, for whom “self-esteem” is the term of practice, tend to regard the various dimensions of a person’s sense of worth as subjective. Many philosophers treat the interpersonal dimension of recognition self-respect objectively, and it is generally thought that having manifestly inaccurate beliefs about oneself is good grounds for at least calling an individual’s sense of worth unjustified or compromised (Meyers 1989). But there is no consensus regarding the standards to which individuals hold themselves and by which they judge themselves, and certainly the standards of the self-defining dimension of moral recognition self-respect are inescapably, though perhaps not exclusively, subjective. Complicating the objective/subjective distinction, however, is the fact of the social construction of self-respect. What it is to be a person or to have a status worthy of respect, what treatment and conduct are appropriate to a person or one with such a status, what forms of life and character have merit—all of these are given different content in different sociocultural contexts. Individuals necessarily, though perhaps not inalterably, learn to engage with themselves and with issues of self-worth in the terms and modes of the sociocultural conceptions in which they have been immersed. And different kinds of individuals may be given different opportunities in different sociocultural contexts to acquire or develop the grounds of the different kinds of self-respect (Dillon 2021, 1997; Moody-Adams 1992–93; Meyers 1989; Thomas 1983b). Even fully justified self-respect may thus be less than strongly objective and more than simply subjective.

Self-respect is frequently appealed to as a means of justifying a wide variety of philosophical claims or positions, generally in arguments of the form: x promotes (or undermines) self-respect; therefore, x is to that extent to be morally approved (or objected to). For example, appeals to self-respect have been used to argue for, among many other things, the value of moral rights (Feinberg 1970), moral requirements or limits regarding forgiving others or oneself (Dillon 2001; Holmgren 1998, 1993; Novitz 1998; Haber 1991; Murphy 1982), and both the rightness and wrongness of practices such as affirmative action. Such arguments rely on rather than establish the moral importance of self-respect. Most philosophers who attend to self-respect tend to treat it as important in one of two ways, which are exemplified in the very influential work of Kant and John Rawls.

Kant argues that, just as we have a moral duty to respect others as persons, so we have a moral duty to respect ourselves as persons, a duty that derives from our dignity as rational beings. This duty requires us to act always in an awareness of our dignity and so to act only in ways that are consistent with our status as ends in ourselves and to refrain from acting in ways that abase, degrade, defile, or disavow our rational nature. That is, we have a duty of moral recognition self-respect. In The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), Kant argues for specific duties to oneself generated by the general duty to respect humanity in our persons, including duties to not engage in suicide, misuse of our sexual powers, drunkenness and other unrestrained indulgence of inclination, lying, self-deception, avarice, and servility. Kant also maintains that the duty of self-respect is the most important moral duty, for unless there were duties to respect oneself, there could be no moral duties at all. Moreover, fulfilling our duty to respect ourselves is a necessary condition of fulfilling our duties to respect other persons. Kant maintains that we are always aware of our dignity as persons and so of our moral obligation to respect ourselves, and he identifies this awareness as a feeling of reverential respect for ourselves. This is one of the natural capacities of feeling which we could have no duty to acquire but that make it possible for us to be motivated by the thought of duty. Reverence for self is, along with “moral feeling,” conscience, and love of others, a subjective source of morality, and it is the motivational ground of the duty of self-respect. Kant also discusses evaluative self-respect, especially in Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and his Lectures on Ethics (1779), as a combination of noble pride, which is the awareness that we have honored and preserved our dignity by acting in morally worthy ways, and a healthy dose of humility, which is the awareness that we inevitably fall short of the lofty requirements of the moral law. Kant regards well-grounded evaluative self-respect as a subjective motivation to continue striving to do right and be good.

Rawls, by contrast, views self-respect neither as something we are morally required to have and maintain nor as a feeling we necessarily have, but as an entitlement that social institutions are required by justice to support and not undermine. In A Theory of Justice (1971) he argues that self-respect (which he sometimes calls “self-esteem” is a “primary good,” something that rational beings want whatever else they want, because it is vital both to the experienced quality of individual lives and to the ability to carry out or achieve whatever projects or aims an individual might have. It is, moreover, a social good, one that individuals are able to acquire only under certain social and political conditions. Rawls defines self-respect as including “a person’s sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his conception of the good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out,” and it implies “a confidence in one’s ability, so far as it is within one’s power, to fulfill one’s intentions” (Rawls 1971, 440). He argues that individuals’ access to self-respect is to a large degree a function of how the basic institutional structure of a society defines and distributes the social bases of self-respect, which include the messages about the relative worth of citizens that are conveyed in the structure and functioning of institutions, the distribution of fundamental political rights and civil liberties, access to the resources individuals need to pursue their plans of life, the availability of diverse associations and communities within which individuals can seek affirmation of their worth and their plans of life from others, and the norms governing public interaction among citizens. Since self-respect is vital to individual well-being, Rawls argues that justice requires that social institutions and policies be designed to support and not undermine self-respect. Rawls argues that the principles of justice as fairness are superior to utilitarian principles insofar as they better affirm and promote self-respect for all citizens.

Rawls’s view that the ability of individuals to respect themselves is heavily dependent on their social and political circumstances has been echoed by a number of theorists working in moral, social, and political philosophy. For example, Margalit (1996) argues that a decent society is one whose institutions do not humiliate people, that is, give people good reason to consider their self-respect to be injured (but see Bird 2010). Honneth’s theory of social criticism (1995) focuses on the way people’s self-respect and self-identity necessarily depend on the recognition of others and so are vulnerable to being misrecognized or ignored both by social institutions and in interpersonal interactions. Some theorists have used the concept of self-respect to examine the oppression of women, people of color, gays and lesbians, and other groups that are marginalized, stigmatized, or exploited by the dominant culture, identifying the plethora of ways in which oppressive institutions, images, and actions can do damage to the self-respect of members of these groups. Other writers discuss ways that individuals and groups might preserve or restore self-respect in the face of injustice or oppression, and the ways in which the development of self-respect in individuals living under oppression or injustice empowers them to participate in the monumental struggles for justice and liberation (for example, Babbitt 2000, 1993; Bartky 1990a, 1990b, 1990c; Basevich 2022; Boxill 1992, 1976; Boxill and Boxill 2015; Collins 1990; Dillon 2021, 1997, 1995; Diller 2001; Hay 2013, 2011; Holberg 2017; Ikuenobe 2004; Khader 2021; Meyers 1989, 1986; Mohr 1992, 1988; Moody-Adams 1992–93; Seglow 2016; Statman 2002; Thomas 2001b, 1983a, 1978–79; Weber 2016). Some theorists, especially those working within a feminist framework, have argued that the prevailing conceptions of self-respect in Kantian theory or in contemporary liberal societies themselves contain features that reflect objectionable aspects of the dominating culture, and they have attempted to reconceive self-respect in ways that are more conducive to empowerment and emancipation (for example, Borgwald 2012, Dillon 1992c).

In moral philosophy, theorists have also focused on connections between self-respect and various virtues and vices, such as self-trust (Borgwald 2012; Govier 1993), justice (Bloomfield 2011), honesty (Mauri 2011), benevolence (Andrew 2011), humility (Dillon 2020, 2015; Grenberg 2010), self-forgiveness (Dillon 2001; Holmgren 1998; Novitz 1998), self-improvement (Johnson 2011), general immorality (Bagnoli 2009; Bloomfield 2008), and arrogance (Dillon 2022, 2021, 2015, 2007, 2003).

Everyday discourse and practices insist that respect and self-respect are personally, socially, politically, and morally important, and philosophical discussions of the concepts bear this out. Their roles in our lives as individuals, as people living in complex relations with other people and surrounded by a plethora of other beings and things on which our attitudes and actions have tremendous effects, cannot, as these discussions reveal, be taken lightly. The discussions thus far shed light on the nature and significance of the various forms of respect and self-respect and their positions in a nexus of profoundly important but philosophically challenging and contestable concepts. These discussions also reveal that more work remains to be done in clarifying these attitudes and their places among and implications for our concepts and our lives.

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Respect: Examples and How to Learn or Teach It

Respect. Learn what it is, why it is important, as well as different types and examples. Discover interesting tips on how to teach it. What to do when we are disrespected? How do you learn to respect yourself? How to respect others? In this article, we answer all these questions.

What is respect? Concept and definition

The word respect comes from the Latin word “ respectus ” meaning attention, regard, or consideration.

It can be defined as “ esteem for or a sense of the worth or excellence of a person, a personal quality or ability, or something considered as a manifestation of a personal quality or ability “.

This is a very important component of both personal identity and interpersonal relationships. To feel respected could be considered a basic human right. Disrespect is a very important thing that can lead to break-ups and even violence.

The concept also refers to the ability to value and honor another person, even if we do not approve or share everything he or she does. It is accepting the other person and not trying to change them.

Our differences are positive because it creates our identity. This means that individual differences exist, but above all to understand that as members of society, we are equal. All people are due respect for the simple fact of being people. Equality is in balance. But it’s also fundamental for oneself since you will value others to the extent that you are able to value yourself.

That is why it is very important to teach children from an early age the value of it. And, the best way to teach respect is to become a role model for our children.

Why Is Respect Important?

Without it, interpersonal relationships will be filled with conflict and dissatisfaction. If we don’t respect others, they will not respect us, and if we don’t respect ourselves we will not be respected by others either.

It is essential to feel safe, to be able to express ourselves without fear of being judged, humiliated or discriminated against.

Being respectful of others, being respected, and respecting ourselves increases our self-esteem , self-efficacy , mental health, and well-being.

Types of Respect

There are many types, the most important of which are: self-respect, for others, social norms, nature, values, laws, culture, and the family.

Some examples of consideration in everyday life are: greeting or speaking to others in a kind and respectful way, giving up your seat in public places, treating others as you would like them to treat you, etc.

• For self: This kind refers to the ability to respect oneself, to value and appreciate oneself. Accepting oneself regardless of what others think. Ensure you are at peak health with this magnesium breakthrough .
• For others: This kind refers to the act of tolerating accepting and considering another person, even though there may be differences between them or the way they think. Some examples would be; respect for parents, men and women equally, teachers, older people, other’s religious beliefs, respect for people of different sexual orientations , etc.
• Social norms: This kind refers to the ability to respect all the norms that govern society. Some examples of this type of respect would be: respect for courtesy rules, working hours, other people’s belongings, letting them speak and listen, and respecting others’ opinions.
• For nature: This kind refers to the appreciation of the environment (animals, plants, rivers, etc.). Some examples of this type of respect would be; not throwing garbage in rivers, forests, or fields, not tearing up plants or mistreating nature, not wasting water, not harming animals or insects, recycling, using environmentally friendly means of transport, etc.
• The family: This kind implies being able to understand and respect each other within the family, and implies being able to follow a set of rules of coexistence.
• For values: This kind refers to the ability to honor our own principles.
• Culture: This type of value refers to the ability to recognize that there are other beliefs and be able to respect them. Some examples of this kind of respect would be: not trying to impose our beliefs on others, avoiding making judgments about the opinions of others, etc.
• N ational symbols: This kind refers to the ability to value and appreciate the symbols of a nation. For example, the anthem or a flag.
• For human beings: This type refers to the ability to comply with legal norms, respect laws, etc.

How to Teach Respect?

This attribute is a two-way street.

Hal and Yates studied respect through words and found out that between parents and children and teachers and students respect is the main aspect of the relationship between them.

These authors learned that it’s about reciprocity. Meaning, we get back what we receive. Therefore if parents respect their children, they will receive the same respect back. The important aspect of this study was that parents and teachers were the ones responsible for teaching respect.

You can start teaching respect to children, maybe this song and tips might help:

1. Respect your children

Take into account your child’s tastes and preferences. Don’t make him do something he doesn’t want, just like you wouldn’t make an adult do it. Suggest, encourage, advise, but don’t force. If your child has their own way of doing things, let your child do it. Don’t pretend to have complete control over your child’s behavior or preferences. Accept their decisions and let them make their own decisions as well.

When we accept children’s differences, they feel listened to and respected. They learn in their own flesh how to treat others who have different opinions and to respect others despite their differences.

2. Stay calm and don’t shout

If you want to teach respect, it is important to set an example and always keep a calm tone. Shouting at a person is disrespectful, too. Although it can be difficult when you feel frustrated, try not to shout.

3. Don’t use negative labels or insults

Telling our child, “you’re a bad boy” or “you’re useless” is very harmful to self-esteem, but it also encourages a disrespectful attitude. So, when he/she behaves badly, it is better to say: “What you have done is wrong”, focusing on his action by not judging the child”. Discover the power of Pygmalion effect . Prophecies come true.

4. Understand why he/she disrespected you

When your child is disrespectful, it’s best to understand why he or she has done it and help them explore their feelings. For example, if your child calls you “bad,” we’ll ask why he or she said it, whether it’s because they’re angry or sad.

We need to think about what might have upset him, and say, “Are you angry about this?” We must be empathic to their anger and make them understand that not because of that anger a person is bad and that hurting others is not a way to solve problems. Once they understand this, we can negotiate with them on how to solve their anger.

5. Don’t let them disrespect you

Don’t let your children or anyone else disrespect you. Be a good role model for them, not letting anyone take advantage of you or accepting yourself.

Portraying respect goes hand in hand with self-esteem. The higher the self-esteem the lower the possibilities you will accept disrespect. Remember that humans strive to achieve respect but we have to focus on providing ourselves with the respect we deserve.

6. Set limits

When teaching respect, it is important to set limits on what is right and wrong for children. When they behave disrespectfully, point out the behavior, calmly, without shouting, as we have mentioned before. However, if there is a lot of emotional activation, if the child is very upset, it is better to wait for him to calm down, or even help him to do so.

7. Apologize when you’re wrong

When you’re wrong, you don’t keep your promise or you’re too hard on your child, it’s important to apologize to them. Not only will we convey humility and the importance of asking for forgiveness, but we will also teach them respect.

8. Congratulate your children when they are respectful

It is important for them to learn the actions that are right and respectful. Let them know that what they have done is right because then they are more likely to repeat it.

Respect in the workplace

Globalization has made most of our workplaces have diverse people, from different races, religions, etc. This is very important because having a diverse workplace helps boost productivity. However, what is most important in a diverse workplace is to maintain respect among coworkers to reduce job stress .

To keep respect at the workplace it is important to be polite with each other, don’t judge people, control your anger, inspire others, etc. Practicing humility, respecting other people’s time, and trying to be empathic are important variables in the workplace.

Learn to respect yourself

Sometimes it’s hard to get others to respect us if we don’t do it ourselves.

1. Treat others the way you want to be treated

It’s a pretty cliché phrase, but it’s true. If you want to be respected, start by respecting others. People tend to be reciprocal.

2. Respect yourself

If others see that you have this, they will also consider and appreciate you and your needs. Consider yourself a priority.

3. Use body language

Body language is very important because it helps to transmit a lot of information. Although many times the information we send with the body is contradictory to our words. Therefore, if we give our opinion but with a faint voice, it is more likely that no one will take into account what we are saying. But on the contrary, if we express what we think in a firm voice, looking into the other’s eyes and confident in ourselves, they are more likely to respect us. Discover here tips for effective communication skills .

4. Speak positively

Even if you do not behave in an arrogant or haughty manner, do not underestimate yourself, or play down.

5. Surround yourself with the right people

Some people are just always disrespectful and no matter what we do they will always disrespect others. These people we should keep further away from us as possible. If you can’t keep them away then learn to ignore their comments.

6. Defend yourself against disrespect

If they disrespect you or don’t take you seriously, defend yourself. Don’t allow it. Don’t attack or respond in the same way either. With a “What you said has hurt me”, “That comment was inappropriate” or “I won’t allow you to speak to me like that”, these phrases will help for this behavior not to repeat again.

7. Boost your self-esteem

Many times we are not respected because we don’t consider ourselves worthy of it. This may be conscious or unconscious. Even if we rationally know that we do deserve respect, sometimes unconsciously we don’t end up believing it. That is why it’s important to work on your self-esteem.

8. Develop assertiveness

Assertiveness is a way of defending our rights while respecting those of others. By being assertive, we will avoid others taking advantage of us, besides increasing our self-esteem. To do this, it is important to learn to say no when something doesn’t feel right or doesn’t suit you.

What to Do with a Lack of Respect?

Do you feel that others don’t respect you and take advantage of you? Here are a few tips to help you overcome disrespect.

• Value your educational trajectory or other forms of education that you have had. If you are not fortunate enough to have a formal education, value your life experience and life skills.
• Honor your body and listen to it. Take care of it without forcing it, do physical exercise, and eat properly.
• Listen to yourself and attend to your needs, whether they are a need for rest, disconnection, or fun.
• Learn to communicate assertively, as mentioned above.
• Stay away from people who don’t do you any good and from toxic relationships.
• Find out what your goals and objectives are in life and work to achieve them.

How do we respect others?

• Listening to the other person.
• Being empathetic , understanding each other, and putting ourselves in their shoes.
• Using assertive communication, that is, defending our rights while respecting the rights of others, in an educated and non-aggressive manner.
• Keep in mind that our approaches, ideas, and opinions may differ from other people and none is wrong. No one has the absolute truth.
• Apologize to each other when we make mistakes.
• Keeping other people’s secrets.
• Complying with and respecting laws and regulations
• Taking care of the common spaces and the environment.
• Interest in others, their everyday life, and how they feel.
• Respecting the privacy and intimacy of others.
• Respecting others’ spaces and belongings, not invade or use what is not ours without permission.
• Respect personal space.
• Make sure we include rather than exclude others.
• Helping others when it is in our power to do so.
• Being grateful.
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Respect: Philosophical Essays

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Respect is one of the central concepts in contemporary moral thought. It plays a prominent role in everyday, pre-philosophical moral thinking, as well as in recent moral theory and applied ethics. Yet basic questions about the concept and role of respect have received less attention than might be expected. This volume takes up some of these basic questions. The book is not meant to be a comprehensive handbook that covers all aspects of the topic of respect, nor is the focus of the book mainly historical. Rather, the aim is to give leading experts in the field a chance to present their latest ideas and point the research on respect in new directions. Following an introductory historical essay, Part I addresses questions of what respect is, its nature and basis. Part II examines questions in moral theory, for example what exactly ought to be respected, what role respect plays in morality, and which different types of respect are appropriate and morally significant. Part III deals with the practical application of requirements of respect. The essays in this volume will be of interest both to scholars and students working on issues of respect and to anyone interested in this central moral notion.

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Essays About Values: 5 Essay Examples Plus 10 Prompts

Similar to how our values guide us, let this guide with essays about values and writing prompts help you write your essay.

Values are the core principles that guide the actions we take and the choices we make. They are the cornerstones of our identity. On a community or organizational level, values are the moral code that every member must embrace to live harmoniously and work together towards shared goals. 

We acquire our values from different sources such as parents, mentors, friends, cultures, and experiences. All of these build on one another — some rejected as we see fit — for us to form our perception of our values and what will lead us to a happy and fulfilled life.

5 Essay Examples

1. what today’s classrooms can learn from ancient cultures by linda flanagan, 2. stand out to your hiring panel with a personal value statement by maggie wooll, 3. make your values mean something by patrick m. lencioni, 4. how greed outstripped need by beth azar, 5. a shift in american family values is fueling estrangement by joshua coleman, 1. my core values, 2. how my upbringing shaped my values, 3. values of today’s youth, 4. values of a good friend, 5. an experience that shaped your values, 6. remembering our values when innovating, 7. important values of school culture, 8. books that influenced your values, 9. religious faith and moral values, 10. schwartz’s theory of basic values.

“Connectedness is another core value among Maya families, and teachers seek to cultivate it… While many American teachers also value relationships with their students, that effort is undermined by the competitive environment seen in many Western classrooms.”

Ancient communities keep their traditions and values of a hands-off approach to raising their kids. They also preserve their hunter-gatherer mindsets and others that help their kids gain patience, initiative, a sense of connectedness, and other qualities that make a helpful child.

“How do you align with the company’s mission and add to its culture? Because it contains such vital information, your personal value statement should stand out on your resume or in your application package.”

Want to rise above other candidates in the jobs market? Then always highlight your value statement. A personal value statement should be short but still, capture the aspirations and values of the company. The essay provides an example of a captivating value statement and tips for crafting one.

“Values can set a company apart from the competition by clarifying its identity and serving as a rallying point for employees. But coming up with strong values—and sticking to them—requires real guts.”

Along with the mission and vision, clear values should dictate a company’s strategic goals. However, several CEOs still needed help to grasp organizational values fully. The essay offers a direction in setting these values and impresses on readers the necessity to preserve them at all costs. 

“‘He compared the values held by people in countries with more competitive forms of capitalism with the values of folks in countries that have a more cooperative style of capitalism… These countries rely more on strategic cooperation… rather than relying mostly on free-market competition as the United States does.”

The form of capitalism we have created today has shaped our high value for material happiness. In this process, psychologists said we have allowed our moral and ethical values to drift away from us for greed to take over. You can also check out these essays about utopia .

“From the adult child’s perspective, there might be much to gain from an estrangement: the liberation from those perceived as hurtful or oppressive, the claiming of authority in a relationship, and the sense of control over which people to keep in one’s life. For the mother or father, there is little benefit when their child cuts off contact.”

It is most challenging when the bonds between parent and child weaken in later years. Psychologists have been navigating this problem among modern families, which is not an easy conflict to resolve. It requires both parties to give their best in humbling themselves and understanding their loved ones, no matter how divergent their values are. 

10 Writing  Prompts On Essays About Values

For this topic prompt, contemplate your non-negotiable core values and why you strive to observe them at all costs. For example, you might value honesty and integrity above all else. Expound on why cultivating fundamental values leads to a happy and meaningful life. Finally, ponder other values you would like to gain for your future self. Write down how you have been practicing to adopt these aspired values. 

Many of our values may have been instilled in us during childhood. This essay discusses the essential values you gained from your parents or teachers while growing up. Expound on their importance in helping you flourish in your adult years. Then, offer recommendations on what households, schools, or communities can do to ensure that more young people adopt these values.

Is today’s youth lacking essential values, or is there simply a shift in what values generations uphold? Strive to answer this and write down the healthy values that are emerging and dying. Then think of ways society can preserve healthy values while doing away with bad ones. Of course, this change will always start at home, so also encourage parents, as role models, to be mindful of their words, actions and behavior.  

The greatest gift in life is friendship. In this essay, enumerate the top values a friend should have. You may use your best friend as an example. Then, cite the best traits your best friend has that have influenced you to be a better version of yourself. Finally, expound on how these values can effectively sustain a healthy friendship in the long term. 

We all have that one defining experience that has forever changed how we see life and the values we hold dear. Describe yours through storytelling with the help of our storytelling guide . This experience may involve a decision, a conversation you had with someone, or a speech you heard at an event.  

With today’s innovation, scientists can make positive changes happen. But can we truly exercise our values when we fiddle with new technologies whose full extent of positive and adverse effects we do not yet understand such as AI? Contemplate this question and look into existing regulations on how we curb the creation or use of technologies that go against our values. Finally, assess these rules’ effectiveness and other options society has. 

Highlight a school’s role in honing a person’s values. Then, look into the different aspects of your school’s culture. Identify which best practices distinct in your school are helping students develop their values. You could consider whether your teachers exhibit themselves as admirable role models or specific parts of the curriculum that help you build good character. 

In this essay, recommend your readers to pick up your favorite books, particularly those that served as pathways to enlightening insights and values. To start, provide a summary of the book’s story. It would be better if you could do so without revealing too much to avoid spoiling your readers’ experience. Then, elaborate on how you have applied the values you learned from the book.

For many, religious faith is the underlying reason for their values. For this prompt, explore further the inextricable links between religion and values. If you identify with a certain religion, share your thoughts on the values your sector subscribes to. You can also tread the more controversial path on the conflicts of religious values with socially accepted beliefs or practices, such as abortion. 

Dive deeper into the ten universal values that social psychologist Shalom Schwartz came up with: power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security. Look into their connections and conflicts against each other. Then, pick your favorite value and explain how you relate to it the most. Also, find if value conflicts within you, as theorized by Schwartz.

Make sure to check out our round-up of the best essay checkers . If you want to use the latest grammar software, read our guide on using an AI grammar checker .

Yna Lim is a communications specialist currently focused on policy advocacy. In her eight years of writing, she has been exposed to a variety of topics, including cryptocurrency, web hosting, agriculture, marketing, intellectual property, data privacy and international trade. A former journalist in one of the top business papers in the Philippines, Yna is currently pursuing her master's degree in economics and business.

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Home — Essay Samples — Philosophy — Values of Life — My Personal Values in Life

My Personal Values in Life

• Categories: Values of Life

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Published: Jan 31, 2024

Words: 773 | Pages: 2 | 4 min read

Table of contents

Introduction, body paragraph 1: personal value 1, body paragraph 2: personal value 2, body paragraph 3: personal value 3, counterargument.

• Adler, M. J. (2000). The four dimensions of philosophy: Metaphysical, moral, objective, categorical. Routledge.
• Miller, W. R., & Thoresen, C. E. (2003). Spirituality, religion, and health: An emerging research field. American Psychologist, 58(1), 24-35.
• Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. E. (2004). Character strengths and virtues: A handbook and classification. Oxford University Press.

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The Four Values Framework: Fairness, Respect, Care and Honesty

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• First Online: 29 May 2019

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Part of the book series: SpringerBriefs in Research and Innovation Governance ((BRIEFSREINGO))

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Values inspire, motivate and engage people to discharge obligations or duties. This chapter defends the values approach in the context of guarding against ethics dumping, the practice of exporting unethical research from higher-income to lower-income settings. A number of essential questions will be answered: What are values? What is the meaning of the word “value”? Why does it make sense to choose values as an instrument to guide ethical action in preference to other possibilities? And what is meant by fairness, respect, care and honesty? It is concluded that values can provide excellent guidance and aspiration in the fight against ethics dumping, and are therefore a well-chosen structure for the Global Code of Conduct for Research in Resource-Poor Settings.

You have full access to this open access chapter,  Download chapter PDF

Introduction

Many celebrated documents which advocate for a better world include a preamble that mentions values. For instance, at the international level, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948 ) lists four values in the first sentence: dignity, freedom, justice and peace in the world. The first sentence of the Convention on Biological Diversity (UN 1992 ) refers to “the intrinsic value of biological diversity and of the ecological, genetic , social, economic, scientific, educational, cultural, recreational and aesthetic values of biological diversity” (emphasis added).

Other national or professional codes have incorporated values prominently into individual articles. For instance, at the national level in the UK, the first item of The Code: Professional Standards of Practice and Behaviour for Nurses, Midwives and Nursing Associates , reads: “Treat people with kindness, respect and compassion” (NMC 2018 ).

In some codes one has to search to find obvious references to values as they are often incorporated in a more implicit manner, such as in the Declaration of Helsinki (WMA 2013 ), which speaks of “safety , effectiveness, efficiency, accessibility and quality” in article 6.

When developing the Global Code of Conduct for Research in Resource-Poor Settings (GCC), a unique approach emerged naturally from the process employed. Its underpinning values materialized ahead of its final articles through an investigation into the risks of exploitation in international collaborative research (Chapter 5 ), and from a global engagement and fact-finding mission (Chapter 6 ).

It soon became clear that fairness, respect, care and honesty are all lacking, or deficient, whenever ethics dumping Footnote 1 occurs, and that a loss of trust in researchers and research itself can result. What also emerged is that these values are shared across the range of cultures that were represented in the TRUST Footnote 2 consortium. It was therefore possible to surmise that these shared values are vital for equitable research partnerships and to prevent ethics dumping . In other words, these values are necessary to foster an ethical culture in research, and are therefore values to which all researchers should aspire.

This chapter will answer some essential questions: What are values? What is the meaning of the word “value”? Why does it make sense to choose values as an instrument to guide ethical action in preference to other possibilities? And finally, what is meant by “fairness”, “respect”, “care” and “honesty”?

The Meaning of “Value”

Values pervade human experience (Ogletree 2004 ), and references to “values” are ubiquitous. With vast numbers of articles, books and internet sites offering advice on matters such as values we should live by , discovering our own values , changing our core values and achieving success through values , it is obvious that values are important to people.

The term “value” can be used in many different ways. Footnote 3 With reference to the way in which people use the term, three primary meanings of “value” can be distinguished (see Fig. 3.1 ).

The meaning of value

First, value can refer to measurability. Mathematics operates with values, which can, for example, be discrete or continuous. Artists might speak of colours having values, meaning the relative lightness or darkness of a colour. In music, a note value determines the duration of a musical note. Economists or art dealers might measure value in monetary terms; a particular company or a particular painting might be valued at a certain amount of money. Value, in this sense of the word, has no relationship to values such as admiration, approval or motivation.

Secondly, people can value certain features or entities. For instance, somebody might value money, fame or glory. For value to exist, there must be an agent (a person) who is doing the valuing, and the feature or entity must be worth something to this agent (Klein 2017 ). The values of one individual can be very different from those of another person. For instance, a regular income is worth a lot to a person who values routine and security ; it can contribute to their wellbeing and happiness. Others, who value personal freedom more than routine and security, might be just as happy with occasional income, as long as they are not bound to a nine-to-five job. If most humans around the world value a particular thing, it can be described as a universal value.

Thirdly, values can refer to goals and ambitions, with a moral connotation. In business literature, for example, one often finds reference to value-led management or organizational values, and many institutions make a point of establishing, promoting and broadcasting their values. For instance, the stated values of the University of Central Lancashire (UCLan), at which several of the authors of this book are based, are: common sense, compassion, teamwork, attention to detail and trust (UCLan nd ). These values are all morally positive and they are intended to guide the actions of students, staff and the institution itself. In this third sense of the word, moral values “will enable us to determine what is morally right or what is valuable in particular circumstances” (Raz 2001 : 208). If most humans around the world share a particular moral value, it can be described as a universal moral value.

There are numerous advantages to having credible moral values at the level of organizations. Such values influence the culture of an organization (Martins and Coetzee 2011 ), which in turn has a positive impact upon corporate performance (Ofori and Sokro 2010 ), and job stress and satisfaction (Mansor and Tayib 2010 ), as well as business performance and competitive advantage (Crabb 2011 ). Furthermore, when employees’ values are aligned with organizational values, this benefits both the wellbeing of individuals and the success of the organization (Posner 2010 ).

There are many internet sites that offer lists of core values. One of them (Threads Culture nd ) includes 500 values, from “above and beyond” to “work life balance”. Not all of these are moral values. For instance, this particular list includes values such as clean, exuberant, hygienic, neat, poised and winning (Threads Culture nd ). Another site lists 50 values, including authenticity, loyalty and wisdom, and advises that fewer than five should be selected for leadership purposes (Clear nd ).

The GCC is structured around four moral values: fairness, respect, care and honesty. These four values were not chosen from any existing lists; they emerged through in-depth consultation efforts around the globe (chapter 6 ). But why did the TRUST team choose moral values rather than other action-guiding moral modes for the GCC?

What Can Guide Moral Action?

The GCC is based on moral values, but the code authors could have opted to frame the code and guide action in other ways, including the following:

Standards is a technical term used to achieve desired action. Standards are precise and give exact specifications, which are in many cases measurable, as in the maximum vehicle emissions allowed for cars. Standards can also be used in ethics. For instance, a well-known voluntary standard to guide ethical action is ISO 26000 (ISO not dated), developed by the International Organization for Standardization. ISO 26000 assesses the social responsibility of companies. Its guidance includes prohibitions against bribery , and the requirement to be accountable for any environmental damage caused.

Principles are behavioural rules for concrete action. When you know the principle, you know what to do. For instance, in dubio pro reo has saved many innocent people from going to jail as it gives the courts very concrete advice. Literally translated, it means, “when in doubt, then for the accused” (a person remains innocent until proven guilty). This principle goes back to both Aristotle and Roman law.

Virtues are beneficial character traits that human beings need to flourish (Foot 1978 : 2f). One can observe them in real people or in fictional characters. England’s semimythical Robin Hood, for instance, is seen as courageous and benevolent. He fights a David-and-Goliath battle against the Sheriff of Nottingham (courage) so that the poor have food (benevolence). Like values, for virtues to exist, there must be an agent (a person) who is being virtuous; virtues focus on the moral agent rather than on the standard or principle that underlies a decision.

Ideals drive towards perfection and are highly aspirational. Some people will say “in an ideal world” to denote that something is unrealistic from the start. The ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle argued that we should strive towards perfection of character and that ideals can be guiding lights in character building. “Good character is an ideal outside of oneself that all strive for” (Mitchell 2015 ).

So why were values chosen as the foundation for the GCC rather than standards , principles , virtues or ideals ?

Ideals are the most aspirational of the concepts available to guide ethical action. However, hardly anybody can live up to all of their ideals. If one phrased an ethics code around ideals, those who should be led by the code might suggest that not reaching the ideals on every occasion would be acceptable. This is not the case. The 23 articles of the GCC (chapter 2 ) are not aspirational. They are mandatory.

Virtues are found both historically and internationally in many important documents of learning and wisdom. Famously, Aristotle (384–322 BC) linked human “happiness and wellbeing” to “leading an ethical life”, guided by the cardinal values of courage, justice, modesty and wisdom (Aristotle 2004 ). According to Confucianism, the most important traditional virtues are said to be benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, trustworthiness, filial piety, loyalty and reciprocity (Wang et al. 2018 ). Virtues are a good way to drive ethical action, in particular global ethical action, but the TRUST team had good reason not to use virtues as the foundation of the GCC.

Virtues can be regarded as embodied ethical values because they are manifested in persons. One can learn a lot by observing real people (such as Mother Theresa or Nelson Mandela) and following their example. This makes virtue approaches very useful in leadership and mentoring (Resnik 2012 ). But not every researcher has access to mentors and learning via example. Besides, early career researchers are said to benefit more from rule-based approaches (Resnik 2012 ). Hence, while virtues were considered as a possibility for the foundation of the GCC, they were excluded because of their strong reliance upon the availability of role models.

Principles have a long-standing tradition in practical moral frameworks, especially principlism , the moral framework relating to bioethics developed by Beauchamp and Childress ( 2013 ). As argued in Chapter 4 , we believe that the four principles of Beauchamp and Childress – autonomy, non-maleficence (do no harm ), beneficence and justice – should instead be called values. Principles, as we understand them, are more concrete than values. Principles can provide almost immediate and very straightforward answers to ethical questions.

A famous principle in political philosophy is Rawls’s difference principle . The principle holds that divergence from an egalitarian distribution of social goods (e.g. income, wealth, power ) is only allowed when this non-egalitarian distribution favours the least advantaged in society (Rawls 1999 : 65–70). In other words, if a particularly talented wealth creator increases the overall wealth pie so that the least advantaged in society are better off, she can receive a bigger share of the pie than others. Knowing about this principle gives answers to social philosophy questions, which the value of fairness or justice would not. Rawls applied the value of fairness to derive the more concrete difference principle . Principles are therefore too concrete and too prescriptive to form the foundation of the GCC. They would not leave enough room for local agreements between partners from high- and lower-income settings as envisaged by various GCC articles, such as article 1: “Local relevance of research … should be determined in collaboration with local partners.”

Standards are even more specific than principles and have an even stronger action-guiding function. They prescribe very concrete activities in given settings. To formulate standards for ethical interaction between partners from different settings would certainly be too prescriptive. A standard cannot be diverged from (for example, a limit to vehicle emissions). For instance, if article 10 Footnote 4 were a standard, no exception to double ethics review would be possible. But there may be good reason to allow such an exception in certain circumstances. For instance, if ethics approval has been given in a high-income setting and community approval obtained in a host setting where no ethics committee operates, then it may be perfectly ethical to proceed.

The San community in South Africa , for instance, has no facility for providing ethics committee approval , but the South African San Council can provide community approval for research projects in the community (Chapter 7 ). A standard of double ethics review would forbid any research in the San community until an ethics committee were established, which might even undermine the San people’s self-determined research governance structures. For this reason, it is clear that standards are too prescriptive to be applied to every setting, and might hinder valuable research.

This leaves ethical values , which operate as guides on the route to doing the right thing and are not overly prescriptive. They do not undermine the need to develop bespoke agreements across cultures via discussions between research teams and communities. At the same time, there is another, positive reason to choose values as the foundation for the GCC. Values inspire and motivate people to take action – and that is exactly what is needed to guard against ethics dumping .

Values and Their Motivating Power

Research stakeholders who are guided by values will hopefully be inspired and motivated by the GCC and not just follow its rules reluctantly or grudgingly. Why is that? Values can serve as motivating factors in promoting or inhibiting human action (Marcum 2008 , Locke 1991 , Ogletree 2004 ). The influence of personal values upon behaviour has become a subject of extensive research in the social sciences and in psychology, particularly over the past forty years, with just about every area of life being examined through the lens of personal values – for example, consumer practices (Pinto et al. 2011 ), political voting habits (Kaufmann 2016 ), employee creativity (Sousa and Coelho 2011 ), healthcare decisions (Huijer and Van Leeuwen 2000 ), investment decisions (Pasewark and Riley 2010 ), and sexuality and disability (Wolfe 1997 ), to name but a few.

Arguably the most prominent theory of the motivational power of human values was developed by social psychologist Shalom Schwartz, back in 1992. Schwartz’s theory of basic values is distinctive because, unlike most other theories, it has been tested via extensive empirical investigation. Studies undertaken since the early 1990s have generated large data sets from 82 countries, including highly diverse geographic, cultural, religious, age and occupational groups (Schwartz 2012 ). Findings from Schwartz’s global studies indicate that values are inextricably linked to affect. He claims that when values are activated, they become infused with feeling (Schwartz 2012 ). For example, people for whom routine and security are important values will become disturbed when their employment is threatened and may fall into despair if they actually lose their jobs. Correspondingly, when moral values like fairness or respect are important, people will react when they witness instances of unfairness or disrespect; they will feel motivated to respond in some way.

Schwartz’s research investigated motivational values in general (combining our second and third meanings of “value”), and not just moral values. As noted earlier, people can be motivated by many different values, but interestingly, when asked to rank values in order of importance, the participants in Schwartz’s studies consistently rated those with explicit moral connotations as the most important values (Schwartz 2012 ). This suggests that people hold their moral values in high esteem and can be strongly influenced by them.

From Values to Action

Ethical values give us direction but are not sufficient to make us ethical researchers who avoid ethics dumping . One can hold the value of honesty and yet fail to be an honest person. One can hold the value of respect and yet cause harm when disrespecting local customs . Values can motivate and they can help to establish moral goals, but they do not explain how to achieve them. A means of operationalizing values is needed.

One method would be to cultivate virtues that are aligned with the values. As noted above, virtues are positive character traits individuals build over time which are needed for human flourishing. Once a value such as honesty becomes second nature, one can say that honesty is a virtue of that person. If all researchers developed the virtues of fairness, respect, care and honesty, then being an ethical researcher would come naturally to them. However, this is far from easy, and the development of virtues takes time. It is perhaps possible for researchers who have worked in the field for many years, and have a wealth of knowledge and experience, but certainly not for young researchers who need training , guidance and practice.

Daniel Russell ( 2015 : 37f) illustrates the challenge for virtue ethics in guiding specific action when he asks us to think about generosity:

Sometimes helping means giving a little, sometimes it means giving a lot; sometimes it means giving money, sometimes it means giving time, or just a sympathetic ear; sometimes it means offering advice, sometimes it means minding one’s own business; and which of these it might mean in this case will depend on such different things as my relationship with my friend, what I am actually able to offer, why and how often my friend has problems of this kind, and so on.

For all those who are still developing their virtues , a code such as the GCC can help to guide action. As noted at the outset, people are much more contented and productive when their own values are aligned with company or institutional values and rules. It therefore made sense to align the articles of the GCC with those values that are necessary for ethical research and to which researchers must aspire. The values of fairness, respect, care and honesty provide the ethos, the motivation and the goals for ethical research. The 23 articles making up the GCC therefore enable operationalization of the values.

This leaves the task of outlining what is meant by each of the four values of fairness, respect, care and honesty, keeping in mind the following important points. First, precise specifications of values might be affected by customs and preferences, so that different cultures have different views on the exact content of the values. Second, the importance of process cannot be underestimated. The reason why articles 2 Footnote 5 and 4 Footnote 6 of the GCC emphasize inclusion is that the specification of what each value requires in a given setting needs to be determined collaboratively. As a result, this sketch of the content of the four values is brief and leaves room for regional variations.

The Four Values

The terms “fairness”, “justice” and “equity” are often used interchangeably. The TRUST consortium chose the term “fairness” in the belief that it would be the most widely understood globally. Philosophers commonly distinguish between four types of fairness (Pogge 2006 ) (see Fig. 3.2 ).

Types of fairness

The most relevant fairness concepts in global research ethics are fairness in exchange and corrective fairness. In global collaborations, at least two parties are involved in a range of transactions. Typical fairness issues between partners from high-income countries (HICs) and those from low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are:

Is the research relevant to local research needs?

Will benefit sharing take place?

Are authors from LMICs involved in publications?

These are questions about fairness in exchange . For instance, LMIC research participants contribute to the progress of science, but this is only fair if the research is relevant to their own community or if other benefits are received where this is not possible. For instance, to carry the burden of a clinical study is only worthwhile for a community if the disease under investigation occurs locally and the end product will become available locally.

Corrective fairness , which presupposes the availability of legal instruments and access to mechanisms to right a wrong (e.g. a complaints procedure , a court, an ethics committee ) is also important in global research collaborations. For instance, if no host country research ethics structure exists, corrective fairness is limited to the research ethics structure in the HIC , which may not have the capacity to make culturally sensitive decisions.

The broader question of what HICs owe LMICs falls under distributive fairness . One can illustrate the difference between fairness in exchange and distributive fairness using the example of post-study access to successfully tested drugs. In the first case (fairness in exchange) one could argue that research participants have contributed to the marketing of a particular drug and are therefore owed post-study access to it (should they need the drug to promote their health and wellbeing, and should they not otherwise have access to it). In the second case (distributive fairness) one could provide a range of arguments, for instance being a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948 ) , to maintain that all human beings who need the drug should have access to it, and not just the research participants . These wider fairness issues cannot be resolved by researchers and are therefore not directly included in the GCC. Likewise, retributive fairness is less relevant as few ethics violations fall under the punitive and criminal law, and if they do, it is indeed criminal law that should be used to deal with a fairness violation.

The term “respect” is used in many ethics frameworks. For instance, the Declaration of Helsinki (WMA 2013 ) notes in article 7:

Medical research is subject to ethical standards that promote and ensure respect for all human subjects and protect their health and rights. (emphasis added)

Its ubiquitous use does not, however, mean that “respect” is a clear term. In everyday life, it is used in the sense of deep admiration. For instance, somebody could say, “I respect the achievements of Nelson Mandela”. However, that is not what is meant by respect in research ethics . The statement from the Declaration of Helsinki does not mean that research participants must be admired. To be respected in research ethics is almost the opposite. It means that one must accept a decision or a way of approaching a matter, even if one disagrees strongly. A case in point would be respecting the decision of a competent adult Jehovah’s Witness to refuse a blood transfusion for reasons of religious belief, even if this means certain death.

Respect is therefore a difficult value, as there will be cases where one cannot accept another’s decision. For instance, if a researcher learns about female genital mutilation being used as a “cure” for diarrhoea in female babies (Luc and Altare 2018 ), respecting this approach to health care is likely to be the wrong decision – particularly as the practice is probably illegal . But the fact that respect may be difficult to operationalize in global research collaborations does not mean that it is a value one can dispense with.

There are many possible ways of showing respect that do not create conflicts of conscience. For instance, illiterate San community members should not be enrolled in research studies unless San leaders have been contacted first, in accordance with community systems. And researchers from HICs should not insist that LMIC ethics committees accept the format of the researchers’ preferred ethics approval submission; instead the HIC researchers should submit the study for approval in the format required by the LMIC committee. This shows respect in international collaborative research.

While it may be difficult to imagine a situation where an HIC researcher is accused of being too fair, too honest or too caring, it is possible to be accused of being “too respectful” – for instance, if one tolerates major violations of human rights. It is indeed sometimes difficult to strike a balance between dogmatically imposing one’s own approach and carelessly accepting human rights violations, but that is the balance researchers should strive for.

Sometimes one word describes different concepts. This is the case with “care”. The statement, “I care for my grandfather,” can mean two diametrically opposed things. First, it could mean that the person is very attached to her grandfather even though she hardly ever sees him. Second, it could mean that she is the person who injects her grandfather with insulin, cooks his meals, and makes sure that his needs are taken care of every day, even if there is antipathy between them.

The meaning of the value of care in the context of global research ethics links more to the second use of the term; to look after or take care of somebody or something. As a main priority, one should take care of the interests of those enrolled in research studies to the extent that one always prioritizes their welfare over any other goals – for example, accepting the decisions of those who choose to withdraw from an ongoing study, even if this impairs the project’s results. In line with article 8 of the Declaration of Helsinki (WMA 2013 ) that means:

While the primary purpose of medical research is to generate new knowledge, this goal can never take precedence over the rights and interests of individual research subjects.

This care applies across disciplines, not only in medical research , and it is not restricted to human research participants . Article 21 of the Declaration of Helsinki (WMA 2013 ) extends the care for research subjects’ welfare to research animals. Likewise, care for environmental protection is increasingly included in research ethics processes and frameworks for responsible research. For instance, the European Commission’s Horizon 2020 ethics review process addresses potentially negative impacts on the environment (Directorate General for Research 2019 : section 7). Richard Owen et al. ( 2013 ) define responsible research and innovation as “a collective commitment of care for the future through responsive stewardship of science and innovation in the present”, a statement that has clear relevance to environmental protection.

Researchers who take care to avoid negative impacts in their work will not “helicopter ” in and out of a research area they are not familiar with, but will use systems of due diligence to ensure that risks are assessed and mitigated . For instance, an HIC research team that strips a local area of all doctors and nurses by attracting them into their high-tech research facility is not acting carefully and ethically.

Ideally, researchers who take good care will combine the two concepts mentioned above: they care about research participants , in the sense that the participants are important to them, and they feel responsible for the welfare and interests of those who contribute to their research, or might suffer as a result of it (including animals and the environment).

Honesty is a value that does not need complicated explanations or definitions. In all cultures and nations, “Do not lie” is a basic prerequisite for ethical human interaction. It is so basic a value that its synonyms are often broad ethics terms. For instance, according to Google ( 2018 ), synonyms for “honesty” are:

moral correctness, uprightness, honourableness, honour, integrity , morals, morality, ethics, principle, (high) principles , nobility, righteousness, rectitude, right-mindedness, upstandingness

What does need explaining, however, is the scope of the value of honesty in the context of global research ethics . Telling lies is only one possible wrongdoing in the context of a broad understanding of honesty. For instance, in research ethics it is equally unacceptable to leave out salient features from an informed consent process. While this might, strictly speaking, not involve a lie, concealing important information that might make a difference to someone’s consent violates the value of honesty as much as lying. For this reason, research ethicists often use the terms “transparency ” and “open communication ” to ensure that all relevant information is provided so that research participants can make an informed choice about whether to participate or not.

In addition to lying and withholding information, there are other ways of being dishonest, in the sense of not communicating openly and transparently. For instance, in a vulnerable population with high levels of illiteracy, it can be predicted that a printed information sheet about research will not achieve informed consent . The same can be said for a conscious failure to overcome language barriers in a meaningful way: leaving highly technical English terms untranslated in information sheets can easily lead to misunderstandings.

Honesty is also related to research conduct other than interaction with research participants . Most prominently, the duties of honesty are described in research integrity frameworks: do not manipulate your data , do not put your name onto publications to which you have not contributed, do not waste research funds, to give only three examples. However, while the latter prescriptions for conduct with integrity in research are important, they are not directly linked to exploitation in global research collaboration and are not covered in the GCC. In this context, the European Code of Conduct for Research Integrity (ALLEA, 2017 ) is very helpful.

Standards , principles , values, virtues and ideals can guide moral action. At the foundation of the GCC are values. Why? For three main reasons:

Values inspire action; they motivate people to do things. For instance, when the value of fairness is threatened, people normally respond with action.

Values provide the golden middle way between being overly prescriptive and overly aspirational. Standards and principles require too much precision in their formulation and are too prescriptive in international collaborative research, while virtues and ideals are too aspirational in their demands of researchers.

Values emerged naturally from the major engagement activities undertaken prior to developing the GCC.

The eradication of ethics dumping requires not only moral guidance but also moral action to counter violations of fairness, respect, care and honesty. The 23 short, accessible articles of the GCC are intended to both guide and inspire researchers to act with fairness, respect, care and honesty.

The export of unethical research from a high-income setting to a resource-poor setting with weaker compliance structures or legal governance mechanisms.

TRUST was an EU -funded project which operated from 2015 to 2018 and developed the GCC, among other outputs. http://trust-project.eu/

This section draws on unpublished work by Professor Michael Davis, a philosopher specializing in professional ethics.

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Local communities and research participants should be included throughout the research process, wherever possible, from planning through to post-study feedback and evaluation , to ensure that their perspectives are fairly represented. This approach represents Good Participatory Practice .

Local researchers should be included, wherever possible, throughout the research process, including in study design, study implementation, data ownership , intellectual property and authorship of publications.

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Schroeder, D., Chatfield, K., Singh, M., Chennells, R., Herissone-Kelly, P. (2019). The Four Values Framework: Fairness, Respect, Care and Honesty. In: Equitable Research Partnerships. SpringerBriefs in Research and Innovation Governance. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15745-6_3

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Essay on Importance of Human Values

Students are often asked to write an essay on Importance of Human Values in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Importance of Human Values

Understanding human values.

Human values are fundamental beliefs that guide our actions and behavior. They include honesty, respect, kindness, and responsibility. These values are important as they help us differentiate between right and wrong.

Role in Society

Values keep society functioning smoothly. They promote peace, unity, and cooperation among individuals. Without values, conflicts and misunderstandings would be rampant.

Personal Development

Values guide personal growth. They shape our character and influence our decisions. By adhering to values, we become better individuals and contribute positively to our community.

250 Words Essay on Importance of Human Values

Introduction.

Human values are the very essence of our character and nature. They are vital for harmonious coexistence and are the foundation of every civilized society. They guide our actions, decisions, and interactions with others.

Role of Human Values

Values like honesty, empathy, respect, and compassion play a crucial role in our lives. They shape our behavior and influence our relationships with others. Honesty fosters trust and integrity, empathy promotes understanding and compassion, and respect ensures dignity and equality.

Human Values and Education

Incorporating human values in education is imperative. It instills a sense of responsibility and ethics in students, preparing them to face the challenges of life with dignity and courage. It also encourages critical thinking and helps students understand the consequences of their actions.

Values in Society

Values are the glue that holds society together. They promote social cohesion and unity, foster peace and harmony, and enhance social well-being. They also serve as a guide to societal norms and expectations, helping to maintain order and stability.

In conclusion, human values are fundamental to our existence. They determine our actions, shape our character, and define our identity. They are the bedrock of a peaceful and prosperous society. As we navigate through life, it is essential that we uphold these values and pass them on to future generations.

500 Words Essay on Importance of Human Values

Human values are the principles, standards, or qualities considered worthwhile or desirable. They provide a foundation for human behavior, actions, and decisions. In an increasingly complex and interconnected world, the importance of human values cannot be overstated. This essay will delve into the significance of human values, their role in society, and their influence on our personal and professional lives.

The Role of Human Values in Society

Human values play a pivotal role in the formation and functioning of society. They act as the glue that binds individuals together, fostering unity, harmony, and cooperation. Values such as respect, honesty, compassion, and fairness promote social cohesion and peaceful coexistence. They enable us to understand and respect the rights, dignity, and freedom of others, thereby reducing conflicts and enhancing social stability.

Human Values and Personal Development

On a personal level, human values shape our character and influence our thoughts, emotions, and actions. They serve as a moral compass, guiding us in making ethical decisions. Values such as integrity, responsibility, and perseverance help us to strive for excellence, overcome challenges, and achieve our goals. They also enhance our emotional intelligence, enabling us to empathize with others, manage our emotions, and establish healthy relationships.

Human Values in Professional Life

In the professional sphere, human values are integral to ethical business practices and corporate social responsibility. Values such as honesty, transparency, and accountability foster trust, enhance reputation, and contribute to sustainable business growth. They also promote a positive organizational culture, leading to increased employee engagement, productivity, and innovation.

Human Values and Global Challenges

In the face of global challenges such as climate change, poverty, inequality, and social injustice, human values such as solidarity, empathy, and respect for diversity are more important than ever. They compel us to take collective action for the common good, promote social justice, and strive for sustainable development.

In conclusion, human values are of paramount importance in shaping a just, peaceful, and sustainable world. They are the bedrock of our personal and professional lives, influencing our behavior, decisions, and interactions with others. As we navigate the complexities of the 21st century, it is crucial that we uphold and promote these values in all spheres of life. By doing so, we can foster a culture of respect, empathy, and cooperation, and contribute to the creation of a better world for all.

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The Importance of Respect in the Military Essay

Introduction, importance of respect.

The feeling of remorse that is bestowed upon a soldier during the playing of the Taps is derived from nothing other than respect for each other. Although in the army most occasions end with sad events, most feel a sense of respect for the fallen soldier who pays the ultimate sacrifice for the country.

Most of the military customs and traditions are not held to this regard. However, we need to uphold our traditions and customs so that we do not lose the sense of pride and duty. This paper seeks to discuss the importance of respect in the military.

Being a soldier in the army means understanding the Seven Core Army Values and living up to them. Some of these include respect, loyalty and honor. Having respect means treating someone as he or she should be treated.

The people in the army are expected to treat each other with respect. They do this since they also expect others to do the same. Another ingredient for respect is self-respect. You cannot respect another if you do not respect yourself. This allows someone to put forth his or her best effort since the Army is a team and each member contributes to the greater goal.

Respecting your fellow soldier means protecting him in all situations, covering his backside when required and clearing the path in order for him to complete the mission. This is because when that person completes the task, it equally means that you have completed yours. Therefore, respect in the army ensures that the jobs of both the seniors and the subordinates are done.

Lack of respect in the Army may hinder development of effective leaders. This is usually accompanied with the lack of proper communication. Disrespect is observed when the seniors in the Army (such as the NCOs) fail to do what they were tasked to do and force other (subordinate) officers to micromanage tasks.

This is where seniors loose the trust of the subordinates. The best way to maintain relationships and respect in the Army is to focus on your task and maintain communication in all situations. This way there would be mutual respect and friendships that last for a lifetime would be fostered.

Another reason why respect in the military is important is that it would ensure that the juniors (subordinates) are informed about the missions and its activities. This would empower them with responsibilities and show them that they are equally important to the team.

Respect is also important because it instills confidence that the mission would be successful. This is especially the case when there is the respect of the soldiers of all ranks. The soldiers need to respect their peers, subordinates and seniors.

This would require one to listen and pay soldiers the proper courtesy. This should be the case even when one does not like the other for any particular reason or the mission as a whole. This would ensure that the tasks are done and missions completed successfully.

The seven Code Army Values govern the soldiers in the Army. Respect is one of the values and it is important since it ensures harmony within the Army. Respecting the peers, subordinates and seniors is important to ensure that the work is done and that missions are completed successfully. Without respect in the army, there would not be any success.

• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

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Dressing Up for Dinner Isn’t Just Fun—It’s a Question of Respect

By Clare Finney

“I should have worn a tie!” my friend lamented, looking around at what was admittedly a beautiful dining room. We laughed at the time. “I really don’t think it matters, James. That lady over there is literally in leggings.” But reflecting on the restaurant afterwards, I couldn’t help but feel he had a point. It was a nice meal (Michelin-starred, since you’re asking) in a nice place (London’s Chiswick neighborhood) with people who could presumably, by virtue of their being in a Michelin-starred restaurant in Chiswick, afford to dress up for dinner. And yet while half the dining room was in shirts and skirts, the rest were in jeans and luxury sportswear.

For years, I applauded this—hailed it as a sign that eating out was becoming ever more egalitarian. It’s tempting, when you write about the rarefied world of restaurants, to point at a grown man eating foie gras in a fleece and insist that this world is somehow “accessible.” Look more closely, however, and you’ll find that said man’s fleece is from Patagonia, while his dining companion is wearing Lululemon leggings. It’s not that they don’t have, or can’t afford, ties and dresses; they’ve just chosen to dress for a fine dining restaurant as if they were on a two-day hike in—well, Patagonia.

Of course, there are many places where such attire is acceptable and even preferable to dressing up, though the food is as good as you’ll find in “classier” establishments. Local wine bars, chef-led pubs, food markets like Arcade and Kerb—Britain is now replete with high-quality, casual-dining joints where even the suits roll up their sleeves and remove their jackets. Donning a jacket or heels here would create a sense of self-consciousness that the whole “concept” of the eatery is designed to undermine. It’s a fundamental part of their magic.

But in a restaurant where solicitous staff, elegant furnishings, and cloth napkins create a more refined atmosphere, the polite thing is surely to dress up a little. This is true whether the menu is $400 or $40 a head. It’s respectful to the staff, who are smartly dressed themselves, and who will spend their evening ensuring yours is enjoyable and carefree. It’s respectful to the chefs, who have cooked all day and will spend all evening plating up a menu of multiple, multi-sensory courses. And it’s respectful to your fellow diners, some of whom might have saved for months for the privilege of being able to eat there.

By Hannah Jackson

By Philipp Wehsack

Because for every couple for whom this meal is just another Wednesday evening, there’s several celebrating their wedding anniversary or another significant milestone. If a restaurant is any good, there are—as acclaimed restaurateur Jeremy King once told me—people running the whole gamut of life within its four walls. For most people these days, eating in restaurants is a luxury. Dressing up is part of that – or it should be. If nothing else, slipping into something nice serves as an act of sartorial delineation between the restaurant and your own kitchen table.

But it’s more than that, for me. It’s a mark of appreciation for the fact that I can afford to do this, that I have health, (relative) wealth, and time at my disposal. That, in and of itself, is astonishingly, extraordinarily lucky, even before you bring crab with pickled apple and caviar into the equation. Above all, though, it’s just nice . Especially now, when we’re often working from home, it’s fun to change in anticipation of going out for dinner. I’m not arguing for a full tie and suit, or heels and a dressy dress—unless that’s your thing. No one should be forced into wearing something that makes them physically or psychologically uncomfortable. But if it’s true, as Flaubert famously wrote, that pleasure is found first in anticipation, later in memory, then dressing up for dinner is more than polite. It’s a pleasure.

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Time in Tbilisi: May 19, 2024 04:42

Georgian PM pledges “protection of values” on Day of Family Purity and Respect for Parents

Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze on Friday said his Government would make “every effort” to “protect values, the state and national interests” in comments at an event marking the Day of Family Purity and Respect for Parents at the Trinity Cathedral in capital Tbilisi. Photo: Gov't Administration

Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze on Friday said his Government would make “every effort” to “protect values, the state and national interests” in comments at an event marking the Day of Family Purity and Respect for Parents at the Trinity Cathedral in capital Tbilisi.

Kobakhidze emphasised the “importance of love as a fundamental value of Christianity” and the significance of the event for “protecting the country’s identity, language, and faith”.

He emphasised the “responsibility of every citizen to protect the country's identity and unity” and urged the public to “unite around the value of love”.

I want to extend my congratulations to all of you on this significant day, which unites our country [...] There are forces that seek to divide our society, but as a Christian nation, love is our primary value, and we must strive to counter attempts to replace love with hate. It is essential for each of us to unite our country around love”, he said.

With love, we can also unite with our Abkhazian and Ossetian brothers and sisters. Long live our united Georgia, united by the love among its people”, the Government head told those in attendance.

Twenty-five cities, including capital Tbilisi, hosted processions to mark the date designated by the Patriarchate of the Georgian Orthodox Church in the 2010s. The religious body said the gatherings were aiming to “honour the significance of family and parental respect”.

Processions will be held across Georgia on Friday to mark the Day of Family Purity and Respect for Parents, with 25 cities including capital Tbilisi hosting the occasion.

May 17 has been designated as a public holiday across Georgia to mark the Day of Family Purity and Respect for Parents, after Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze signed a decree, the Government Administration said on Thursday.

Hundreds of Georgians are marching in Tbilisi today, marking family purity day backed by the Georgian orthodox church, first celebrated in 2014.

Usually, on this day clerics call on people to take to the streets with them. However, amid the coronavirus-related restrictions on gathering and social distancing, this time the demonstration was held without public participation. The Georgian Orthodox Church announced plans to celebrate the day after the attack on LGBT supporters and their opposers on May 17, 2013, which also marks the International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia.