discussion essay vegetarianism

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Vegetarianism Essay

This is a model  vegetarianism essay .

As I always stress, you should  read the question very carefully  before you answer it to make sure you are writing about the right thing.

Take a look at the question:

Every one of us should become a vegetarian because eating meat can cause serious health problems.

To what extent do you agree or disagree?

Staying on topic

If you rush to start writing and don't analyse the question and brainstorm some ideas you may include the wrong information.

There are religious or moral arguments for not eating meat, but if you discuss those you will be going off topic .

This question is specifically about the health problems connected to eating meat.

So you must discuss in your answer what some of these problems are and if you think there are real health risks or not.

Knowing about the topic

And don't get worried that you do not know much about diet and health.

As part of your IELTS study it will help if you know the basics of most topics such as some health vocabulary in this case, but you are not expected to be an expert on nutrition.

Remember, you are being judged on your English ability and your ability to construct an argument in a coherent way, not to be an expert in the subject matter. So relax and work with

Organisation

In this vegetarianism essay, the candidate disagrees with the statement, and is thus arguing that everyone does not need to be a vegetarian.

The essay has been organised in the following way:

Body 1: Health issues connected with eating meat (i.e. arguments in support of being a vegetarian Body 2: Advantages of eating meat

Now take a look at the model answer.

Model Essay

You should spend about 40 minutes on this task.

Write about the following topic:

Give reasons for your answer and include any relevant examples from your own experience or knowledge.

Write at least 250 words.

IELTS Vegetarianism Essay - Sample Answer

Vegetarianism is becoming more and more popular for many people, particularly because of the harm that some people believe meat can cause to the body. However, I strongly believe that it is not necessary for everybody to be a vegetarian.

Vegetarians believe that meat is unhealthy because of the diseases it has been connected with. There has been much research to suggest that red meat is particularly bad, for example, and that consumption should be limited to eating it just a few times a week to avoid such things as cancer. Meats can also be high in saturated fats so they have been linked to health problems such as cardiovascular disease and diabetes.

However, there are strong arguments for eating meat. The first reason is that as humans we are designed to eat meat, which suggests it is not unhealthy, and we have been eating meat for thousands of years. For example, cavemen made hunting implements so that they could kill animals and eat their meat. Secondly, meat is a rich source of protein which helps to build muscles and bones. Vegetarians often have to take supplements to get all the essential vitamins and minerals. Finally, it may be the case that too much meat is harmful, but we can easily limit the amount we have without having to cut it out of our diet completely.

To sum up, I do not agree that everyone should turn to a vegetarian diet. Although the overconsumption of meat could possibly be unhealthy, a balanced diet of meat and vegetables should result in a healthy body.

(264 words)

You should begin by intoducing the topi c. The introduction in this vegetarianism essay begins by mentioning vegetarians and the possible harm of eating meat .

It then goes on to the thesis statement , which makes it clear what the candidate's opinion is.

The first body paragraph has a topic sentence which makes it clear that the paragraph is going to address the possible health issues of eating meat.

Some reasons and examples are then given to support this.

The second body paragraph then has a topic sentence which makes it clear that the main idea is now about the arguments for eating meat .

The conclusion in this vegetarianism essay then repeats the opinion and gives the candidates final thoughts.

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106 Vegetarianism Essay Topic Ideas & Examples

Inside This Article

As the world becomes more conscious of the impact of our food choices on the environment, health, and animal welfare, vegetarianism has become an increasingly popular lifestyle choice. Whether you are a seasoned vegetarian or just curious about the benefits of a plant-based diet, there are endless essay topics to explore on the subject. Here are 106 vegetarianism essay topic ideas and examples to get you started:

• The health benefits of a vegetarian diet
• The environmental impact of meat consumption
• The ethics of factory farming
• Vegetarianism and weight loss
• The myth of protein deficiency in vegetarian diets
• How to transition to a vegetarian diet
• The economic benefits of a plant-based diet
• Vegetarianism and cultural identity
• The role of vegetarianism in reducing greenhouse gas emissions
• Vegetarianism and animal rights
• The history of vegetarianism
• The psychology of food choices
• Vegetarianism and longevity
• The benefits of a vegan diet compared to a vegetarian diet
• Vegetarianism and sports performance
• The impact of vegetarianism on global hunger
• Vegetarianism and mental health
• The challenges of being a vegetarian in a meat-centric society
• Vegetarianism and spirituality
• The health risks of a meat-heavy diet
• The environmental benefits of organic agriculture
• Vegetarianism and food justice
• The impact of vegetarianism on water usage
• The role of vegetarianism in sustainable agriculture
• The health benefits of plant-based diets for children
• Vegetarianism and animal welfare laws
• The role of vegetarianism in reducing deforestation
• The impact of vegetarianism on biodiversity
• The benefits of vegetarianism for pregnant women
• Vegetarianism and food deserts
• The impact of vegetarianism on soil health
• The benefits of vegetarianism for reducing food waste
• Vegetarianism and food security
• The impact of vegetarianism on antibiotic resistance
• The benefits of vegetarianism for reducing pesticide use
• Vegetarianism and the obesity epidemic
• The impact of vegetarianism on fisheries
• The benefits of vegetarianism for reducing air pollution
• Vegetarianism and the rise of plant-based meat alternatives
• The impact of vegetarianism on rural economies
• The benefits of vegetarianism for reducing foodborne illnesses
• Vegetarianism and the rise of plant-based dairy alternatives
• The impact of vegetarianism on agricultural workers' rights
• The benefits of vegetarianism for reducing food-related allergies
• Vegetarianism and the rise of plant-based egg alternatives
• The impact of vegetarianism on indigenous food systems
• The benefits of vegetarianism for reducing food-related chronic diseases
• Vegetarianism and the rise of plant-based seafood alternatives
• The impact of vegetarianism on food sovereignty
• The benefits of vegetarianism for reducing food-related disabilities
• Vegetarianism and the rise of plant-based pet food alternatives
• The impact of vegetarianism on food cooperatives
• The benefits of vegetarianism for reducing food-related mental health disorders
• Vegetarianism and the rise of plant-based beauty products
• The impact of vegetarianism on food waste reduction initiatives
• The benefits of vegetarianism for reducing food-related autoimmune diseases
• Vegetarianism and the rise of plant-based clothing alternatives
• The impact of vegetarianism on food redistribution programs
• The benefits of vegetarianism for reducing food-related respiratory diseases
• Vegetarianism and the rise of plant-based household products
• The impact of vegetarianism on food security programs
• The benefits of vegetarianism for reducing food-related skin conditions
• Vegetarianism and the rise of plant-based pharmaceuticals
• The impact of vegetarianism on food safety regulations
• The benefits of vegetarianism for reducing food-related reproductive disorders
• Vegetarianism and the rise of plant-based dietary supplements
• The impact of vegetarianism on food service industry practices
• The benefits of vegetarianism for reducing food-related neurological disorders
• Vegetarianism and the rise of plant-based medical treatments
• The impact of vegetarianism on food retail industry trends
• The benefits of vegetarianism for reducing food-related cardiovascular diseases
• Vegetarianism and the rise of plant-based health clinics
• The impact of vegetarianism on food processing industry practices
• The benefits of vegetarianism for reducing food-related hormonal imbalances
• Vegetarianism and the rise of plant-based wellness retreats
• The impact of vegetarianism on food packaging industry trends
• The benefits of vegetarianism for reducing food-related metabolic disorders
• Vegetarianism and the rise of plant-based fitness programs
• The impact of vegetarianism on food marketing industry practices
• Vegetarianism and the rise of plant-based cooking classes
• The impact of vegetarianism on food labeling regulations
• The benefits of vegetarianism for reducing food-related gastrointestinal disorders
• Vegetarianism and the rise of plant-based recipe blogs
• The impact of vegetarianism on food industry lobbying efforts
• The benefits of vegetarianism for reducing food-related immune disorders
• Vegetarianism and the rise of plant-based food festivals
• The impact of vegetarianism on food industry advertising campaigns
• The benefits of vegetarianism for reducing food-related inflammatory disorders
• Vegetarianism and the rise of plant-based food delivery services
• The impact of vegetarianism on food industry trade agreements
• The benefits of vegetarianism for reducing food-related endocrine disorders
• Vegetarianism and the rise of plant-based food trucks
• The impact of vegetarianism on food industry supply chain practices
• The benefits of vegetarianism for reducing food-related genetic disorders
• Vegetarianism and the rise of plant-based food markets
• The impact of vegetarianism on food industry waste management practices
• Vegetarianism and the rise of plant-based food incubators
• The impact of vegetarianism on food industry research and development
• Vegetarianism and the rise of plant-based food startups
• The impact of vegetarianism on food industry sustainability practices
• Vegetarianism and the rise of plant-based food cooperatives
• The impact of vegetarianism on food industry corporate social responsibility initiatives

These essay topics and examples cover a wide range of issues related to vegetarianism, making it a rich and diverse subject to explore. Whether you are interested in health, ethics, environment, or culture, there is something for everyone in the world of vegetarianism. So pick a topic that resonates with you and start writing!

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Moral Vegetarianism

Billions of humans eat meat. To provide it, we raise animals. We control, hurt, and kill hundreds of millions of geese, nearly a billion cattle, billions of pigs and ducks, and tens of billions of chickens each year.

To feed these animals, we raise crops. To raise crops, we deforest and use huge quantities of water. To quench these animals, we use still more water.

In turn, these animals produce staggering amounts of waste, waste that poisons water sources and soil. They produce staggering amounts of greenhouse gasses.

To raise these animals and produce this meat, farmers and slaughterhouse workers labor in conditions from onerous to brutal.

If controlling, hurting, or killing animals is wrong or if the production of these environmental effects or effects on people is wrong or if consuming the meat produced is wrong, then a breathtaking level of wrong-doing goes on daily.

Many fewer than a billion humans are vegetarian, have diets excluding meat. They are vegetarian for various reasons: because it’s healthy, because their parents make them be vegetarian, because they don’t like meat. Some are vegetarian on moral grounds. Moral vegetarianism is the view that it is morally wrong—henceforth, “wrong”—to eat meat.

The topic of this entry is moral vegetarianism and the arguments for it. Strikingly, most contemporary arguments for moral vegetarianism start with premises about the wrongness of producing meat and move to conclusions about the wrongness of consuming it. They do not fasten on some intrinsic feature of meat and insist that consuming things with such a feature is wrong. They do not fasten on some effect of meat-eating on the eater and insist that producing such an effect is wrong. Rather, they assert that the production of meat is wrong and that consumption bears a certain relation to production and that bearing such a relation to wrongdoing is wrong. So this entry gives significant space to food production as well as the tricky business of connecting production to consumption.

§1 introduces relevant terminology and an overview of the main positions. §2 explains meat production, the main moral arguments against it, and some responses to those arguments. That section—like the rest of the entry—focuses on medium-sized land animals. Yet fish and insects are killed in a number that dwarfs the number of land animals killed. Some issues these killings raise are covered in §3.

None of the foregoing is about consuming animals. §4 covers moral arguments from premises about meat production to conclusions about meat consumption. §5 considers some extensions of the arguments in §2. It wonders about which arguments against meat production can, if sound, be extended to show that animal product production or even some plant production is morally wrong. This last idea is relatively new. §6 briefly summarizes some other new issues in the moral vegetarian literature.

1. Terminology and Overview of Positions

2.1 animal farming, 2.2.1 suffering, 2.2.2 killing, 2.2.3 harming the environment, 2.2.4 general moral theories, 3. fish and insects, 4.1 bridging the gap, 4.2 against bridging the gap, 5.1.2 dairy, 5.2.1 plants themselves, 5.2.2 plant production and animals, 5.2.3 plant production and the environment, 5.3 summary of animal product and plant subsections, 6. conclusion: where the debate about vegetarianism stands and is going, other internet resources, related entries.

Moral vegetarianism is opposed by moral omnivorism, the view according to which it is permissible to consume meat (and also animal products, fungi, plants, etc.).

Moral veganism accepts moral vegetarianism and adds to it that consuming animal products is wrong. Whereas in everyday life, “vegetarianism” and “veganism” include claims about what one may eat, in this entry, the claims are simply about what one may not eat. They agree that animals are among those things.

In this entry, “animals” is used to refer to non-human animals. For the most part, the animals discussed are the land animals farmed for food in the West, especially cattle, chicken, and pigs. There will be some discussion of insects and fish but none of dogs, dolphins, or whales.

Primarily, this entry concerns itself with whether moral vegetarians are correct that eating meat is wrong. Secondarily—but at greater length—it concerns itself with whether the production of meat is permissible.

Primarily, this entry concerns itself with eating in times of abundance and abundant choices. Moral vegans need not argue that it is wrong to eat an egg if that is the only way to save your life. Moral vegetarians need not argue it is wrong to eat seal meat if that is the only food for miles. Moral omnivores need not argue it is permissible to eat the family dog. These cases raise important issues, but the arguments in this entry are not about them.

Almost exclusively, the entry concerns itself with contemporary arguments. [ 1 ] Strikingly, many historical arguments and most contemporary arguments against the permissibility of eating meat start with premises about the wrongness of producing meat and move to conclusions about the wrongness of consuming it. That is, they argue that

It is wrong to eat meat

By first arguing that

It is wrong to produce meat.

The claim about production is the topic of §2.

2. Meat Production

The vast majority of animals humans eat come from industrial animal farms that are distinguished by their holding large numbers of animals at high stocking density. We raise birds and mammals this way. Increasingly, we raise fish this way, too.

Raising large numbers of animals enables farmers to take advantage of economies of scale but also produces huge quantities of waste, greenhouse gas, and, generally, environmental degradation (FAO 2006; Hamerschlag 2011; Budolfson 2016). There is no question of whether to put so many animals on pasture—there is not enough of it. Plus, raising animals indoors, or with limited access to the outdoors, lowers costs and provides animals with protection from weather and predators. Yet when large numbers of animals live indoors, they are invariably tightly packed, and raising them close together risks the development and quick spread of disease. To deal with this risk, farmers intensively use prophylactic antibiotics. Tight-packing also restricts species-typical behaviors, such as rooting (pigs) or dust-bathing (chickens), and makes it so that animals cannot escape each other, leading to stress and to antisocial behaviors like tail-biting in pigs or pecking in chickens. To deal with these, farmers typically dock tails and trim beaks, and typically (in the U.S., at least) do so without anesthetic. Animals are bred to grow fast on a restricted amount of antibiotics, food, and hormones, and the speed of growth saves farmers money, but this breeding causes health problems of its own. Chickens, for example, have been bred in such a way that their bodies become heavier than their bones can support. As a result, they “are in chronic pain for the last 20% of their lives” (John Webster, quoted in Erlichman 1991). Animals are killed young—they taste better that way—and are killed in large-scale slaughterhouses operating at speed. Animal farms have no use for, e.g., male chicks on egg-laying farms, are killed at birth or soon after. [ 2 ]

Raising animals in this way has produced low sticker prices (BLS 2017). It enables us to feed our appetite for meat (OECD 2017).

Raising animals in this way is also, in various ways, morally fraught.

It raises concerns about its effects on humans. Slaughterhouses, processing this huge number of animals at high speed, threaten injury and death to workers. Slaughterhouse work is exploitative. Its distribution is classist, racist, and sexist with certain jobs being segmented as paupers’ work or Latinx work or women’s (Pachirat 2011).

Industrial meat production poses a threat to public health through the creation and spread of pathogens resulting from the overcrowding of animals with weakened immune systems and the routine use of antibiotics and attendant creation of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Anomaly (2015) and Rossi & Garner (2014) argue that these risks are wrongful because unconsented to and because they are not justified by the benefits of assuming those risks.

Industrial meat production directly produces waste in the form of greenhouse gas emissions from animals and staggering amounts of waste, waste that, concentrated in those quantities, can contaminate water supplies. The Böll Foundation (2014) estimates that farm animals contribute between 6 and 32% of greenhouse gas emissions. The range is due partly to different ideas about what to count as being farm animals’ contributions: simply what comes out of their bodies? Or should we count, too, what comes from deforestation that’s done to grow crops to feed them and other indirect emissions?

Industrial animal farming raises two concerns about wastefulness. One is that it uses too many resources and produces too much waste for the amount of food it produces. The other is that feeding humans meat typically requires producing crops, feeding them to animals, and then eating the animals. So it typically requires more resources and makes for more emissions than simply growing and feeding ourselves crops ( PNAS 2013.

Industrial animal farming raises concerns about the treatment of animals. Among others, we raise cattle, chickens, and pigs. Evidence from their behavior, their brains, and their evolutionary origins, adduced in Allen 2004, Andrews 2016, and Tye 2016, supports the view that they have mental lives and, importantly, are sentient creatures with likes and dislikes. Even chickens and other “birdbrains” have interesting mental lives. The exhaustive Marino 2017 collects evidence that chickens can adopt others’ visual perspectives, communicate deceptively, engage in arithmetic and simple logical reasoning, and keep track of pecking orders and short increments of time. Their personalities vary with respect to boldness, self-control, and vigilance.

We farm billions of these animals industrially each year (Böll Foundation 2014: 15). We also raise a much smaller number on freerange farms. In this entry “freerange” is not used in its tightly-defined, misleading, legal sense according to which it applies only to poultry and simply requires “access” to the outdoors. Instead, in the entry, freerange farms are farms that that, ideally, let animals live natural lives while offering some protection from predators and the elements and some healthcare. These lives are in various ways more pleasant than lives on industrial farms but involve less protection while still involving control and early death. These farms are designed, in part, to make animal lives go better for them, and their design assumes that a natural life is better, other things equal, than a non-natural life. The animal welfare literature converges on this and also on other components of animal well-being. Summarizing some of that literature, David Fraser writes,

[A]s people formulated and debated various proposals about what constitutes a satisfactory life for animals in human care, three main concerns emerged: (1) that animals should feel well by being spared negative affect (pain, fear, hunger etc.) as much as possible, and by experiencing positive affect in the form of contentment and normal pleasures; (2) that animals should be able to lead reasonably natural lives by being able to perform important types of normal behavior and by having some natural elements in their environment such as fresh air and the ability to socialize with other animals in normal ways; and (3) that animals should function well in the sense of good health, normal growth and development, and normal functioning of the body. (Fraser 2008: 70–71)

In this light, it is clear why industrial farming seems to do less for animal welfare than freerange farming: The latter enables keeping animals healthy. It enables happy states (“positive affect”) and puts up some safeguards against the infliction of suffering. There is no need, for example, to dock freerange pigs’ tails or to debeak freerange chickens, if they have enough space to stay out of each other’s way. It enables animals to socialize and to otherwise lead reasonably natural lives. A freerange’s pig’s life is in those ways better than an industrially-farmed pig’s.

Yet because freerange farming involves being outdoors, it involves various risks: predator- and weather-related risks, for example. These go into the well-being calculus, too.

Animals in the wild are subjected to greater predator- and weather-related risks and have no health care. Yet they score very highly with regard to expressing natural behavior and are under no one’s control. How well they do with regard to positive and negative affect and normal growth varies from case to case. Some meat is produced by hunting such animals. In practice, hunting involves making animals suffer from the pain of errant shots or the terror of being chased or wounded, but, ideally, it involves neither pain nor confinement. Of course, either way, it involves death. [ 3 ]

2.2 The Schematic Case Against Meat Production

Moral vegetarian arguments about these practices follow a pattern. They claim that certain actions—killing animals for food we do not need, for example—are wrong and then add that some mode of meat production—recreational hunting, for example—does so. It follows that the mode of meat-production is wrong.

Schematically

X is wrong.

Y involves X . Hence,

Y is wrong.

Among the candidate values of X are:

• Causing animals pain for the purpose of producing food when there are readily available alternatives.
• Killing animals for the purpose of…
• Controlling animals…
• Treating animals as mere tools…
• Ontologizing animals as food…
• Harming humans….
• Harming the environment…

And among the candidate values of Y are:

• Industrial animal farming
• Freerange farming
• Recreational hunting

Space is limited and cranking through many instances of the schema would be tedious. This section focuses on causing animals pain, killing them, and harming the environment in raising them. On control, see Francione 2009, DeGrazia 2011, and Bok 2011. On treating animals as mere tools, see Kant’s Lectures on Ethics , Korsgaard 2011 and 2015, and Zamir 2007. On ontologizing, see Diamond 1978, Vialles 1987 [1994], and Gruen 2011, Chapter 3. On harming humans, see Pachirat 2011, Anomaly 2015, and Doggett & Holmes 2018.

Some moral vegetarians argue:

Causing animals pain while raising them for food when there are readily available alternatives is wrong.

Industrial animal farming involves causing animals pain while raising them for food when there are readily available alternatives. Hence,

Industrial animal farming is wrong.

The “while raising them for food when there are readily available alternatives” is crucial. It is sometimes permissible to cause animals pain: You painfully give your cat a shot, inoculating her, or painfully tug your dog’s collar, stopping him from attacking a toddler. The first premise is asserting that causing pain is impermissible in certain other situations. The “when there are readily available alternatives” is getting at the point that there are substitutes available. We could let the chickens be and eat rice and kale. The first premise asserts it is wrong to cause animals pain while raising them for food when there are readily available substitutes.

It says nothing about why that is wrong. It could be that it is wrong because it would be wrong to make us suffer to raise us for food and there are no differences between us and animals that would justify making them suffer (Singer 1975 and the enormous literature it generated). It could, instead, be that it is wrong because impious (Scruton 2004) or cruel (Hursthouse 2011).

So long as we accept that animals feel—for an up-to-date philosophical defense of this, see Tye 2016—it is uncontroversial that industrial farms do make animals suffer. No one in the contemporary literature denies the second premise, and Norwood and Lusk go so far as to say that

it is impossible to raise animals for food without some form of temporary pain, and you must sometimes inflict this pain with your own hands. Animals need to be castrated, dehorned, branded, and have other minor surgeries. Such temporary pain is often required to produce longer term benefits…All of this must be done knowing that anesthetics would have lessened the pain but are too expensive. (2011: 113)

There is the physical suffering of tail-docking, de-beaking, de-horning, and castrating, all without anesthetic. Also, industrial farms make animals suffer psychologically by crowding them and by depriving them of interesting environments. Animals are bred to grow quickly on minimal food. Various poultry industry sources acknowledge that this selective breeding has led to a significant percentage of meat birds walking with painful impairments (see the extensive citations in HSUS 2009).

This—and much more like it that is documented in Singer & Mason 2006 and Stuart Rachels 2011—is the case for the second premise, namely, that industrial farming causes animals pain while raising them for food when there are readily available alternatives.

The argument can be adapted to apply to freerange farming and hunting. Freerange farms ideally do not hurt, but, as the Norwood and Lusk quotation implies, they actually do: For one thing, animals typically go to the same slaughterhouses as industrially-produced animals do. Both slaughter and transport can be painful and stressful.

The same goes for hunting: In the ideal, there is no pain, but, really, hunters hit animals with non-lethal and painful shots. These animals are often—but not always—killed for pleasure or for food hunters do not need. [ 4 ]

Taken together the arguments allege that all manners of meat production in fact produce suffering for low-cost food and typically do so for food when we don’t need to do so and then allege that that justification for producing suffering is insufficient. Against the arguments, one might accept that farms hurt animals but deny that it is even pro tanto wrong to do so (Carruthers 1992 and 2011; Hsiao 2015a and 2015b) on the grounds that animals lack moral status and, because of this, it is not intrinsically wrong to hurt them (or kill or control them or treat them like mere tools). One challenge for such views is to explain what, if anything, is wrong with beating the life out of a pet. Like Kant, Carruthers and Hsiao accept that it might be wrong to hurt animals when and because doing so leads to hurting humans. This view is discussed in Regan 1983: Chapter 5. It faces two distinct challenges. One is that if the only reason it is wrong to hurt animals is because of its effects on humans, then the only reason it is wrong to hurt a pet is because of its effects on humans. So there is nothing wrong with beating pets when that will have no bad effects on humans. This is hard to believe. Another challenge for such views, addressed at some length in Carruthers 1992 and 2011, is to explain whether and why humans with mental lives like the lives of, say, pigs have moral status and whether and why it is wrong to make such humans suffer.

Consider a different argument:

Killing animals while raising them for food when there are readily available alternatives is wrong.

Most forms of animal farming and all recreational hunting involve killing animals while raising them for food when there are readily available alternatives. Hence,

Most forms of animal farming and all recreational hunting are wrong.

The second premise is straightforward and uncontroversial. All forms of meat farming and hunting require killing animals. There is no form of farming that involves widespread harvesting of old bodies, dead from natural causes. Except in rare farming and hunting cases, the meat produced in the industrialized world is meat for which there are ready alternatives.

The first premise is more controversial. Amongst those who endorse it, there is disagreement about why it is true. If it is true, it might be true because killing animals wrongfully violates their rights to life (Regan 1975). It might be true because killing animals deprives them of lives worth living (McPherson 2015). It might be true because it treats animals as mere tools (Korsgaard 2011).

There is disagreement about whether the first premise is true. The “readily available alternatives” condition matters: Everyone agrees that it is sometimes all things considered permissible to kill animals, e.g., if doing so is the only way to save your child’s life from a surprise attack by a grizzly bear or if doing so is the only way to prevent your pet cat from a life of unremitting agony. (Whether it is permissible to kill animals in order to cull them or to preserve biodiversity is a tricky issue that is set aside here. It—and its connection to the permissibility of hunting—is discussed in Scruton 2006b.) At any rate, animal farms are in the business of killing animals simply on the grounds that we want to eat them and are willing to pay for them even though we could, instead, eat plants.

The main objection to the first premise is that animals lack the mental lives to make killing them wrong. In the moral vegetarian literature, some argue that the wrongness of killing animals depends on what sort of mental life they have and that while animals have a mental life that suffices for hurting them being wrong, they lack a mental life that suffices for killing them being wrong (Belshaw 2015 endorses this; McMahan 2008 and Harman 2011 accept the first and reject the second; Velleman 1991 endorses that animal mental lives are such that killing them does not harm them). Animals could lack a mental life that makes killing them wrong because it is a necessary condition for killing a creature being wrong that that creature have long-term goals and animals don’t or that it is a necessary condition that that creature have the capacity to form such goals and animals don’t or that it is a necessary condition that the creature’s life have a narrative structure and animals’ lives don’t or… [ 5 ]

Instead, the first premise might be false and killing animals we raise for food might be permissible because

[t]he genesis of domestic animals is…a matter…of an implicit social contract—what Stephen Budiansky…calls ‘a covenant of the wild.’…Humans could protect such animals as the wild ancestors of domestic cattle and swine from predation, shelter them from the elements, and feed them when otherwise they might starve. The bargain from the animal’s point of view, would be a better life as the price of a shorter life… (Callicott 2015: 56–57)

The idea is that we have made a “bargain” with animals to raise them, to protect them from predators and the elements, and to tend to them, but then, in return, to kill them. Moreover, the “bargain” renders killing animals permissible (defended in Hurst 2009, Other Internet Resources, and described in Midgley 1983). Such an argument might render permissible hurting animals, too, or treating them merely as tools.

Relatedly, even conceding that it is pro tanto wrong to kill animals, it might be all things considered permissible to kill farm animals for food even when there are ready alternatives because and when their well-being is replaced by the well-being of a new batch of farmed animals (Tännsjö 2016). Farms kill one batch of chickens and then bring in a batch of chicks to raise (and then kill) next. The total amount of well-being is fixed though the identities of the receptacles of that well-being frequently changes.

Anyone who endorses the views in the two paragraphs above needs to explain whether and then why their reasoning applies to animals but not humans. It would not be morally permissible to create humans on organ farms and harvest those organs, justifying this with the claim that these humans wouldn’t exist if it weren’t for the plan to take their organs and so part of the “deal” is that those humans are killed for their organs. Neither would it be morally permissible to organ-farm humans, justifying it with the claim that they will be replaced by other happy humans. [ 6 ]

Finally, consider:

Harming the environment while producing food when there are readily available alternatives is wrong.

Industrial animal farming involves harming the environment while producing food when there are readily available alternatives. Hence,

A more plausible premise might be “egregiously harming the environment…” The harms, detailed in Budolfson 2018, Hamerschlag 2011, Rossi & Garner 2014, and Ranganathan et al. 2016, are egregious and include deforestation, greenhouse gas emission, soil degradation, water pollution, water and fossil fuel depletion.

The argument commits to it being wrong to harm the environment. Whether this is because those harms are instrumental in harming sentient creatures or whether it is intrinsically wrong to harm the environment or ecosystems or species or living creatures regardless of sentience is left open. [ 7 ]

The argument does not commit to whether these harms to the environment are necessary consequences of industrial animal farming. There are important debates, discussed in PNAS 2013, about whether, and how easily, these harms can be stripped off industrial animal production.

There is an additional important debate, discussed in Budolfson 2018, about whether something like this argument applies to freerange animal farming.

Finally, there is a powerful objection to the first premise from the claim that these harms are part of a package that leaves sentient creatures better off than they would’ve been under any other option.

Nothing has been said so far about general moral theories and meat production. There is considerable controversy about what those theories imply about meat production. So, for example, utilitarians agree that we are required to maximize happiness. They disagree about which agricultural practices do so. One possibility is that because it brings into existence many trillions of animals that, in the main, have lives worth living and otherwise would not exist, industrial farming maximizes happiness (Tännsjö 2016). Another is that freerange farming maximizes happiness (Hare 1999; Crisp 1988). Instead, it could be that no form of animal agriculture does (Singer 1975 though Singer 1999 seems to agree with Hare).

Kantians agree it is wrong to treat ends in themselves merely as means. They disagree about which agricultural practices do so. Kant ( Lectures on Ethics ) himself claims that no farming practice does—animals are mere means and so treating them as mere means is fine. Some Kantians, by contrast, claim that animals are ends in themselves and that typically animal farming treats them as mere means and, hence, is wrong (Korsgaard 2011 and 2015; Regan 1975 and 1983).

Contractualists agree that it is wrong to do anything that a certain group of people would reasonably reject. (They disagree about who is in the group.) They disagree, too, about which agricultural practice contractualism permits. Perhaps it permits any sort of animal farming (Carruthers 2011; Hsiao 2015a). Perhaps it permits none (Rowlands 2009). Intermediate positions are possible.

Virtue ethicists agree that it is wrong to do anything a virtuous person would not do or would not advise. Perhaps this forbids hurting and killing animals, so any sort of animal farming is impermissible and so is hunting (Clark 1984; Hursthouse 2011). Instead, perhaps it merely forbids hurting them, so freerange farming is permissible and so is expert, pain-free hunting (Scruton 2006b).

Divine command ethicists agree that it is wrong to do anything forbidden by God. Perhaps industrial farming, at least, would be (Halteman 2010; Scully 2002). Lipscomb (2015) seems to endorse that freerange farming would not be forbidden by God. A standard Christian view is that no form of farming would be forbidden, that because God gave humans dominion over animals, we may treat them in any old way. Islamic and Jewish arguments are stricter about what may be eaten and about how animals may be treated though neither rules out even industrial animal farming (Regenstein, et al. 2003).

Rossian pluralists agree it is prima facie wrong to harm. There is room for disagreement about which agricultural practices—controlling, hurting, killing—do harm and so room for disagreement about which farming practices are prima facie wrong. Curnutt (1997) argues that the prima facie wrongness of killing animals is not overridden by typical justifications for doing so.

In addition to pork and beef, there are salmon and crickets. In addition to lamb and chicken, there are mussels and shrimp. There is little in the philosophical literature about insects and sea creatures and their products, and this entry reflects that. [ 8 ] Yet the topics are important. The organization Fish Count estimates that at least a trillion sea creatures are wild-caught or farmed each year (Mood & Brooke 2010, 2012, in Other Internet Resources). Globally, humans consume more than 20 kg of fish per capita annually (FAO 2016). In the US, we consume 1.5 lbs of honey per capita annually (Bee Culture 2016). Estimates of insect consumption are less sure. The UN FAO estimates that insects are part of the traditional diets of two billion humans though whether they are eaten—whether those diets are adhered to—and in what quantity is unclear (FAO 2013).

Seafood is produced by farming and by fishing. Fishing techniques vary from a person using a line in a boat to large trawlers pulling nets across the ocean floor. The arguments for and against seafood production are much like the arguments for and against meat production: Some worry about the effects on humans of these practices. (Some workers, for example, are enslaved on shrimpers.) Some worry about the effects on the environment of these practices. (Some coral reefs, for example, are destroyed by trawlers.) Some worry about the permissibility of killing, hurting, or controlling sea creatures or treating them merely as tools. This last worry should not be undersold: Again, Mood and Brooke (2010, 2012, in Other Internet Resources) estimate that between 970 billion and 2.7 trillion fish are wild-caught yearly and between 37 and 120 billion farmed fish are killed. If killing, hurting, or controlling these creatures or treating them as mere tools is wrong, then the scale of our wrongdoing with regard to sea creatures beggars belief.

Are these actions wrong? Complicating the question is that there is significantly more doubt about which sea creatures have mental lives at all and what those mental lives are like. And while whether shrimp are sentient is clearly irrelevant to the permissibility of enslaving workers who catch them, it does matter to the permissibility of killing shrimp. This doubt is greater still with regard to insect mental lives. In conversation, people sometimes say that bee mental life is such that nothing wrong is done to bees in raising them. Nothing wrong is done to bees in killing them. Because they are not sentient, there is no hurting them. Because of these facts about bee mental life, the argument goes, “taking” their honey need be no more morally problematic than “taking” apples from an apple tree. (There is little on the environmental impact of honey production or (human) workers and honey. So it is unclear how forceful environment- and human-based worries about honey are.)

This argument supporting honey production hinges on some empirical claims about bee mental life. For an up-to-date assessment of bee mental life, see Tye 2016, which argues that bees “have a rich perceptual consciousness” and “can feel some emotions” and that “the most plausible hypothesis overall…is that bees feel pain” (2016: 158–159) and see, too, Barron & Klein 2016, which argues that insects, generally, have a capacity for consciousness. The argument supporting honey production might be objected to on those empirical grounds. It might, instead, be objected to on the grounds that we are uncertain what the mental lives of bees are like. It could be that they are much richer than we realize. If so, killing them or taking excessive honey—and thereby causing them significant harms—might well be morally wrong. And, the objection continues, the costs of not doing so, of just letting bees be, would be small. If so, caution requires not taking any honey or killing bees or hurting them. Arguments like this are sometimes put applied to larger creatures. For discussion of such arguments, see Guerrero 2007.

4. From Production to Consumption

None of the foregoing is about consumption. The moral vegetarian arguments thus far have, at most, established that it is wrong to produce meat in various ways. Assuming that some such argument is sound, how to get from the wrongness of producing meat to the wrongness of consuming that meat?

This question is not always taken seriously. Classics of the moral vegetarian literature like Singer 1975, Regan 1975, Engel 2000, and DeGrazia 2009 do not give much space to it. (C. Adams 1990 is a rare canonical vegetarian text that devotes considerable space to consumption ethics.) James Rachels writes,

Sometimes philosophers explain that [my argument for vegetarianism] is unconvincing because it contains a logical gap. We are all opposed to cruelty, they say, but it does not follow that we must become vegetarians. It only follows that we should favor less cruel methods of meat production. This objection is so feeble it is hard to believe it explains resistance to the basic argument [for vegetarianism]. (2004: 74)

Yet if the objection is that it does not follow from the wrongness of producing meat that consuming meat is wrong, then the objection is not feeble and is clearly correct. In order to validly derive the vegetarian conclusion, additional premises are needed. Rachels, it turns out, has some, so perhaps it is best to interpret his complaint as that it is obvious what the premises are.

Maybe so. But there is quite a bit of disagreement about what those additional premises are and plausible candidates differ greatly from one another.

Consider a productivist idea about the connection between production and consumption according to which consumption of wrongfully-produced goods is wrong because it produces more wrongful production. The idea issues an argument that, in outline, is:

Consuming some product P produces production of Q .

Production of Q is wrong.

It is wrong to produce wrongdoing. Hence,

Consuming P is wrong.

Or never mind actual production. A productivist might argue:

Consuming some product P is reasonably expected to produce production of Q .

It is wrong to do something that is reasonably expected to produce wrongdoing. Hence,

Consuming P is wrong. (Singer 1975; Norcross 2004; Kagan 2011)

(The main ideas about connecting consumption and production that follow can—but won’t —be put in terms of expectation, too.)

The moral vegetarian might then argue that meat is among the values of both P and Q : consuming meat is reasonably expect to produce production of meat. Or the moral vegetarian might argue that consuming meat produces more normalization of bad attitudes towards animals and that is wrong. There are various possibilities.

Just consider the first, the one about meat consumption producing meat production. It is most plausible with regard to buying . It is buying the wrongfully-produced good that produces more of it. Eating meat produces more production, if it does, by producing more buying. When Grandma buys the wrongfully produced delicacy, the idea goes, she produces more wrongdoing. The company she buys from produces more goods whether you eat the delicacy or throw it out.

These arguments hinge on an empirical claim about production and a moral claim about the wrongfulness of producing wrongdoing. The moral claim has far-reaching implications (DeGrazia 2009 and Warfield 2015). Consider this rent case:

You pay rent to a landlord. You know that he takes your rent and uses the money to buy wrongfully-produced meat.

If buying wrongfully-produced meat is wrong because it produces more wrongfully-produced meat, is it wrong to pay rent in the rent case? Is it wrong to buy a vegetarian meal at a restaurant that then takes your money and uses it to buy wrongfully-produced steak? These are questions for productivists’ moral claim. There are further, familiar questions about whether it is wrong to produce wrongdoing when one neither intends to nor foresees it and whether it is wrong to produce wrongdoing when one does not intend it but does foresee it and then about whether what is wrong is producing wrongdoing or, rather, simply producing a bad effect (see entries on the doctrine of double effect and doing vs. allowing harm ).

An objection to productivist arguments denies the empirical claim and, instead, accepting that because the food system is so enormous, fed by so many consumers, and so stuffed with money, our eating or buying typically has no effect on production, neither directly nor even, through influencing others, indirectly (Budolfson 2015; Nefsky 2018). The idea is that buying a burger at, say, McDonald’s produces no new death nor any different treatment of live animals. McDonald’s will produce the same amount of meat—and raise its animals in exactly the same way—regardless of whether one buys a burger there. Moreover, the idea goes, one should reasonably expect this. Whether or not this is a good account of how food consumption typically works, it is an account of a possible system. Consider the Chef in Shackles case, a modification of a case in McPherson 2015:

Alma runs Chef in Shackles, a restaurant at which the chef is known to be held against his will. It’s a vanity project, and Alma will run the restaurant regardless of how many people come. In fact, Alma just burns the money that comes in. The enslaved chef is superb; the food is delicious.

The productivist idea does not imply it is wrong to buy food from or eat at Chef in Shackles. If that is wrong, a different idea needs to explain its wrongness.

So consider instead an extractivist idea according to which consumption of wrongful goods is wrong because it is a benefiting from wrongdoing (Barry & Wiens 2016). This idea can explain why it is wrong to eat at Chef in Shackles—when you enjoy a delicious meal there, you benefit from the wrongful captivity of the chef. In outline, the extractivist argument is:

Consuming some product P extracts benefit from the production of P .

Production of P is wrong.

It is wrong to extract benefit from wrongdoing. Hence,

Moral vegetarians would then urge that meat is among the values of P . Unlike the productivist argument, this one is more plausible with regard to eating than buying. It’s the eating, typically, that produces the benefit and not the buying. Unlike the productivist argument, it does not seem to have any trouble explaining what is wrong in the Chef in Shackles case. Unlike the productivist argument, it doesn’t seem to imply that paying a landlord who pays for wrongfully produced food is wrong—paying a landlord is not benefiting from wrongdoing.

Like the productivist argument, the extractivist argument hinges on an empirical claim about consumer benefits and a moral claim about the ethics of so benefiting.

The notion of benefiting, however, is obscure. Imagine you go to Chef in Shackles, have a truly repulsive meal, and become violently ill afterwards. Have you benefit ted from wrongdoing? If not, the extractivist idea cannot explain what is wrong with going to the restaurant.

Put so plainly, the extractivist’s moral claim is hard to believe. Consider the terror-love case, a modification of a case Barry & Wiens 2016 credits to Garrett Cullity:

A terrorist bomb grievously injures Bob and Cece. They attend a support group for victims, fall in love, and live happily ever after, leaving them significantly better off than they were before the attack.

Bob and Cece seem to benefit from wrongdoing but seem not to be doing anything wrong by being together. Whereas the productivist struggles to explain why it is wrong to patronize Chef in Shackles, the extractivist struggles to explain why it is permissible for Bob and Cece to benefit from wrongdoing.

A participatory idea has no trouble with the terror-love case. According to it, consuming wrongfully-produced goods is wrong because it cooperates with or participates in or, in Hursthouse’s phrase, is party to wrongdoing (2011). Bob and Cece do not participate in terror, so the idea does not imply they do wrong. The idea issues an argument that, in outline, goes:

Consuming some product P is participating in the production of P .

It is wrong to participate in the production of wrongful things. Hence,

Consuming P is wrong. (Kutz 2000; Lepora & Goodin 2013)

Moral vegetarians would then urge that meat is among the values of P . Unlike the productivist or extractivist ideas, the participatory idea seems to as easily cover buying and eating for each is plausibly a form of participating in wrongdoing. Unlike the productivist idea, it has no trouble explaining why it is wrong to patronize Chef in Shackles and does not imply it is wrong to pay rent to a landlord who buys wrongfully-produced meat. Unlike the extractivist idea, whether or not you get food poisoning at Chef in Shackles has no moral importance to it. Unlike the extractivist idea, the participatory idea does not falsely imply that the Bob and Cece do wrong in benefiting from wrongdoing—after all, their failing in love is not a way of participating in wrongdoing.

Yet it is not entirely clear what it is to participate in wrongdoing. Consider the Jains who commit themselves to lives without himsa (violence). Food production causes himsa. So Jains try to avoid eating many plants, uprooted to be eaten, and even drinking untreated water, filled with microorganisms, to minimize lives taken. Yet Jaina monastics are supported by Jaina laypersons. The monastic can’t boil his own water—that would be violent—but the water needs boiling so he depends on a layperson to boil. He kills no animals but receives alms, including meat, from a layperson. Is the monastic participating in violence? Is he participating because he is complicit in this violence (Kutz 2000; Lepora & Goodin 2013)? Is he part of a group that together does wrong (Parfit 1984: Chapter 3)? When Darryl refuses to buy wrongfully-produced meat but does no political work with regard to ending its production is he party to the wrongful production? Does he participate in it or cooperate with its production? Is he a member of a group that does wrong? If so, what are the principles of group selection?

As a matter of contingent fact, failing to politically protest meat exhibits no objectionable attitudes in contemporary US society. Yet it might be that consuming certain foods insults or otherwise disrespects creatures involved in that food’s production (R.M. Adams 2002; Hill 1979). Hurka (2003) argues that virtue requires exhibiting the right attitude towards good or evil, and so if consuming exhibits an attitude towards production, it is plausible that eating wrongfully produced foods exhibits the wrong attitude towards them. These are all attitudinal ideas about consumption. They might issue in an argument like this:

Consuming some product P exhibits a certain attitude towards production of P .

It is wrong to exhibit that attitude towards wrongdoing. Hence,

Moral vegetarians would then urge that meat is among the values of P . Like the participatory idea, the attitudinal idea explains the wrongness of eating and buying various goods—both are ways of exhibiting attitudes. Like the participatory idea, it has no trouble with Chef in Shackles, the rent case, the food poisoning case, or the terror-love case. It does hinge on an empirical claim about exhibition—consuming certain products exhibits a certain attitude—and then a moral claim about the impermissibility of that exhibition. One might well wonder about both. One might well wonder why buying meat exhibits support for that enterprise but paying rent to someone who will buy that meat does not. One might well wonder whether eating wrongfully-produced meat in secret exhibits support and whether such an exhibition is wrong. Also, there are attitudes other than attitudes towards production to consider. Failing to offer meat to a guest might exhibit a failure of reverence (Fan 2010). In contemporary India, in light of the “meat murders” committed by Hindus against Muslims nominally for the latter group’s consumption of beef, refusing to eat meat might exhibit support for religious discrimination (Doniger 2017).

The productivist, extractivist, participatory, and attitudinal ideas are not mutually exclusive. Someone might make use of a number of them. Driver, for example, writes,

[E]ating [wrongfully produced] meat is supporting the industry in a situation where there were plenty of other, better, options open…What makes [the eater] complicit is that she is a participant . What makes that participation morally problematic…is that the eating of meat displays a willingness to cooperate with the producers of a product that is produced via huge amounts of pain and suffering. (2015: 79; all italics mine)

This seems to at least incorporate participatory and attitudinal ideas. Lawford-Smith (2015) combines attitudinal and productivist ideas. McPherson (2015) combines extractivist and participatory ideas. James Rachels (2004) combines participatory and productivity ideas. And, of course, there are ideas not discussed here, e.g., that it is wrong to reward wrongdoers for wrongdoing and buying wrongfully produced meat does so. The explanation of why it is wrong to consume certain goods might be quite complex.

Driver, Lawford-Smith, McPherson, and James Rachels argue that it is wrong to consume wrongfully produced food and try to explain why this is. The productivist, extractivist, participatory, and attitudinal ideas, too, try to explain it. But it could be that there is nothing to explain.

It could be that certain modes of production are wrong yet consuming their products is permissible. We might assume that if consumption of certain goods is wrong, then that wrongness would have to be partly explained in terms of the wrongness of those goods’ production and then argue that there are no sound routes from a requirement not to produce a food to a requirement not to consume it (Frey 1983). This leaves open the possibility that consumers might be required to do something —for example, work for political changes that end the wrongful system—but permitted to eat wrongfully-produced food.

As §4.1 discusses, Warfield raises a problem for productivist accounts that they seem to falsely imply that morally permissible activities like paying rent to meat-eaters or buying salad at a restaurant serving meat are morally wrong (2015). Add the assumption that if consumption is wrong, it is wrong because some productivist view is true, and it follows that consumption of wrongful goods need not be wrongful. (Warfield does not assume this but instead says that “the best discussion” of the connection between production and consumption is “broadly consequentialist” (ibid., 154).)

Instead, we might assume that an extractivist or participatory or attitudinal view is correct if any is and then argue no such view is correct. We might, for example, argue that these anti-consumption views threaten to forbid too much. If the wrongness of producing and wrongness of consuming are connected, what else is connected? If buying meat is wrong because it exhibits the wrong attitude towards animals, is it permissible to be friends with people who buy that meat—or does this, too, evince the wrong attitudes towards animals? If killing animals for food is wrong, is it permissible merely to abstain from consuming them or must one do more work to stop their killing? The implications of various arguments against consuming animals and animal products might be far-reaching. Some will see this as an acknowledgment that something is wrong with moral vegetarian arguments. As Gruen and Jones (2015) note, the lifestyle some such arguments point to might not be enactable by creatures like us. Yet they see this not as grounds for rejection of the argument but, rather, as acknowledgment that the argument sets out an aspiration that we can orient ourselves towards (cf. §4 of Curtin 1991 on “contextual vegetarianism”).

A different sort of argument in favor of the all things considered permissibility of consuming meat comes from the idea that eating and buying animals actually makes for a great cultural good (Lomasky 2013). Even if we accept that the production of those animals is wrong, it could be that the great good of consuming justifies doing so. (Relatedly, it could be that the bad of refusing to consume justifies consumption as in a case in which a host has labored over barbequed chicken for hours and your refusing to eat it would devastate him.) Yet this seems to leave open the possibility that all sorts of awful practices might be permissible because they are essential parts of great cultural goods. It threatens to permit too much.

5. Extending Moral Vegetarian Arguments: Animal Products and Plants

Moral veganism accepts moral vegetarianism and adds to it that consuming animal products is wrong. Mere moral vegetarians deny this and add to moral vegetarianism that it is permissible to consume animal products. An additional issue that divides some moral vegans and moral vegetarians is whether animal product production is wrong. This raises a general question: If it is wrong to produce meat on the grounds adduced in §2 , what other foods are wrongfully produced? If it is wrong to hurt chickens for meat, isn’t it wrong to hurt them for eggs? If it is wrong to harm workers in the production of meat, isn’t it wrong to harm workers in the production of animal products? If it is wrong to produce huge quantities of methane for meat, isn’t it wrong to produce it for milk? These are challenges posed by moral veganism.

But various vegan diets raise moral questions. If it is wrong to hurt chickens for meat, is it wrong to hurt mice and moles while harvesting crops? If it is wrong to harm workers in the production of meat, isn’t it wrong to harm workers in the production of tomatoes? If it is wrong to use huge quantities of water for meat, isn’t it wrong to use huge quantities of water for almonds?

5.1 Animal Products

As it might be that meat farming wrong, it might be that animal product farming is wrong for similar reasons. These reasons stem from concerns about plants, animals, humans, and the environment. This entry will focus on the first, second, and fourth and will consider eggs and dairy.

Like meat birds, egg layers on industrial farms are tightly confined, given on average a letter-sized page of space. Their beaks are seared off. They are given a cocktail of antibiotics. Males, useless as layers, are killed right away: crushed, dehydrated, starved, suffocated. As they age and their laying-rate slows, females are starved so as to force them to shed feathers and induce more laying. They are killed within a couple years (HSUS 2009; cf. Norwood & Lusk 2011: 113–127, which rates layer hen lives as not worth living).

Freerange egg farming ideally avoids much of this. Yet it still involves killing off young but spent hens and also baby roosters. It often involves painful, stressful trips to industrial slaughterhouses. So, as it is plausible that industrially and freerange farming chickens for meat makes them suffer, so too is it plausible that industrially and freerange farming them for eggs does. The same goes for killing.

The threat to the environment, too, arises from industrial farming itself rather than whether it produces meat or eggs. Chickens produce greenhouse gas and waste regardless of whether they are farmed for meat or eggs. Land is deforested to grow food for them and resources are depleted to care for them regardless of whether they are farmed for meat or eggs.

In sum, arguments much like arguments against chicken production seem to apply as forcefully to egg production. Arguments from premises about killing, hurting, and harming the environment seem to apply to typical egg production as they do to typical chicken production.

Like beef cattle, dairy cows on industrial farms are tightly confined and bereft of much stimulation. As dairy cows, however, they are routinely impregnated and then constantly milked. Males, useless as milkers, are typically turned to veal within a matter of months. Females live for maybe five years. (HSUS 2009; cf. Norwood & Lusk 2011: 145–150).

Freerange milk production does not avoid very much of this. Ideally, it involves less pain and suffering but it typically involves forced impregnation, separation of mother and calf, and an early death, typically in an industrial slaughterhouse. So far as arguments against raising cows for meat on the basis that doing so kills them and makes them suffer are plausible, so are analogous arguments against raising cows for dairy.

The threat to the environment is also similar regardless of whether cattle are raised for meat or milk. So far as arguments against raising cows for meat on the basis that doing so harms the environment are plausible, so are analogous arguments against raising cows for milk. Raising cows for meat and for milk produces greenhouse gas and waste; it deforests and depletes resources. In fact, to take just one example, the greenhouse-gas-based case against dairy is stronger than the greenhouse-gas-based case against poultry and pork (Hamerschlag 2013).

In sum, arguments much like arguments against beef production seem to apply as forcefully to dairy production. Arguments from premises about killing, hurting, and harming the environment seem to apply to typical dairy production as they do to typical beef production.

As it might be that animal, dairy, and egg farming are wrong, it might be that plant farming is wrong for similar reasons. These reasons stem from concerns about plants, animals, humans, and the environment. This entry will focus on the first, second, and fourth.

Ed drenches Fatima’s prized cactus in pesticides without permission. This is uncontroversially wrongful but only uncontroversial because the cactus is Fatima’s. If a cactus grows in Ed’s yard and, purely for fun, she drenches it in pesticides, killing it, is that wrong? There is a family of unorthodox but increasingly common ideas about the treatment of plants according to which any killing of plants is at least pro tanto wrongful and that treating them as mere tools is too (Marder 2013; Stone 1972, Goodpaster 1978, and Varner 1998 are earlier discussions and Tinker 2015 discusses much earlier discussions). One natural way to develop this thought is that it is wrong to treat plants this way simply because of the effects on plants themselves. An alternative is wrong to treat the plants this way simply because of its effects on the biosphere. In both cases, we can do intrinsic wrong to non-sentient creatures.

The objection raises an important issue about interests. Singer, following Porphyry and Bentham, assumes that all and only sentient creatures have interests. The challenge that Marder, et al. raise is that plants at least seem to do better or worse, to flourish or founder, because they seem to have interests in a certain amount of light, nutrients, and water. One way to interpret the position of Porphyry, et al. is that things are not as they seem here and, in fact, plants, lacking sentience, have no interests. This invites the question of why sentience is necessary for interests (Frey 1980 and 1983). Another way to interpret the position of Porphyry, et al. is that plants do have interests but they have no moral import. This invites the questions of when and why is it permissible to deprive plants of what they have interests in. Marder’s view is that plants have interests and that these interests carry significantly more moral weight than one might think. So, for example, as killing a dog for fun is wrong, so, too, is killing a dandelion. If killing a chicken for food we don’t need is wrong, so, too, is killing some carrots.

If it is impermissible to kill plants to provide ourselves food we don’t need, how far does the restriction on killing extend: To bacteria? Pressed about this by Gary Francione, Marder is open-minded: “We should not reject the possibility of respecting communities of bacteria without analyzing the issue seriously” (2016: 179).

Marder’s view rests on a controversial interpretation of plant science and, in particular, on a controversial view that vegetal responses to stimuli—for example that “roots…are capable of altering their growth pattern in moving toward resource-rich soil or away from nearby roots of other members of the same species” (2016: 176)—suffice to show that plants have interests, are ends in themselves, and it is pro tanto wrong to kill them and treat them as tools.

Uncontroversially, much actual plant production does have various bad consequences for animals. Actual plant production in the US is largely large scale. Large-scale plant production involves—intentionally or otherwise—killing a great many sentient creatures. Animals are killed by tractors and pesticides. They are killed or left to die by loss of habitat (Davis 2003; Archer 2011). The scope of the killing is disputed in Lamey 2007 and Matheny 2003 but all agree it is vast (cf. Saja 2013 on the moral imperative to kill large animals).

The “intentionally or otherwise” is important to some. While these harms are foreseen consequences of farming, they are unintended. To some, that animals are harmed but not intentionally harmed in producing corn in Iowa helps to make those harms permissible (see entry on doctrine of double effect ). Pigs farmed in Iowa, by contrast, are intentionally killed. Chickens and cows, too. (Are any intentionally hurt? Not typically. Farming is not sadistic.)

The scale is important, too. Davis (2003) and Archer (2011) argue that some forms of meat production kill fewer animals than plant production and, because of that, are preferable to plant production.

The idea is that if animal farming is wrong because it kills animals simply in the process of producing food we don’t need, then some forms of plant farming are wrong for the same reason. More weakly, if animal farming is wrong because it kills very large numbers of animals in the process of producing food we don’t need, then some forms of plant farming are wrong for the same reason.

An outstanding issue is whether these harms are necessary components of plant production or contingent. A further issue is how easy it would be to strip these harms off of plant production while still producing foods humans want to eat at prices they are willing to pay.

A final objection to the permissibility of plant production: There are clearly environmental costs of plant production. Indeed, the environmental costs of plant farming are large: topsoil loss; erosion; deforestation; run-off; resource-depletion; greenhouse gas emissions. To take just the last two examples, Budolfson (2016: 169) estimates that broccoli produces more kilograms of CO 2 per thousand calories than pork and that almonds use two and a half times the water per thousand calories that chicken does.

If some forms of animal farming are wrong for those environmental reasons, then some forms of plant farming are wrong for those reasons (Budolfson 2018).

Again, an outstanding issue is whether these harms are necessary components of plant production or contingent. A further issue is how easy it would be to strip these harms off of plant production while still producing foods people want to eat at prices they are willing to pay.

Moral vegetarian arguments standardly oppose treating animals in various ways while raising them for food that we do not need to eat to survive. This standardly makes up part of the arguments that it is wrong to eat animals.

These arguments against meat production can be extended mutatis mutandis to animal product production. [ 9 ] They can be extended, too, to some forms of plant production. This suggests:

The arguments against industrial plant production and animal product production are as strong as the arguments against meat production.

The arguments against meat production show that meat production is wrong. Hence,

The arguments against industrial plant production and animal product production show that those practices are wrong.

One possibility is that the first premise is false and that some of the arguments are stronger than others.

Another possibility is that the first premise is true and all these arguments are equally strong. We would then have to choose between accepting the second premise—and thereby accepting the conclusion—or denying that meat production is wrong.

Another possibility is that the argument is sound but of limited scope, there being few if any alternatives in the industrialized West to industrialized plant, animal product, and meat production.

A final possibility is that the parity of these arguments and evident unsoundness of an argument against industrial plant production show that the ideas behind those arguments are being misexpressed. Properly understood, they issue not in a directive about the wrongness of this practice or that. Rather, properly understood, they just show that various practices are bad in various ways. If so, we can then ask: Which are worse? And in which ways? The literature typically ranks factory farming as worse for animals than industrial plant farming if only because the former requires the latter and produces various harms—the suffering of billions of chickens—that the latter does not. Or consider the debate in the literature about the relative harmfulness to animals of freerange farming and industrial plant farming. Which produces more animal death or more animal suffering? Ought we minimize that suffering? Or consider the relative harmfulness of freerange and industrial animal farming. Some argue that the former is worse for the environment but better for animals. If so, there is a not-easy question about which, if either, to go in for.

Given length requirements, this entry cannot convey the vastness of the moral vegetarian literature. There is some excellent work in the popular press. Between the Species , Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics , Journal of Animal Ethics , Environmental Ethics , and Journal of Food Ethics publish articles yearly. Dozens of good articles have been omitted from discussion.

This entry has omitted quite direct arguments against consuming meat, arguments that do not derive from premises about the wrongness of producing this or that. Judeo-Islamic prohibitions on pork, for example, derive from the uncleanliness of the product rather than the manner of its production. Rastafari prohibitions on eating meat, for another example, derive in part from the view that meat consumption is unnatural. Historically, such prohibitions and justifications for them have not been limited to prohibitions on consuming meat. The Laws of Manu ’s prohibition on onion-eating derives from what consuming onion will do to the consumer rather than the manner of onion-production (Doniger & Smith (trans.) 1991: 102). The Koran’s prohibition on alcohol-drinking derives from what consuming alcohol will do to the consumer rather than the manner of alcohol-production (5:90–91).

Arguments like this, arguments against consumption that start from premises about intrinsic features of the consumed or about the consumed’s effects on consumers, largely do not appear in the contemporary philosophical literature. What we have now are arguments according to which certain products are wrongfully produced and consumption of such products bears a certain relation to that wrongdoing and, ipso facto , is wrong. Moral vegetarians then argue that meat is such a product: It is typically wrongfully produced and consuming it typically bears a certain relation to that wrongdoing. This then leaves the moral vegetarian open to two sorts of objections: objections to the claims about production— is meat produced that way? Is such production wrongful?—and objections to the claims connecting consumption to production— is consuming meat related to wrongful production in the relevant way? Is being so related wrong? Explaining moral vegetarian answers to these questions was the work of §2 and §4 .

There are further questions. If moral vegetarian arguments against meat-consumption are sound, then are arguments against animal product consumption also sound? Might dairy, eggs, and honey be wrongfully produced as moral vegetarians argue meat is? Might consuming them wrongfully relate the consumer to that production? Explaining the case for “yes” was some of the work of §5 .

Relatedly, some plants, fruit, nuts, and other putatively vegetarian foods might be wrongfully produced. Some tomatoes are picked by workers working in conditions just short of slavery (Bowe 2007); industrial production of apples sucks up much water (Budolfson 2016); industrial production of corn crushes numerous small animals to death (Davis 2003). Are these food wrongfully produced? Might consuming them wrongfully relate the consumer to that production? Explaining the case for “yes” here, too, was some of the work of §5 .

Fischer (2018) suggests that the answers to some of the questions noted in the previous two paragraphs support a requirement to “eat unusually” and, one might add, to produce unusually. If meat, for example, is usually wrongfully produced, it must be produced unusually for that production to stand a chance of being permissible, perhaps as faultless roadkill (Koelle 2012; Bruckner 2015) or as the corpse of an animal dead from natural causes (Foer 2009) or as a test-tube creation (Milburn 2016; Pluhar 2010; see the essays in Donaldson & Carter (eds.) 2016 for discussion of plant-based “meat”).

If consuming meat is usually wrong because it usually bears a certain relation to production, it must be consumed unusually to stand a chance of being permissible. Some people eat only food they scavenge from dumpsters, food that would otherwise go to waste. Some people eat only food that is given to them without asking for any food in particular. If consuming is wrong only because it produces more production, neither of these modes of consumption would be wrongful.

As some unusual consumption might, by lights of the arguments considered in this entry, turn out to be morally unobjectionable, some perfectly usual practices having nothing to do with consumption might turn out, by those same lights, to be morally objectionable. Have you done all you are required to do by moral vegetarian lights if you stop eating, for example, factory-farmed animals? Clearly not. If it is wrong to eat a factory-farmed cow, it is for very similar reasons wrong to wear the skin of that cow. Does the wrongful road stop at consumption, broadly construed to include buying, eating, or otherwise using? Or need consumers do more than not consume wrongfully-produced goods? Need they be pickier in how they spend their money than simply not buying meat, e.g., not going to restaurants that serve any meat? Need they protest or lobby? Need they take more direct action against farms? Or more direct action against the government? Need they refuse to pay rent to landlords who buy wrongfully-produced meat? Is it permissible for moral vegetarians to befriend—or to stay friends with—meat-eaters? As there are questions about whether the moral road gets from production to consumption, there are questions about whether the road stops at consumption or gets much farther.

As discussed in §5 , the moral vegetarian case against killing, hurting, or raising animals for food might well be extended to killing, hurting, or raising animals in other circumstances. What, if anything, do those cases show about the ethical treatment of pets (Bok 2011; Overall (ed.) 2017; Palmer 2010 and 2011)? Of zoo creatures (DeGrazia 2011; Gruen 2011: Chapter 5; Gruen 2014)?

What, if anything, do they show about duties regarding wild animals? Palmer 2010 opens with two cases from 2007, one of which involved the accidental deaths of 10,000 wildebeest in Kenya, the other involving the mistreatment and death of 150 horses in England. As Palmer notes, it is plausible that we are required to care for and help domesticated animals—that’s why it is plausibly wrong to let horses under our care suffer—but permissible to let similar harms befall wild animals—that’s why it is plausibly permissible to let wildebeest suffer and die. And yet, Palmer continues, it is also plausible that animals with similar capacities—animals like horses and wildebeest—should be treated similarly. So is the toleration of 10,000 wildebeest deaths permissible? Or do we make a moral mistake in not intervening in such cases? Relatedly, moral vegetarians oppose chicken killing and consumption and yet some of them aid and abet domestic cats in the killings of billions of birds each year in the United States alone (Loss, et al. 2013; Pressler 2013). Is this permissible? If so, why (Cohen 2004; Milburn 2015; Sittler-Adamczewski 2016)? McMahan (2015) argues that standard moral vegetarian arguments against killing and suffering lead (eventually) to the conclusion that we ought to reduce predation in the wild.

What, if anything do moral vegetarian arguments show about duties regarding fetuses? There are forceful arguments that if abortion is wrong, then so is killing animals for food we don’t need (Scully 2013). The converse is more widely discussed but less plausible (Abbate 2014; Colb & Dorf 2016; Nobis 2016).

Finally, in the food ethics literature, questions of food justice are among the most common questions about food consumption. Sexism, racism, and classism, are unjust. Among the issues of food justice, then, are how, if at all, the practices of vegetarianism and omnivorism or encouragement of them are sexist (C. Adams 1990) or racist (Alkon & Agyeman (eds.) 2011) or classist (Guthman 2011). Industrial animal agriculture raises a pair of questions of justice: It degrades the environment—is this unjust to future generations who will inherit this degraded environment? Also, what makes it so environmentally harmful is the scale of it. That scale is driven, in part, by demand for meat among the increasingly affluent in developing countries (Herrero & Thornton 2013). Is refusing to meet that demand—after catering to wealthy Western palates for a long stretch—a form of classism or racism?

The animals we eat dominate the moral vegetarian literature and have dominated it ever since there has been a moral vegetarian literature. A way to think about these last few paragraphs is that questions about what we eat lead naturally to questions about other, quite different topics: the animals we eat but also the animals we don’t; eating those animals but also eating plants; refusing to eat those animals but also raising pets and refusing to intervene with predators and prey in the wild; refusing to eat but also failing to protest or rectify various injustices. Whereas the questions about animals—and the most popular arguments about them—are very old, these other questions are newer, and there is much progress to be made in answering them.

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animal: cognition | animal: consciousness | animals, moral status of | doing vs. allowing harm | double effect, doctrine of | ethics: in Indian Buddhism | moral status, grounds of

Acknowledgments

Surveys of the moral vegetarian literature are common. I have greatly benefited from reading, among others, Engel 2015, Fischer 2018, McPherson 2018, and Stuart Rachels 2011.

I have benefited, too, from helpful comments, criticisms, and suggestions. For them, I thank Anne Barnhill, Selim Berker, Mark Budolfson, Terence Cuneo, Bob Fischer, Rachelle Gould, Matthew C. Halteman, Elizabeth Harman, Oscar Horta, James John, Robert C. Jones, Jeff McMahan, members of the Vermont Ethics Group, Kate Nolfi, Clare Palmer, L.A. Paul, Tina Rulli, Jeff Sebo, Peter Singer, Sarah Stroud, Mark Timmons, Amy Trubek, and Alisha Utter.

Some material in this entry started life in Barnhill & Doggett 2017a and 2017b.

Copyright © 2018 by Tyler Doggett < tyler . doggett @ uvm . edu >

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Home / IELTS, CAE, FCE Writing Samples / IELTS Writing Task 2: Vegetarianism

IELTS Writing Task 2: Vegetarianism

As veganism trending is becoming extremely common, many people hold the view that people can maintain a healthy lifestyle without the need of meat. I agree that being a vegetarian means being healthier. However, I would argue that remove meat from daily diet can lead to variously-detrimental consequences which directly associates to our health (1) . To begin with, there are many undeniable positive aspects of having a vegetarian diet. The most significant benefit is that this diet helps reverse several chronic illnesses such as heart disease, cancer or obesity. This is mainly because plant-based foods consume less cholesterol so consequently, there will be a lower level of blood pressure and cholesterol (2) . Another advantage is that vegetarians are less likely to be overweight as the amount of fat in vegetables is extremely lower than that in meat (3) . However, meat can nourish our body more than plant-based foods can. Firstly, vegetables are deficient in protein whereas a large amount of this is found in meat (4) . The main reason why human’s body needs to consume a balanced diet of protein is to build and repair tissue as well as maintain a healthy body, which is vital when doing anything energetic (5) . Secondly, besides promoting mental health, meat also improve physical health as meat is extremely rich in various vitamins and minerals such as vitamin A, B, D (6) . It has been proven that these vitamins play an important role in promoting good vision, stronger teeth and bones system (7) . In conclusion, it is true that following vegetarian diets results in many benefits such as lowering risks of getting chronic illnesses. However, I believe that meat is highly required while maintaining healthy diets (8) . 283 words

The commentaries are marked in brackets with number (*). The numbered commentaries are found below. The part in  italics  is taken from the text, the word  underlined  is the suggested correction. Words in (brackets) are the suggested addition to the original phrase or sentence.

• However, I would argue that removing  meat from daily diet can lead to variously detrimental consequences for our health . — a gerund form is needed instead of ‘remove’. You don’t need a hyphen between ‘variously’ and ‘detrimental’. I have shortened your construction because the extra words do not add anything to the text. In that case the syntax was wrong too. Using more words that do not add any meaning is bad for your final score.
• This is mainly because plant-based foods contain  less cholesterol so consequently, blood pressure will be lower. — ‘Cholesterol’ is pretty difficult to paraphrase, avoid using it twice in the same sentence.
• Another advantage is that vegetarians are less likely to be overweight as the amount of fat in vegetables is much  lower than that in meat.  — don’t forget that you are making a comparison here, a comparative adjective should be used.
• Firstly, vegetables are deficient in protein whereas a large amount of it  is found in meat. — ‘it’ should be used to refer to something mentioned just now.
• The main reason why human’s body needs (to have ) a balanced diet of protein is to build and repair tissue (what tissue?) as well as maintain a healthy body, which is vital when doing anything energetic. — ‘to have a diet’ is a better collocation . Alternatively (and preferably), it could be omitted (the text in the brackets is optional). The second part of the sentence is a bit vague — it lacks specific information and hardly adds anything new to the essay. It states the obvious, like ‘you need a healthy body to do something that requires energy’. Use your essay to conduct more interesting thoughts and less trite ideas e.g. ‘A healthy, energetic lifestyle is rare nowadays as most people spend their time in front of their computers. To maintain an active life like this, one has to have a balanced diet’. This is just an example of how you can use the precious writing space to convey a message.
• Secondly, besides promoting mental health, meat also improves physical health as it  is extremely rich in various vitamins and minerals such as vitamin A, B, D. — ‘meat’ is singular. Also avoid using this word twice — I have replaced it with with a pronoun.
• It has been proven that these vitamins play an important role in ensuring  good vision, stronger teeth and bones  — ‘Promote’ is not the best verb for this context. I have also dropped ‘system’ as it is redundant here.
• However, I believe that meat is highly recommended  while maintaining healthy diets — ‘highly required’ is rarely used, and almost all the uses are by foreign speakers (or so my Google research indicates). Use ‘highly recommended’ or simply ‘required’.

The essay has adequate structure — both positive and negative aspects of the approach are given equal attention. The reader would be well-informed on the issue of vegetarianism. The language is fairly varied, with a good range of health-related vocabulary. Occasional mistakes and inaccuracies do not stand in the way of understanding the message. The author occasionally repeats the same word — proof-reading the essay would have helped eliminate this.

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Happy but Vegetarian? Understanding the Relationship of Vegetarian Subjective Well-Being from the Nature-Connectedness Perspective of University Students

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Vegetarianism constitutes not only a diet, but also a way of life and social movement currently in expansion worldwide. Since meat consumption negatively influences the environment, vegetarianism helps to preserve the health of ecosystems enhancing people’s well-being. Yet vegetarians tend to experience lower subjective well-being. Potential reasons for this include social stigmatization, underlying mental conditions, or perception of the world as unfair. In this paper, we explore the possibility that vegetarians who feel connected to nature enjoy higher subjective well-being. To do so, we explore a sample comprising 1068 undergraduates and relate vegetarian commitment, accounting for vegetarian identity and vegetarian self-assessment scale, with connectedness to nature for three different measures of subjective well-being, life satisfaction, emotional well-being, and subjective vitality. We find that vegetarian subjective well-being is better understood through individuals’ connection with the environment. Our results suggest that connectedness to nature is positively related, and vegetarian commitment generally associates negatively to subjective well-being except for vegans who have greater emotional well-being and vitality than other food identities. However, vegans experience greater life satisfaction while highly connected to nature. Lacto-pesco and lacto-ovo vegetarians also enjoy greater emotional well-being and vitality, respectively, while highly connected to nature. Considering vegetarian scale, individuals rating higher experience increased subjective vitality when highly connected to nature. Therefore, we propose that further policy developments in the area should consider the role of connectedness to nature in order to achieve higher levels of subjective well-being, while actively promoting pro-environmental behaviors such as vegetarianism.

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Acknowledgements

We are grateful to Daniel Rosenfeld who contributed to this work with various kinds of support and valuable insights. The manuscript has been enriched thanks to the comments of the people attending to the International Society of Quality of Life Studies, held in September 2019 in Granada, particularly Dr. Chitra S. Nair and Dr. Tithi Bhatnagar. Usual disclaimer applies.

The authors acknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación and the European Regional Development Fund (project ECO2017–86822-R); the Regional Government of Andalusia and the European Regional Development Fund (projects P18-RT-576 and B-SEJ-018-UGR18) and the University of Granada (Plan Propio. Unidad Científica de Excelencia: Desigualdad, Derechos Humanos y Sostenibilidad -DEHUSO-).

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Krizanova, J., Guardiola, J. Happy but Vegetarian? Understanding the Relationship of Vegetarian Subjective Well-Being from the Nature-Connectedness Perspective of University Students. Applied Research Quality Life 16 , 2221–2249 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11482-020-09872-9

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DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s11482-020-09872-9

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Using Vegetarianism

Writing an argumentative essay

Write a discussion essay with the title: Are you for or against using vegetarianism? Explain your answer. Think and plan: What is the situation at the moment? What arguments for and against using vegetarianism can you think of? What is your personal opinion?

At the moment vegetarianism is becoming more and more popular. Many people do not eat meat. Although, there are arguments both for and against this practice.

One of the main arguments for going without meat is the fact that it saves many animals. Killing animals for food is cruel and immoral. Scientific evidence shows that animals like pigs, sheep, chickens, and cows feel stress, fear, and pain when faced with and experiencing their death.

Furthermore, it’s much more healthier to avoid eating meat. A vegetarian diet has been shown to have many health benefits. Vegetarians are usually thinner than meat-eaters. According to the studies vegetarians are more likely to live longer than meat-eaters.

In addition, it’s cheaper to keep to this diet. Lentils and beans are much more affordable sources of high-quality protein than meat.

On the other hand, many people argue that eating meat is necessary. Also, they say that meat is rich in proteins. Meat is the most efficient way of obtaining protein in your diet. It is also a supply of zinc, iron, and B vitamins. Meat is the best source for B12. Studies have found that many vegetarians lack vitamin D.

What’s more people used to hunt and eat lots of meat from ancient times.

As far as I am concerned, I am not in favour of using vegetarianism but I am sure that it is necessary to eat as many fruits and vegetables as possible. I believe that we should keep to a balanced diet and there is nothing wrong with eating meat.

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One comment.

Are you for or against using vegetarianism? Vegetarianism is the practice of refusing to eat meat, fish, eggs and even dairy and many other different varieties of food. Vegetarianism can be adopted for various reasons such as health, ethics and religion. There are many positive and negative opinions regarding this practice. Let’s review some of them. An important advantage of vegetarianism is that animals’ lives are saved. In addition, vegetarians say that their health becomes better when they don’t eat meat. I definitely understand people who don’t want to eat meat or fish but I think that it is not clever enough not to eat eggs or not to drink milk. I am especially against people who make their little children vegetarians. I think that vegetarian nutrition is poor in protein, some micro elements such as iron, zinc, Omega-3 fatty acids and some vitamins. So they need to take artificial (chemical) analogs of nutrition. I have some friends vegetarians, and they look good, they do sport, they don’t insist on everyone becoming a vegetarian. So it is a personal choice. I must admit that I am not a big fan of meat of and fish but I will never become a vegetarian, because I like tasty meat and fish dishes.

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Arguments For and Against Veganism

For veganism.

• ANIMAL WELFARE: Eating meat requires the death of a living being. Eating dairy usually involves animals being separated from their children, causing distress to both mother and calf. Dairy cattle frequently develop bovine mastitis (a painful infection and inflammation of the udders), and factory farmed animals are kept in cramped conditions and pumped full of antibiotics and growth hormones in order to maximise profit. Unlike wild animals, humans do not require meat to survive (and definitely not dairy products from other animals). Eating meat is a choice and, as moral actors, the correct choice is surely to give up meat and dairy.
• ENVIRONMENT: When cows eat grass, microbes in their gut break down their meal and produce methane. This methane (a greenhouse gas) is released into the atmosphere via the magic of cow burps and farts, making livestock farming one of the biggest contributors to global warming. Factor in deforestation from land clearance, biodiversity loss, and air and water pollution, and animal agriculture is terrible for the environment.
• HEALTH: Vegan diets tend to be rich in foods that have proven health benefits: fresh fruit, vegetables, seeds, nuts, beans and pulses. A vegan diet is typically higher in fibre, and  lower  in cholesterol, protein, calcium and salt compared to a non-vegan diet. Research suggests that vegans may have a lower risk of heart disease than non-vegans. It is true that vegans need to supplement their diets with B12, but this is easy to do (e.g. via yeast extracts such as Marmite).

AGAINST Veganism

• NATURE: Humans (and our ancestors) have eaten meat for an estimated  2.6 million years . In fact, scientists argue that animal protein was vital for helping early hominids develop larger brains, meaning that humans likely wouldn’t even exist if it weren’t for eating meat. We evolved to have meat as part of our diets. Animals eat meat and it would be cruel to prevent them from doing so. Well, guess what? Humans are animals too, and meat is a natural part of our diets.
• CULTURE: Food is a central part of all human cultures. And, around the world, people celebrate their cultures by cooking meat dishes. If the world went vegan, we would lose iconic cultural traditions such as bolognese sauce, tandoori chicken, sashimi, currywurst, and Peking duck.
• HEALTH: A balanced diet is a healthy diet. Eating moderate amounts of fish, meat, and dairy alongside fruit, vegetables and pulses gives us all the vitamins, minerals, fatty acids, and other things we need to stay healthy. Research does suggest that vegans have a lower risk of heart disease, but that same research also indicates they have a higher risk of strokes (possibly due to B12 deficiency), and it’s unclear whether the supposed health benefits of veganism are anyway less about diet and more about broader lifestyle (e.g. vegans tend to exercise more, be non-smokers, not drink to excess, be more moderate in what they consume, etc.).

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Physical Health Benefits of Vegetarianism: A Review of the Scientific Evidence

A healthy, nutritious diet is essential for your physical and mental  well-being .

Increasing evidence is showing the detrimental impact of a diet high in red meat, saturated fat, and refined foods on health and longevity, with increased risk of cardiovascular disease, cancers, diabetes, obesity, and mortality.

Recently, increasing interest is being shown in the adoption of a plant-based diet and the benefits this diet can have on your health, and the health of the planet.

In this article, we explain (in plain English!) the conclusions of scientific studies that have looked at the  physical health benefits of vegetarianism.

Vegetarian diets consist of plant-based foods rich in whole grains, legumes, nuts, seeds, fruits, and vegetables, while avoiding red meat, processed meat products, refined foods, and sweets.

There are several variations of a vegetarian diet:

• Lacto-vegetarians allow the consumption of low-fat dairy products
• Ovo-vegetarians allow the consumption of eggs
• Pescatarians allow the consumption of fish
• Pollotarians allow lean white meat such as chicken to be consumed.

Drawbacks of Vegetarianism

Restrictive, unbalanced vegetarian diets could lead to nutrient deficiencies such as  vitamin B 12 , iron, zinc, calcium, and vitamin D.

Physical Benefits of Vegetarianism

Despite the drawbacks of vegetarianism covered in the previous section, numerous studies have reported the many health benefits of vegetarianism.

In the sections that follow we highlight studies that have linked vegetarianism with  physical   health benefits  such as:

• Weight loss
• Lowered blood pressure
• Reduced risk of diabetes
• Reduced risk of cardiovascular disease
• Cancer prevention
• Improved skin health
• Improved gut health
• Improved memory and cognition
• Reduced risk of all-cause mortality

According to the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics “An appropriately planned vegetarian, including vegan, diets are healthful, nutritionally adequate, and may provide health benefits for the prevention and treatment of certain diseases. These diets are appropriate for all stages of the life cycle, including pregnancy, lactation, infancy, childhood, adolescence, older adulthood, and for athletes” (Melina et al., 2016).

Weight Loss

Vegetarianism may aid in weight-loss and assist in maintaining a healthy body weight.

Scientists from the University of Bergen, investigated the influence of a plant-based diet on weight-loss “The results in this review propose that a shift to a plant-based diet may have  beneficial health effects  on  body weight  and BMI in individuals with overweight” (Tran et al., 2020).

According to a study performed by Huang et al. (2016), who investigating the link between vegetarian diets and weight loss “Vegetarian diets appeared to have  significant benefits  on  weight reduction  compared to non-vegetarian diets”.

A study published in the journal, Nutrition, investigated the effect of a plant-based diet on weight loss. Adherence to a vegan diet resulted in significantly higher weight loss “Vegan diets may result in  greater weight loss  than more modest recommendations” (Turner-McGrievy et al., 2015).

Lowered Blood Pressure

Vegetarianism may be effective against high blood pressure.

A study published in the journal, JAMA Internal Medicine, evaluated the effectiveness of a vegetarian diet on reducing blood pressure (BP), compared to an omnivorous diet. A vegetarian diet proved  effective in reducing blood pressure  “consumption of vegetarian diets was associated with a reduction in mean systolic BP and diastolic BP compared with the consumption of omnivorous diets” (Yokoyama et al., 2014).

Reduced Risk of Diabetes

A vegetarian diet may reduce your risk of developing diabetes.

A study published in the journal, JAMA Internal Medicine, assessed the link between a plant-based diet and the risk of developing type 2 diabetes. A  reduction in diabetes risk  was observed with increased consumption of healthful plant-based foods, such as vegetables, fruits, whole-grains, and nuts “Plant-based dietary patterns, especially when they are enriched with healthful plant-based foods, may be beneficial for the primary prevention of type 2 diabetes” (Qian et al., 2019).

A review published in the journal, Current Diabetes Reports, investigated the association between vegetarian diet and risk of diabetes. Adherence to a vegetarian diet was associated with a reduced risk of diabetes “A vegetarian diet characterized by whole plant foods is most beneficial for  diabetes prevention  and management” (Olfert & Wattick, 2018).

Skin Health: Anti-Aging and Treatment of Psoriasis

Vegetarianism may improve skin health and prevent skin aging.

A study published in The Journal of Clinical and Aesthetic Dermatology, evaluated the effectiveness of a whole-food, plant-based diet (WFPB) on  preventing  and  reversing skin aging . They found that the abundance of antioxidants in a WFPB diet prevented inflammation and oxidative stress which are both factors that promote skin aging “A WFPB diet maximizes the antioxidant potential within our cells by providing essential vitamins, including vitamins A, C, and E. It also helps to eliminate harmful carcinogens and gerontotoxins within our bloodstream and has been shown to lengthen telomeres, which prevents cellular damage” (Solway et al., 2020).

A vegetarian diet may treat the symptoms of psoriasis, a skin condition that leads to red, itchy scaly patches.

A study published in the journal, Alternative Medicine Review, analysed the effectiveness of a plant-based diet consisting of fresh fruit and vegetables, olive oil, small quantities of fish and poultry, while avoiding red meat, and refined carbohydrates to  treat mild to severe psoriasis . They found that all cases improved over the 6-month period “These results suggest a dietary regimen based on Edgar Cayce’s readings may be an effective medical nutrition therapy for the complementary treatment of psoriasis” (Brown et al., 2004).

Cancer Prevention

Vegetarianism may reduce your risk of developing cancer and other chronic diseases.

A study published in the journal, Nutrition Research and Practice, investigated the link between diet and cancer risk. They found that plant-based diets rich in fruits, vegetables, whole grains, and nuts are able to  reduce inflammation  and  prevent disease  “chronic inflammation contributes to the development of cancer, cardiovascular disease and diabetes, consumption of a varied plant-based diet, as recommended by multiple public health agencies, could effectively  reduce the incidence of cancer and other chronic diseases ” (Hardman, 2014).

A study published in the journal, Cancer Epidemiology, Biomarkers and Prevention, investigated the relationship between diet and overall cancer incidence among 69 000 participants. Cancer incidence was lowest in participants who followed vegetarian diets “Vegetarian diets seem to confer  protection against cancer ” (Tantamango-Bartley et al., 2013).

Vegetarianism may even assist with disease management and slow cancer progression.

A study published in the journal, Integrative Cancer Therapies, evaluated the effectiveness of a plant-based diet and stress management on progression of prostate cancer.  A plant-based diet slowed the progression of prostate cancer “adoption of a plant-based diet, in combination with stress reduction, may  attenuate disease progression  and have therapeutic potential for clinical management of recurrent prostate cancer” (Saxe et al., 2006).

Heart Health

Vegetarianism may provide a protective benefit to your heart health and reduce the risk of cardiovascular disease.

A study published in the Journal of the American Heart Association, investigated the association between plant-based diets and the incidence of cardiovascular disease (CVD), CVD mortality, and all-cause mortality. Participants who followed a healthful plant-based diet had a  19% reduced risk of CVD mortality  “Diets higher in plant foods and lower in animal foods were associated with a lower risk of cardiovascular morbidity and mortality in a general population” (Kim et al., 2019).

A study published in the Journal of the American College of Cardiology, evaluated the effectiveness of a plant-based diet and incidence of coronary heart disease (CHD). A positive relationship was observed between the consumption of healthful plant-based foods and a reduced risk of CHD “Higher intake of a plant-based diet index rich in healthier plant foods is associated with substantially  lower coronary heart disease risk ” (Satija et al., 2017).

According to research conducted by Hu (2003) “plant-based diets including whole grains as the main form of carbohydrate, unsaturated fats as the predominate form of dietary fat, an abundance of fruit and vegetables, and adequate n−3 fatty acids can play an  important role in preventing CVD ”.

Reduced Symptoms of Osteoarthritis

Vegetarianism may reduce the symptoms of osteoarthritis. Osteoarthritis is one of the most common types of arthritis, and is characterised by degradation of cartilage and bone in joints.

A study conducted by scientists from the Department of Internal Medicine at Michigan University, investigated the effectiveness of a 6-week whole-food, plant-based diet (WFPB) on  alleviating symptoms of osteoarthritis  “WFPB diet was associated with a significant  reduction in pain  compared to an ordinary omnivorous diet, with statistically significant pain reduction seen as early as two weeks after initiation of the dietary modification” (Clinton et al., 2015).

Improved Gut Health

Vegetarianism may positively impact your gut health, by providing your gut fuel to stimulate the growth of “good” gut microbes that produce health promoting compounds.

A review published in the journal, Frontiers in Nutrition, investigated the effects of a vegetarian and vegan diet on the gut microbiota. A vegetarian diet conferred a  positive impact on gut microbiota , with an increase in microbial diversity and production of beneficial compounds that support a healthy gut “diet is the essential factor for human gut microbiota composition; a plant-based diet may be an effective way to promote a diverse ecosystem of beneficial microbes that support overall health” (Tomova et al., 2019).

Memory and Cognition

Vegetarianism may improve cognitive function.

Scientists from the University of California, investigated the relationship between a plant-based diet and cognitive function. Participants who followed a plant-based diet had improved results on all cognitive tasks “Greater adherence to a dietary pattern consistent with a plant-based diet was related to  better performance on all cognitive tasks ” (Ramey et al., 2020).

Vegetarianism may protect your eye health and reduce the risk of developing cataracts.

A study published in the Journal of the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics, investigated the link between a vegetarian diet and the risk of cataracts. A 20% reduction in cataract risk was observed for participants who followed a vegetarian diet “A  vegetarian diet  was associated with a  lower risk of cataracts ” (Chiu et al., 2021).

Reduced Risk of All-Cause Mortality

Vegetarianism may lead to a reduced risk of all-cause mortality.

A review published in the journal, Critical Reviews in Food Science and Nutrition, evaluated the relationship between adherence to a plant-based diet and the risk of mortality. Adherence to a healthful vegetarian diet was linked to a reduced risk of mortality for chronic disease “Our findings show the potential  protective role of plant-based diets against chronic disease mortality ” (Jafari et al., 2021).

A study published in The Journal of Nutrition, analysed the link between a plant-based diet and all-cause and cardiovascular disease mortality risk. They found that adoption of a healthful plant-based foods was associated with a reduced risk of all-cause mortality “Healthy plant-based diet scores above the median were associated with a  lower risk of all-cause mortality  in US adults” (Kim et al., 2018).

Scientists from Wageningen University, investigated the influence of a Mediterranean diet on all-cause mortality in an elderly European population. They found that adherence to a Mediterranean diet was linked to an incredible 50% reduction in all-cause mortality risk “Among individuals aged 70 to 90 years, adherence to a Mediterranean diet and healthful lifestyle is associated with a more than  50% lower rate of all-causes and cause-specific mortality ” (Knoops et al., 2004).

Wrapping Up

Substantial evidence suggests that a well-planned, balanced and varied vegetarian diet abundant in healthful plant-based foods such as whole-grains, legumes, fruits, vegetables, and nuts, while monitoring for deficiencies is able to provide you with an abundance of health benefits, including:

• Healthy heart
• Healthy skin and eyes

Adopting a healthful rich plant-based diet, is beneficial for your physical and mental health, and may lead to a longer life-span with fewer visits to the doctor.

• Brown, A. C., Hairfield, M., Richards, D. G., McMillin, D. L., Mein, E. A., & Nelson, C. D. (2004). Medical nutrition therapy as a potential complementary treatment for psoriasis-five case reports.  Alternative Medicine Review ,  9 (3), 297-307.
• Chiu, T. H., Chang, C. C., Lin, C. L., & Lin, M. N. (2021). A Vegetarian Diet Is Associated with a Lower Risk of Cataract, Particularly Among Individuals with Overweight: A Prospective Study.  Journal of the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics ,  121 (4), 669-677.
• Clinton, C. M., O’Brien, S., Law, J., Renier, C. M., & Wendt, M. R. (2015). Whole-foods, plant-based diet alleviates the symptoms of osteoarthritis.  Arthritis ,  2015 .
• Hardman, W. E. (2014). Diet components can suppress inflammation and reduce cancer risk.  Nutrition research and practice ,  8 (3), 233-240.
• Hu, F. B. (2003). Plant-based foods and prevention of cardiovascular disease: an overview.  The American journal of clinical nutrition ,  78 (3), 544S-551S.
• Huang, R. Y., Huang, C. C., Hu, F. B., & Chavarro, J. E. (2016). Vegetarian diets and weight reduction: a meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials.  Journal of general internal medicine ,  31 (1), 109-116.
• Jafari, S., Hezaveh, E., Jalilpiran, Y., Jayedi, A., Wong, A., Safaiyan, A., & Barzegar, A. (2021). Plant-based diets and risk of disease mortality: a systematic review and meta-analysis of cohort studies.  Critical reviews in food science and nutrition , 1-13.
• Kim, H., Caulfield, L. E., Garcia‐Larsen, V., Steffen, L. M., Coresh, J., & Rebholz, C. M. (2019). Plant‐based diets are associated with a lower risk of incident cardiovascular disease, cardiovascular disease mortality, and all‐cause mortality in a general population of middle‐aged adults.  Journal of the American Heart Association ,  8 (16), e012865.
• Kim, H., Caulfield, L. E., & Rebholz, C. M. (2018). Healthy plant-based diets are associated with lower risk of all-cause mortality in US adults.  The Journal of nutrition ,  148 (4), 624-631.
• Knoops, K. T., de Groot, L. C., Kromhout, D., Perrin, A. E., Moreiras-Varela, O., Menotti, A., & Van Staveren, W. A. (2004). Mediterranean diet, lifestyle factors, and 10-year mortality in elderly European men and women: the HALE project.  Jama ,  292 (12), 1433-1439.
• Olfert, M. D., & Wattick, R. A. (2018). Vegetarian diets and the risk of diabetes.  Current diabetes reports ,  18 (11), 1-6.
• Qian, F., Liu, G., Hu, F. B., Bhupathiraju, S. N., & Sun, Q. (2019). Association between plant-based dietary patterns and risk of type 2 diabetes: a systematic review and meta-analysis.  JAMA internal medicine ,  179 (10), 1335-1344.
• Ramey, M. M., Shields, G. S., & Yonelinas, A. P. (2020). Markers of a plant-based diet relate to memory and executive function in older adults.  Nutritional neuroscience , 1-10.
• Satija, A., Bhupathiraju, S. N., Spiegelman, D., Chiuve, S. E., Manson, J. E., Willett, W., … & Hu, F. B. (2017). Healthful and unhealthful plant-based diets and the risk of coronary heart disease in US adults.  Journal of the American College of Cardiology ,  70 (4), 411-422.
• Saxe, G. A., Major, J. M., Nguyen, J. Y., Freeman, K. M., Downs, T. M., & Salem, C. E. (2006). Potential attenuation of disease progression in recurrent prostate cancer with plant-based diet and stress reduction.  Integrative cancer therapies ,  5 (3), 206-213.
• Solway, J., McBride, M., Haq, F., Abdul, W., & Miller, R. (2020). Diet and dermatology: the role of a whole-food, plant-based diet in preventing and reversing skin aging—a review.  The Journal of clinical and aesthetic dermatology ,  13 (5), 38.
• Tantamango-Bartley, Y., Jaceldo-Siegl, K., Fan, J., & Fraser, G. (2013). Vegetarian diets and the incidence of cancer in a low-risk population.  Cancer Epidemiology and Prevention Biomarkers ,  22 (2), 286-294.
• Tran, E., Dale, H. F., Jensen, C., & Lied, G. A. (2020). Effects of plant-based diets on weight status: a systematic review.  Diabetes, Metabolic Syndrome and Obesity: Targets and Therapy ,  13 , 3433.
• Turner-McGrievy, G. M., Davidson, C. R., Wingard, E. E., Wilcox, S., & Frongillo, E. A. (2015). Comparative effectiveness of plant-based diets for weight loss: a randomized controlled trial of five different diets.  Nutrition ,  31 (2), 350-358.
• Yokoyama, Y., Nishimura, K., Barnard, N. D., Takegami, M., Watanabe, M., Sekikawa, A., … & Miyamoto, Y. (2014). Vegetarian diets and blood pressure: a meta-analysis.  JAMA internal medicine ,  174 (4), 577-587.

Physical Health Benefits Studies

Physical health benefits of vegetarianism (including impact on weight loss and the skin)

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vegetarianism

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• PBS - The History Kitchen - From Pythagorean to Pescatarian - The Evolution of Vegetarianism
• Ancient Origins - Unearthing the Ancient Roots of Vegetarianism
• UNESCO World Heritage Convention - Vegetarianism and Vegan Diet
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Moral Vegetarianism
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• The Nemours Foundation - For Parents - Vegetarianism
• The Nemours Foundation - For Teens - Becoming a Vegetarian
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vegetarianism , the theory or practice of living solely upon vegetables , fruits , grains , legumes , and nuts —with or without the addition of milk products and eggs —generally for ethical , ascetic , environmental, or nutritional reasons. All forms of flesh (meat, fowl, and seafood ) are excluded from all vegetarian diets, but many vegetarians use milk and milk products; those in the West usually eat eggs also, but most vegetarians in India exclude them, as did those in the Mediterranean lands in Classical times. Vegetarians who exclude animal products altogether (and likewise avoid animal-derived products such as leather , silk , honey , and wool ) are known as vegans . Those who use milk products are sometimes called lacto-vegetarians, and those who use eggs as well are called lacto-ovo vegetarians; those who exclude land-based meats, like vegetarians, but consume fish and shellfish are called pescatarians . Among some agricultural peoples, flesh eating has been infrequent except among the privileged classes; such people have rather misleadingly been called vegetarians.

Deliberate avoidance of flesh eating probably first appeared sporadically in ritual connections, either as a temporary purification or as qualification for a priestly function. Advocacy of a regular fleshless diet began about the middle of the 1st millennium bce in India and the eastern Mediterranean as part of the philosophical awakening of the time. In the Mediterranean, avoidance of flesh eating is first recorded as a teaching of the philosopher Pythagoras of Samos (c. 530 bce ), who alleged the kinship of all animals as one basis for human benevolence toward other creatures. From Plato onward many pagan philosophers (e.g., Epicurus and Plutarch ), especially the Neoplatonists , recommended a fleshless diet; the idea carried with it condemnation of bloody sacrifices in worship and was often associated with belief in the reincarnation of souls and, more generally, with a search for principles of cosmic harmony in accord with which human beings could live. In India, followers of Buddhism and Jainism refused on ethical and ascetic grounds to kill animals for food. Human beings, they believed, should not inflict harm on any sentient creature. This principle was soon taken up in Brahmanism and, later, Hinduism and was applied especially to the cow . As in Mediterranean thought, the idea carried with it condemnation of bloody sacrifices and was often associated with principles of cosmic harmony.

In later centuries the history of vegetarianism in the Indic and Mediterranean regions diverged significantly. In India itself, though Buddhism gradually declined, the ideal of harmlessness ( ahimsa ), with its corollary of a fleshless diet, spread steadily in the 1st millennium ce until many of the upper castes , and even some of the lower, had adopted it. Beyond India it was carried, with Buddhism, northward and eastward as far as China and Japan . In some countries, fish were included in an otherwise fleshless diet.

West of the Indus the great monotheistic traditions were less favorable to vegetarianism. The Hebrew Bible , however, records the belief that in paradise the earliest human beings had not eaten flesh. Ascetic Jewish groups and some early Christian leaders disapproved of flesh eating as gluttonous, cruel, and expensive. Some Christian monastic orders ruled out flesh eating, and its avoidance has been a penance and a spiritual exercise even for laypersons. A number of saints, such as St. Anthony of Egypt , were noted vegetarians. Many Muslims have been hostile to vegetarianism, yet some Muslim Sufi mystics recommended a meatless diet for spiritual seekers.

The 17th and 18th centuries in Europe were characterized by a greater interest in humanitarianism and the idea of moral progress, and sensitivity to animal suffering was accordingly revived. Certain Protestant groups came to adopt a fleshless diet as part of the goal of leading a perfectly sinless life. Persons of diverse philosophical views advocated vegetarianism; for example, Voltaire praised it, and Percy Bysshe Shelley and Henry David Thoreau practiced the diet. In the late 18th century the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham asserted that the suffering of animals, like the suffering of humans, was worthy of moral consideration, and he regarded cruelty to animals as analogous to racism .

Vegetarians of the early 19th century usually condemned the use of alcohol as well as flesh and appealed as much to nutritional advantages as to ethical sensibilities. As before, vegetarianism tended to be combined with other efforts toward a humane and cosmically harmonious way of life. Although the vegetarian movement as a whole was always carried forward by ethically inclined individuals, special institutions grew up to express vegetarian concerns as such. The first vegetarian society was formed in England in 1847 by the Bible Christian sect, and the International Vegetarian Union was founded tentatively in 1889 and more enduringly in 1908.

Vegetarianism and Its Causes Essay

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Common Reasons for Becoming a Vegetarian

Economic reasons, animal protection, health-related restrictions.

Today, the vegetarian diet is becoming more widespread, and the reasons for this are rather different. Some people are influenced by the popular vegan culture, while others are concerned about protecting animal rights. Not everybody knows about the most common reasons to become a vegetarian. For example, economic factor influences eating habits of many low-income families who cannot allow buying meat. People who call for animal protection adopt a vegetarian diet to demonstrate their respect for animals. Finally, specific health conditions may become the reason to eliminate meat-containing products from the menu to maintain well-being. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the most common causes of vegetarianism in detail.

The choice of a vegetarian diet can be explained by different factors that are highly individual. Some people choose this lifestyle to reduce family expenses; others follow personal principles or eliminate meat to remain healthy. At the same time, inhumanity towards animals is considered the most widespread reason for choosing vegetarianism. In this part of the essay, all causes mentioned above will be discussed separately.

The first cause to discuss is connected with economic reasons or the inability to include meat in everyday diet. Many families consider vegetarianism an effective way to reduce expenses. Indeed, meat is usually more expensive than vegetables, fruits, or grains, and low-income families may find it difficult to buy meat regularly. At the same time, the nutrients contained in meat can often be found in other products. For example, beans and eggs are much cheaper than meat but can provide a human with sufficient proteins. Finally, reducing the consumption of meat may positively influence the agricultural sector, as the demand for vegetables, legumes, and grains may increase.

One of the most powerful and widespread causes of vegetarianism is connected with ethical issues related to animal protection. For some people, abstinence from meat is a matter of principle rather than gastronomical preference. Like people, animals have feelings, and many vegetarians consider eating meat unethical and disrespectful of living creatures. Besides, livestock animals are bred and held in inappropriate conditions. In captivity, animals often live in small pounds, where they have no room to move freely; some of them are forcefully nourished or injected with hormones. The cattle are usually treated in a violent way, and animals live in constant pain and suffering; in the end, they are killed through violent methods. Many vegetarians share the opinion that a meat-based diet is a sign of inhumanity. On the contrary, plant-based ration is often seen as a way to fight for animal rights.

The last cause to analyze is connected with particular health conditions when meat should be excluded from the everyday menu. Medical specialists prescribe a vegetarian diet to people with diabetes, cardiac problems, and other dysfunctions. A plant-based diet reduces the risk of health deterioration and provides a human with the necessary nutrients. It is also scientifically proved that vegetarianism is beneficial for overall well-being. As the organism requires more energy to digest meat, vegetarians are usually more active, have greater stamina, and are in better shape than meat-eaters. Besides, meat-based products often contain chemical supplements and flavor intensifiers that are harmful to health. Preservatives allow meat to be stored on the shelves for a longer time, though these additives may lead to allergy, intolerance, or other conditions. As a result, vegetarians have more chances to avoid health-related risks.

To sum up, it is important to emphasize that a wholesome lifestyle and overall well-being are based on a sensible and balanced diet. The choice of eating habits is individual since different people have their own opinions about healthy products. Plant-based and meat-based diets have already been profoundly studied by many specialists. Referring to multiple scientific works, many people say that vegetarianism is the only way to provide the body with nutrients, remain healthy and active, and contribute to one’s environmental and spiritual balance.

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What Do You Think About Vegetarianism?

By Shannon Doyne

• Sept. 17, 2018

Are there vegetarians or vegans in your life? Are you a vegetarian or vegan?

What challenges have you noticed vegetarians and vegans sometimes face? What about the meat eaters around them — do they ever face any challenges as well?

In “ When Your Child Believes Meat Is Murder ,” Julie Halpert writes:

According to a 2014 Harris Poll, there are about two million vegetarians — defined as someone who never consumes meat, fish, seafood or poultry — ages 8 to 18 in the United States, representing 4 percent of that age group. That exceeds the 3.3 percent of adults surveyed who declare themselves vegetarian. Many children at very young ages are deciding to become vegetarians on their own, driven primarily by ethical concerns and the toll that meat production takes on the environment. … Inevitable tensions can arise when a child feels that eating meat constitutes murder and can’t tolerate other family members doing so. Rachel Gunther’s son, Elias, decided to become a vegetarian at the age of 4, repulsed by the idea that animals were being killed for food. He was deeply troubled that his younger brother, Theo, continued to eat meat. “It was a difficult parenting moment,” said Ms. Gunther, who lives in Cambridge, Mass., and is associate director for Youth on Board, which supports young people organizing for change in their communities and in their own lives. She used the conflict as an opportunity to teach empathy. She would say, “Elias, you need to understand how your actions affect Theo and vice versa.” Elias, now 12, became a vegan two years ago, while his younger brother ultimately gave up his beloved pepperoni pizza and made the choice to become a vegetarian, as did the rest of the family. They were the subject of a short documentary, “Elias’s Stand,” which can be seen on Facebook.

Students, read the entire article, then tell us:

— Do you identify with anything in the article? If so, what?

— Are there any foods that you either choose not to eat or cannot eat?

— What is your advice for people who avoid certain foods when eating in places like school cafeterias, friends’ houses and the like?

— What do you think it is like to be a parent of children who adhere to different diets?

— At your home, are there food items that some people eat while others do not? If so, how does this affect meal preparations?

— Do you think vegetarianism or veganism is a worthwhile diet and pursuit for some? Explain.

— To what degree does your school cafeteria address the needs of students who have dietary restrictions?

Students 13 and older are invited to comment. All comments are moderated by the Learning Network staff, but please keep in mind that once your comment is accepted, it will be made public.

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Vegetarianism/veganism: a way to feel good.

1. Introduction

2. literature insights and background information, 2.1. vegetarianism and veganism—definition and perception, 2.2. sociodemographics, 2.3. motivations, values and attitudes, 2.4. transition process, 2.5. vegetarianism/veganism in social contexts, 3. method and sample.

• MP stresses the dynamics of psychological development in everyday life and the mechanism that drives these developments [ 64 ], while gestalt psychology focuses on gestalt patterns, the morphological approach extends the theory of gestalt to a dynamic and developmental perspective called “gestalt in motion”. More specifically, it aims to identify the opposing motivations that determine psychological development. By focusing on dynamics and development, it integrates Goethe’s ideas of morphology [ 64 ].
• MP acts on the assumption that unconscious and preconscious dimensions influence the behavior and experience of consumers and that there is a reason for the relevant psychological aspects to not become conscious. In line with psychoanalytical theory, it identifies the underlying psychodynamic mechanisms and provides a comprehensive system to explain psychological phenomena. Like psychoanalysis, morphological psychology considers a meaningful structure as given, even if the phenomena do not appear to make sense at first glance [ 31 ].
• Acquisition and transformation describe the fundamental motive of striving for security, continuity and preserving what has been achieved so far on the one hand, in relation to the striving for change, dynamics and development on the other hand.
• Impact and structure refer to the fundamental motive for individuality, self-positioning and influence in close relation to structure, rules and being embedded in the social environment.
• Expansion and resources capture the fundamental motive for achieving ideals in close relation to a person’s abilities and knowledge as well as awareness and acceptance of personal limitations.

4.1. Liberation

4.2. empowerment and enrichment, 4.3. gaining attention and autonomy, 4.4. creating identity and superiority, 4.5. vegetarianism and veganism, 5. discussion, 6. conclusions, author contributions, institutional review board statement, informed consent statement, data availability statement, conflicts of interest, ethics statement.

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Simons, J.; Vierboom, C.; Klink-Lehmann, J.; Härlen, I.; Hartmann, M. Vegetarianism/Veganism: A Way to Feel Good. Sustainability 2021 , 13 , 3618. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13073618

Simons J, Vierboom C, Klink-Lehmann J, Härlen I, Hartmann M. Vegetarianism/Veganism: A Way to Feel Good. Sustainability . 2021; 13(7):3618. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13073618

Simons, Johannes, Carl Vierboom, Jeanette Klink-Lehmann, Ingo Härlen, and Monika Hartmann. 2021. "Vegetarianism/Veganism: A Way to Feel Good" Sustainability 13, no. 7: 3618. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13073618

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A ‘Life-Style Choice’ or a Philosophical Belief?: The Argument for Veganism and Vegetarianism to be a Protected Philosophical Belief and the Position in England and Wales

Paul mckeown.

Northumbria School of Law, Northumbria University, City Campus East 1, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 8ST UK

Rachel Ann Dunn

The recent judgment in Casamitjana Costa v The League Against Cruel Sports in England and Wales held that ethical veganism was a protected philosophical belief under employment law. In contrast, vegetarianism was found not to be a protected philosophical belief in Conisbee v Crossley Farms Limited and others . The authors argue that the Employment Tribunal misunderstood the notion of vegetarianism when deciding that it was a ‘life-style choice’. There are different kinds of vegans and vegetarians, each with their own way of practising the philosophy which influences how they live their life. Not all people who follow a meat-free diet should be afforded this protection, and it depends on whether their belief is one which is determined by certain factors, such as animal welfare and environmentalism, rather than for health purposes. The authors explore the arguments and analysis in the above employment cases, coming to the conclusion that the tribunals oversimplified what it means to hold values such as veganism and vegetarianism, failing to understand the differences between different classifications and sub-groups when coming to a decision. The different kinds of vegans and vegetarians and their characteristics are outlined, before determining whether this should constitute protection under employment law, protecting individuals from discrimination. The situation in the USA and Canada regarding this issue is very different, and there are parallels drawn with attempting to establish veganism or vegetarianism as a religion, and where they could benefit from the recent decision in England and Wales. Finally, this paper concludes that ethical and environmental veganism and vegetarianism should both qualify as protected philosophical beliefs, but other kinds may fall short of what is required to satisfy the requirements under law.

Introduction

Veganism is by no means a new concept, but has become more prominent in recent years, particularly in the UK. Statistics show that in 2018 the UK had the highest number of new vegan products launched, 1 which is understandable when the number of vegans has risen to 600,000 in 2019, from 150,000 in 2014, with about half of UK vegans converting in 2018. 2 Other research found that vegetarianism is the most popular non-meat diet, followed by pescatarian and then vegan, with an estimation that 6.7 million British adults currently follow a meat-free diet, but with an indication that this will rise to 12 million by the end of 2020. 3 The reasons for becoming vegetarian or vegan 4 vary, including to improve health, the environmental impacts and, the main motivation, animal welfare concerns.

Despite the rising popularity of veganism and vegetarianism, those who practice as vegans or vegetarians can be subjected to discrimination. There are reasons as to why individuals are opposed to the vegan diet, and actively argue against it, with views that ‘predation is natural and that animals often kill and eat each other.’ 5 Others see it as an attack on their autonomy of choice or a conflict with the omnivore’s majority beliefs. 6 Some of the difficulties vegans report in their life is eating out, finding vegan substitutes for clothing and household products, and feeling isolated from omnivore family and friends. 7 Further, vegans and vegetarians face stereotypes and prejudices on a regular basis, such as the belief they want to convert omnivores to veganism and are judgmental toward them, that they are hippies and all are animal activists. 8 Some even hide their beliefs in the workplace, for the fear of prejudice, or avoid conversations about their beliefs at mealtimes, wanting to avoid confrontation. 9

Though vegetarians and vegans may have such a strong belief, they are not more biased than meat eaters, but as Adams argues, they ‘do not benefit as meat eaters from having their biases actually approved of by the dominant culture’. 10 Further, it has been trivialised, or seen as a ‘distraction’ from other important aspects of history, and judged as irrelevant to other topics such as sexism and racism. 11 This discrimination, or bias, does happen though, and studies have found that vegans and vegetarians are subjected to attitudes which are equivalent or more negative than common prejudice target groups, including significantly more negatively than black people, and overall vegans were viewed more negatively than vegetarians. 12 This was not, however, in all aspects of life, and they were not subject to less willingness to be hired for a job or rented accommodation compared to other target groups, including immigrants and atheists. 13 This kind of bias even has a name: veganphobia. This bias and discrimination can affect individuals in the work place, for example being forced to use animal products in the workplace, 14 or their taxes going toward systems which abuse animals, ‘forcing vegans to contribute to something they strongly disagree with.’ 15

In January 2020, an Employment Tribunal in England held ethical veganism to be a philosophical belief and therefore a protected characteristic pursuant to the Equality Act 2010. 16 As such, ethical vegans may gain protection from discriminatory treatment. In contrast however, an Employment Tribunal previously held that vegetarianism was not capable of satisfying the requirements of being a philosophical belief. 17 The authors will argue that these cases oversimplified concepts of veganism and vegetarianism. In particular, the authors will analyse what it means to hold beliefs in veganism and vegetarianism, and how the tribunal failed to understand the differences between different classifications and sub-groups when coming to a decision.

This article begins by defining religion, philosophical beliefs and creeds, looking at the legal position in the England and Wales, US and Canada. A discussion of the philosophy of veganism and vegetarianism follows, looking at the work of Francione specifically, before exploring the influencing factors of becoming, and kinds of, a vegan or vegetarian. It is analysed whether veganism and vegetarianism are protected philosophical beliefs, exploring recent case law in the England and Wales, and whether they should be protected. Finally, this article concludes which classifications of veganism and vegetarianism should both qualify as protected philosophical beliefs, though, some classifications may fall short of what is required to satisfy the requirements under law.

Defining Religion, Philosophical Beliefs and Creeds

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief , and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice , worship and observance . 18 {emphasis added}

The text above acknowledges the universal human right to thought, conscience and beliefs. This right is further enshrined into international law through Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966. The movement to eradicate discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief is further re-enforced through the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. Whilst Article 1(1) of the aforementioned Declaration re-iterates the language of ‘thought, conscience and religion’, Article 1(2) states, ‘No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have a religion or belief of his choice .’{emphasis added}

Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) also enshrines the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, whilst within the European Union, Article 10 the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union embeds freedom of ‘thought, conscience and religion’ within member states. 19 Whilst there have been no cases determining the meaning of thought, conscience and religion within the context of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the matter has been considered in relation to the ECHR.

Religion is not defined within the text of Article 9 nor in the European Court of Human Rights case law. 20 This is deliberate, as any definition would need to be ‘both flexible enough to embrace the whole range of religions worldwide…and specific enough to be applicable to individual cases—an extremely difficult, indeed impossible undertaking.’ 21 However, Article 9 ECHR has been held to apply to ‘the “major” or “ancient” world religions’, ‘new or relatively new religions’ and ‘various coherent and sincerely-held philosophical convictions’. 22

Freedom of belief, including secular beliefs, is well established in international law, as summarised above. However, whilst international law recognises the freedom of religion and belief, the protection of these freedoms needs to be afforded at domestic level for individuals to meaningfully avail themselves to protection of these freedoms as the discrimination will often emanate from individuals or private companies rather than the State. Further, where freedom of religion and belief are protected at domestic level, it is for national authorities to interpret the extent of the protection afforded based upon their jurisdictional definition of religion and belief, or whatever wording each jurisdiction may utilise. The difficulties on establishing an international consensus on the definition of religion and belief can be seen with certain ‘religions’ such as the Church of Scientology. 23

Within England and Wales, religion and belief are a protected characteristic pursuant to the Equality Act 2010. 24 Whilst claims for contravention of the ECHR can only be brought against public authorities, 25 courts and tribunals must interpret legislation, so far as is possible, in a way which is compatible with the ECHR. 26 As such, the definition of religion and belief is a ‘broad definition in line with the freedom of thought, conscience and religion guaranteed by Article 9’. 27

Religion is defined under the Equality Act 2010 as ‘any religion and a reference to religion includes a reference to a lack of religion.’ 28 Thus, religion is defined as itself. The definition encompasses traditional religions such as Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam and Judaism but also smaller religions such as Rastafarianism or Paganism, as long as it has a clear structure and belief system. 29 The approach appears to be that whilst religion is not defined in England and Wales, the courts and tribunals will know it when they see it.

Section 10(2) of the Equality Act 2010 defines ‘belief’ as ‘any religious or philosophical belief and a reference to belief includes a reference to a lack of belief.’ 30 In determining what constitutes a ‘philosophical belief’, the Explanatory Notes to the Equality Act 2010 provide some guidance stating the belief ‘must be genuinely held; be a belief and not an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available; be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour; attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance; and be worthy of respect in a democratic society, compatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others.’ 31 Further, the belief must have a similar status or cogency to a religious belief. 32

There is an inherent problem in providing a statutory definition for philosophical beliefs due to the widely varying beliefs that individuals may hold and which of these beliefs should be protected. As with religion, it has therefore been left to the courts to define whether a particular belief should be protected and indeed the guidance set out above was implied or introduced by reference to the jurisprudence. 33

In the United States, freedom of religion is established by the First Amendment of the Constitution stating that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…’ 34 Whilst the First Amendment regulates the role of the Government in legislating on religion, it does little to protect individuals from being discriminated against by other individuals or private organisations. At Federal level, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) prohibits employment discrimination on the grounds of, inter alia, religion. 35 In contrast to the Equality Act 2010, Title VII only refers to ‘religion’, not ‘religion and belief’. It is therefore necessary to consider the definition of religion for the purposes of Title VII. Religion is defined broadly to include ‘all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief…’ 36 Whilst it includes all traditional religions, it also encompasses unorganised and less common systems of belief. 37 The US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) have adopted the definition of religion given by the US Supreme Court in United States v Seeger and therefore, it is religious if it is “a sincere and meaningful belief that occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by…God.” 38 As such, religious beliefs include theistic and non-theistic beliefs, although beliefs are not protected merely because they are strongly held. 39 In United States v Meyers , 40 the court set out the following factors to assist in determining whether a belief is religious: Ultimate Ideas; Metaphysical Beliefs; Moral or Ethical System; Comprehensiveness of Beliefs; and Accoutrements of Religion. 41 The latter factor considers the following: Founder, Prophet, or Teacher; Important Writings; Gathering Places; Keepers of Knowledge; Ceremonies and Rituals; Structure or Organization; Holidays; Diet or Fasting; Appearance and Clothing; and Propagation. 42

The court recognised that no one factor is dispositive, and instead the factors should be seen as ‘criteria’ that if ‘minimally satisfied’ should include the beliefs with the term religion. 43 However, ‘[p]urely personal, political, ideological, or secular beliefs probably would not satisfy enough criteria for inclusion.’ 44 Examples of beliefs falling outside the definition of religion include: nihilism; anarchism; pacifism; utopianism; socialism; libertarianism; Marxism; ‘vegetism’; and humanism. 45 Such an effect this has had on gaining protection for veganism and vegetarianism in the US, some have argued for the establishment of a Church of Animal Liberation, to provide a religious organization for those who wish to seek protection and accommodation for their beliefs in animal rights. 46

In contrast to the United States Constitution, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Canadian Charter) enshrines ‘conscience and religion’ as well as ‘thought, belief, opinion and expression’ as fundamental freedoms. 47 Moon posits that ‘distinguishing religious beliefs/practices from secular beliefs/practices’ in Canada resolves the problem ‘which has bedevilled the American courts’. 48 However, the Canadian Charter only applies to Governments, not disputes between individuals, businesses and other organisations.

The Canadian Human Rights Act does prohibit discrimination on the grounds of religion. 49 Whilst the Act only applies to federally regulated activities, each province and territory has its own anti-discrimination laws, adopting differing approaches to religion and creed. 50 The Supreme Court of Canada has defined religion broadly ‘as a particular and comprehensive system of faith and worship’ which ‘tends to involve the belief in a divine, superhuman or controlling power.’ 51 However, this definition did not include ‘secular, socially based or conscientiously held’ beliefs. 52 The Supreme Court of Canada summarised the definition stating:

…religion is about freely and deeply held personal convictions or beliefs connected to an individual’s spiritual faith and integrally linked to one’s self-definition and spiritual fulfilment, the practices of which allow individuals to foster a connection with the divine or with the subject or object of that spiritual faith. 53

In 2015, the Ontario Human Rights Commission updated their ‘Policy on preventing discrimination based on creed’. Whilst creed was previously interpreted to mean religion, 54 in the updated policy, creed was defined to ‘also include non-religious belief systems that, like religion, substantially influence a person’s identity, worldview and way of life.’ 55 Whilst there is no single definition, the factors identifying a creed within this policy are; it is sincerely, freely and deeply held; it is integrally linked to a person’s identity, self-definition and fulfilment; it is a particular and comprehensive, overarching system of belief that governs one’s conduct and practices; it addresses ultimate questions of human existence, including ideas about life, purpose, death, and the existence or non-existence of a Creator and/or a higher or different order of existence; and it has some “nexus” or connection to an organization or community that professes a shared system of belief. 56

In considering the various definitions used, it is clear that religion, philosophical beliefs and creed have been interpreted broadly. However, the various jurisdictions have been reluctant to include secular beliefs, which would include veganism and vegetarianism, within the definition of religion. Whilst the position is still unclear with regards to the United States, which will be considered below, a secular belief system is more likely to be protected when legislation expressly differentiates between religion and other beliefs. This can be seen in international law, specifically within the context of the ECHR, within England and Wales protecting philosophical beliefs, and in Ontario, Canada developing the definition of creed as distinct from religion.

There is also a distinct similarity between the factors determining whether a belief constitutes a philosophical belief in England and Wales, or a creed in Ontario, Canada as shown in Table  1 below. 57 This suggests that philosophical belief and creed are synonymous with one another.

Table 1

Factors determining a philosophical belief in England and Wales or a creed in Ontario, Canada

Protection Afforded to Philosophical Beliefs and Creeds

The extent of protection afforded by anti-discrimination legislation varies between jurisdictions. In England and Wales, the Equality Act 2010 makes it unlawful to discriminate against an individual on the grounds of a protected characteristic. The Act applies to numerous areas such as the provision of services, 58 housing, 59 employment, 60 education, 61 and associations. 62 As such, individuals are protected from discrimination in many aspects of their lives. There is a wide breadth of this protection in comparison to anti-discrimination legislation in other jurisdictions. For example, Title VII only relates to the employment field, and therefore does not offer protection from discrimination in other areas such as the provision of services. Further, it only applies where an employer employs fifteen or more employees. 63 As such, there are significant limitations in the protection afforded under Title VII. However, there are various statutes in each State protecting freedom of religion. The Canadian Human Rights Act applies in the areas of the provision of goods and services, 64 commercial and residential premises 65 and employment. 66 The Canadian Human Right Act is limited to Federally regulated activities although each Province has their own anti-discrimination legislation.

The Equality Act 2010 protects individuals from different types of discrimination, namely: direct; indirect; harassment; and victimisation. Whilst there will be instances of individuals experiencing direct discrimination 67 i.e. not being employed because of their vegan beliefs; in many instances, it is likely that an employer or service provider simply does not cater for their requirements. For example, a failure to provide a vegan meal option or the requirement to wear a uniform manufactured with non-vegan products. The issue is not that the individual is vegan per se, it is the manifestation of those vegan beliefs, i.e. their dietary requirements or refusal to wear clothes manufactured from animal products, which places the individual at a disadvantage in comparison to non-vegans.

Under Article 9 ECHR, 68 the freedom of religion and belief is an absolute right. However, the right to manifest those beliefs may be limited where it is ‘prescribed by law and…necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ 69

The Equality Act 2010 protects individuals from discrimination because of a manifestation of their religion or belief through indirect discrimination where a ‘provision, criterion or practice’ is applied equally, whether or not individuals share the protected characteristic but places individuals who share the protected characteristic at a particular disadvantage in comparison to those who do not share the characteristic, placing the individual at a disadvantage. 70 However, unlike direct discrimination, indirect discrimination can be justified if it can be shown to be a ‘proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.’ 71

With reference to the above examples, a failure to provide a vegan food option or the imposition of a uniform policy is a ‘provision, criterion or practice’ which would clearly put an individual who is vegan at a disadvantage compared with a non-vegan. The question therefore is whether an employer or service provider can establish that the ‘provision, criterion or practice’ was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. Section 19 of the Equality Act 2010 should be read compatibly with Article 9(2) ECHR. What is proportionate will differ in every case, so the more serious the impact of the policy, criterion or practice, the greater the justification will need to be for implementing the policy.

Courts and tribunals will balance business needs against the impact on the group disadvantaged. In applying this to the above scenarios, it is likely that the provision of a vegan meal option or allowance of a suitable alternative uniform will suffice to negate any claims for indirect discrimination. However, an example where the provision, criterion or practice may be proportionate is a requirement for a vegan shop worker to handle notes, which are made with animal products, as the business requires the handling of cash. Further, it may be appropriate to discipline an employee for proselytising about their vegan convictions if it violates the dignity of other workers. 72

Individuals will also be protected from harassment which is defined as unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic which has the purpose or effect of violating their dignity, or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. 73 As such, individuals will be protected from bullying or mockery due to their philosophical beliefs and/or the manifestation of those beliefs.

Similar types of discrimination are included within Title VII prohibiting disparate treatment, 74 disparate impact, 75 a failure to accommodate religion, 76 and harassment. 77 The right to reasonable accommodation for religion protects those manifesting their belief, and offers a greater degree of protection than indirect discrimination within England and Wales as there is no requirement to establish a disproportionate impact on a group, merely the individual.

Under the Canadian Human Rights Act, direct discrimination (or disparate treatment) is unlawful within the prescribed areas, 78 as is harassment 79 and retaliation 80 (similar to victimisation). However, a discriminatory policy or practice is only applicable to employment matters albeit there is no justification defence. 81 Once again, different Provinces have their own anti-discrimination legislation.

Philosophy of Vegetarianism and Veganism

The concept of vegetarianism and veganism has been explored in the literature around animal ethics, with philosophers such as Peter Singer 82 and Tom Regan 83 arguing for the abstaining of eating meat and potentially other animal derived products, albeit with differing philosophical underpinnings to come to this conclusion. None are more aligned to the principles of ethical veganism, or abolitionist veganism, than Gary Francione, who argues that this diet rejects any use of animal products, and is ‘the moral baseline for the animal rights movement.’ 84 He rejects any other reasons, or approaches, for animal rights, stating that environmental vegans, or philosophers such as Singer who may allow for the use of animals in certain circumstances, are not really vegans, and do not see veganism as a “philosophy of living” but merely a lifestyle. 85 Thus, those who are serious about the animal rights movement are those who adopt this philosophy in all aspects of their life, and accept that animal lives have moral significance, rejecting their current commodity status. 86 Francione takes his abolitionist view further than food, and argues that we should not have companion animals (though he himself has dogs he sees as ‘refugees’) and should cease to bring domesticated non-human animals into existence, purely for our benefit. 87 This is the same as in Casamitjana Costa, where the Claimant did not live with a companion animal.

Ethical and environmental vegans ‘make their choices in line with their core values. They want to live in alignment with their beliefs.’ 88 Thus, in order to do so, they change the way in which they live their life, adhering to a set of rules which looks to minimise the detrimental impacts a non-vegan life can have on sentient beings and the environment. This can be seen as the practice Ahimsa, the vow of non-injury, the prime practice in Jainism. Apparently, all ‘Jainas are strict vegetarians, living solely on one-sense beings (vegetables) and milk products. Alcohol, honey, and certain kinds of fig are also prohibited, because they are said to harbour many forms of life.’ 89 Thus, it can be seen how veganism has developed from the practice of Ahimsa, taking the vow of non-injury further and modernised it, to incorporate other forms of nonviolence, such as cosmetic and medical products and clothing, which has come at the expense of violence to animals. It is important to note that the philosophy of Ahimsa also extends to non-injury to the environment, and has been argued to be capable of addressing current bio-diversity issues the planet is facing. 90 Thus, though animal rights advocates, such as Francione, argue that ethical veganism is the only way to project animals to a higher moral and legal standing and produce consistent behaviour, it seems that environmental vegans and their beliefs are also encapsulated by the teachings of Ahimsa and the philosophy on non-injury. The teachings of Ahimsa were discussed in Casamitjana Costa, and it was highlighted that the Claimant lived his life in line with these teachings and beliefs, which will be discussed in more detail below.

There are arguments which seek to undermine the philosophy and practice of ethical veganism, however, and they should be addressed. Some people argue that ethical veganism does not, for example, minimise the suffering of animals, due to how many animals are killed in fields from the ploughing of fields and harvesting of vegetables and grains. 91 Therefore, ‘a vegan diet doesn’t necessarily mean a diet that doesn’t interfere with the lives of animals.’ 92 This is true, and in the process of gathering food, whether on an industrial or home-grown organic scale, there will be other beings harmed in the process. Francione argues that this is unavoidable, and all human actions have consequences, some of them adverse. This is no reason, though, to argue against the use of animals and the intentional harm humans cause to them. 93 This is the thinking that helped the Claimant in Casamitjana Costa, and the fact that he would only use animal by-products where there was no other alternative, and only after exhausting all reasonable steps ‘to ensure that his consumption contributes as little as possible to the suffering and/or exploitation of sentient beings no matter how remote that is.’ 94 This was to the extent of food products, such as figs, which he believed would cause harm, and is consistent with the practices of Ahimsa. Whilst the argument of unintentional harm is valid, it does not affect the beliefs held by ethical vegans.

Veganism and Vegetarianism Dissected

There is a clear distinction between veganism and other kinds of non-meat diets, and there is a large variety of diets available. For example, pescatarians do not eat meat, but eat fish and other seafood, as well as other animal derived products, like milk, eggs and cheese. Vegetarians do not eat meat, including ingredients such as gelatine, but eat other animal derived products. Vegans, on the other hand, do not eat any animal derived products, including honey. It is defined by the Vegan Society as ‘a way of living which seeks to exclude, as far as is possible and practicable, all forms of exploitations of, and cruelty to, animals for food, clothing or any other purpose.’ 95 This has been a gradual shift in movement from a promotion of a vegetarian diet to a vegan diet, starting in the early 1900’s in the UK, where the Vegetarian Society broke off into two strands with some asking for vegetarians to refrain from eating eggs, milk and products made with them. 96 Leneman states that the main argument for a vegan diet was ‘always the cruelty, inseparable from the acquisition of dairy products, and the linkage of the meat and dairy industries.’ 97 There were, however, other arguments including health and consistency with the philosophy. 98 Thus, it is necessary to explore why individuals choose to go vegetarian or vegan, before going on to discuss in depth the different kinds of diets. There are other influencing factors for going vegetarian or vegan, including religion and as part of the feminist movement, but for the purposes of this article and focusing on protected philosophical beliefs, only factory farming, animal welfare, the environment, health, and working conditions in slaughter houses will be discussed.

The Farming Industry

It is no longer a secret that the farming industry has industrialised and, as a result, intensive farming practices have ensued. 99 Harrison acknowledges that as ‘people become richer, they tend to want more meat, with the result that more and more animals are being farmed for food.’ 100 Since the publication of Animal Machines in 1964, 101 which first exposed the suffering inflicted on animals in factory farms, there have been some significant changes, particularly in the EU and the UK. For example, veal crates, which restrict the movement of calves who are usually tied by their necks, have been banned in the UK since 1990, 102 and the EU brought in a ban in 2006. 103 These crates, however, are still legal in countries such as the US. Whilst there have been some significant improvements, there are certain pressures contributing to intensive farming, such as population growth, urbanization, economic growth and nutrition transition. 104 As a result of this demand, the farming industry has developed to incorporate increasing use of technology, (such as artificial insemination, and advanced feeding systems), suffered structural changes (influenced by factors such as cost reduction), and lessened the restraints of local resources, (such as the rise of supermarkets). 105

These intensive farming practices are having a negative impact on animal welfare, the environment, public health, and the welfare of slaughter house workers.

Animal Welfare

Compassion in World Farming state that 74 billion animals are reared for food each year, with 50 billion reared for food through intensive farming on factory farms. 106 There are many animals which are reared for food, including, but not limited to, cattle, pigs, sheep and chickens, and those who are reared on factory farms face dismal living conditions before slaughter. As stated above, this was brought to light in the UK through the book Animal Machines , 107 but there are others who have shed light on the conditions such as Peter Singer in Animal Liberation , 108 PETA and Compassion in World Farming. The conditions in which animals live on these farms are too extensive to fully outline in this article, but a small discussion will illustrate how they contribute to the factors of becoming a vegan or vegetarian and the philosophy of such practices.

Compassion in World Farming state that there are more than 50 billion chickens reared annually for food, either broiler chickens or egg-laying hens, 109 making them the most farmed animal in the world. For example, 110 in the UK there were 157,000 cattle slaughtered in April 2020, 111 compared to 104 million broiler chickens in the same month. 112 On these farms, chickens are often kept in battery cages, 113 no larger than a single sheet of A4 paper, which restricts them from exhibiting normal behaviour patterns, such as nesting or foraging for food. 114 Further, due to crowding, egg-laying hens feather-peck each other, leading to injuries. As a result, it is practice to de-beak the bird, removing a part of the beak with a hot blade and no aesthetic. 115 Broiler chickens are kept in barns with no natural lighting, and are barren apart from food and water. They are bred to grow intensively, resulting in their legs not being able to carry their weight and suffer from leg disorders. Many die in these sheds from excessive heat, heart attacks, and ammonia pollution produced by their droppings. 116 This is one example of the animal welfare issues on factory farms, but there are many conditions deemed to be ‘common practice’ which result in immense suffering for various animals, such as cows, pigs and sheep.

Vegans, particularly ethical vegans, take the point of animal welfare further, and their philosophy is influenced by other animal welfare issues outside of factory farms. For example, strict ethical vegans do not eat honey, as they believe the harvesting of honey does not abide by their definition of veganism, and it exploits the bees involved in the process. 117 The honey industry can involve specific breeding of honey bees to increase productivity and clipping the wings of queen bees to prevent them setting up a colony elsewhere. Further, there are many animal welfare issues associated with industries such as fur, 118 cosmetic and medical testing, 119 and animals used in entertainment. 120 Clearly our use of animals raises ethical and moral questions, those which vegans, and perhaps to a lesser extent vegetarians, have answered with abolishing any involvement with such industries and choosing to live a life which does not contribute to such welfare violations. After all, the consumer is somewhat responsible for the continuation of such suffering of animals, and to reduce this responsibility DeGrazia argues we should live by the following moral rule: ‘make every reasonable effort not to provide financial support to institutions that cause extensive unnecessary harm.’ 121

Environmental Factors

It is becoming more prominent that current farming practices, whether that be for food or other industries such as factory and fur farming, are causing an impact on our environment. The Pew Commission reported that there are three main causes of environmental degradation resulting from intensive farming: large volumes of animal waste, the disposal of these materials and unsustainable water usage and soil degradation associated with feed. 122 There are other issues, including factory farming releasing large amounts of toxic air emission, such as ammonia, causing a risk to public health. 123 Waste can also disturb the environment, and the enjoyment of it, in other ways, such as the odours from poultry facilities attracting flies and rodents, which can carry disease. 124

Land degradation is a common result of unsustainable agricultural practices, and ‘refers to a temporary or permanent decline in the productive capacity of the land of its potential for environmental management.’ 125 This not only damages the environment, but can also affect national food supply, trade and malnutrition. 126 The decrease in the usage of this land due to degradation reduces productivity, and therefore has an economic consequence for farmers, pushing farmland into natural habitats, causing land destruction. This impacts on climate change, loss of biodiversity and depletion of water resources. 127 With regard to climate change, it is becoming increasingly clear that greenhouse gas emissions are severely contributed to by animal agriculture, and agriculture is ‘directly responsible’ for approximately 20% of greenhouse gasses produced by human-generated emissions. 128 By lowering the number of intensively farmed animals, we can lower the impact on climate change. Further, it is predicted that climate change will make it harder to produce enough food needed to meet growing population demands. 129 It is important to recognise that some non-meat diets can also negatively contribute to climate change, and there needs to be consideration still as to which products are consumed in order for the positive impacts to be fully realised. 130

Lastly, there is ‘easily enough grain protein, if used sensibly, to feed every human on earth.’ 131 Not only could this grain protein be used to feed humans rather than animals, but the amount of energy (calories) livestock feed consumes is almost 43%, and animal products return 29%, making it an inefficient system. 132 The amount calories used to feed animals could, therefore, be used directly as human food, creating an annual calorie need for over 3.5 million people. 133

The impact of intensive farming on rural communities has been researched, noting detrimental effects on physical health, mental health, and social health. For example, Horrigan et al. note how pollution from factory farms harms the health of workers and residents, causing respiratory diseases such as asthma, bronchitis and organic dust toxic syndrome. 134 This is caused by the environmental impacts, discussed above.

Factory farms also use antibiotics and hormones, as a way to limit diseases in livestock and promote growth and weight gain. 135 However, this has caused antimicrobial resistance in the environment, and more drug resistant infections have increased in humans. In fact, it is becoming such an issue that the World Health Organisation has asked that farmers and the food industry refrain from routinely using antibiotics. 136 Some countries have, and the EU banned the use of antibiotics for growth production in 2006. 137 The reasons for this are the serious health implications this resistance can have for human health. For example, LA-MRSA identified in pig production is a health risk for the farmers and veterinarians who come into contact with the animals and, though it is unclear what the public health relevance is of consuming contaminated meat, it has been found in pork and meat products. 138

As well as antimicrobial resistance, other concerns with factory farming include the transmission of zoonotic diseases from animals to humans, becoming increasingly more common and prevalent. Morse et al. outline how no pandemic pathogens have been predicted before appearing in humans, 139 though over 70% of emerging infection diseases in humans are zoonotic. 140 For example, the current Covid-19 pandemic is thought to have started in a wet-market in Wuhan, China, which sold wildlife as meat. 141 These issues aren’t isolated to wet-markets, however, and there are many opportunities for animal diseases to jump to humans. Morse et al. identify three stages to assess pandemic potential, the first being no human infection, but factors can contribute to transmission between hosts, expanding within its population, and be transmitted to other non-human populations, increasing likeliness of transmission to humans. Moving of livestock and transportation of wildlife for food can all contribute to a stage 1 emergence. 142 The Food and Agriculture Organisation have stressed that transport systems are ‘ideally suited for spreading disease, as the animals commonly originate from different herds or flocks and are confined together for long periods in poorly ventilated, stressful environments.’ 143 However, there are also cases of animal–animal and animal-human disease being spread from animals transported for use in research, horses moved for equestrian competitions, and in the exotic pet trade. 144

Another health aspect to take into consideration is the health benefits which come with a low meat, or non-meat, diet. It has been shown that high meat consumption, particularly of red meat, can cause cancers, heart disease, type 2 diabetes, and abstinence from meat products, even a vegetarian diet, can significantly lower mortality rates from these illnesses. 145 It is important to highlight, however, that there are some health negatives from following these diets, however, particularly with veganism which can cause some deficiencies if not substituted adequately. 146

There is less focus on the working conditions in factory farms and slaughterhouses, but it is becoming more discussed. In the Global South, such as Kenya, very few slaughterhouses provide their workers with protective equipment and hand washing facilities, and a high level of illnesses is reported. 147 In western societies, there are still dangers associated with the job, mainly due to speed at which slaughterers have to work in order to meet targets. Injuries include musculoskeletal injuries, such as carpal tunnel syndrome, and more life-threatening injuries, often with the knives used to cut through bone. 148 Workers have reported being crushed by animals falling out of apparatus or kicked by them as they struggle. 149 There are even deaths caused by poisonous fumes being inhaled while cleaning a blood-collection tank. 150

Accounts of emotional and mental health of slaughterers being affected have emerged, leading to alcohol related problems and even suicide. 151 This has been confirmed by research, which found that slaughterers during the initial stages of their employment had frequent vivid dreams about their work, feeling guilt and shame. In order to deal with these emotions, workers adopt psychological defences and become emotionally detached from their work. This can lead to expressions of anger which spill over into the home as abuse and violence. 152 Though there is no evidence of a vegan of vegetarian choosing to adopt the belief because of this issue, with emerging research and information it may become an influencing factor.

There is also an issue with the wages of slaughterers which have fallen below that of an average manufacturing wage, 153 to maintain production speed despite more meat being produced, and workers not being allowed to go to the toilet and wearing adult diapers or refraining from urinating and causing health issues. 154 The conditions for workers is clearly a very important issue, and one that Muller says to ignore ‘is to ignore a key corner of the intersectional labyrinth that is the pursuit of social justice.’ 155

Different Branches of Veganism and Vegetarianism

How people practice veganism does differ, and a study found that those who ‘created and abided by personal, idiosyncratic definitions of veganism, which were considerably less strict and often included dairy products and honey’, compared to those who followed the rules set by the Vegan Society. 156 As stated above, there are various reasons why one becomes a vegan, and Greenebaum separates vegans into three district categories: health, environmental and ethical vegans. 157 The authors would actually add another kind of vegan which, whilst has links to other groups of vegans, has its own distinct set of characteristics: the humanitarian vegan. There was not any previous research found, which explored this kind of vegan, though some may mention it as an influencing factor and link it to environmental factors, and it may be because there is not enough awareness of these issues. Nonetheless, the authors felt it important to include. Not all of the issues discussed in the previous sections will influence an individual to become vegan, but can be factors in the decision to follow the diet and lifestyle.

What becomes more complicated is where vegetarianism fits into the argument, with some people putting ethical vegetarianism and veganism in the same category. 158 Further, there was less literature which focused solely on ethical vegetarianism, and some which referred to ethical veganism as ‘strict vegetarianism’. 159 The main difference is that, whilst both abstain from eating meat, not all vegetarians will refrain from eating other animal derived products (e.g. eggs) or using animal derived products (e.g. leather), but some will. The differences and similarities between the groups can be different for each individual, and it is not simple to state that vegans have a stronger ethical belief than vegetarians do. Veganism is a relatively newer concept, when one considers the history and development of vegetarianism, and veganism, outside of religion, began as a concern for animal welfare. 160 There are different strands of vegetarianism, such as lacto-ovo vegetarians, who do not eat meat, but eat diary and eggs, or ovo vegetarians, who include eggs in their diet, but not meat or milk/milk products. 161 The underpinning beliefs of animal welfare and environmental practices may be the same, but the practice of those beliefs may vary, 162 and it is not only veganism, but also vegetarianism, which can be seen as ‘being about defining the self, defining who one is, what sort of being one is, what it is to be human and the relationship one has with the non-human…’ 163 Thus, due to the consistent grouping of these terms, they are discussed together, but some of the differences are highlighted throughout the discussions

Figure  1 displays the different kinds of vegans, and the general characteristics which contribute to their belief and identity based on previous research which has explored these influencing factors:

Different kinds of vegans and influencing factors

Munroe’s research argues that ethical vegetarianism is part of the animal welfare movement, a kind of DIY activism, ‘used by activists to publicize an issue as well as to disrupt life in its immediate vicinity.’ 164 To disrupt this life even further, ethical vegans do not use any animal derived products at all, including those in cosmetics or clothing. Greenebaum states an ethical vegan is someone who ‘adopts a vegan diet for moral, ethical and political reasons. The diet forms only part of a lifestyle that is structured around philosophy of animal rights.’ 165 Further, her research found that ethical vegan participants saw veganism as a belief and ‘“liv[ing] in a connected way to the world around you.”’ 166 Their philosophy was so strong that the ethical vegan participants did not like the approach of the health vegans, stating that the purpose of giving up animal products is to no longer harm animals, not to lose weight. Maxim groups the health and environmental rationales together, stating they are merely dietary preferences. 167 The authors would not necessarily agree with this, as ethical, environmental and humanitarian vegans all have an external factor which drives their belief in veganism and dictates how they live, whether this be the treatment of animals or the influence on climate change. A health vegan is the only kind which has an internal driving force, usually the need to control, or prevent, an illness and for the health and body image benefits.

These findings are consistent with other studies, where the driving factor for becoming a vegan was animal welfare issues, followed by health considerations. 168 Mann’s study also found that an influencing factor was that a vegan diet can feed more people, linking into arguments of humanitarian veganism outlined above, as well as the impacts on the environment. 169 Further, a quarter of participants reported being vegetarian, before making the change to veganism, some as a purposeful transition into veganism, and some ultimately moving that way to further eliminate animal cruelty. 170 Interestingly, two vegans in this study who stated they did not follow a vegan lifestyle solely became vegans for health purposes. 171 There are some studies which show, however, that the driving factor for becoming a vegan was for health reasons. 172 Thus, the reasons for becoming a vegetarian or vegan are complex, multi-faceted, and can evolve and change over time.

Is Veganism and Vegetarianism a Protected Philosophical Belief?

Vegan convictions have long been held to fall within the scope of Article 9 ECHR following the 1993 decision in W v the United Kingdom . 173 However, whether veganism and vegetarianism are protected philosophical beliefs has only recently been tested in the domestic courts and tribunals of England and Wales. 174

In 2011, an Employment Tribunal in Hashman v Milton Park (Dorset) Limited t/a Orchard Park found belief in the sanctity of life to fall within the definition of philosophical belief. 175 Beliefs in the sanctity of life incorporated ‘beliefs in the value of life or veganism, environmentalism and animal rights activism.’ 176 As such, it was clearly arguable that veganism and vegetarianism could be regarded as philosophical beliefs.

There was discussion during the passage of the Equality Bill through Parliament as to whether veganism and vegetarianism were included within the definition of philosophical belief, with Baroness Warsi stating:

…the weight of case law meant that only serious and important beliefs would be included as a religious or philosophical belief for the purposes of the law…to include cults and other lifestyle choices such as veganism and vegetarianism is to make something of a farce of the debates that we had. 177

This statement highlights that the inclusion of veganism and vegetarianism within the definition of philosophical belief was controversial, equating veganism and vegetarianism to a ‘cult’. The Equality and Human Rights Commission initially included veganism as an example of a belief attaining protection under the Equality Act stating in draft guidance:

A person who is a vegan chooses not to use or consume animal products of any kind. That person eschews the exploitation of animals for food, clothing, accessories or any other purpose and does so out of an ethical commitment to animal welfare. This person is likely to hold a belief which is covered by the Act. 178

The Government did not share the view that veganism was covered although accepted the decision was ultimately for the courts to determine. 179 The above cited example of veganism as a protected belief did not appear in the final guidance.

In 2019, in Conisbee v Crossley Farms Limited and others , 180 an Employment Tribunal rejected that vegetarianism was capable of being a philosophical belief within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010. The Claimant, a barman/waiter, alleged that he had been bullied during the course of his employment because he was a vegetarian. 181 The Claimant’s vegetarianism stemmed from his belief ‘that the world would be a better place if animals were not killed for food.’ 182 It was accepted that the Claimant was a vegetarian, that he had a genuine belief in his vegetarianism, 183 and that the practice of vegetarianism was worthy of respect in a democratic society and not incompatible with human dignity. 184 However, the tribunal concluded that the belief in vegetarianism was an opinion and view point, 185 which could not be described as a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour, merely a life style choice. 186 Finally, the tribunal concluded that the Claimant’s belief did not attain the required level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance as vegetarians could adopt the practice for many different reasons such as lifestyle, health, diet, concern about the way animals are raised or indeed, personal taste. 187 Further, the tribunal stated that the belief did not have a similar status or cogency to that of religion. 188

In contrast to Conisbee , ethical veganism was held to be a philosophical belief in the subsequent Employment Tribunal case, Casamitjana Costa v The League Against Cruel Sports , 189 decided in January 2020. The Claimant alleged that he had been dismissed after he wrote to colleagues advising them that their pensions were being invested in non-ethical funds, specifically pharmaceutical and tobacco companies known to engage in animal testing, and the only ethical fund offered by their employer offered worse rates of return than other ethical funds on the market. 190 The Claimant alleged that the investments were ‘directly contradictory to the reason for the existence and values of the organisation.’ 191 Further, the investment also contravened the Claimant’s beliefs as set out below. It is important to highlight that the judgments in both Casamitjana Costa and Conisbee are First Instance decisions, and therefore not binding. The decisions in these judgments may not be followed in other Employment Tribunals and may be reversed if appealed. 192

The Claimant in Casamitjana Costa did not eat any animal products nor did he purchase any animal products, including products tested on animals; his beliefs had other consequences for his life. 193 Examples include:

• He would not allow non-vegan food to be brought into his home by any other person;
• He would not consume food where he believed its production harmed animals in any way;
• He would not attend any spectacle involving live animals, including zoos, circuses and animal races;
• He would not live with an animal companion;
• He would avoid social gatherings where non-vegan food was to be served;
• He would not date a non-vegan nor share his property with anyone who was not vegan;
• If his destination was within an hour’s walking distance, the Claimant would normally walk rather than use public transport to avoid accidental crashes with insects or birds; and
• He would usually pay for purchases using with a credit card or coins, avoiding as far as possible notes which have been manufactured using animal products. 194

It is interesting to contrast the rationale for the difference in finding vegetarianism not to be a philosophical belief whilst ethical veganism is regarded a philosophical belief. 195

Opinion and Viewpoint

In Conisbee , the tribunal held that the ‘Claimant’s belief in vegetarianism was his opinion and viewpoint in that the world would be a better place if animals were not killed for food .{emphasis added}’. 196 In Casamitjana Costa , the tribunal found that ethical veganism was more than an opinion and viewpoint stating:

…ethical veganism carries with it an important moral essential. That is so even if the Claimant may transgress on occasions. It is clear it is founded upon a longstanding tradition recognising the moral consequences of non - human animal sentience which has been upheld by both religious and atheists alike. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the Claimant personally holds ethical veganism as a belief. He has clearly dedicated himself to that belief throughout what he eats, where he works, what he wears, the products he uses, where he shops and with whom he associates. It clearly is not simply a viewpoint, but a real and genuine belief and not just some irrational opinion. 197 {emphasis added}

It is difficult to reconcile the reasoning given in these two cases. In both cases, the Claimants established a belief in how humans used animals; the difference seemingly the extent of that belief and its manifestation. In McClintock v Department of Constitutional Affairs, 198 the Employment Appeal Tribunal differentiated a ‘belief’ from an ‘opinion or viewpoint’ stating:

…to constitute a belief there must be a religious or philosophical viewpoint in which one actually believes; it is not enough “to have an opinion based on some real or perceived logic or based on information or lack of information available.” 199

In Conisbee , the Claimant’s belief that the world would be a better place if animals were not killed for food appears to be just that: a belief. The judgment does not make any reference to any logic or information which would support the Claimant merely having an opinion or viewpoint. The Claimant in Conisbee asserted that it was ‘wrong and immoral to eat animals’. 200 As such, there is an analogy with the reasoning in both Hashman v Milton Park (Dorset) Limited t/a Orchard Park 201 and Casamitjana Costa . The common feature of all these cases is the belief in the relationship between humans and animals. However, it is perhaps the case that sanctity of life encompasses beliefs in the value of life or veganism, environmentalism and animal rights activism, thus impacting upon the individual’s life to a greater extent than merely adopting a vegetarian diet. Similarly, veganism, particularly in the case of Casamitjana Costa , also has a significant impact upon the individual’s daily life. This, however, suggests that the test in some way relies upon the extent and manifestation of the belief and therefore the test has been wrongly applied, as the law does not provide that the manifestation belief has to be extreme or applicable to every aspect on the individual’s life.

Lifestyle Choice

In Conisbee , whilst acknowledging the Claimant’s belief in vegetarianism was an ‘admirable sentiment’, the tribunal determined that it was a lifestyle choice that could not ‘altogether be described as relating to weight and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour.’ 202 It is clear that the Claimant’s vegetarianism in Conisbee did not impact upon his daily life as much as the that of the Claimant’s veganism in Casamitjana Costa , therefore it is necessary to consider what differentiates a belief from a mere lifestyle choice.

It is not necessary for a philosophical belief to ‘govern the entirety of a person’s life’. 203 Indeed, vegetarianism was suggested as an example of such a belief. 204 Again, it is difficult to reconcile the reasoning provided in each of the cases. The tribunal accepted in Casamitjana Costa the ‘relationship between humans and other fellow creatures is plainly a substantial aspect of human life’ 205 and therefore it should follow that someone who does not eat animal flesh due to their belief that it is ‘wrong and immoral’ should also satisfy this aspect of the test as it is more than a mere lifestyle choice.

Cogency, Seriousness, Cohesion and Importance

In Conisbee , the tribunal rejected the notion that vegetarianism attained a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. 206 The tribunal compared vegetarianism with veganism stating ‘the reason for being a vegetarian differs greatly…unlike veganism where the reasons for being a vegan appear to be largely the same.’ 207 The tribunal assert that there are many reasons to become vegetarian; lifestyle, health, diet, animal welfare and personal taste. 208 However, the tribunal state that vegans do not accept the practice of eating animal flesh or products under any circumstances, due to a distinct concern about the way animals are reared and a ‘clear belief that killing and eating animals is contrary to a civilised society and also against climate control.’ 209 A similar statement was made in Casamitjana Costa acknowledging ethical veganism as attaining cogency, cohesion and importance describing ethical veganism as:

a way of life which seeks to exclude as far as possible and practical all forms of exploitation and cruelty to animals for food, clothing or any other purpose and by extension promotes the development and use of animal free alternatives for the benefit of humans, animals and the environment. 210

In Conisbee , the tribunal were dismissive of the notion that vegetarianism achieved a similar status or cogency to that of religion. The judgment provides little in the way of reasoning, merely stating it was not enough to have a belief relating to an important aspect of human life or behaviour. 211 Interestingly, the tribunal in Casamitjana Costa did not expressly consider whether veganism attained a similar status or cogency to that of religion, albeit this finding could be implied from the discussion of veganism’s root in Ahimsa. 212 Ahimsa was not discussed greatly in the judgment, but was highlighted that the concept of veganism is rooted in it, that it is the belief of causing no harm or injury, and that the Claimant followed these principles as a firm believer.

The tribunal has misunderstood the concepts of vegetarianism and veganism, using the terminology generally where the concepts are, in reality, more nuanced. As discussed above, there are different classifications and subsets of vegetarians and vegans. Each classification or subset of veganism or vegetarianism should be considered to determine whether they satisfy the criteria for protection as a philosophical belief.

Whether veganism or vegetarianism are protected in the United States remains debateable. Schwartz outlines how ethical veganism as religious discrimination is not a new idea in the United States, but has ‘never fully made its way to the courts on its merits.’ 213 To the authors’ knowledge, the only decided cases on the matter have found against veganism being recognised as a religion. In 2002, Friedman v Southern California Permanente Medical Group , 214 determined that veganism was not a ‘religious creed’ within the meaning of meaning of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. In 2006, a Californian Federal Court found that veganism was not a religion for the purpose of the First Amendment in relation to a prisoners request for a vegan diet. 215 However, the EEOC has indicated that that they consider that a ‘strict vegetarian’ does fall within the definition of religion for the purposes of Title VII. 216 Further in 2012, the United States District Court Southern District Of Ohio Western Division found ‘it plausible that [the Plaintiff] could subscribe to veganism with a sincerity equating that of traditional religious views.’ 217 In both cases, the matter settled before a court determination and therefore, whilst these cases have not established that ethical veganism is a religion, they have also not finished the conversation of it in the courts.

The question of veganism and vegetarianism have not been tested before any Canadian court within the authors’ knowledge. In the 2012 case, Ketenci v Ryerson University , 218 the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario did not find it necessary to consider whether ethical veganism fell within the definition of creed pursuant to the Ontario Human Rights Code. 219 The tribunal determined that the applicant had no reasonable prospect of establishing that she was discriminated against because of her beliefs in ethical veganism. 220

The Ontario Human Rights Commission did consider veganism within their consultation on the definition of creed. Drawing upon the work of Labchuck and Szytbel, it was suggested that confining the definition of creed to religion could result in the absurdity of differently sourced beliefs in ethical veganism being protected differently. 221 Labchuck provided the example of: (1) a Jain follower, who is vegan for religious reasons; (2) a practising Christian who sees veganism as a religious duty: (3) A Christian who is vegan, but is a vegan for secular moral relating to animal welfare; and (4) An atheist who is an ethical vegan for strictly secular moral reasons. 222 Labchuck argued that excluding secular beliefs from the definition of creed would result in the ‘apparent logical absurdity’ that protection would only apply to the first two examples despite all being equally committed to the same ethical vegan beliefs. 223

As a consequence of the above consultation, the ‘Policy on preventing discrimination based on creed’ 224 was updated to explicitly state creed included non-religious beliefs. Based upon the consultation, there is clearly an argument that creed includes ethical veganism.

It appears the definition of creed will be tested before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario to determine whether it includes ‘ethical veganism’ in the case of Knauff v Ministry of Natural Resources . This case concerns a firefighter, with a belief in ethical veganism, alleging a chronic lack of vegan food and cross-contamination in the preparation of the food. 225 The Casamitjana Costa case is likely to be cited persuasively with Mr Knauff’s lawyer, Wade Poziomka, quoted as saying:

[It] demonstrates to the HRTO that ethical veganism as a creed is not necessarily something novel. Ontario is not being asked to lead the way in respect of this issue—we’re simply asking the Tribunal to apply the facts of Adam’s particular case and his particular belief-system to the already-accepted creed standard in Ontario. This case shows it is already happening elsewhere. 226

The development of the law around philosophical beliefs or creeds demonstrate that ethical veganism can be protected pursuant to anti-discrimination legislation. Indeed, Mr Knauff is hoping the ruling in his case ‘could be influential in other provinces and internationally.’ 227 The legal profession within Canada also acknowledge the development in this area with one lawyer commenting:

Times are changing. While the development of creed as a protected ground is in its infancy, we fully expect that this will become an important aspect of human rights protections in British Columbia in the near future. 228

Should Veganism and Vegetarianism be a Philosophical Belief?

This article has so far outlined the law relating to discrimination and protected philosophical beliefs, and the different kinds of veganism and vegetarianism, and their influencing factors. The following section analyses and discusses whether they should in fact be protected philosophical beliefs and, if so, to what extent.

The authors concur with the decision in Casamitjana Costa to the extent that ethical veganism should be protected as a philosophical belief. Further, the authors argue that ethical vegetarianism should also be considered a philosophical belief. What becomes more difficult is where we draw the line with what kinds of vegans and vegetarians benefit from the above law. Schwartz argues that this is dependent on how the ethical vegan/vegetarian lives their life, and how they present their arguments. 229 Though the practice of veganism may be similar between the different groups outlined above, it is the underlying belief of the practice which is philosophical, or religious as some argue, in nature. 230 This is a difficulty Schwartz outlines, for example, what position does a court take for a health vegan turned ethical vegan? We know from the studies discussed above that some of those who began as a vegan other than ethical, have since done research and moved over to the ethical branch. Would this restrict their claim of it being a protected philosophical belief, or even religion? The authors argue not, as the reason for starting the practice is irrelevant to the beliefs held at the time of the discrimination, and the seriousness with which they are held. It will be based on the individual and how they practice and hold that belief, as long as they maintain that it is a philosophy, which influences how they live their life and the choices they make. It is useful at this point to make an analogy with religion. It is clear that an individual who has found, or converted to religion, whatever that religion may be, would be protected from discrimination on the grounds of that religion.

Whilst the case for ethical veganism appears to be well established, should other types of veganism warrant protection as a philosophical belief? The case of Casamitjana Costa highlights how the Claimant lived in a way which held the belief of ethical veganism, linked to a philosophical belief that we should not harm animals, closely linked to Ahimsa philosophy. He refused to consume any food which he believed had harmed animals, but beyond this, he would not live with companion animals, and would avoid travelling on public transport which could potentially harm insects or birds. It is clear that his ethical veganism was a belief which was found to have cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. The authors argue that this should be the same principles are applicable for environmental vegans, with support from Grainger plc and others v Nicholson, 231 which held that climate change is a protected philosophical belief. Health vegans, on the other hand, practising veganism solely for intrinsic reasons and to benefit their own health, should not be protected under law.

The authors posit that health vegans would not satisfy the criteria for establishing a philosophical belief. Firstly, it is an opinion and viewpoint that a vegan diet is healthier than a non-vegan diet. By definition, if an individual is adopting a diet for health reasons, if there was evidence to suggest an alternative non-vegan diet was healthier, it is likely their opinion and viewpoint would change. At the very least, they would consider the alternative. Secondly, the authors suggest that health veganism is a lifestyle choice that cannot be described as relating to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour. Finally, health veganism is entirely intrinsic and therefore, in the authors’ view, lacks the necessary level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. If health veganism were considered a philosophical belief, then the belief in attending the gym might also be considered a philosophical belief. For the same reasons, the authors suggest that health veganism does not have a similar status or cogency to a religious belief.

The issue with Casamitjana Costa being the first case to state ethical veganism as a protected philosophical belief, is just how extremely the Claimant follows the practices and the extents he goes to, to ensure that he is not participating in the harm of animals. For future cases, it is not sure how strict a vegan has to be, or how much impact they let it have on, or influence in, their life. In Conisbee , for example, though the Claimant held a belief that it was wrong to kill and eat other animals, it was not found strong enough to be held as a philosophical belief, but rather an opinion or a view point. The authors believe the Employment Tribunal adopted a simplistic definition of vegetarianism and, as discussed in this article, there are many different branches of vegans and vegetarians with different influencing factors. It has already been argued that ‘at best Conisbee could be described as a muddled judgment; at worst, it is seriously flawed. 232 Many vegetarians would strongly disagree that their belief is a lifestyle choice and not a philosophical belief. Further, as highlighted above, studies have shown that a number of vegans become vegetarian first before making the transition, so to deny that they have that philosophical belief whilst going on that journey is an incorrect and narrow view. As Edge stressed, the view of ethical vegetarianism that killing and eating animals is morally wrong, is wider than the decision in Hashman v Milton Park (Dorset) Ltd , that animals should not be hunted for sport. 233 There needs to be a middle ground, and ethical vegetarianism, or even environmental vegetarianism, should fall on the side of protection. We can again draw an analogy with religion and consider the comparison between devout and non-devout followers of a religion. Whilst their practice, or the manifestation of the religion, may be different, the underlying belief is the same. If we consider the application of this in Conisbee and Casamitjana Costa , whilst the manifestation of their belief was significantly different, they both believed it was morally wrong to kill animals.

The authors suggest that it is misconceived to determine whether an individual has a philosophical belief based upon the label of being a vegan or a vegetarian. Whilst many vegans are likely to satisfy the criteria to qualify as a philosophical belief, some vegans may not. Similarly, some vegetarians may satisfy the criteria whilst others will not. In essence, the court or tribunal need to consider the underlying rationale as to why an individual practices veganism or vegetarianism to determine whether it is a philosophical belief, not merely looking at the manifestation of their veganism or vegetarianism. The classifications and subsets of veganism and vegetarianism may assist in this determination but ultimately, each belief is personal.

Whilst we can criticise the approach adopted by the tribunal, Casamitjana Costa demonstrates that ethical veganism has been judicially recognised as a philosophical belief, building upon the jurisprudence of the EHCR. Casamitjana Costa provides persuasive authority that ethical veganism should be a protected belief not only in other cases within England and Wales, but also in other jurisdictions. There is a distinct challenge in veganism and vegetarianism being recognised as a religion, as illustrated in the United States. However, where non-secular beliefs are protected independently of religious beliefs, there is a stronger argument for inclusion. The wording of legislation protecting non-secular beliefs may take different forms; ‘thought and conscience’; ‘philosophical beliefs’; or ‘creed’. After all, the language used is synonymous.

However, the mere recognition of ethical veganism as a protected belief does not necessarily mean significant changes in the protection afforded. The extent of protection varies across jurisdictions in the areas subject to protection on the grounds of religion and belief, as well as the types of discrimination afforded protection. The authors have identified the broad range of discrimination experienced by vegans and vegetarians, often as a consequence of the manifestation of their beliefs. There will therefore be a continuing question as to how far it is reasonable to protect or accommodate those beliefs.

What has become clear throughout this article is that there is no clear definition of a vegan or a vegetarian, and what influences the choice to abstain from meat, and possibly other animal derived products, is not necessarily based on one factor. There are potentially multiple reasons as to why an individual chooses to practice veganism or vegetarianism, which can change and evolve over time. What this does mean, however, is that it can impact on whether it is perceived to be a protected philosophical belief, worthy of protection of the law.

In Casamitjana Costa it was clear that the Claimant has a deeply rooted philosophical belief in his veganism, to the extent that it impacted on almost every aspect of his life. What is concerning, though, is how this extremity will affect future claims and the extent a claim will have to go to, in order to justify their veganism or vegetarianism as a philosophical belief. This is exactly the issues faced in the previous case of Conisbee , where his vegetarianism was deemed to be a lifestyle choice, rather than appreciating that it also ‘expresses the conviction that to be fully human is to have reverence for all life, especially sentient life. This includes a rejection of violence.’ 234

Whilst the judgment in Casamitjana Costa is a First Instance decision, and therefore not binding, it is important. It has sent a message that the philosophical belief in ethical veganism, which has been justified through research and academic writings, is recognised, and can be protected from discrimination. The comparison to religion is not one the authors think is a substantial argument, and it is important to recognise and protect beliefs which are secular, and more aligned to philosophical beliefs or creeds. Rather than try to fit veganism and vegetarianism into the narrow definition of religion, or even argue for the establishment of a Church of Animal Liberation, 235 those who hold this belief can still be adequately protected and realised by law.

Veganism and vegetarianism are genuine philosophical beliefs which, to the individuals who believe and practice it, is important and impacts greatly on their everyday life. This belief is strong, but not only for ethical vegans, it is also present in ethical and environmental vegans and vegetarians. The criteria and practices for establishing this belief should not be held to the high standard provided in Casamitjana Costa, and extended to others who hold the belief, though they may not practice it as extremely as what has been established in law. The belief that is held philosophically needs to be established in law, so that those who practice it can be protected from discrimination in law.

Acknowledgements

We are very grateful to Professor Tanya Wyatt, for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this work.

Compliance with Ethical Standards

On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no conflict of interest.

1 Mintel Press Office, #Veganuary: UK Overtakes Germany as World’s Leader for Vegan Food Launches , (January 10th 2019) https://www.mintel.com/press-centre/food-and-drink/veganuary-uk-overtakes-germany-as-worlds-leader-for-vegan-food-launches .

2 Vegan Trade Journal, Almost Half of UK Vegans Made the Change in the Last Year, According to New Data (19th November 2018) https://www.vegantradejournal.com/almost-half-of-uk-vegans-made-the-change-in-the-last-year-according-to-new-data/ .

3 Finder, UK Diet Trends 2020 (27 April 2020) https://www.finder.com/uk/uk-diet-trends .

4 Agricultural and Horticulture Development Board, Consumer Insights , (July 2018) https://media.ahdb.org.uk/media/Default/Consumer%20and%20Retail%20Insight%20Images/PDF%20articles/ConsumerInsights%20WEB_1653_180725.pdf .

5 Matthew Calarco, Being toward meat: anthropocentrism, indistinction, and veganism, 38 Dialect Anthropol 415, 426 (2014).

6 Cara C. MacInnis and Gordon Hodson, It ain’t easy eating greens: Evidence of bias toward vegetarians and vegans from both source and target, 20(6) Group Processes and Intergroup Relations 721 (2017).

7 Kelsey Steele, The Vegan Journey: An Exploration of Vegan Experiences with Vegan from Burlington, Vermont, Environmental Studies Electronic Thesis Collection 23, University of Vermont (2013).

8 Kelsey Steele, The Vegan Journey: An Exploration of Vegan Experiences with Vegan from Burlington, Vermont, Environmental Studies Electronic Thesis Collection 23, University of Vermont (2013); Anna Lindquist, Beyond Hippies and Rabbit Food: The Social Effects of Vegetarianism and Veganism Honors Program Theses, University of Puget Sound (2013).

9 Anna Lindquist, Beyond Hippies and Rabbit Food: The Social Effects of Vegetarianism and Veganism Honors Program Theses, University of Puget Sound (2013); Lisa Johnson, The Religion of Ethical Veganism, 5(1) Journal of Animal Ethics 31 (2015); Swinder Janda and Phillip J. Trocchia, Vegetarianism: Toward a Greater Understanding, 18(12) Psychology and Marketing 1205 (2001).

10 Carol J. Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory, xxxvii (Bloomsbury Academic 2015).

11 Id. 142.

12 Cara C. MacInnis and Gordon Hodson, ‘It ain’t easy eating greens: Evidence of bias toward vegetarians and vegans from both source and target’ 20(6) Group Processes and Intergroup Relations 721, 726 (2017).

13 Id. 726–727.

14 Donna D. Page, Veganism and Sincerely Held Religious Beliefs in the Workplace: No Protection without Definition, 7 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 363 (2005).

15 Oscar Horta, ‘Discrimination Against Vegans’ 24 Re Publica 359, 370 (2018).

16 Casamitjana Costa v The League Against Cruel Sports [2020] ET 3331129/2018 (England and Wales).

17 Conisbee v Crossley Farms Limited and others [2019] ET 3335357/2018 (England and Wales).

18 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights art.18.

19 The Treaty on European Union art. 6 (as amended by Treaty of Lisbon).

https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_9_ENG.pdf .

22 Id. para 17.

23 Id. paras 21–22.

24 The Equality Act 2010 consolidated discrimination and equality legislation that had developed over a period of more than 40 years. Prior to the Equality Act 2010, religion and belief was protected under The Employment Equality (Religion and Belief) Regulations 2003. The Employment Equality (Religion and Belief) Regulations 2003 were introduced pursuant to the United Kingdom’s obligations under Council Directive (EC) 2000/78.

25 Human Rights Act 1998 section 7.

26 Id, section 3.

27 Equality Act 2010, Explanatory Notes, para.51; see also Harron v Chief Constable of Dorset Police [2016] IRLR 481 (England and Wales).

28 Equality Act 2010, section 10(1).

29 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Religion or belief discrimination: Advice and Guidance https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/advice-and-guidance/religion-or-belief-discrimination ; see also Equality Act 2010, Explanatory Notes, para.51.

30 Equality Act 2010, Explanatory Notes, para.52.

32 Grainger plc and others v Nicholson [2010] I.C.R. 360, 370 (England and Wales); Regulation 2 of The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 defined ‘religion or belief’ as ‘any religion, religious belief, or similar philosophical belief.’ {emphasis added} As such, under the Regulations, a ‘philosophical belief’ would need to have some similarity to the definition of religion or religious belief to gain protection under the Regulations. The Regulations were amended by section 77(1) of the Equality Act 2006 to remove the word ‘similar’. As explained by Baroness Scotland, it is not clear whether the word ‘similar’ adds to the definition describing it as ‘redundant’ as ‘any philosophical belief must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance, must be worthy of respect in a democratic society and must not be incompatible with human dignity.’ (HL Deb 13 July 2005, vol 673, col 1109–1110).

33 See Grainger plc and others v Nicholson [2010] I.C.R. 360, 369–370 (England and Wales).

34 U.S. Const. amend 1. art 1.

35 42. U.S.C. §2000e-2.

36 42. U.S.C. §2000e-2(j).

37 EEOC, Compliance Manual Section 12: Religious Discrimination (22 July 2008) https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/section-12-religious-discrimination.

40 906 F. Supp. 1494 (D. Wyo. 1995).

41 Id. 1502.

42 Id. 1502–1503.

43 Id. 1503.

44 Id. 1504.

46 Bruce Friedrich, The Church of Animal Liberation: Animal Rights as Religion under the Free Exercise Clause, 21 Animal L. 65 (2014).

47 Constitution Act, 1982, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 2.

48 Richard Moon, Religious Commitment and Identity: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 29(1) The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 201, 214 (2005).

49 R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6, section 3(1).

http://a.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/consultation%20report_creed%20human%20rights%20research%20and%20consultation%20report.pdf .

51 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem [2004] 2 SCR 551 para.39 (Canada).

54 Ontario Human Rights Commission, Human rights and creed research and consultation report, 46 (2013) http://a.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/consultation%20report_creed%20human%20rights%20research%20and%20consultation%20report.pdf .

55 Ontario Human Rights Commission, Policy on preventing discrimination based on creed, (17 September 2015) http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/policy-preventing-discrimination-based-creed .

57 The Ontario Human Rights Commission did not incorporate a factor similar to being ‘worthy of respect in a democratic society, compatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others’, whilst it is not necessary for a philosophical belief to have ‘some “nexus” or connection to an organization or community that professes a shared system of belief’.

58 Equality Act 2010 Part 3.

59 Id. Part 4.

60 Id. Part 5.

61 Id. Part 6.

62 Id. Part 7.

63 42. U.S.C. §2000e(b).

64 Section 5.

65 Section 6.

66 Section 7.

67 Section 13(1) of the Equality Act 2010 defines direct discrimination as ‘A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others.’

69 ECHR art. 9(2).

70 Equality Act 2010 section 19(1) and (2)(a)–(c).

71 Id. section 19(2)(d).

72 Wasteney v East London NHS Foundation Trust UKEAT/0157/15/LA (England and Wales).

73 Equality Act 2010 section 26(1).

74 Similar to direct discrimination.

75 Similar to indirect discrimination.

76 42. U.S.C. §2000e-2(j).

77 Included within the definition of disparate treatment.

78 Sections 5–9.

79 Section 14.

80 Section 14.1.

81 Section 10.

82 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (Random House 1975).

83 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (University of California Press 1983).

84 Gary L. Francione, Some Thoughts on the Meaning of Vegan, Abolitionist Approach (18 October 2009) https://www.abolitionistapproach.com/some-thoughts-on-the-meaning-of-vegan/ .

86 Gary L. Francione, Reflections on Animals, Property, and the Law and Rain without Thunder, 70 Law & Contemp. Probs. 9 (2007).

87 Gary L. Francione, Animal Rights: The Abolitionist Approach, 224–28 (Exempla Press 2015).

88 Kelsey Steele, ‘The Vegan Journey: An Exploration of Vegan Experiences with Vegan from Burlington, Vermont’ Vermont, Environmental Studies Electronic Thesis Collection 23, University of Vermont, 15 (2013).

89 Christopher Key Chapple, Nonviolence to Animals, Earth and Self in Asian Traditions 10 (State University of New York Press, 1993).

90 Kavita Bhatt, ‘Ahimsa: The Jain’s Strategy for the Conservation of Biodiversity’, as found in Indoo Pandey Khanduri (Ed) Human Freedom and Environment: Contemporary Paradigms and Moral Strategies 302 (Kalpaz Publications, 2010).

91 Steven L. Davis, The Least Harm Principle May Require that Humans Consume a Diet Containing Large Herbivores, Not a Vegan Diet, as found in S. Armstrong and R. Botzler (Eds), The Animal Ethics Reader (3rd edn, Routledge 2016).

92 Id. 267.

93 Gary L. Francione, Animal Rights: The Abolitionist Approach (Exempla Press 2015).

94 Casamitjana Costa v The League Against Cruel Sports [2020] UK ET 3331129/2018, para 17 (England and Wales).

95 The Vegan Society, Definition of Veganism , https://www.vegansociety.com/go-vegan/definition-veganism .

96 Leah Leneman, No Animal Food: The Road to Veganism in Britain, Britain 7(3) Society and Animals 219, 221 (1999).

97 Id. 222.

99 David DeGrazia, Meat Eating, as found in S. Armstrong and R. Botzler (Eds), The Animal Ethics Reader (3rd edn, Routledge 2016).

100 Marian Stamp Dawkins, Why We Still Need to Read Animal Machines, as found in Ruth Harrison, Animal Machines, 2 (First published 1964, 2013 CABI).

101 Ruth Harrison, Animal Machines (First published 1964, 2013 CABI).

102 The current legislation is the Welfare of Farmed Animals (England) Regulations 2000.

103 Council Directive 2008/119/EEC.

104 Henning Steinfeld et al., Livestock’s Long Shadow: Environmental Issues and Options, 7–11 (Food & Agriculture Org 2006).

105 Id. 11–20.

106 Compassion in World Farming, Strategic Plan 2018–2022: Working Together to End Factory Farming Worldwide https://assets.ciwf.org/media/7432824/ciwf_strategic-plan-revise18-lr2.pdf .

107 Ruth Harrison, Animal Machines (First published 1964, 2013 CABI).

108 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (Random House 1975).

109 Compassion in World Farming, Farm Animals: Chickens , <  https://www.ciwf.org.uk/farm-animals/chickens/ > accessed 5.06.20.

110 It should be noted that these statistics were recorded during the Covid-19 pandemic and may not be as representative of how many animals are slaughtered due to the issues faced by farmers.

111 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, United Kingdom Slaughter Statistics—April 2020 (14th May 2020) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/884944/slaughter-statsnotice-14may20.pdf .

112 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, United Kingdom Poultry and Poultry Meat Statistics—April 2020 ( 21st May 2020) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/886407/poultry-statsnotice-21may20.pdf .

113 It must be noted that battery cages are now banned in some parts of the world. For example, the EU effectively banned battery cages in 2012 through Directive 1999/74/EC. They are still used in the USA, however. For more information, please see: Jessica Braunschweig-Norris, The U.S. Egg Industry - Not All It's Cracked up to Be for the Welfare of the Laying Hen: A Comparative Look at United States and European Union Welfare Laws, 10 Drake J. Agric. L. 511 (2005).

114 Whitney R. Morgan, Proposition Animal Welfare: Enabling an Irrational Public or Empowering Consumers to Align Advertising Depictions with Reality, 26 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 297 (2015).

116 Compassion in World Farming, Farm Animals: Chickens Farmed for Meat https://www.ciwf.org.uk/farm-animals/chickens/meat-chickens/ .

117 The Vegan Society, The Honey Industry https://www.vegansociety.com/go-vegan/why-go-vegan/honey-industry .

118 For example, please see, Rachel Dunn, For Fur’s Sake: Can the UK Can Imports of Fur from Other Countries?, 3(1) The UK Journal of Animal Law 42 (2019).

119 For example, please see, Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (Random House 1975).

120 For example, please see, Trevor J. Smith, Bullhooks and the Law: Is Pain and Suffering the Elephant in the Room? 19(2) Animal Law Review 423 (2013).

121 David DeGrazia, Meat Eating, as found in S. Armstrong and R. Botzler (Eds), The Animal Ethics Reader 428 (3rdedn, Routledge 201).

122 Pew Commission, Environmental Impact of Industrial Farm Animal Production: A Report of the Pew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production https://www.lclark.edu/live/files/6699-environmental-impact-of-industrial-farm-animal .

123 Liam H. Michener, Meating America's Demand: An Analysis of the Hidden Costs of Factory Farming and Alternate Methods of Food Production, 7 J. Animal & Envtl. L. 145 (2015).

124 P. Gerber, C. Opio and H. Steinfeld, Poultry production and the environment — a review, Animal Production and Health Division, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 3 http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/home/events/bangkok2007/docs/part2/2_2.pdf .

125 Sara J. Scherr and Satya Yadav, Land Degradation in the Developing World: Implications for Food, Agriculture, and the Environment to 2020, Food, Agriculture, and the Environment Discussion Paper 14, 3 (1996).

127 Henning Steinfeld et al , Livestock’s Long Shadow: Environmental Issues and Options 29 (Food & Agriculture Org 2006).

128 Leo Horrigan, Robert S. Lawrence and Polly Walker, How Sustainable Agriculture Can Address the Environmental and Human Harms of Industrial Agriculture, 110(5) Environmental Health Perspectives 445, 448 (2002).

129 Compassion in World Farming, Beyond Factory Farming: Sustainable Solutions for Animals, People and the Planet 39 (2009) https://www.compassioninfoodbusiness.com/media/3817096/beyond-factory-farming-report.pdf .

130 Bingli Clark Chai et al , Which Diet has the Least Environmental Impact on our planet? A Systematic Review or Vegan, Vegetarian and Omnivorous Diets, 11(15) Sustainability 4410 (2019).

131 David DeGrazia, Meat Eating, as found in S. Armstrong and R. Botzler (Eds), The Animal Ethics Reader 428 (3rdedn, Routledge 2016).

132 Compassion in World Farming, Beyond Factory Farming: Sustainable Solutions for Animals, People and the Planet 36 (2009) https://www.compassioninfoodbusiness.com/media/3817096/beyond-factory-farming-report.pdf .

133 Christian Nellemann et al , The Environmental Food Crisis: The Environment’s Role in Averting Future Food Crises, 27 (2009) https://www.gwp.org/globalassets/global/toolbox/references/the-environmental-crisis.-the-environments-role-in-averting-future-food-crises-unep-2009.pdf .

134 Leo Horrigan, Robert S. Lawrence and Polly Walker, How Sustainable Agriculture Can Address the Environmental and Human Harms of Industrial Agriculture, 110(5) Environmental Health Perspectives 445, 451 (2002).

135 Ian Phillips et al , Does the use of antibiotics in food animals pose a risk to human health? A critical review of published data, 53(1) Journal of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy 28 (2004).

136 World Health Organisation, Stop using antibiotics in healthy animals to prevent the spread of antibiotic resistance (7 November 2017) https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/07-11-2017-stop-using-antibiotics-in-healthy-animals-to-prevent-the-spread-of-antibiotic-resistance .

137 Regulation 1831/2003/EC.

138 Brigit Lassok and Bernd-Alois Tenhagen, From Pig to Pork: Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus in the Pork Production Chain, 76(6) Journal of Food Production 1095 (2013).

139 Stephen S Morse et al , Prediction and prevention of the next pandemic zoonosis, 380(9857) Lancet 1956 (2012).

140 L.F. Wang and G. Crameri, Emerging zoonotic viral diseases, 33(2) Rev SciTech Off Int Epiz 569 (2014).

141 For example, please see Jimmy Whitworth, COVIDCOVID-19: A fast evolving pandemic, 114(4) Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 241(2020).

142 Stephen S Morse et al , Prediction and prevention of the next pandemic zoonosis, 380(9857) Lancet 1956 (2012).

143 FOA Animal Production and Health Paper, Improved animal health for poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods 19 (2002) http://www.fao.org/3/a-y3542e.pdf .

144 Michael Greger, The Human/Animal Interface: Emergence and Resurgence of Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, 33(4) Critical Reviews in Microbiology 243 (2007).

145 Alessandra Petti et al , Vegetarianism and veganism: not only benefits but also gaps. A Review, 19(3) Progress in Nutrition 229, 231 (2017).

146 F Phillips, Vegetarian nutrition, British Nutrition Foundation: Briefing Paper (2005).

147 Elizabeth Anne Jessie Cook et al , Working conditions and public health risks in slaughterhouses in western Kenya, 17 BMC Public Health (2017).

148 Jennifer Dillard, A Slaughterhouse Nightmare: Psychological Harm Suffered by Slaughterhouse Employees and the Possibility of Redress through Legal Reform, 15 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol'y 391 (2008).

149 Gail A. Eisnitz, Slaughterhouse: The Shocking Story of Greed, Neglect, and Inhumane Treatment Inside the US Meat Industry (Prometheus Books 2006).

150 Stephanie Marek Muller, Zombification, Social Death, and the Slaughterhouse: U.S. Industrial Practices of Livestock Slaughter, 53(3) American Studies 81 (2018).

151 BBC News: Stories, Confessions of a slaughterhouse worker (6th January 2020) https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/stories-50986683 .

152 Karen Victor and Antoni Barnard, Slaughtering for a living: A Hermeneutic phenomenological perspective on the well-being of slaughterhouse employees, 11 International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Health and Well-being (2016).

153 Jennifer Dillard, A Slaughterhouse Nightmare: Psychological Harm Suffered by Slaughterhouse Employees and the Possibility of Redress through Legal Reform, 15 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol'y 391 (2008).

154 Oxfam Research Report, Lives on the Line: The Human Cost of Cheap Chicken (2015) https://s3.amazonaws.com/oxfam-us/www/static/media/files/Lives_on_the_Line_Full_Report_Final.pdf .

155 Stephanie Marek Muller, Zombification, Social Death, and the Slaughterhouse: U.S. Industrial Practices of Livestock Slaughter, 53(3) American Studies 81, 82 (2018).

156 Elizabeth Cherry, Veganism as a Cultural Movement: A Relational Approach, 5(2) Social Movement Studies 155, 156 (2006).

157 Jessica Greenebaum, Veganism, Identity and the Quest for Authenticity, 15(1) Food, Culture and Society 129 (2012).

158 For example, Lisa Johnson, The Religion of Ethical Veganism, 5(1) Journal of Animal Ethics 31 (2015).

159 Rebecca Schwartz, Employers, Got Vegan: How Ethical Veganism Qualifies for Religious Protection under Title VII, 24 Animal L. 221, 224 (2018).

160 Please see David Newton, Vegetarianism and Veganism: A Reference Handbook (Contemporary World Issues) (ABC-CLIO 2019) 38–41; Leah Leneman, No Animal Food: The Road to Veganism in Britain, 7(3) Society and Animals 219 (1999).

161 Id. 40.

162 Swinder Janda and Phillip J. Trocchia, Vegetarianism: Toward a Greater Understanding, 18(12) Psychology and Marketing 1205 (2001).

163 Malcolm Hamilton, Eating Ethically: ‘Spiritual’ and’Quasi-Religious’ Aspects of Vegetarianism, 15(1) Journal of Contemporary Religion 65, 69 (2000).

164 Lyle Munro, Strategies, Action Repertoires and DIT Activism in the Animal Rights Movement, 4(1) Social Movement Studies 75, 76 (2005).

165 Jessica Greenebaum, Veganism, Identity and the Quest for Authenticity, 15(1) Food, Culture and Society 129, 130 (2012).

166 Id. 134.

167 Jain Maxim, Vegan Values, Religious Rights: A Cultural Critique of Entrenched Ethics, Conference paper Lewis & Clark Animal Law Conference, 5 (October 2010).

168 Sarah E. Mann, More Than Just A Diet: An Inquiry Into Veganism, Paper 156 Anthropology Senior Theses, 59 (2014).

169 Id. 60.

170 Id. 62.

171 Id. 70.

172 Laura Jennings et al , Exploring Perceptions of Veganism, (2019) https://arxiv.org/pdf/1907.12567.pdf.

173 W v the United Kingdom (App No 18187/91) Commission Decision 10 February 1993; see also European Court of Human Rights ‘Guide on Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Freedom of thought, conscience and religion’ (30 April 2020), para.17(c); This case concerned a vegan prisoner who objected to working in a print shop because his beliefs prevented him from working with products tested on animals (i.e. the dyes). It should be noted that the United Kingdom Government did not contest whether veganism was protected under Article 9 ECHR. The case was determined on the basis that the applicant had not exhausted his domestic remedies.

174 ‘Vegetarianism’ has been cited as an ‘uncontroversial’ example of a belief that would fall within the scope of Article 9 See Regina v Secretary of State for Education and Employment & Others (Respondents) ex parte Williamson (Appellant) & Others [2005] UK HL 15, para.55 (England and Wales).

175 Hashman v Milton Park (Dorset) Limited t/a Orchard Park [2011] ET 3105555/2009 (England and Wales); the case concerned the definition of ‘philosophical belief’ within the context of the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003.

176 Id. para. 55; the case particularly related to the Claimant’s belief in anti-hunt activism.

177 House of Lords Debate, UK, 23 March 2010, vol 718, col 853.

178 Equality and Human Rights Commission: Draft Code of Practice Equality Act as stated Practical Law Employment: Religion or Belief Discrimination; See also House of Lords Debate, UK, 23 March 2010, vol 718, col 852–853.

179 Practical Law Employment: Religion or Belief Discrimination.

180 Conisbee v Crossley Farms Limited and others [2019] ET 3335357/2018 (England and Wales).

was also shouted at in front of customers - Conisbee v Crossley Farms Limited and others [2019] ET

3335357/2018 (England and Wales) para.7.

182 Conisbee v Crossley Farms Limited and others [2019] ET, para.39.

183 Id. para.38.

184 Id. para.42.

185 Id. para.39.

186 Id. para.40.

187 Id. para.41.

188 Id. para.43.

189 Casamitjana Costa v The League Against Cruel Sports [2020] ET 3331129/2018 (England and Wales).

190 Jordi Casamitjana, Help an Ethical Vegan who was dismissed by an Animal Welfare charity , www.crowdjustice.com/case/help-a-discriminated-ethical-vegan/ .

192 The authors have no knowledge of an appeal being lodged in the case of Conisbee whilst the parties settled in Casamitjana Costa (Casamitjana Costa v The League Against Cruel Sports [2020] UK ET 3331129/2018 Consent Judgment (England and Wales)).

193 Casamitjana Costa v The League Against Cruel Sports [2020] ET 3331129/2018 (England and Wales) para.20.

195 Incidentally, both Conisbee and Casamitjana Costa were heard before the same Employment Judge.

197 Casamitjana Costa v The League Against Cruel Sports [2020] ET 3331129/2018 (England and Wales) para.34.

198 McClintock v Department of Constitutional Affairs UKEAT/0223/07/CEA (England and Wales).

199 Id. para.45.

200 Conisbee v Crossley Farms Limited and others [2019] ET 3335357/2018 (England and Wales) para.16b.

201 Hashman v Milton Park (Dorset) Limited t/a Orchard Park [2011] ET 3105555/2009 (England and Wales).

202 Id. para.40.

203 Grainger plc and others v Nicholson [2010] I.C.R. 360, 371 (England and Wales).

205 Casamitjana Costa v The League Against Cruel Sports [2020] ET 3331129/2018 (England and Wales) para.35.

206 Conisbee v Crossley Farms Limited and others [2019] ET 3335357/2018 (England and Wales) para.41.

211 Conisbee , v Crossley Farms Limited and others [2019] ET 3335357/2018 (England and Wales) para.43.

213 Rebecca Schwartz, Employers, Got Vegan: How Ethical Veganism Qualifies for Religious Protection under Title VII, 24 Animal L. 221, 230 (2018).

214 No. B150017. Second Dist., Div. Five. Sept. 13, 2002.

215 McDavid v County of Sacramento ED Cal., June 27, 2006.

216 Anderson v Orange County Transit Authority , Charge No. 345960598, EEOC Determination Letter.

217 Chenzira v Cincinnati Childrens' Hospital , No. 1:2011cv00917 - Document 18 (S.D. Ohio 2012).

218 2012 HRTO 994 (Ontario, Canada).

219 Id. para.2.

221 Labchuck, C., Protecting secular beliefs: Should creed provisions protect ethical vegans from discrimination?, Paper presented at the Ontario Human Rights Commission/York University Legal Workshop on Human rights, creed and freedom of religion (2012, March 29–30) Osgoode Hall, York University. Retrieved from https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BwFvhg37TTCjMk84Q0l4QTdic3M/preview ; Sztybel, D., Giving credence to philosophical creeds: The cases of Buddhism and veganism. Paper presented at the Ontario Human Rights Commission/York University Legal Workshop on Human rights, creed and freedom of religion (2012, March 29–30) Osgoode Hall, York University Retrieved from https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BwFvhg37TTCjS1Awa1JSNkJZNWM/preview?pli=1 as cited in Ontario Human Rights Commission, Human Rights and Creed: Research and consultation report, 49 (2013).

224 Ontario Human Rights Commission, Policy on preventing discrimination based on creed, (17 September 2015) http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/policy-preventing-discrimination-based-creed .

225 Veromi Arsiradam, A Case for Recognizing Ethical Veganism as Creed, Obiter-Dicta (10 March 2020) https://obiter-dicta.ca/2020/03/10/a-case-for-recognizing-ethical-veganism-as-creed/ .

227 Lily Puckett, ‘ Vegan firefighter complains to Human Rights Tribunal because he wasn’t offered enough food’ food, Independent (22 May 2019) https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/vegan-firefighter-sue-food-ontario-human-rights-a8926246.html .

228 Richard Johnson, ‘ Creed: Protecting Veganism as a Human Right’ Right (11 March 2020) https://kentemploymentlaw.com/2020/creed-protecting-veganism-as-a-human-right/ .

229 Rebecca Schwartz, Employers, Got Vegan: How Ethical Veganism Qualifies for Religious Protection under Title VII, 24 Animal L. 221 (2018).

230 Lisa Johnson, The Religion of Ethical Veganism, 5(1) Journal of Animal Ethics 31 (2015).

231 Grainger plc and others v Nicholson [2010] I.C.R. 360, 371 (England and Wales).

232 Frank Cranmer, A Critique of the Decision in Conisbee that Vegetarianism in not ‘A Belief’, 22(1) Ecclesiastical Law Journal 36, 48 (2020).

233 Peter Edge, Vegetarianism as a protected characteristic: Another view on Conisbee, Law and Religion UK (23 September 2019) https://www.lawandreligionuk.com/2019/09/23/vegetarianism-as-a-protected-characteristic-another-view-on-conisbee/ .

234 Malcolm Hamilton, Eating Ethically: ‘Spiritual’ and’Quasi-Religious’ Aspects of Vegetarianism’ (2000), 15(1) Journal of Contemporary Religion 65, 70 (2000).

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• General Reading
• Academic Reading
• IELTS Writing Task 2
• IELTS Writing Task 1

Essay#56 | Vegetarianism

Do not attempt to rewrite model or sample answers in the exam. Your composition will not fit the task exactly, even if it is about a similar object. The examiners can recognize a prepared answer and you will lose a lot of marks.

You should spend about 40 minutes on this task.

Write about the following topic:

Some people choose to eat no meat or fish. They believe that this is not only better for their own health but also benefits the world as a whole.

Discuss this view and give your own opinion.

Give reasons for your answer and include any relevant examples from your own knowledge or experience.

Write at least 250 words.

Model answer.

The number of vegetarian in a community may depend on various factors, for example the traditions of the country, the wealth of the country, the religion or the age group. Therefore, the reasons why people choose to exclude meat and fish from their diet may also vary.

Some people become vegetarian because they believe that this will benefit their health. Undoubtedly, eating too much meat, especially too much red meat, is not to be recommended. Moreover, the fact that there are healthy populations in some parts of the world where no one eats meat proves that it is not, as some people claim, an essential part of the human diet. However, it is important to ensure that enough protein, for example, is included in the diet from other sources. Where vegetarianism is not a tradition, this may require some careful planning.

In my experience, it is quite common for people to become vegetarians because they feel that it is selfish to eat meat or because meat production increases global warming. They may also feel that if no one ate meat, there would be no food shortage, because meat production uses up food resources. This idealistic point of view is very attractive, but it is hard to judge whether it is in fact correct.

In some families, if a teenager decides to become a vegetarian, they may do so partly out of a spirit of rebellion, because this behaviour can be interpreted as a criticism of their parents’ way of life. However, provided that they continue to eat healthily, the parents should not raise objections, in my opinion. Vegetarianism is a valid choice in life. Moreover, research shows that vegetarians tend to be healthier in many ways than meat-eaters.

Personally, I think that being a vegetarian is a good idea in principle as there are proven health benefits and probably social benefits as well. However, it does not suit everybody, and I doubt whether it will ever be a universal choice.

(330 words)

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