what is ethical egoism essay

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Ethical Egoism: The Morality of Selfishness

Author: Nathan Nobis Category: Ethics Word Count: 999

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Selfishness is often considered a vice and selfish actions are often judged to be wrong. But sometimes we ought to do what’s best for ourselves: in a sense, we sometimes should be selfish.

The ethical theory known as ethical egoism states that we are always morally required to do what’s in our own self-interest. The view isn’t that we are selfish—this is psychological egoism [1] —but that we ought to be.

This essay explores ethical egoism and the main arguments for and against it.

1. Understanding Egoism

Selfish people often have nasty dispositions towards other people, but ethical egoism generally discourages that: such selfishness is rarely to our advantage, especially in the long run. And egoism does not suggest that we never help others: egoists might be quite generous.

Egoism does entail, however, that what makes acting like this right, when it is right, is that it’s for our own benefit: it makes us better off. So, if you must help someone else, this is only because doing so would be good for you; and if you should refrain from harming someone that’s also only because doing so is for your benefit.

2. Why Egoism?

2.1. individuals know themselves best.

Some egoists argue that, since we each know our own wants and needs best, everyone should focus on themselves: people meddling in other people’s lives tend to go badly.

2.2. The Unique Value of Your Own Life

Also, some claim that egoism uniquely recognizes the value of individuals’ lives and goals. Other ethical theories can require altruistic sacrifices of your interests for the sake of other people or abstract standards, whereas egoists maintain that each person has their own life to live for themselves , not anyone or anything else. [2]

2.3. Egoism’s Explanation of Right and Wrong

Finally, some egoists argue that their theory best explains what makes wrong actions wrong and right actions right. Kantians say it’s whether anyone is used as a “mere means”; consequentialists say it’s an action’s consequences; egoists say it’s really how someone’s actions impact their self-interest. [3]

Let’s respond to these arguments by reviewing some objections.

3. Why Not Egoism?

3.1. egoism and what’s good for everyone.

First, in response to the claim that egoism is desirable because everyone adopting it would be good for all, we should notice that this isn’t an egoistic argument since the motivating concern is everyone’s interests, which aren’t important if egoism is true: only you should matter to you.

And are we really always “meddling” with people when we help them—say by trying to help feed people who are starving to death or are living in dire poverty—as some egoists say we are?

3.2. Egoism and Contradictions

One objection assumes that ethical theories should help resolve conflicts: e.g., for consequentialists, who should win a presidential election? Whoever will produce the best consequences as president. Egoists, however, say that each candidate should do what’s in their best self-interest, which is winning the election. But, critics argue, they can’t both win, so egoism requires the impossible, so it can’t be correct. [4]

Egoists might respond that not everyone can do what’s right: if you win, you do what’s right; if you lose, you’ve done wrong.

They can also use this objection to refine egoism: you must try to do what’s best for you, not necessarily achieve that. Actual success is often difficult, but everyone can try.

3.3. Egoism and Wronging Others for Your Own Gain

Another objection takes us to the heart of the matter. Imagine this:

Your credit card bill is due tonight, but you won’t be able to pay the full amount until next month, so you will be charged interest and a late fee.

You just saw someone, however, accidentally leave their wallet on a park bench with a lot of cash hanging out of it. You saw where they went, but you could take the cash to pay the bill and nobody would ever know.

Also, you know of an elderly person who always carries a lot of cash on their evening walk. You know you could rob them, pay your bill, certainly never get caught and then buy dinner at a fancy restaurant.

If ethical egoism is true, not only can you permissibly take the wallet and rob someone, you must : not doing so would be wrong, since these crimes are in your self-interest. (If you’d feel guilty doing this, egoists respond that you shouldn’t since you’ve done nothing wrong on their view.)

Many believe that, since actions like these are clearly wrong, this shows that egoism is false and the argument at 2.3 fails: egoism does not best explain our moral obligations even if we sometimes must do what’s best for ourselves.

An egoist might respond that we are just assuming their theory is false: they don’t agree that we shouldn’t steal the wallet and refrain from assault. [5]

But we aren’t “assuming” anything: we just have better reason to believe that assault for personal gain is wrong than that egoism is true . Recall that racists and sexists do not agree that their forms of discrimination are wrong either, but this doesn’t justify racism or sexism. People sometimes hold false moral views; this might be true of egoists.

3.4. Egoism and Discrimination

Finally, racists and sexists think that people of their group are entitled to special benefits and are even justified in harming people not of their group. Egoists think something similar, but about themselves : harms they allow for and inflict on other people just don’t matter.

But is there anything about one’s race or sex or oneself that justifies treating others badly? No, so egoism is a form of prejudice, in favor of your own group of one, you . [6] This objection agrees with the argument at 2.2, that everyone does have their own life, but corrects it with the fact that everyone’s life matters, not just the egoist’s.

4. Conclusion

Doing what’s right is sometimes in our self-interest. If the above discussion is correct, though, that an action benefits us is never the sole reason it is right. And, more importantly, if an action is not in our own self-interest, we might be obligated to do it, nevertheless. [7]

There are other arguments about egoism. Reviewing them might be in our self-interest. Should we?

[1] Psychological egoism presents itself as an empirical, scientific, observational, or descriptive claim about our motives: everything we do is an attempt to make ourselves better off .

The problem though is that there is no good scientific evidence for this claim. We are sometimes selfish, or seek our own best interest, but what kind of observations could show that we are always selfish? Our many motives have never been adequately examined to conclude anything like that: furthermore, it’s often hard to conclusively determine what anyone’s motives are, especially since motives are often mixed.

Advocates of psychological egoism simply don’t have any such evidence, and perhaps couldn’t have such evidence, so the view is usually proposed as a kind of dogma or unsupported hypothesis, and so should not be accepted.

It’s worthwhile, however, to note that if psychological egoism were true (and we always did what we believe to be in our own interest), and ethical egoism were true (and so we must do what’s in our best self-interest, or try), then we would always do what’s right and could do no wrong we would always do what’s in our best self-interest. Since it seems clear that we don’t always do what’s right, or even try, at least one of these theories is false, if not both.

Also, if psychological egoism were true, then, since most other ethical theories require some altruism (that is, actions that benefit others, for their own sake), these other theories demand the impossible. And since some of us sometimes seem to be altruistic, psychological egoism seems to be false.

Furthermore, since ethical egoists advise making choices that benefit ourselves, that acknowledges that we might fail at doing that, and not even try, which suggests that even ethical egoists recognize that psychological egoism is false.

[2] For a presentation of this and related concerns, see Rand (1964).

[3] For an introduction to these theories, see Deontology: Kantian Ethics by Andrew Chapman and Consequentialism by Shane Gronholz

[4] For a presentation of this and related arguments, see Baier (1973).

[5] Egoists might consider this a “question-begging” response to their theory. To “beg the question” is to offer an argument that in some way assumes the conclusion of the argument as a premise: it’s a type of circular reasoning. So here the charge is that this response assumes that egoism is false in arguing that egoism is false. In the main text of this essay, I respond to this charge and explain why this argument against egoism is not question-begging.

[6] This argument was developed by James Rachels (1941-2003). For its most recent presentation, see Rachels and Rachels (2019). Beyond racism and sexism, another potential form of discrimination that can be compared and contrasted with egoism is “speciesism”: see Speciesism by Dan Lowe for discussion.  

[7] Related, but more subtle ethical questions, beyond the egoism-inspired question of whether others’ interests must be given any moral consideration or moral weight, are whether, and to what extent, we can ever be justifiably “partial” to anyone’s interests: e.g., can I permissibly act in ways that favor the interests of my family and loved ones, over the interests of, say, strangers? For an introduction to these questions, see (Im)partiality by Shane Gronholz. 

Baier, Kurt. “Ethical Egoism and Interpersonal Compatibility.” Philosophical Studies , vol. 24, no. 6, 1973, pp. 357–368 .

Rand, Ayn. The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism . New York: New American Library, 1964.

Rachels, James and Rachels, Stuart. The Elements of Moral Philosophy , 9th Edition (1986, 1st edition). Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2019.

For Further Reading

Shaver, Robert, “Egoism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

Moseley, Alexander, “Egoism,” the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy .

Related Essays

Deontology: Kantian Ethics by Andrew Chapman

Consequentialism by Shane Gronholz

(Im)partiality by Shane Gronholz 

Why be Moral? Plato’s ‘Ring of Gyges’ Thought Experiment  by Spencer Case

Defining Capitalism and Socialism by Thomas Metcalf

Arguments for Capitalism and Socialism  by Thomas Metcalf

Happiness by Kiki Berk

Meaning in Life: What Makes Our Lives Meaningful? by Matthew Pianalto

Ethics and Absolute Poverty: Peter Singer and Effective Altruism by Brandon Boesch

The African Ethic of Ubuntu by Thaddeus Metz 

Speciesism by Dan Lowe

Evolution and Ethics by Michael Klenk

Social Contract Theory by David Antonini

John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’ by Ben Davies

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About the Author

Nathan Nobis is a Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA. He is the author of Animals & Ethics 101 , co-author of Thinking Critically About Abortion , a co-author of Chimpanzee Rights and author or co-author of many other articles, chapters, and reviews in philosophy and ethics. www.NathanNobis.com

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What Is Ethical Egoism?

Should people always pursue only their own self-interest?

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• Philosophical Theories & Ideas
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• Ph.D., Philosophy, The University of Texas at Austin
• M.A., Philosophy, McGill University
• B.A., Philosophy, University of Sheffield

Ethical egoism is the view that people ought to pursue their own self-interest, and no one has any obligation to promote anyone else’s interests. It is thus a normative or prescriptive theory: it is concerned with how people ought to behave. In this respect, ethical egoism is quite different from psychological egoism , the theory that all our actions are ultimately self-interested. Psychological egoism is a purely descriptive theory that purports to describe a basic fact about human nature.

Arguments In Support of Ethical Egoism

Everyone pursuing his own self-interest is the best way to promote the general good. This argument was made famous by Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733) in his poem "The Fable of the Bees" and by Adam Smith (1723-1790) in his pioneering work on economics, "The Wealth of Nations ."  

In a famous passage, Smith wrote that when individuals single-mindedly pursue “the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires” they unintentionally, as if “led by an invisible hand,” benefit society as a whole. This happy result comes about because people generally are the best judges of what is in their own interest, and they are much more motivated to work hard to benefit themselves than to achieve any other goal.

An obvious objection to this argument, though, is that ​it doesn’t really support ethical egoism. It assumes that what really matters is the well-being of society as a whole, the general good. It then claims that the best way to achieve this end is for everyone to look out for themselves. But if it could be proved that this attitude did not, in fact, promote the general good, then those who advance this argument would presumably stop advocating egoism.

Prisoner's Dilemma

Another objection is that what the argument states is not always true. Consider the prisoner’s dilemma, for instance. This is a hypothetical situation described in game theory . You and a comrade, (call him X) are being held in prison. You are both asked to confess. The terms of the deal you are offered are as follows:

• If you confess and X doesn’t, you get six months and he gets 10 years.
• If X confesses and you don’t, he gets six months and you get 10 years.
• If you both confess, you both get five years.
•  If neither of you confesses, you both get two years.

Regardless of what X does, the best thing for you to do is confess. Because if he doesn’t confess, you’ll get a light sentence; and if he does confess, you’ll at least avoid getting extra prison time. But the same reasoning holds for X as well. According to ethical egoism, you should both pursue your rational self-interest. But then the outcome is not the best one possible. You both get five years, whereas if both of you had put your self-interest on hold, you’d each only get two years.

The point of this is simple. It isn’t always in your best interest to pursue your own self-interest without concern for others. Sacrificing your own interests for the good of others denies the fundamental value of your own life to yourself.

Ayn Rand's Objectivism

This seems to be the sort of argument put forward by Ayn Rand, the leading exponent of “objectivism” and the author of "The Fountainhead" and " Atlas Shrugged ."  Her complaint is that the Judeo-Christian moral tradition, which includes—or has fed into—modern liberalism and socialism, pushes an ethic of altruism. Altruism means putting the interests of others before your own. 

This is something people are routinely praised for doing, encouraged to do, and in some circumstances even required to do, such as when you pay taxes to support the needy. According to Rand, no one has any right to expect or demand that I make any sacrifices for the sake of anyone other than myself.

A problem with this argument is that it seems to assume that there is generally a conflict between pursuing your own interests and helping others. In fact, though, most people would say that these two goals are not necessarily opposed at all. Much of the time they complement one another. 

For instance, one student may help a housemate with her homework, which is altruistic. But that student also has an interest in enjoying good relations with her housemates. She may not help everyone in all circumstances, but she will help if the sacrifice involved is not too great. Most people behave like this, seeking a balance between egoism and altruism.

More Objections to Ethical Egoism

Ethical egoism is not a very popular moral philosophy. This is because it goes against certain basic assumptions that most people have regarding what ethics involves. Two objections seem especially powerful.

Ethical egoism has no solutions to offer when a problem arises involving conflicts of interest. Many ethical issues are of this sort. For example, a company wants to empty waste into a river; the people living downstream object. Ethical egoism advises that both parties actively pursue what they want. It doesn’t suggest any sort of resolution or commonsense compromise.

Ethical egoism goes against the principle of impartiality. A basic assumption made by many moral philosophers—and many other people, for that matter—is that we should not discriminate against people on arbitrary grounds such as race, religion, sex, sexual orientation or ethnic origin. But ethical egoism holds that we should not even try to be impartial. Rather, we should distinguish between ourselves and everyone else, and give ourselves preferential treatment.

To many, this seems to contradict the very essence of morality. The golden rule—versions of which appear in Confucianism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—says we should treat others as we would like to be treated. One of the greatest moral philosophers of modern times, ​ Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), argued that the fundamental principle of morality (the “categorical imperative,” in his jargon) is that we should not make exceptions of ourselves. According to Kant, we shouldn’t perform an action if we cannot honestly wish that everyone would behave in a similar way in the same circumstances.

• Psychological Egoism
• Moral Philosophy According to Immanuel Kant
• Would You Kill One Person to Save Five?
• Three Basic Principles of Utilitarianism, Briefly Explained
• An Introduction to Virtue Ethics
• The Ethics of Lying
• Analysis of Plato's 'Crito'
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• Logical Fallacies: Begging the Question
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• Fallacies of Relevance: Appeal to Authority
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Ethical Egoism

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Egoism can be a descriptive or a normative position. Psychological egoism, the most famous descriptive position, claims that each person has but one ultimate aim: her own welfare. Normative forms of egoism make claims about what one ought to do, rather than describe what one does do. Ethical egoism claims that it is necessary and sufficient for an action to be morally right that it maximize one's self-interest. Rational egoism claims that it is necessary and sufficient for an action to be rational that it maximize one's self-interest.

1. Psychological Egoism

2. ethical egoism, 3. rational egoism, bibliography, other internet resources, related entries.

All forms of egoism require explication of “self-interest” (or “welfare” or “well-being”). There are two main theories. Preference or desire accounts identify self-interest with the satisfaction of one's desires. Often, and most plausibly, these desires are restricted to self-regarding desires. What makes a desire self-regarding is controversial, but there are clear cases and counter-cases: a desire for my own pleasure is self-regarding; a desire for the welfare of others is not. Objective accounts identify self-interest with the possession of states (such as virtue or knowledge) that are valued independently of whether they are desired. Hedonism, which identifies self-interest with pleasure, is either a preference or an objective account, according to whether what counts as pleasure is determined by one's desires.

Psychological egoism claims that each person has but one ultimate aim: her own welfare. This allows for action that fails to maximize perceived self-interest, but rules out the sort of behavior psychological egoists like to target -- such as altruistic behavior or motivation by thoughts of duty alone. It allows for weakness of will, since in weakness of will cases I am still aiming at my own welfare; I am weak in that I do not act as I aim. And it allows for aiming at things other than one's welfare, such as helping others, where these things are a means to one's welfare.

Psychological egoism is supported by our frequent observation of self-interested behavior. Apparently altruistic action is often revealed to be self-interested. And we typically motivate people by appealing to their self-interest (through, for example, punishments and rewards).

A common objection to psychological egoism, made famously by Joseph Butler, is that I must desire things other than my own welfare in order to get welfare. Say I derive welfare from playing hockey. Unless I desired, for its own sake, to play hockey, I would not derive welfare from playing. Or say I derive welfare from helping others. Unless I desired, for its own sake, that others do well, I would not derive welfare from helping them. Welfare results from my action, but cannot be the only aim of my action.

The psychological egoist can concede that I must have desires for particular things, such as playing hockey. But there is no need to concede that the satisfaction of these desires is not part of my welfare. My welfare might consist simply in the satisfaction of self-regarding desires. In the case of deriving welfare from helping others, the psychological egoist can again concede that I would not derive welfare without desiring some particular thing, but need not agree that what I desire for its own sake is that others do well. That I am the one who helps them may, for example, satisfy my self-regarding desire for power.

A bigger problem for psychological egoism is that some behavior does not seem to be explained by self-regarding desires. Say a soldier throws himself on a grenade to prevent others from being killed. It does not seem that the soldier is pursuing his perceived self-interest. It is plausible that, if asked, the soldier would have said that he threw himself on the grenade because he wanted to save the lives of others or because it was his duty. He would deny as ridiculous the claim that he acted in his self-interest.

The psychological egoist might reply that the soldier is lying or self-deceived. Perhaps he threw himself on the grenade because he could not bear to live with himself afterwards if he did not do so. He has a better life, in terms of welfare, by avoiding years of guilt. The main problem here is that while this is a possible account of some cases, there is no reason to think it covers all cases. Another problem is that guilt may presuppose that the soldier has a non-self-regarding desire for doing what he takes to be right.

The psychological egoist might reply that some such account must be right. After all, the soldier did what he most wanted to do, and so must have been pursuing his perceived self-interest. In one sense, this is true. If self-interest is identified with the satisfaction of all of one's preferences, then all intentional action is self-interested (at least if intentional actions are always explained by citing preferences, as most believe). Psychological egoism turns out to be trivially true. This would not content defenders of psychological egoism, however. They intend an empirical theory that, like other such theories, it is at least possible to refute by observation.

There is another way to show that the trivial version of psychological egoism is unsatisfactory. We ordinarily think there is a significant difference in selfishness between the soldier's action and that of another soldier who, say, pushes someone onto the grenade to avoid being blown up himself. We think the former is acting unselfishly while the latter is acting selfishly. According to the trivial version of psychological egoism, both soldiers are equally selfish, since both are doing what they most desire.

The psychological egoist might handle apparent cases of self-sacrifice, not by adopting the trivial version, but rather by claiming that facts about the self-interest of the agent explain all behavior. Perhaps as infants we have only self-regarding desires; we come to desire other things, such as doing our duty, by learning that these other things satisfy our self-regarding desires; in time, we pursue the other things for their own sakes.

Even if this picture of development is true, however, it does not defend psychological egoism, since it admits that we sometimes ultimately aim at things other than our welfare. An account of the origins of our non-self-regarding desires does not show that they are really self-regarding. The soldier's desire is to save others, not increase his own welfare, even if he would not have desired to save others unless saving others was, in the past, connected to increasing his welfare.

The psychological egoist must argue that we do not come to pursue things other than our welfare for their own sakes. In principle, it seems possible to show this by showing that non-self-regarding desires do not continue for long once their connection to our welfare is broken. However, evidence for this dependence claim has not been forthcoming.

Faced with these difficulties, the psychological egoist might move to what Gregory Kavka 1986 64-80 calls “predominant egoism:” we act unselfishly only rarely, and then typically where the sacrifice is small and the gain to others is large or where those benefiting are friends, family, or favorite causes. Predominant egoism is not troubled by the soldier counter-example, since it allows exceptions; it is not trivial; and it is empirically plausible.

Ethical egoism claims that it is necessary and sufficient for an action to be morally right that it maximize one's self-interest. (There are possibilities other than maximization. One might, for example, claim that one ought to achieve a certain level of welfare, but that there is no requirement to achieve more. Ethical egoism might also apply to things other than acts, such as rules or character traits. Since these variants are uncommon, and the arguments for and against them are largely the same as those concerning the standard version, I set them aside.)

One issue concerns how much ethical egoism differs in content from standard moral theories. It might appear that it differs a great deal. After all, moral theories such as Kantianism, utilitarianism, and common-sense morality require that an agent give weight to the interests of others. They sometimes require uncompensated sacrifices, particularly when the loss to the agent is small and the gain to others is large. (Say the cost to me of saving a drowning person is getting my shirtsleeve wet.) Ethical egoists can reply, however, that egoism generates many of the same duties to others. The argument runs as follows. Each person needs the cooperation of others to obtain goods such as defense or friendship. If I act as if I give no weight to others, others will not cooperate with me. If, say, I break my promises whenever it is in my direct self-interest to do so, others will not accept my promises, and may even attack me. I do best, then, by acting as if others have weight (provided they act as if I have weight in return).

It is unlikely that this argument proves that ethical egoism generates all of the standard duties to others. For the argument depends on the ability of others to cooperate with me or attack me should I fail to cooperate. In dealings with others who lack these abilities, the egoist has no reason to cooperate. The duties to others found in standard moral theories are not conditional in this way. I do not, for example, escape a duty to save a drowning person, when I can easily do so, just because the drowning person (or anyone watching) happens never to be able to offer fruitful cooperation or retaliation.

The divergence between ethical egoism and standard moral theories appears in other ways.

First, the ethical egoist will rank as most important duties that bring her the highest payoff. Standard moral theories determine importance at least in part by considering the payoff to those helped. What brings the highest payoff to me is not necessarily what brings the highest payoff to those helped. I might, for example, profit more from helping the local Opera society refurbish its hall than I would from giving to famine relief in Africa, but standard moral theories would rank famine relief as more important than Opera hall improvements.

Second, the cooperation argument cannot be extended to justify extremely large sacrifices, such as the soldier falling on the grenade, that standard moral theories rank either as most important or supererogatory. The cooperation argument depends on a short-term loss (such as keeping a promise that it is inconvenient to keep) being recompensed by a long-term gain (such as being trusted in future promises). Where the immediate loss is one's life (or irreplaceable features such as one's sight), there is no long-term gain, and so no egoist argument for the sacrifice.

An ethical egoist might reply by taking the cooperation argument further. Perhaps I cannot get the benefits of cooperation without converting to some non-egoist moral theory. That is, it is not enough that I act as if others have weight; I must really give them weight. I could still count as an egoist, in the sense that I have adopted the non-egoist theory on egoist grounds.

One problem is that it seems unlikely that I can get the benefits of cooperation only by conversion. Provided I act as if others have weight for long enough, others will take me as giving them weight, and so cooperate, whether I really give them weight or not. In many situations, others will neither have the ability to see my true motivation nor care about it.

Another problem is that conversion can be costly. I might be required by my non-egoist morality to make a sacrifice for which I cannot be compensated (or pass up a gain so large that passing it up will not be compensated for). Since I have converted from egoism, I can no longer reject making the sacrifice or passing up the gain on the ground that it will not pay. It is safer, and seemingly feasible, to remain an egoist while cooperating in most cases. If so, ethical egoism and standard moralities will diverge in some cases. (For discussion of the cooperation argument, see Frank 1988; Gauthier 1986 ch. 6; Kavka 1984 and 1986 pt. II; Sidgwick 1981 II.V.)

There is another way to try to show that ethical egoism and standard moral theories do not differ much. One might hold one particular objective theory of self-interest, according to which my welfare lies in possessing the virtues required by standard moral theories. This requires an argument to show that this particular objective theory gives the right account of self-interest. It also faces a worry for any objective theory: objective theories seem implausible as accounts of welfare. If, say, all my preferences favor my ignoring the plight of others, and these preferences do not rest on false beliefs about issues such as the likelihood of receiving help, it seems implausible (and objectionably paternalistic) to claim that “really” my welfare lies in helping others. I may have a duty to help others, and the world might be better if I helped others, but it does not follow that I am better off by helping others. (For a more optimistic verdict on this strategy, noting its roots in Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the British Idealists, see Brink 1997.)

Of course the divergence between ethical egoism and standard moral theories need not bother an ethical egoist. An ethical egoist sees egoism as superior to other moral theories. Whether it is superior depends on the strength of the arguments for it. Two arguments are popular.

First, one might argue for a moral theory, as one argues for a scientific theory, by showing that it best fits the evidence. In the case of moral theories, the evidence is usually taken to be our most confident common-sense moral judgments. Egoism fits many of these, such as the requirements of cooperation in ordinary cases. It fits some judgments better than utilitarianism does. For example, it allows one to keep some good, such as a job, for oneself, even if giving the good to someone else would help him slightly more, and it captures the intuition that I need not let others exploit me. The problem is that, as the discussion of the cooperation argument shows, it also fails to fit some of the confident moral judgments we make.

Second, one might argue for a moral theory by showing that it is dictated by non-moral considerations -- in particular, by facts about motivation. It is commonly held that moral judgments must be practical, or capable of motivating those who make them. If psychological egoism were true, this would restrict moral judgments to those made by egoism. Other moral judgments would be excluded since it would be impossible to motivate anyone to follow them.

One problem with this argument is that psychological egoism seems false. Replacing psychological with predominant egoism loses the key claim that it is impossible to motivate anyone to make an uncompensated sacrifice.

The ethical egoist might reply that, if predominant egoism is true, ethical egoism may require less deviation from our ordinary actions than any standard moral theory. But fit with motivation is hardly decisive; any normative theory, including ethical egoism, is intended to guide and criticize our choices, rather than simply endorse whatever we do. When I make an imprudent choice, this does not count against ethical egoism, and in favor of a theory recommending imprudence.

The argument has other problems. One could deny that morality must be practical in the required sense. Perhaps morality need not be practical at all: we do not always withdraw moral judgments when we learn that the agent could not be motivated to follow them. Or perhaps moral judgments must be capable of motivating not just anyone, but only idealized versions of ourselves, free from (say) irrationality. In this case, it is insufficient to describe how we are motivated; what is relevant is a description of how we would be motivated were we rational.

Finally, if I do not believe that some action is ultimately in my self-interest, it follows from psychological egoism that I cannot aim to do it. But say I am wrong: the action is in my self-interest. Ethical egoism then says that it is right for me to do something I cannot aim to do. It violates practicality just as any other moral theory does.

So far I have considered arguments for ethical egoism. There are two standard arguments against it.

The first is that ethical egoism is inconsistent in various ways. Say ethical egoism recommends that A and B both go a certain hockey game, since going to the game is in the self-interest of each. Unfortunately, only one seat remains. Ethical egoism, then, recommends an impossible state of affairs. Or say that I am A and an ethical egoist. I both claim that B ought to go to the game, since that is in her self-interest, and I do not want B to go to the game, since B's going to the game is against my self-interest.

Against the first inconsistency charge, the ethical egoist can reply that ethical egoism provides no neutral ranking of states of affairs. It recommends to A that A go to the game, and to B that B go to the game, but is silent on the value of A and B both attending the game.

Against the second inconsistency charge, the ethical egoist can claim that she morally recommends that B go to the game, although she desires that B not go. This is no more odd than claiming that my opponent in a game would be wise to adopt a particular strategy, while desiring that he not do so. True, the ethical egoist is unlikely to recommend ethical egoism to others, to blame others for violations of what ethical egoism requires, to justify herself to others on the basis of ethical egoism, or to express moral attitudes such as forgiveness and resentment. These publicity worries may disqualify ethical egoism as a moral theory, but do not show inconsistency.

The second standard argument against ethical egoism is just that: ethical egoism does not count as a moral theory. One might set various constraints on a theory's being a moral theory. Many of these constraints are met by ethical egoism -- the formal constraints, for example, that moral claims must be prescriptive and universalizable. Ethical egoism issues prescriptions – “do what maximizes your self-interest” -- and it issues the same prescriptions for people in relevantly similar situations. But other constraints are problematic for ethical egoism: perhaps a moral theory must sometimes require uncompensated sacrifices; or perhaps it must supply a single, neutral ranking of actions that each agent must follow in cases where interests conflict; or perhaps it must respect principles such as “that I ought to do x is a consideration in favor of others not preventing me from doing x;” or perhaps it must be able to be made public in the way, just noted, that ethical egoism cannot. (For sample discussions of these two objections, see Baier 1958 189-191; Campbell 1972; Frankena 1973 18-20; Kalin 1970; Moore 1903 96-105.)

The issue of what makes for a moral theory is contentious. An ethical egoist could challenge whatever constraint is deployed against her. But a neater reply is to move to rational egoism, which makes claims about what one has reason to do, ignoring the topic of what is morally right. This gets at what ethical egoists intend, while skirting the issue of constraints on moral theories. After all, few if any ethical egoists think of egoism as giving the correct content of morality, while also thinking that the rational thing to do is determined by some non-egoist consideration. One could then, if one wished, argue for ethical egoism from rational egoism and the plausible claim that the best moral theory must tell me what I have most reason to do.

Rational egoism claims that it is necessary and sufficient for an action to be rational that it maximize one's self-interest. (As with ethical egoism, there are variants which drop maximization or evaluate rules or character traits rather than actions. There are also variants which make the maximization of self-interest necessary but not sufficient, or sufficient but not necessary, for an action to be rational. Again, I set these aside.)

Like ethical egoism, rational egoism needs arguments to support it. One might cite our most confident judgments about rational action and claim that rational egoism best fits these. The problem is that our most confident judgments about rational action seem to be captured by a different, extremely popular theory -- the instrumental theory of rationality. According to the instrumental theory, it is necessary and sufficient, for an action to be rational, that it maximize the satisfaction of one's preferences. Since psychological egoism seems false, it may be rational for me to make an uncompensated sacrifice for the sake of others, for this may be what, on balance, best satisfies my (strong, non-self-interested) preferences. This conflict with the instrumental theory is a major problem for rational egoism.

The rational egoist might reply that the instrumental theory is equally a problem for any standard moral theory that claims to give an account of what one ought rationally, or all things considered, to do. If, for example, a utilitarian claims that I have most reason to give to charity, since that maximizes the general happiness, I could object that giving to charity cannot be rational given my particular preferences, which are for things other than the general happiness.

A different problem for rational egoism is that it appears arbitrary. Suppose I claim that I ought to maximize the welfare of blue-eyed people, but not of other people. Unless I can explain why blue-eyed people are to be preferred, my claim looks arbitrary, in the sense that I have given no reason for the different treatments. As a rational egoist, I claim that I ought to maximize the welfare of one person (myself). Unless I can explain why I should be preferred, my claim looks equally arbitrary.

One reply is to argue that non-arbitrary distinctions can be made by one's preferences. Say I like anchovies and hate broccoli. This makes my decision to buy anchovies rather than broccoli non-arbitrary. Similarly, my preference for my own welfare makes my concentration on my own welfare non-arbitrary.

There are two problems for this reply.

First, we do not always take preferences to establish non-arbitrary distinctions. If I defend favoring blue-eyed people simply by noting that I like blue-eyed people, without any justification for my liking, this seems unsatisfactory. The rational egoist must argue that hers is a case where preferences are decisive.

Second, if psychological egoism is false, I might lack a preference for my own welfare. It would follow that for me, a distinction between my welfare and that of others would be arbitrary, and the rational egoist claim that each ought to maximize his own welfare would be unjustified when applied to me. The proposal that preferences establish non-arbitrary distinctions supports the instrumental theory better than rational egoism.

Another reply to the arbitrariness worry is to claim that certain distinctions just are non-arbitrary. Which distinctions these are is revealed by looking at whether we ask for justifications of the relevance of the distinction. In the case of my maximizing of the welfare of the blue-eyed, we do ask for a justification; we do not take “because they're blue-eyed” as an adequate defense of a reason to give to the blue-eyed. In the case of my maximizing my own welfare, however, “because it will make me better off” may seem a reasonable justification; we do not quickly ask “why does that matter?”

Debate over rational egoism was revitalized by Parfit 1984 pts. II-III. Parfit gives two main arguments against rational egoism. Both focus on the rational egoist's attitude toward the future: the rational egoist holds that the time at which some good comes is by itself irrelevant, so that, for example, I ought to sacrifice a small present gain for a larger future gain.

First, one could challenge rational egoism, not only with the instrumental theory, but also with the “present-aim” theory of rationality. According to the present-aim theory, I have most reason to do what maximizes the satisfaction of my present desires. Even if all of these desires are self-regarding, the present-aim theory need not coincide with rational egoism. Suppose I know that in the future I will desire a good pension, but I do not now desire a good pension for myself in the future; I have different self-regarding desires. Suppose also that, looking back from the end of my life, I will have maximized my welfare by contributing now to the pension. Rational egoism requires that I contribute now. The present-aim theory does not. It claims that my reasons are relative not only to who has a desire -- me rather than someone else – but also to when the desire is held -- now rather than in the past or future. One reason the present-aim theory is important is that it shows there is a coherent, more minimal alternative to rational egoism. The rational egoist cannot argue that egoism is the most minimal theory, and that standard moral theories, by requiring more of people, require special, additional justification.

Second, Parfit argues for a theory of personal identity according to which what matters is (in part) the connections between my present mental states and the mental states of my future self. These connections take the form of persisting desires, character traits, and memories. Since these can decrease between my present and future selves, it is implausible to claim, as the rational egoist does, that I now should care equally about my present self and all my future selves.

Psychological Egoism

• Broad, C. D., 1971, “Egoism as a Theory of Human Motives,” in Broad, Broad's Critical Essays in Moral Philosophy , London: George Allen and Unwin.
• Butler, J., 1900, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel , in The Works of Bishop Butler , ed. J. H. Bernard, London: Macmillan, Sermons I and XI.
• Feinberg, J., 1978 “Psychological Egoism,” in Feinberg, Reason and Responsibility , fourth edition (and other editions), Belmont: Wadsworth.
• Hume, D., 1975, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals , in Enquiries , ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Appendix II.
• Kavka, G., 1986, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory , Princeton: Princeton University Press, 35-44, 51-64.
• Sidgwick, H., 1981, The Methods of Ethics , seventh edition, Indianapolis: Hackett, I.IV.
• Slote, M. A., 1964, “An Empirical Basis for Psychological Egoism,” Journal of Philosophy 61: 530-537.

Ethical Egoism

• Baier, K., 1958, The Moral Point of View , Ithaca: Cornell.
• Brink, D., 1997, "Self-love and Altruism," Social Philosophy and Policy 14: 122-157.
• Campbell, R., 1972, "A Short Refutation of Ethical Egoism," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2: 249-54.
• Frank, R. H., 1988, Passions Within Reason , New York: Norton.
• Frankena, W. K., 1973, Ethics , Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
• Gauthier, D., 1986, Morals By Agreement , Oxford: Clarendon.
• Hobbes, T., 1968, Leviathan , ed. C. B. Macpherson, Harmondsworth: Penguin, chs. 14-15.
• Kalin, J., 1970, "In Defense of Egoism," in D. Gauthier, Morality and Rational Self-Interest , Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
• Kavka, G., 1984, “The Reconciliation Project,” in Morality, Reason, and Truth , ed. D. Copp and D. Zimmerman, Totowa: Rowman and Allanheld.
• Kavka, G., 1986, Part II.
• McConnell, T. C. 1978, “The Argument from Psychological Egoism to Ethical Egoism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56: 41-47.
• Moore, G.E., 1903, Principia Ethica , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Sidgwick, H., 1981, II.I, II.V, and concluding ch.

Rational Egoism

• Brink, D. 1992, “Sidgwick and the Rationale for Rational Egoism,” in Essays on Henry Sidgwick , ed. B. Schultz, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Kagan, S., 1986, “The Present-Aim Theory of Rationality,” Ethics 96: 746-759.
• Parfit, D., 1984, Reasons and Persons , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Parfit, D., 1986, Reply to Kagan, Ethics , 96: 843-846, 868-869.
• Shaver, R. 1999, Rational Egoism , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[Please contact the author with suggestions.]

Aristotle, General Topics: ethics | Hobbes, Thomas | Hume, David | -->idealism: British --> | Plato: shorter ethical works | prisoner's dilemma | -->rationality --> | Sidgwick, Henry | Stoicism | well-being

Abstract:  The various forms of ethical egoism are defined. Standard objections to ethical egoism are evaluated, and the conclusion is drawn that ethical egoism is incomplete.

• Personal ethical egoism is not a theory because it is not generalized to others.
• I cannot recommend personal ethical egoism to others because such a recommendation would be against my own self-interest.
• Individual ethical egoism is a belief that can't be consistent unless it applies to just one person. In other words, this belief is not universalizable.
• Practically speaking, the doctrine is similar to solipsism —there's no way to justify the belief since it applies to just one person.
• One problem is without knowledge of the world, how can we truly know what's in our best interest? ( c.f. the Socratic Paradox ).
• Another problem is trying to figure out what "their own interests" means. Does this phrase mean short-term or long-term benefit, pleasure, happiness, preference, or something else? What gives you pleasure might not be a benefit or in your interest.
• set forth systematically the first principles of morality
• show how to justify these principles, and, as a result,
• elucidate a conception of a life of excellence for people.
• Consistency :  there should be no contradictions or incompatible statements. e.g ., the injunctions from folklore morals, "Haste makes waste" and "Look before you leap" would be inconsistent with "A stitch in time saves nine," or "The race is to the swift."
• Completeness : there should be no moral truth which is not provable from the basic moral principles of the theory. e.g ., In Christian ethics, the principle "Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's" (Matthew 22:21) is meant to distinguish between secular and religious situations in order to avoid political difficulty for religious belief and so would be an incomplete theory of action in the secular realm.
• mistaken in truth or
• inconsistent or
• incomplete.
• It's right for Jack to praise Jack's qualities.
• It's wrong for Jill to praise Jack's qualities. Therefore, praising Jack's qualities is both right and wrong—right for Jack and wrong for Jill.
• But this is not to say the same act is both right and wrong—these are two different acts: one is done by Jack and one is done by Jill.
• The best that can be said is that there is a conflict of interest which could be settled by contract law. Hence, this is not a good objection.
• We tell Jack to do his best and we tell Jill to do her best, or
• Jack tells Jill to be an altruist.
• Isn't this inconsistent?
• But there is no inconsistency. All statements are consistent with Jack's interest. There is no formal contradiction. In contest in sports we can hope that each team will do its best without contradiction; in fact, we can even hope that each team wins without contradiction..
• Jack might believe this, but he isn't going to tell Jill.
• He looks to his own interest first.
• Again, there is no inconsistency in not telling Jill.
• Example: Where the hirer for a particular job has no personal stake, who should he choose for a job when the candidates have equal qualifications:  Jack or Jill?
• Hence, the theory of ethical egoism  is incomplete.
• When there is a conflict of interests between egoists, egoism provides no way to resolve the conflict.
• Life is not seen as a contest between people so much as it is a challenge. If someone an egoist, then that person does not necessarily act against my own self-interest.
• Some observations are in order.
• E.g. , your going to college is in your self-interest, and it will help keep you off welfare. In pursuing your self-interest, you will get a job which will benefit others.
• E.g. , you start a business to make money, but you must have satisfied employees and a competitive product thereby helping others.
• If the egoist doesn't help others to be happy, they will not return the favor.
• Often, it is in our own interest to look to our long-term interests by the effects of our actions on other people as a group. Hence, there is no inconsistency for the egoist to help a group of which he is a part. E.g. , An ethical egoist can act in self-interest by contributing to the Salvation Army or to the United Fund.
• Hence, the egoist must allow everyone to pursue his own personal interest (universal ethical egoism).
• Consequently, egoism leads into a right-based theory -each individual has certain inalienable rights or
• Egoism leads to a rule-based theory that certain rules of conduct are in the interest of everyone to observe. That is we are all better off if everyone obeys the law—we have to give up some good to achieve our maximum possible good.

Recommended Sources

Solipsism : An excellent discussion of the role of solipsism in the history of Western and Eastern philosophy and its role as a limiting case in thought experiments and epistemology from Wikipedia . See also from this source links to various related concepts to egoism including ethical egoism .

Ethical Egoism : A section of the entry "Egoism" discussing arguments for and against by Robert Shaver published in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .

Ethical Egoism : A section of the entry "Egoism' from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy by Alexander Moseley emphasizing conflict resolution.

Taking Egoism Seriously

• Published: 04 June 2012
• Volume 16 , pages 529–542, ( 2013 )

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• Keith Burgess-Jackson 1  

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Though utilitarianism is far from being universally accepted in the philosophical community, it is taken seriously and treated respectfully. Its critics do not dismiss it out of hand; they do not misrepresent it; they do not belittle or disparage its proponents. They allow the theory to be articulated, developed, and defended from criticism, even if they go on to reject the modified versions. Ethical egoism, a longstanding rival of utilitarianism, is treated very differently. It is said to be “refuted” by arguments of a sort that apply equally well to utilitarianism. It is said to be “unprovable,” when many of the greatest utilitarians themselves, such as Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), and Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900), admitted that no normative ethical theory, including their own, is provable. Critics of ethical egoism seldom discuss the various theoretical moves that utilitarians are routinely allowed to make, such as (1) fighting the facts, (2) transforming the theory from “act utilitarianism” to “rule utilitarianism,” and (3) biting the bullet. This essay argues that every defensive move made by utilitarians can be made, with equal vigor (if not also plausibility), by ethical egoists. The conclusion is that ethical egoism deserves to be taken more seriously than it is.

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Ethical decision-making theory: an integrated approach.

Mark S. Schwartz

Principlism

Principlism in Bioethics

One prominent philosopher who did not treat Rand dismissively is Robert Nozick ( 1971 ).

According to its new coauthor, Stuart Rachels (the son of James), The Elements of Moral Philosophy is “the best-selling textbook in philosophy.” Rachels 2011 .

Rachels 1974 , 298. Rachels also calls it “a pernicious doctrine.” Ibid., 297. Perhaps Rachels (a utilitarian) was projecting, for a recent empirical study discloses that “the endorsement of utilitarian solutions to a set of commonly-used moral dilemmas correlates with a set of psychological traits that can be characterized as emotionally callous and manipulative—traits that most would perceive as not only psychologically unhealthy, but also morally undesirable” (Bartels and Pizarro 2011 , 154).

Rolston 1988 , 294 (emphasis in original).

Ewing 1944 , 130. “Preposterous” means “utterly absurd; outrageous” or “contrary to nature, reason, or common sense.” The Oxford American Dictionary and Language Guide 1999 , 785.

A similar conclusion is drawn by James Cornman, Keith Lehrer, and George Pappas, who claim, in their textbook, that “ethical egoism ought to be rejected . . . because there is no sound argument to support it and because it prescribes certain morally repugnant actions.” Cornman et al. 1982 , 289–90 (ellipsis added). To be fair, these authors also claim that utilitarianism “is clearly wrong” and “should be rejected.” Ibid., 305. In other words, there is no sound argument to support utilitarianism, either.

William Shaw, a utilitarian, points out that “Although many philosophers reject utilitarianism, those working in normative ethics, legal theory, or social and political philosophy cannot avoid situating themselves with reference to it.” Shaw 1999 , ix.

For an attempt to work out a deontological (i.e., a nonconsequentialist) version of egoism, see Burgess-Jackson 2003 .

For a more in-depth discussion of the similarities and differences between egoism and utilitarianism, see Burgess-Jackson ( 2012 ).

See Sidgwick 1981 , 84, for a discussion of the similarities between the theories.

The colorful name for this move, which is said to occur while criticizing a constructive dilemma, is “grabbing (or grasping) the bull by the horn.”

Smith 2005 , 271. As this example shows, egoism is every bit as austere and demanding as utilitarianism. However, instead of requiring strict impartiality between individuals , where the temptation is to favor certain individuals (including oneself), it requires strict impartiality between temporal stages of one’s self , where the temptation is to favor one’s current self. As C. I. Lewis put it, “There is no automatic inclination always on the side of prudence. Instead we natively incline to choose the immediate or nearer goods, to the prejudice of more remote ones and of the rational interest in the greatest or highest good in a whole lifetime. Meeting the requirements of prudence calls for self-government” (Lewis 1969 , 108).

Two decades after coining the term “rule worship,” Smart apologized to rule utilitarians for his use of it. See Smart 1977 , 135. By 1991, however, he was back to his old ways, describing rule utilitarianism as “absurd rule worship.” See Smart 1991 , 371.

Kavka 1986 , chap. 9. Stephen Darwall concurs, though without characterizing Hobbes as a rule egoist. What Hobbes denies, Darwall writes, “is that it is ever wise to break a covenant, even in a state of nature, unless the contract has been voided by reasonable suspicion of the other’s defaulting. Hobbes’s reason was that even if there are cases where breaking a covenant might be beneficial, one can never know for sure that one is in such a situation, and the risks and costs are such that the wisest policy is always to keep a covenant rather than taking a chance.” Darwall 1998 , 105 (emphasis in original).

Kavka 1986 , 358–9. Kavka calls this principle “REP,” for rule-egoistic principle.

An exception is Kagan 1998 , 194–204, esp. 199.

Feldman, for example, devotes three chapters to act utilitarianism and one to rule utilitarianism, for a total of four chapters on utilitarianism. He devotes one chapter to egoism. He does not consider rule egoism. It might be said that the reason rule egoism is not discussed by critics is that it has had no proponents (other than Hobbes). This is false. John Hospers ( 1973 ) described (and named) such a theory in 1973. In that essay, Hospers suggested that Ayn Rand is best interpreted as a rule egoist. See ibid., 393–4. More recently, Stephen Buckle has interpreted Peter Singer (!) as a rule egoist (though without using that label). See Buckle 2005 , 187 (“It seems . . . that, for Singer, ethics must rest on a foundation of carefully-calculated (or as he calls it, ‘prudent’) egoism” [ellipsis added]).

Another attempt to modify utilitarianism so as to avoid its many unsavory implications is R. M. Hare’s two-level approach. See Hare 1981, chap. 2. Hare writes:

The two kinds of utilitarianism . . . can coexist at their respective levels; the critical thinker considers cases in an act-utilitarian or specific rule-utilitarian way, and on the basis of these he selects . . . general prima facie principles for use, in a general rule-utilitarian way, at the intuitive level” (Hare 1981, 43 [ellipses added]).

The words “utilitarianism” and “utilitarian” can be replaced, respectively, by “egoism” and “egoistic.” I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for recommending that I consider Hare’s approach as falling under this heading (viz., “ Modifying the Theory ”).

According to philosopher and lexicographer Robert M. Martin, “The phrase [viz., “biting the bullet”] comes from old movies, in which wounded cowboys bit down on a bullet to help them stand the pain of surgery without anaesthetic” (Martin 2002 , 44).

Singer 1974 , 516. Shelly Kagan, another revisionary utilitarian, replies to the objection that consequentialism (a superset of utilitarianism) is too demanding by suggesting that “Perhaps our moral intuitions should be given little or no weight in general.” Kagan 1998 , 159.

Here is a flagrant example of the double standard. In 1974, James Rachels argued that egoism is “not correct” because it has what he considers to be a false implication. Rachels 1974 , 309. In 1979, he rejected a similar argument against utilitarianism, claiming that “The most famous objections to act-utilitarianism . . . are little more than descriptions of the theory, with the question-begging addendum, ‘Because it says that , it can’t be right’” (Rachels 1979 , 169 n. 12 [italics in original; ellipsis added]). That is to say, Rachels allows utilitarians, but not egoists, to bite the bullet. Another example comes from William Shaw, who writes: “[E]goism is an implausible theory of right and wrong. By reducing everything to individual self-interest, egoism permits any action whatsoever—theft, extortion, arson, or murder—as long as it advances the interests of the agent” (Shaw 1999 , 17). One could just as easily have written the following: “ Utilitarianism is an implausible theory of right and wrong. By reducing everything to the maximization of utility , utilitarianism permits any action whatsoever—theft, extortion, arson, or murder—as long as it advances utility .” The problem Shaw identifies inheres in consequentialism , of which utilitarianism and egoism are but two species. It does not inhere in egoism per se .

According to Alan Donagan, “Every moral system gives rise to hard cases, in which those who accept it must, contrary to their desire, cause harm or permit it” (Donagan 1977 , 180). Put differently, every normative ethical theorist must bite at least one bullet.

According to Cornman, Lehrer, and Pappas ( 1982 , 297), “Bentham was right: There is no direct proof of the principle of utility or of any other ultimate ethical principle.” R. M. Hare believes that utilitarianism follows logically from two formal features of moral judgments, viz., their universalizability and their prescriptivity. See Hare 1981 , 111: “[T]he requirement to universalize our prescriptions generates utilitarianism.” Not everyone agrees that this constitutes a proof, however, for (1) not everyone shares Hare’s view of the formal features of moral judgments (in other words, not everyone is a universal prescriptivist) and (2) even some of those who share Hare’s view of the formal features of moral judgments (or accept it for the sake of argument) reject the inference. See, e.g., Mackie 1977 , chap. 4. I thank an anonymous reviewer for reminding me of Hare’s putative proof and for recommending that I discuss it, however briefly.

Lewis 1969 , 195. See also ibid., 142–3, 199.

See also Broad 1930 , 243 (“The first point to notice is that the Egoist’s doctrine, when thus stated, cannot be accused of any arbitrariness or partiality. He does not claim anything for his Ego which he is not prepared to allow to any other Ego” [italics in original]).

Smart, a utilitarian, admits forthrightly that “many people find utilitarianism repugnant.” Smart 1981 , 461. An anonymous reviewer of this essay conjectures that many of those who find utilitarianism repugnant find egoism even more so. They may believe, for example, that while utilitarianism sometimes disrespects persons, it at least endorses impartialism . Egoism not only fails to endorse impartialism; it endorses the most extreme form of partialism . I concede the force of this objection, but note that it fails to show that egoism should not be taken seriously as a normative ethical theory. The most it shows is that the seriousness with which a theory should be taken varies inversely with the degree to which people find it repugnant. I suspect (though I cannot prove) that a sophisticated version of egoism would differ little in its results from a sophisticated version of utilitarianism, in which case the degree of repugnance felt toward the two theories may be similar. To put the point differently, if egoism were taken more seriously than it is (i.e., if it were given the benefit rather than the detriment of the doubt by its critics), there might not be the same degree of aversion to it.

As Sidgwick noted, the attraction is not limited to philosophers. “[I]t seems sufficient to point to the wide acceptance of the principle that it is reasonable for a man to act in the manner most conducive to his own happiness” (Sidgwick 1981 , 119).

“Almost any normative theory is likely to have its counterintuitive aspects, and people can sincerely disagree as to which theory is, on balance, the most attractive. That is why there are few or no ‘knockdown’ arguments in ethics (or anywhere, for that matter). All you can do is point out the attractive features of your own favored theory, explain why you are prepared to live with its various unattractive features, and try to show that the alternatives are even worse” (Kagan 1998 , 16). This seems to me exactly right.

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Acknowledgments

This essay is dedicated to my canine companion Shelbie, who, for the past nine years, has made every day a joy. Her happiness is an important component of my happiness. I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers of this periodical for their comments, criticisms, and suggestions. One of the reviewers went above and beyond the call of scholarly duty. Neither of the reviewers is responsible for what remains. I am also grateful to the editor in chief, Bert Musschenga, for his courtesy, promptness, and professionalism.

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Burgess-Jackson, K. Taking Egoism Seriously. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 16 , 529–542 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-012-9372-5

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DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-012-9372-5

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Law of Ethical Egoism

Definition of law of ethical eegoism.

Ethical egoism is the idea that people should act in ways that are best for themselves. Imagine each person as the captain of their own ship. The captain’s first job is to keep their ship sailing smoothly. Ethical egoism is thinking that the best way for a captain to make sure all ships sail smoothly is for each one to focus on their own ship first. It’s not about being mean or not caring about others, it’s about making sure you’re okay so that you can help others when needed.

To explain it simply, think about the rule of putting on your own oxygen mask in an airplane before helping others. You’re not doing it because you don’t care about the other passengers; instead, you understand that you’ll be much more helpful if you’re okay first. This is just like ethical egoism, where taking care of your own needs first means you’ll be better at taking care of others when the time comes.

Types of Ethical Egoism

While ethical egoism is a broad concept, it can be seen in a few different ways:

• Individual Ethical Egoism: This type is about believing you should look after your own interests, but it doesn’t say what others should do. People who follow this believe it’s up to everyone to decide for themselves how to act.
• Personal Ethical Eegoism: Much like individual ethical egoism, this version is centered on the idea that a person should focus on their own interests but it doesn’t require them to tell others to do the same. It’s all about personal choice.
• Universal Ethical Eegoism: This one is a bit different because it extends the idea to everyone. It says that all people would be better off if they put their own interests first. If every person is taking care of themselves, then the thinking goes that everyone will end up okay.

Examples of Law Of Ethical Egoism

• Choosing a Career: Let’s say you really love art and you find a job that allows you to paint all day and pays well, even if it means moving to a new city away from your friends. You choose this job because it’s what will make you feel fulfilled and happy in life. This is you putting your interest and happiness first, which is at the heart of ethical egoism.
• Self-Care: If you decide to exercise daily and eat healthy because it makes you feel strong and improves your chances of a long, happy life, then this is ethical egoism. You’re focusing on taking good care of yourself so you can live your best life.
• Setting Boundaries: Say you have a spa day planned for some rest and a friend asks for help moving on the same day. You say no to your friend because you need that relaxation time. This is ethical egoism because you’re prioritizing your own well-being over someone else’s needs.

Why is it important?

Ethical egoism is important because it puts a spotlight on the idea of taking care of yourself and being responsible for your own happiness and well-being. When we truly understand what’s best for us, we can make smarter choices. Plus, when we’re happy and our needs are met, we can be much more helpful to others around us.

In the real world, being able to look after our own interests helps us build a better life. For instance, in school, focusing on your own study habits can lead to better grades, which can open up more opportunities in the future. When we apply ethical egoism to our everyday choices, we shape a life that’s rewarding and enriching. In business, this idea encourages people to chase goals that make sense for them, which helps them succeed and contribute to their field in meaningful ways.

Implications and Applications

When we wrap our heads around ethical egoism, it can have a big say in how we steer our lives. The choices we make about our jobs, our relationships, and how we grow as individuals can all be influenced by this idea. By concentrating on what really benefits us, we might find that we lead richer and more satisfying lives.

In the world of work, ethical egoism pushes us to go after projects and ambitions that fit with our own interests and that will help us do well over time. This can mean better businesses and workplaces because everyone is motivated by their own success, which can actually help everyone do better.

Comparison with Related Axioms

Ethical egoism often gets confused with other ideas that look like it but are different. Take altruism , which says we should always think of others first, even when it makes things tough for us. Ethical egoism is the opposite, betting that taking care of ourselves will end up helping everyone in the long run. And then there’s utilitarianism , which tells us to do what makes the most people happy. Ethical egoism is more focused on the individual’s happiness rather than the whole group’s.

Related Topics

There are some ideas that are quite close to ethical egoism that are worth knowing about:

• Self-Interest Theory: This is the belief that we’re always motivated by personal gain in some way. It’s not so much about what we should do, like ethical egoism, but about why we do things.
• Rational Egoism: This is the thought that it’s rational to act in our own self-interest. It’s different from ethical egoism because it’s about what’s logical, not necessarily what’s ethical.
• Objectivism : A philosophy developed by Ayn Rand, it talks about the importance of self-interest and individual rights. It overlaps with ethical egoism, but it’s a full system that covers politics, art, and more.

Ethical egoism stretches way back into history. Ancient thinkers like Epicurus believed that searching for personal happiness in smart ways leads to the best life. Modern philosophers, like Ayn Rand, have talked a lot about why it’s good and right to focus on our own interests.

Controversies

The debates around ethical egoism can get pretty heated. Some people argue that it’s just a fancy way of saying it’s fine to be selfish and forget about what others need. Critics suggest that if we all just look after ourselves, we could end up with a world where no one helps anyone else and we all just go after what we want. These arguments show up because some see ethical egoism as too distant or unkind, even though its supporters believe that taking care of ourselves is actually the best way to be able to help others well.

In conclusion, the law of ethical egoism suggests that focusing on our own interests first is both moral and practical. It’s not about being self-centered to the point of harming others, but about ensuring personal well-being in order to lead a happy life and contribute positively to society. This concept has been around for a long time and remains a key part of discussions on ethics and morality.

Cloning: The Ethical Approaches Essay

Introduction, the ethical egoism position, the social contract ethics position, the medical ethics code and cloning.

Cloning is a controversial topic not only in the realm of ethics, but also in the medical field. There are several reasons why certain people believe that cloning is unethical. They believe that it is unethical due to medical concerns since cloning is a relatively unexplored field of science. In addition, the clones’ self-perception in the society is a point of ethical controversy, given that the clones might have trouble seeing themselves as separate entities (Häyry, 2018). On the other hand, there are individuals who believe that cloning is at the center of the future development of the human race and to stymie it is an unethical decision. Furthermore, human cloning would allow families that cannot have children to reproduce, elevating the mental burden that they experience. Depending on the person’s set of ethics, one can take the stance either pro or against cloning.

As the point of ethical egoism is to support oneself before others, the question of whether an ethical egoist would support cloning is the question of cloning’s potential benefit. If the goals of an ethical egoist align with the possibilities that cloning might open, then they would take its side. However, for an ethical egoist, it is vital to consider their future rather than focus on the satisfaction of the present needs (Rachels, 2003). Therefore, unless they have an external motivation, an ethical egoist would be wary of the concept of cloning. They would regard this phenomenon as an agent of unpredictability that has the potential to irreversibly change society. In addition, their social position would have a significant influence. Cloning is not an inexpensive process, and wealthy people would be the ones most likely to afford it. These circumstances would essentially create a separate class of people consisting of the wealthy and their clones. Ethical egoists belonging to the middle or lower class would not see the created divide as beneficial to themselves.

The moral position of an ethical egoist, in this case, would be justified by the fact that a person has only one life. The great value that human life has justifies them making decisions based on the merit of their own benefit rather than the benefit of society. The second moral justification is that restricting a person’s ability to pursue their benefit without a concrete reason is immoral and devalues their status as human beings. Depending on an ethical egoist’s pursuits, the conflict between self and loyalty to the community here comes through the possible implications of cloning for society as a whole. It is a person’s responsibility to ensure the stability of the society around them; however, if the egoist decided to site with cloning, they would easily disregard the troublesome notions. The best course of action here is to make a convincing argument in favor of the long-term detrimental outcomes of cloning.

The ethics of social contract theory rely on the notion that people agree to adhere to a set of morals for the communal good of society. A social contract follower would evaluate the matter of human cloning, consider the potentially detrimental outcomes, and take a side against it regardless of their personal agenda. The idea behind social contract ethics is that through the pursuit of their own good, people end up in an ultimately worse situation (Rachels, 2003). The first moral justification that these individuals would provide is that trying to give childless people the ability to have children would devalue the notion of childbirth. A world consisting entirely or almost entirely of clones would suffer from significant biological and genetic consequences. The second moral justification would be that, although the purpose of cloning is to solve the childless persons’ grief and anguish, it would create a moral struggle for the clones themselves. Thus, while trying to manage mental health disparities, cloning could become a source of new issues in the sphere instead. The topic does not involve a collision between national and personal obligations.

AMA code for doctors provides guidelines for ethical decisions made by doctors regarding their patients. The AMA code states that doctors have an obligation towards society (Rakatansky, 2018). Therefore, the doctors that are presented with the opportunity to introduce cloning as a widespread medical procedure should consider the societal implications of this phenomenon. The chosen topic involves the conflict between professional and familial duties if the professional in question has a family member that suffers severely from their inability to bear children. This conflict is intensified if the person is considering self-cloning as an option.

In conclusion, cloning can be a subject of extensive debate with various arguments, depending on which school of thought is employed. Individuals adhering to ethical egoism and social contract theory would not support the idea of cloning; however, their reasoning would be different. A doctor’s position towards cloning would be dictated by the AMA code that dictates them to consider the good of society, and they would take a stance against it as well.

Häyry, M. (2018). Ethics and cloning. British Medical Bulletin , 128 (1), 15–21.

Rachels, J. (2003). The elements of moral philosophy . 4 th ed. McGraw Hill Higher Education.

Rakatansky, H. (2018). AMA code of ethics: Roots, revisions and relevance today. Rhode Island Medical Journal, 101 (3), 12–14.

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