mikhail gorbachev essay grade 12

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Gr. 12 HISTORY T3 W1:The end of the Cold War and a new world order 1989 to the present

This essay focus on Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union in 1989 and its impact on South Africa

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Mikhail Gorbachev and the de-nuclearisation dream

The actions and achievements of the prominent Russian politician in the 1980s.

A staff writer National Library of Scotland

Mikhail Gorbachev is known for being the first real reforming General Secretary of the old Soviet Union.

Soon after his appointment as leader in 1985, he immediately set out his vision for a more open society. His attempts to reshape the economy were partly successful, despite being hampered by entrenched vested interests in both the departmental ministries and also the Communist Party itself.

'Glasnost' (transparency) was introduced by Gorbachev as a way of opening up the Soviet system to citizens' scrutiny with a view to improvement — from 1987, he accelerated the process using 'perestroika' (restructuring), including the introduction of private business. Arguably, this was too fast for the turning of a juggernaut like the Soviet system — many were still in favour of central control of the economy and baulked at anything that smacked of capitalism. It was not helped by the fact that the economy was suffering a steep decline, only partly hidden by Soviet official statistics (from 'The impact of Gorbachev's policies on Soviet economic statistics: a conference report', CIA, 1987).

Action against nuclear weapons

Fascinating though these changes were — particularly to the Soviet Union's Cold War adversaries — Gorbachev's most remarkable aim was his determination to rid the world of nuclear weapons. This was a path that had been embarked on by his predecessor, Konstantin Chernenko, but had been met with distrust by the Americans. Within a few months of taking office, Gorbachev threw down the gauntlet to the USA by declaring a freeze on the deployment of missiles in Europe, which would expire in six months if the NATO deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles was not also withdrawn. They included a moratorium on all nuclear testing.

Cynics claimed that the failing Soviet economy desperately required divestment of their huge commitments to arms spending and the propping up of Soviet-friendly states around the world, and that this was the prime motivation behind Gorbachev's actions (from 'Gorbachev's economic program', 1988).

the USA administration was also very aware that they were dealing with a new type of Soviet leader

But in any case, Gorbachev's charm offensive, particularly amongst European leaders and USA allies such as South Korea, succeeded in lessening the perceived Soviet threat, certainly amongst European nations. The CIA saw it as an attempt 'to seed discord within NATO' (also from 'Gorbachev's economic program', 1988). His visit to the UK in 1984 fascinated Westerners, who saw him as a modern, urbane leader, with a sophisticated wife and confident and open manner. This was someone that UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said she could do business with.

But his casting of the USA as the obstacle to arms limitation talks alarmed the Reagan administration. With a background of a growing anti-nuclear movement in Europe and the USA, the Americans were keen to frame the negotiations as a path towards nuclear weapons reduction. However, the USA administration was also very aware that they were dealing with a new type of Soviet leader with whom they could, in fact, have a constructive dialogue. Détente had been attempted before, and a weaker version of 'glasnost' had been tried, but never had a Soviet leader embarked on what appeared, at least to Western eyes, as such an ambitious undertaking. President Reagan was keen to meet with Gorbachev, despite the qualms of his more hawkish aides. He reasoned that they may as well call Gorbachev's bluff by agreeing to discussions on nuclear weapons reduction.

Gorbachev's meetings with Reagan

The two leaders met in Geneva in 1985 in a spirit of positivity and pragmatism, and established a good rapport. In fact, they got on so well that Reagan admitted 'you could almost get to like the guy' (from 'Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan', 1999). They were to meet several times more, in Washington in 1987 and in Moscow in 1988.

However, their meeting in Reykjavik in 1986 was the real breakthrough. The stakes were high: on the negotiating table were the reduction of strategic (long-range) weapons — the elimination of all Europe-based medium-range weapons; a strengthening of the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty.

On the second point, the Soviets left aside the nuclear potential of France and the UK (a very large concession on their part; they were well aware of Prime Minister Thatcher's absolute belief in their deterrent effect, something they discussed when she visited Moscow in 1987). The two leaders went 'off-piste' and spent 10 hours talking with only their interpreters present. But the great stumbling block at Reykjavik was the USA commitment to the so-called 'Star Wars' project.

Reykjavik … was widely acknowledged as the turning point of the end of the Cold War

In 1983 the Americans had embarked enthusiastically on plans for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a space-based anti-ballistic missile system which in theory could intercept Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) thereby rendering nuclear weapons obsolete. The Soviets saw it as the USA gaining the upper hand in the arms race. President Reagan insisted that it could be a shared initiative, perhaps overseen by an international body such as the UN. Gorbachev dismissed this as a highly unlikely scenario, famously declaring that the USA would not even share the technicalities of its milking machines with them. However, Reagan's proposal was very far removed from his previous assertion that the Soviet Union was an untrustworthy 'evil empire', and indicated how far the Cold War mindset had thawed.

Reykjavik, despite its failures, was widely acknowledged as the turning point of the end of the Cold War. It paved the way for the signing of the historic Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987, which abolished a whole category of nuclear weapons for the first time. As a result, the Soviet Union had destroyed 1,846 missiles, and the USA destroyed 846 missiles over the next four years.

By the time of the Moscow summit in 1988, Republican hawks had forced Reagan to be less facilitative so that the Soviets were not seen to gain the upper hand on their home turf. But nonetheless, the summit played well to the Russian public, and Gorbachev took the opportunity to push through more reforms, including the first elected legislature in Russia since the 1917 Revolution. He could not foresee that these reforms would, ironically, contribute to the eventual demise of the Soviet Union.

Beginning of the end of the Soviet Union

1991 saw the two sides in negotiations on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), but by this time, Gorbachev was in a weaker position. The Soviet military was opposed to further concessions, as they saw it. Gorbachev also faced increasing opposition to his economic reforms from all sides — Communist Party hardliners who longed for the certainties of the old Soviet Union, and others who believed his reforms did not go far enough.

His decentralisation plans were a step too far for some of his influential Communist Party opponents: in August that year tanks appeared on the streets of Moscow in an attempted coup d'état. It failed, but the beginning of the end of the old Soviet Union had begun. By the end of that year, Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Republic, along with 11 other leaders of the 12 republics, declared the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

De-nuclearisation today

Mikhail Gorbachev continues his work through his International Foundation for Socio-Economic and Political Studies. Since then, although new state actors now have nuclear weapons and political allegiances have changed, Gorbachev still claims that it is possible to de-nuclearise the world. If he, Reagan and Bush could agree, he asserts that all that is needed is the political will.

However, the outlook is not optimistic. This year, despite European pressure, President Donald Trump withdrew the USA from the historic INF Treaty, after complaining that Russia had violated its terms. The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee has said that 'The withdrawal without a follow-on is the invitation for an arms race'. Currently, there is only one nuclear weapons treaty, START, between the two superpowers. It expires in 2021.

Perestroika

By: History.com Editors

Updated: November 1, 2022 | Original: April 14, 2010

Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev's Friendship

Perestroika (“restructuring” in Russian) refers to a series of political and economic reforms meant to kick-start the stagnant 1980s economy of the Soviet Union. Its architect, President Mikhail Gorbachev, oversaw the most fundamental changes to his nation’s economic engine and political structure since the Russian Revolution of 1917. But the suddenness of these reforms, coupled with growing instability both inside and outside the Soviet Union, would contribute to the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1991.

Early Attempts at Reform

In May 1985, two months after coming to power, Mikhail Gorbachev delivered a speech in St. Petersburg (then known as Leningrad ), in which he publicly criticized the inefficient economic system of the Soviet Union , making him the first Communist leader to do so.

This was followed by a February 1986 speech to the Communist Party Congress, in which he expanded upon the need for political and economic restructuring, or perestroika, and called for a new era of transparency and openness, or glasnost.

But by 1987, these early attempts at reform had achieved little, and Gorbachev embarked on a more ambitious program.

What Is Perestroika?

Gorbachev’s perestroika program loosened centralized control of many businesses, allowing some farmers and manufacturers to decide for themselves which products to make, how many to produce, and what to charge for them.

This incentivized them to aim for profits, but it also went against the strict price controls that had been the bedrock of Soviet economic policies. It was a move that rankled many high-ranking officials who had previously headed these powerful central committees.

In May 1988, Gorbachev introduced a new policy that allowed for the creation of limited co-operative businesses within the Soviet Union, which led to the rise of privately owned stores, restaurants and manufacturers. Not since the short-lived New Economic Policy of Vladimir Lenin , instituted in 1922 after the Russian civil war, had aspects of free-market capitalism been permitted in the U.S.S.R.

But even here, Gorbachev tread lightly. As William Taubman , historian and author of Gorbachev: His Life and Times , notes, “This was a way of introducing private enterprise without calling it that.”

In fact, the term “private property” was never even used. Many of these new co-ops became the basis of the oligarchical system that continues to control power in Russia today.

Gorbachev Relaxes Trade Restrictions

Gorbachev also peeled back restrictions on foreign trade, streamlining processes to allow manufacturers and local government agencies to bypass the previously stifling bureaucratic system of the central government.

He encouraged Western investment, although he later reversed his original policy, which called for these new business ventures to be majority Russian-owned and operated.

He also showed initial restraint when laborers began to push for increased protections and rights, with thousands protesting the wild inefficiencies of the Soviet coal industry. But he again reversed course when faced with pressure from hardliners after a massive strike by 300,000 miners in 1991.

Economic Reforms Backfire

While Gorbachev had instituted these reforms to jumpstart the sluggish Soviet economy, many of them had the opposite effect. The agricultural sector, for example, had provided food at low cost thanks to decades of heavy government subsidies.

Now, it could charge higher prices in the marketplace—prices many Soviets could not afford. Government spending and Soviet debt skyrocketed, and pushes by workers for higher wages led to dangerous inflation.

If Gorbachev faced opposition from the entrenched hardliners that he was moving too far, too fast, he was criticized for doing just the opposite by others. Some liberals called for full-fledged abolishment of central planning committees entirely, which Gorbachev resisted.

As Taubman notes, “His more radical critics would say he didn’t move fast enough to create a market economy, but the reason he didn’t was that the very effort to do so would produce chaos, which in fact it did under [former President Boris] Yeltsin .”

Political Reforms Under Perestroika

As reforms under glasnost revealed both the horrors of the Soviet past, and its present-day inefficiencies, Gorbachev moved to remake much of the political system of the U.S.S.R.

At a Party meeting in 1988, he pushed through measures calling for the first truly democratic elections since the Russian Revolution of 1917. Hardliners who supported this initially believed that the date for these elections would be far enough in the future that they could control the process. Instead, Gorbachev announced that they would be held just months later.

The resulting campaign for the new Congress of People’s Deputies was remarkable. While some Communist Party members reserved many of the seats for themselves, other hardliners went down to defeat at the ballot box to liberal reformers.

Former dissidents and prisoners—including Nobel laureate physicist and activist Andrei Sakharov —were elected, as candidates waged vigorous Western-style campaigns.

When the new Congress met for its first session in May 1989, newspapers, television and radio stations—newly empowered by the lifting of press restrictions under glasnost—devoted hours of time to the meetings, which featured open conflict between conservatives and liberals.

“Everybody stopped working,” Taubman says. “It was as if the whole country started watching television…the windows were open, and you could hear the debates coming out of apartment windows.” In 1990, Gorbachev became the first—and only—President of the Soviet Union.

Opponents of Perestroika

But as with economic reforms, many of these newly-elected reformers used their platforms to criticize what they still considered limited change. And the pushback by hardliners was just as fierce.

In March 1988, the largest newspaper in the Soviet Union published a full-throttled attack on Gorbachev by chemist and social critic Nina Andreyeva . The article, “I Cannot Forsake My Principles,” was likely written with the tacit approval of several members of the Politburo, the highest-echelon of the Communist Party, and was seen as an attempt to destabilize Gorbachev.

Gorbachev’s additional reforms—which allowed for the creation of political parties and increasingly shifted autonomy and control to local and regional bodies, rather than the central government—weakened his own base of support as the Communist Party lost its monopoly on political power in the vast Soviet Union.

International Events Under Perestroika

Gorbachev held firm on a promise to end Soviet involvement in a war in Afghanistan , which the U.S.S.R. invaded in 1979. After 10 controversial years and nearly 15,000 Soviet deaths, troops fully withdrew in 1989.

The Soviets began increasingly engaging with the West, and Gorbachev forged key relationships with leaders including British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher , West German leader Helmut Kohl and most famously, United States President Ronald Reagan .

It was with the staunchly anti-Communist Reagan that Gorbachev, a new kind of Communist leader, achieved a series of landmark agreements, including the 1987 INF Treaty that eliminated all intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe. That same year, Reagan stood near the Berlin Wall and gave the most famous speech of his presidency: “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.”

Results and Aftermath of Perestroika

The failure of Gorbachev’s perestroika hastened the fall of the Soviet Union. After decades of heavy-handed control over Eastern Bloc nations, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev eased their grip. In 1988, he announced to the United Nations that Soviet troop levels would be reduced, and later said that the U.S.S.R. would no longer interfere in the domestic affairs of those countries.

The remarkable speed of the collapse of these satellite countries was stunning: By the end of 1989, the Berlin Wall came down and a divided East and West Germany were on the path to reunification , and relatively peaceful revolutions had brought democracy to countries like Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania .

Inspired by reforms with the Soviet Union under both perestroika and glasnost, as well as the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, nationalist independence movements began to swell within the U.S.S.R. in the late 1980s.

As the difficulties of half a decade of reform rocked the Communist Party, Gorbachev attempted to right the ship, shifting his positions to appease both hardliners and liberals. His increasing appeals for Western support and assistance, particularly to President George H. W. Bush , went unheeded.

In August 1991, a coup by hardliners aligned with some members of the KGB attempted to remove Gorbachev, but he maintained in control, albeit temporarily.

In December, almost 75 years after the Russian Revolution ushered in the Communist Party era, the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Gorbachev resigned on December 25, 1991. And with the fall of the Soviet Union , the Cold War was over.

Gorbachev: His Life and Times , by William Taubman (W. W. Norton & Company, 2017). Revolution 1989: The Fall of the Soviet Empire , by Victor Sebestyen (Vintage, 2010). Milestones of Perestroika: Spiegel Online . Greater Glasnost Turns Some Soviet Heads. The New York Times , November 9, 1986. Glasnost and Its Limits: Commentary Magazine (July, 1988). Perestroika and Glasnost: 17 Moments in Soviet History, Macalester College and Michigan State University . Perestroika, Library of Economics and Liberty . New Struggle in the Kremlin: How to Change the Economy. The New York Times , June 4, 1987). Perestroika: Reform that changed the world. BBC News , March 10 2015. Glasnost: RT Media .

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2. Gorbachev and the Disintegration of the USSR

CBSE Class 12
Chapter 2: The End of Bipolarity
2. Gorbachev and the Disintegration of the USSR Notes

Education Vision Political Science Book
Publication
PathSet Publications
Political Science

GORBACHEV AND THE DISINTEGRATION OF USSR

Mikhail Gorbachev the General Secretary of Communist party (USSR) in 1985.
He brought reform in the USSR.
He wanted to know the citizens of USSR and also wanted to be fully updated about the technological revolutions taking place in the West.
He wanted to normalize the relationships with the west and democratize and reform the USSR.
But this brought some effects which neither he nor anyone else anticipated:
East European countries started protesting against their own government and USSR for democracy to be established. And one by one communist regimes started collapsing.
At the same time economic system was of the USSR weakened which hastened the disintegration.
Gorbachev initiated political and economic reforms and democratization within the country but the reforms were opposed by the leaders withing the Communist party.
And the leaders of communist party started a coup in 1991.
People now tasted the freedom and did not want to live in the old style.
Boris Yeltsin became the national hero as he won the election in Republic Russia and opposed the coup.
Eastern Europe demanded independence and Central Asian republics wanted to remain with Soviet Federations.
In 1991, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, the three major republics of USSR declared that USSR has disbanded.
Capitalism and democracy were adopted for post- Soviet republics.
USSR disintegrated, all states separated from Warsaw Pact and “Commonwealth of Independent States” (CIS) was introduced and this was a surprise for Central Asia republics.
After disintegration Russia inherited the Soviet seat in the UN security Council.
Russia accepted all the international treaties of Soviet Union.
Only nuclear state was Russia and carried out some nuclear disarmament measures with the US.
Old USSR buried and Russia was accepted as the successor state.

Why Did the Soviet Union Disintegrate?

Weakness of the USSR’s economic and political institutions led to the disintegration:

1. Economic Weakness:

Reasons of weak and stagnated economy:
USSR used to spend money and resources in maintaining a nuclear and military arsenal.
Spend money in development of satellite states in Eastern Europe and within USSR (basically in 5 Central Asian republics).
People gained knowledge about the technological advancement in the West and started comparing.

2. Political Weakness:

Communist party was ruling over 70 years and became authoritarian and was not accountable to people.
Corruption started at high rate; government could not stop/reduce it.
The people did not know about the functioning about the government/ political system i.e., lack of transparency between people and the government.
Party bureaucrats gained privileges than ordinary citizens.
People did not identify with the system and with the rulers and the government lost popular backing.
Even after reforms of Gorbachev were introduced and promised to deal with the problems, USSR disintegrated. Why?

3. There were sections of society which believed that Gorbachev should have moved much faster, and he was disappointed and impatient with his methods.

4. Communist party had a opposite view and concerns, they felt that their power and privileges were eroding and Gorbachev was moving very fast.

Therefore, Gorbachev lost support on all sides and divided the public opinion. People who were with him were disillusioned and felt he did not defend his own policies.
The final and most immediate cause for the disintegration for USSR:

5. The rise of nationalism and the desire for sovereignty within various republics including Russia and the Baltic Republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Ukraine, Georgia, and others.

2.Consequences of Disintegration

There were many consequences of disintegration, but for now we will talk about only three:

1) End of Cold War Confrontation and Ideology Dispute

The ideological dispute over whether the socialist system would beat the capitalist system was not an issue any more.
As a result, the end of confrontation demanded an end to his arms race and a possible new peace.

2) Power relations in World Politics Changed:

Two possibilities were there:

(i) Unipolar world- Only one republic will be dominant

(ii) Multipolar world- No one country will be dominant.

But after Cold War US became the dominant republic and became unipolar.
Capitalistic ideology was followed internationally.
Institutions like World Bank and International Monetary Fund became powerful advisors and other countries took loan from them for developing.
Now, the best way to organize the political life was liberal democracy.

3) Emergence of New Countries:

The end of Cold War led to the emergence of many new countries.
Baltic and east European states became part of NATO.
Central Asian countries continued close ties with Russia and also established ties with the west, the US, China and others.
All the new countries had their own independent aspirations and choices.

Grade 12 - The Cold War

How did the Cold War period shape international relations after the Second World War?

After the Second World War, there was a struggle between two world powers, the US and Russia. Why was it called the ‘Cold War’ ? The reason lay in the threat of new and even deadlier weapons of nuclear technology that prevented outright open warfare. The Cold War was characterised by conflict through proxy wars, the manipulation of more vulnerable states through extensive military and financial aid, espionage, propaganda, rivalry over technology, space and nuclear races, and sport. Besides periods of tense crisis in this bi-polar world, the Cold War deeply affected the newly independent countries in Africa and the liberation struggles in southern Africa from the 1960s until the 1990s, when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was dismantled.

Did you know? The term “Cold War” was first used by George Orwell, author of the book satirizing Stalinism, “Animal Farm”.

The detente (friendship) that existed between the Allied powers (The US, France and Russia) after 1945 was no more. That military aid would be offered to each other when faced with Nazism fell away, and increased hostility was the order of the day. Some historians argue that it was the formulation and implementation of common policy documents by the USSR for its East European territories that heralded the beginning of different spheres of influence. Quickly, two distinct blocs emerged.

Also see: National Senior Certificate Grd 12, History Paper 1, November 2014 and National Senior Certificate Grd 12, History Paper 2, November 2014 .

Most learners will understand that a ‘war’ involves conflict between warring parties; that a ‘war’ involves the use of weaponry amongst ‘warring parties’ BUT what is meant by a ‘COLD’ war as opposed to a ‘HOT’ one? Common reference to any war usually involves the type of war that involves weaponry, personnel, devastation, explosions, and most of the images of war. A “COLD” war would refer to a battle of ideologies where the protagonists do not face each other, or fight, each other DIRECTLY.

The Cold War was characteristics by different ideologies being imposed or sold to other countries.

It dissected the world into spheres of influence, with the United States of America (USA) as a champion of democracy (and incidentally, Capitalism, as well) pitted against the USSR (Russia), which stood as a beacon of Communism. These divisions played themselves out in the exporting of influence...and then arms and money....to countries sympathetic to either cause.

The Cold War, which occurred from 1945 until 1989/1990 had far-reaching consequences for the world in general. Much of the literature during this period focussed on the bi-polar nature of the globe. Nation-states across the world, whatever explicit or not, empathised with either Russia or the USA. These countries became the battlefields for the competing influences of Democracy/Capitalism against Communism/Centrally-planned economies.

So, learners might ask as to why this Cold War did not escalate into a ‘Hot’ war, where conventional means of warfare were employed. The reason lies in the proliferation (increase) of nuclear weapons so that if these weapons were ever used, the destruction that would follow would result in a global destruction. So, this Cold War was fought behind the threat of a nuclear war. The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) was probably the closest that the world got to a full-blown conventional war.

The Cold War was a period of increased hostility between two blocs of power, the USA and its allies on the one hand; and the USSR and China, on the other. From the end of the Cold War until the early 1990s, world politics and events were primarily viewed through this lens the battle to exert control and influence globally. The Cold War spread outside Europe to every region of the world, and drew to a close by end of the late 1980s / early 1990s. Towards the end of the 1980s, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev held conferences with USA President Ronald Reagan. The USSR introduced reform policies aimed at restructuring (perestroika) and opening the Russian economy (glasnost).

In December 1989, after more than four decades, Russian President Gorbachev and American President G. H.W Bush declared the Cold War officially over.

Timeline (Source: “ Timeline of events in the Cold War ” [ Accesssed: 23 January 2015])

1945: Cold War begins
1946: Winston Churchill delivers his ‘ Iron Curtain’ speech
1947: Marshall Plan is announced
1948 : February, Communists take over Czechoslovakia
1948 : June, The ‘Berlin Blockade’ begins
1949 : July, NATO is ratified
1950 : February, McCarthy begins communist witchunt
1954 : KGB established. CIA assists in overthrowing ‘unfriendly’ regimes in Iran and Guatemala
1961 : Bay of Pigs invasion. Construction of Berlin Wall begins. US involvement in Vietnam increases ( troops were dispatched in 1965)
1962 : Cuban Missile Crisis
1965 : 150000 troops dispatched to Vietnam
1970 : US President Nixon extends the war to Cambodia.
1973 : Ceasefire between the US and Vietnam.
1975 : North Vietnam defeats South Vietnam.
1979 : USSR invades Afghanistan
1983 : Ronald Reagan proposes Star Wars
1989 : Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan. Communist governments collapse in Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania. The Soviet Empire ( USSR ) ends.

http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/what%20was%20the%20cold%20war.htm

http://www.amazon.com/The-Cold-War-New-History/dp/0143038273

USSR and USA and the creation of spheres of interest :

- installation of Soviet-friendly governments in satellite states;

- USA’s policy of containment: Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan;

- Berlin Crises from 1949 to 1961 (broad understanding of the crises); and

- opposing military alliances: NATO and Warsaw Pact (broadly)

Containment and brinkmanship: the Cuban crisis (as an example of containment and brinkmanship)

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Mikhail Gorbachev (1931–2022) — Magnificent Achievements, Monumental Failures

Mikhail Gorbachev at Harvard University on November 11, 2002.

Gorbachev’s brief but tumultuous tenure as leader of the Soviet Union brought about immense shifts in the course of world history, writes Mark Kramer.

Forty years ago, in the late summer of 1982, the Soviet Union was under the rule of Leonid Brezhnev, who had been in power since October 1964. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) exercised stifling control of the country and routinely violated basic human rights and freedoms. The USSR was largely closed off from the rest of the world, and the CPSU prevented Soviet citizens from traveling abroad. The Soviet press was rigidly controlled, and most foreign publications were not allowed into the country. Brezhnev and other members of the CPSU’s ruling Politburo were supported by millions of troops in the Soviet armed forces and the vast apparatus of the State Security Committee (KGB). The dissident movement had been crushed during Brezhnev’s long reign, and ethnic tensions were largely dormant. Slower economic growth rates in the 1980s and lags in technological innovation were a problem for the CPSU but not a fatal one. The prospect that the USSR would disintegrate in less than a decade seemed entirely fanciful.

Over the next two-and-a-half years, the Soviet Union underwent several changes of leadership, culminating in the ascendance of Mikhail Gorbachev as CPSU General Secretary in March 1985. Gorbachev, who died on 30 August 2022 at age 91, ended up changing everything . He remained in power in the Kremlin for less than seven years, but during that time he transformed the USSR and Soviet foreign policy in truly remarkable ways. He had come to office seeking to strengthen the Soviet Union and to consolidate the Warsaw Pact military alliance under Soviet leadership. He ultimately failed to achieve either of these basic goals and instead presided over the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the USSR. But even though he failed to accomplish his main goals, his failures were accompanied by magnificent achievements. The Cold War and all the dangers it posed came to an end in the late 1980s and early 1990s in large part through Gorbachev’s efforts. Although other political leaders such as Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and George H. W. Bush also played important roles in ending the Cold War, Gorbachev deserves the greatest share of the credit. Few leaders in modern history have had as great an impact on the world and on their own countries as Gorbachev did during his brief tenure.

The stream of disclosures about the Soviet past and about the deficiencies of Soviet society did not spark mass unrest, but it did have the cumulative impact of delegitimizing the Soviet regime in the eyes of many Russians as well as non-Russians.

In the first eighteen months after coming to power, Gorbachev pursued relatively orthodox policies of uskorenie (acceleration), with only modest results. Even when he shifted to a more ambitious agenda of perestroika (restructuring) in the aftermath of the 27th Soviet Party Congress in February-March 1986 it was not yet clear whether he would take the Soviet Union in a genuinely new direction. This began to change in the latter half of 1986 and 1987, especially with the release of Soviet political prisoners and dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov and with the inception of glasnost, a policy of official openness that soon expanded to give much greater leeway to newspapers and journals to cover previously taboo subjects.

The greater openness of Soviet press coverage was reinforced by Gorbachev’s decision to open Soviet society to the outside world. By early 1988, international telecommunications links were markedly increased, and ordinary Soviet citizens were allowed to travel abroad. Foreign corporations were encouraged to establish joint ventures with Soviet partners and to undertake investments that were previously off-limits. Gorbachev began drastically expanding the number of exit visas given to Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel, symbolized by the release in 1986 of the renowned dissident Anatoly Shcharansky (Natan Sharansky), who had spent nearly a decade in a harsh prison camp for his defiance of Soviet tyranny.

Soviet economic reforms were a much more formidable challenge. Gorbachev could not bring himself to adopt radical free-market reforms as Deng Xiaoping had implemented in China at the end of the 1970s. Gorbachev sought instead to reform, rather than jettison, the Soviet economic model. But he gradually came to believe that far-reaching political liberalization would be a prerequisite for economic advancement. From mid-1988 on, he combined perestroika and glasnost with demokratizatsiya , including the first free elections the Soviet Union had ever held. As the CPSU gradually relinquished its grip over political and social life, unrest emerged in many parts of the Soviet Union, particularly the Baltic republics, the Caucasus, and Moldova, where separatist movements and political instability gradually spread.

The freer flow of information under glasnost contributed to the decline of central control. Soviet citizens could finally read about the full magnitude of Stalin-era crimes, the wide range of social problems afflicting the Soviet Union — alcoholism, juvenile delinquency, declining health indices, homelessness, spiritual malaise, crime, poverty, and the disaffection of young people — and the destruction caused by natural disasters, accidents, and environmental pollution. The stream of disclosures about the Soviet past and about the deficiencies of Soviet society did not spark mass unrest, but it did have the cumulative impact of delegitimizing the Soviet regime in the eyes of many Russians as well as non-Russians.

Glasnost also had a profound impact on Soviet elites, who were suddenly free to talk about the regime’s past iniquities and the Soviet Union’s “failure to measure up to the civilized world” (as Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze put it). The exposure of Stalinist crimes, and the outpouring of criticism about the continued shortcomings of Soviet life, eroded the morale of elites who had previously been loyal to the Communist system. Even though Gorbachev believed that these trends would ultimately benefit his reforms and strengthen the Soviet Union, a hardline backlash began to emerge in the CPSU and KGB.

The vastly greater leeway for political protest and mobilization in the late 1980s came at the same time that economic conditions were sharply deteriorating. Ironically, in the two years prior to Gorbachev’s emergence as leader of the CPSU, the Soviet economy had actually been improving. Although economic growth rates had been lagging since the early 1970s, the economy was not in crisis in 1985 and could probably have continued functioning indefinitely. Gorbachev's own economic policies, which led to macroeconomic imbalances, soaring inflation, rampant shortages, the stripping of assets of large firms, and a rapid buildup of foreign debt, destabilized the economy and produced a genuine crisis by 1990 and 1991. The hardships that resulted from Gorbachev’s failure to pursue an effective economic program generated widespread social discontent.

The confluence of these trends by the end of the 1980s produced a highly volatile mix that was made even more combustible by the increasing polarization of key elites. On one end were hardline officials in the CPSU and KGB who wanted to roll back the reforms and to reassert centralized control. On the other end were radical reformers (including Sakharov and other former dissidents) who were disappointed that Gorbachev was not moving faster and who were intent on creating new political parties to supplant the CPSU. The more moderate reformers led by Gorbachev were increasingly isolated in a tenuous middle position.

Gorbachev's refusal to lend his imprimatur to the putsch during the crucial first few days was decisive in depriving the GKChP of any legitimacy it might have attained and in ensuring the coup’s failure.

Many of the radical reformers coalesced around Boris Yeltsin, who had staged a remarkable political comeback in 1989 after being demoted and humiliated by Gorbachev in October 1987. Although Yeltsin remained a CPSU member until July 1990, he increasingly presented himself as an anti-establishment and populist figure who would confront the party hierarchy. Voters in Moscow overwhelmingly elected Yeltsin to the new Soviet legislature, known as the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, in March 1989, despite strong opposition from senior CPSU officials. Yeltsin used this new platform to call repeatedly on Gorbachev and the CPSU to move much faster with political and economic reforms.

Yeltsin’s position was strengthened still further in June 1990 when he gained the chairmanship of the newly created Russian parliament and, a few weeks later, when he demonstratively walked out of the CPSU’s 28th Congress and renounced his party membership. Over the next year, he kept up his pressure on Gorbachev and continued to demand much bolder reforms. When Yeltsin was elected by a wide margin to the new Russian presidency in July 1991, he had an even stronger vantage point from which to challenge Gorbachev and the Soviet regime.

Despite Yeltsin’s increasing assertiveness, Gorbachev tried to hold the Soviet Union together by forging a new relationship between the center and the union republics. Prolonged negotiations toward this end in 1990-1991 were plagued by difficulties, but the mere possibility of a lasting accord that would bring about far-reaching decentralization inspired hardliners in the KGB, the army, the military-industrial complex, and the CPSU to launch a coup d'état on 19 August 1991, the day before the scheduled signing of a Union Treaty that would have reconfigured center-republic ties. The coup did not come entirely out of the blue. It was preceded by the abrupt resignation of Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in December 1990 (as he warned of an impending hardline backlash), a violent crackdown in Lithuania and Latvia in January 1991, an attempt to stage a “constitutional coup” in June 1991, and the publication of an ultra-hardline “Word to the People” ( Slovo k narodu ) manifesto in July.

Several months prior to the coup, Gorbachev had authorized planning for a general crackdown, and he therefore knew at least in broad terms that a coup was in the offing. But the evidence indicates that Gorbachev did not condone the specific attempt that occurred on 19 August and that his refusal to back the conspirators proved decisive in the coup's failure on 21 August. By all indications, the leaders of the putsch — who set up a State Committee on the State of Emergency (GKChP) to oversee matters — were hoping that Gorbachev would reluctantly join them if they forced his hand. Although it is impossible to know what Gorbachev might have done if the coup had lasted longer and the conspirators had been more resolute in cracking down on unrest, his refusal to lend his imprimatur to the putsch during the crucial first few days was decisive in depriving the GKChP of any legitimacy it might have attained and in ensuring the coup’s failure.

Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev sign the INF Treaty in the east room of the White House.

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signing the INF Treaty in the East Room of the White House, December 8, 1987.

The coup failed not because the plotters lacked enough force to carry it out — they in fact had immense numbers of well-armed troops at their disposal — but because they were averse to taking responsibility for large-scale bloodshed unless they received explicit authorization from the country’s highest command authority (namely, Gorbachev). This dynamic underscores the enormous importance of the top leader’s role in the Soviet political system. Even though the heads of the key institutions of power in the USSR — the army, the KGB, the Internal Affairs Ministry, the military-industrial complex, and the CPSU apparatus — were all complicit in the coup, their backing was insufficient without direct authorization from the very top. If the CPSU General Secretary was unwilling to resort to mass repression, other high-ranking officials did not want to accept responsibility for causing widespread loss of life.

The failure of the putsch prefigured the collapse of the USSR itself four months later. The rebuff of the coup gave unstoppable momentum to several of the union republics — the Baltic states, Georgia, Moldova, and others — in their drives for independence. Of particular importance was Ukraine. In the absence of the failed coup attempt, the independence movement in Ukraine probably would not have gained the momentum that it did by December 1991. As recently as March 1991, when a countrywide referendum was held on the future of the Soviet Union, nearly three-quarters of voters in Ukraine had been in favor of preserving the union. But the aborted coup profoundly altered public sentiment in Ukraine. The Ukrainian parliament reflected the new mood by adopting an independence declaration on 24 August 1991. When a republic-wide referendum was held in Ukraine on 1 December, more than 90 percent voted in favor of full independence, a result that led a week later to the signing of the Belovezhskaya Pushcha accords that codified the end of the Soviet Union.

Even as fissiparous trends in the USSR intensified during the final four months, Gorbachev was unable to take effective remedial action. Yeltsin's highly visible role in the resistance to the putsch — symbolized most vividly by his standing on top of a tank — enabled him to gain clear ascendance over Gorbachev once the coup was rebuffed. The Russian leader promptly recognized the independence of the Baltic states, Georgia, and Moldova. Although Yeltsin initially wanted to preserve the rest of the union as a Russian-led federation, he was intent on reducing the Soviet regime to a mere figurehead status, if that. His efforts in this regard in the last few months of 1991 accelerated trends that ultimately forced him to accept the outright disintegration of the union.

Coercive options, which had played such a prominent role in the USSR from the time it was founded, were no longer a practical means of holding the USSR together after August 1991. The rebuff of the coup had undermined the CPSU and severely weakened the KGB, the army, and the Soviet government. None of these institutions was in any position afterward to rely on violence as a last-ditch means of trying to keep the Soviet Union together. Yeltsin promptly suspended and then banned the CPSU, bringing a de facto end to Communist rule. The KGB and the army were temporarily immobilized and were incapable of resisting the breakup of the Soviet state. The failure of the coup was decisive in eliminating any further willingness on the part of top elites to resort to large-scale repression. Although Gorbachev raised the possibility of a military crackdown in a private conversation with the Soviet defense minister as late as mid-November 1991, he undoubtedly realized that it was much too late for such a step even as he proposed it.

With Gorbachev relegated to a subordinate position in the aftermath of the coup, Yeltsin worked sedulously in the fall of 1991 to ensure that the Soviet regime would play no more than a ceremonial role in a new political structure. No longer did Yeltsin seek to cooperate with Gorbachev in any sustained way. Although both men hoped to preserve a union after 21 August, their conceptions of the entity that should emerge were incompatible. The resounding shift of public opinion in Ukraine in support of outright independence, as reflected in the voting results on 1 December, is what ultimately forced Yeltsin to change his goals and precipitate the demise of the Soviet Union through the Belovezhskaya Pushcha agreements , which he signed on 7-8 December with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and Belarusian leader Stanislau Shushkevich. But even if the situation in Ukraine had not changed so dramatically, it is questionable whether a viable union structure could have been devised that would have satisfied both Yeltsin and Gorbachev as well as other leaders of the republics that were still part of the USSR.

Yeltsin (right) points finger at Gorbachev

Russian President Boris Yeltsin, right, confronts Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, left, during a special session of the Russian Federation Parliament in Moscow on Friday, August 23, 1991.

When ordinary Russians suddenly learned on 8 December 1991 that the Soviet Union was going to be dissolved by the end of the year, they did not take to the streets in protest. On the contrary, Russian society reacted to the Belovezhskaya Pushcha accords with evident relief and even, in some cases, with indifference. Gorbachev had desperately wanted to preserve the Soviet Union, but his effort to do so was greatly complicated by the public mood in Russia during the final few months of 1991. In the aftermath of the Belovezhskaya Pushcha meeting and another meeting in Kazakhstan two weeks later that officially set up the Commonwealth of Independent States, Gorbachev faced up to reality. He resigned all his offices on 25 December 1991 , and the next day the Supreme Soviet of the USSR formally approved the dissolution of the Soviet Union, bringing an end to the state the Bolsheviks had created after coming to power in Petrograd in November 1917.

The dissolution of the USSR seemed inconceivable before Gorbachev came to power, but one of the consequences of his policies — obviously an unintended consequence — was the growing public perception in Russia that the demise of the Soviet state was bound to occur and was therefore not worth resisting. Although Russians were not inclined to end Soviet rule through the use of force, the important thing by the end of 1991 was that all major social groups in Russia no longer had a stake in the future existence of the USSR. Russia’s important role in the breakup of the Soviet Union is worth recalling today. In 2005, Vladimir Putin claimed that the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991 had been “ the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the [20th] century,” but this assertion glosses over Russia’s own key role in precipitating the outcome Putin now laments.

The dissolution of the USSR seemed inconceivable before Gorbachev came to power, but one of the consequences of his policies was the growing public perception in Russia that the demise of the Soviet state was bound to occur and was therefore not worth resisting.

When the Soviet Union broke apart, Gorbachev was only 60 years old, the same age as Yeltsin. The two men never reconciled. One of the tragic consequences of the lasting animosity between them is that they did not cooperate in late 1991 and early 1992 in taking steps that would have given a fillip to genuine democratization in the new Russian state. The most fundamental steps that were needed in the wake of the abortive coup were the permanent dismantling of the KGB, the banning of all KGB personnel from public office at any level, and the demolition of the entire Lubyanka headquarters of the KGB. The KGB’s deep involvement in the coup created a window of opportunity for Gorbachev and Yeltsin to get rid of the agency after the coup fell apart. The prospects of success in disbanding the security apparatus would have been especially great if the two leaders had acted together on the matter in the final months of 1991. If just one or the other had taken such a step, opponents of the move would have had an easier time trying to derail it. But if Gorbachev and Yeltsin had worked together, they undoubtedly could have gotten rid of the KGB and thereby eliminated the main obstacle to democratization in Russia. One of Yeltsin’s closest advisers, Gennadii Burbulis, raised this very matter with Yeltsin and suggested that they enlist Gorbachev’s support for it, but Yeltsin brushed aside Burbulis’s proposal and decided to keep the KGB and simply rename it.

In the aftermath of the failed coup, senior KGB officers themselves had worried that Gorbachev or Yeltsin (or both) would seek to dismantle the state security organs, and they were relieved when nothing of the sort ultimately happened. The renamed security apparatus in Russia (now the Federal Security Service) inherited the personnel and resources of the KGB and quickly regained a dominant position in Russia, enabling it to thwart lasting progress toward democratic governance .

Despite the grudge Gorbachev felt toward Yeltsin, the former Soviet leader did not condemn some of the most unsavory steps Yeltsin took after 1991, including coercive actions the Russian government pursued vis-à-vis neighboring countries, notably Moldova, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine. Despite all the differences between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, they were alike in believing that Russia was entitled to a privileged sphere of influence in former Soviet republics.

After Yeltsin stepped down at the end of 1999, Gorbachev initially welcomed the new Russian president, Vladimir Putin, and sought a cordial relationship with him. Over time, Gorbachev became unnerved by Putin’s reversion to autocratic rule and by the return of stifling repression, and he openly criticized some of the steps Putin took. But Gorbachev refrained from the blunter criticism one might have expected. During the years Gorbachev was in power in the USSR, he mostly avoided the use of large-scale violence both domestically and abroad. He later expressed pride that he had deemphasized the role of violence in the Soviet Union and had steered Soviet foreign policy away from expansionism and aggression. Even so, he supported Putin’s ruthless war in Chechnya from 1999 to 2009, and he also condoned the war Putin waged against Georgia in August 2008.

Most disturbing of all, from today’s perspective, was Gorbachev’s endorsement of Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and his support of the domineering position Putin adopted toward Ukraine thereafter, not least by fomenting and fueling a war in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian officials who had been hoping that Gorbachev would oppose or at least distance himself from Putin’s heavy-handed belligerence toward Ukraine were left disappointed .

Gorbachev had been gravely ill in the months before his death, and he did not make any public comment about the war Russia has been waging against Ukraine since 24 February 2022. Aleksei Venediktov, a well-known Russian journalist, reported in July 2022 that he had spoken with Gorbachev by phone and that the former Soviet leader was “upset” ( rasstroen ) about the war, but Gorbachev’s foundation did not confirm that claim. Gorbachev himself certainly would not have launched an unprovoked war, and he undoubtedly regretted that Putin has made Russia an international pariah. He also likely would have been appalled by the atrocities committed by Russian troops and the cruelty inflicted on Ukrainian civilians. But whether he would have publicly condemned Putin’s military campaign is more questionable, despite the phone call with Venediktov.

His record in office was one of monumental achievement and epic failure. Assessments that focus on only one or the other are misleading.

The economic hardships that many in the USSR experienced during Gorbachev’s final years in power, and the economic upheavals that occurred in every former Soviet republic after 1991, resulted in extremely low favorability ratings for Gorbachev all over the former Soviet Union. Nowhere in the former USSR have opinion polls over the past 31 years turned up favorable attitudes toward Gorbachev. In Russia, for example, periodic surveys conducted by the Levada Center and other organizations have consistently shown that only a tiny minority of Russians view Gorbachev positively . Given the way the Russian government under Putin has tendentiously shaped the narrative of Soviet history for Russian schoolchildren — claiming, among other things, that Gorbachev was misguided in pursuing a rapprochement with the “bloodthirsty” West — Gorbachev’s image in Russia may remain negative for a long time to come. Putin was guarded in his reaction to Gorbachev’s death, and he declined to arrange a state funeral or day of mourning . Putin also indicated he would not attend the funeral in Novodevichy Cemetery on 3 September.

Nevertheless, at some point in the future, after generational change in Russia proceeds apace, a more balanced assessment of Gorbachev may well be feasible in his native country. His record in office was one of monumental achievement and epic failure. Assessments that focus on only one or the other are misleading. Gorbachev was instrumental in the end of the Cold War, and he brought hopes of freedom and democratization to Russia, giving the country a chance to become truly democratic. That opportunity was subsequently squandered under Yeltsin and was abandoned altogether under Putin, who reimposed autocratic repression at home and embraced military expansion abroad. Gorbachev cannot entirely escape blame for those setbacks, but the primary responsibility lies with his successors. None of what happened under Yeltsin and Putin, especially Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine, should be allowed to tarnish Gorbachev’s great achievements.

Mikhail Gorbachev delivers a speech, "Looking Back on Perestroika," at Harvard University on November 11, 2002.

In Western Europe and North America, Gorbachev has been viewed much more favorably than in the former Soviet Union. When Gorbachev came to Harvard University’s Davis Center in November 2002 and gave a lecture in Sanders Theatre , he was greeted by an overflow crowd of roughly 3,000 people (mostly students), who understood his immense historical significance. When he gave lectures in other Western countries, he drew crowds of similar size. The passage of time did not dim Gorbachev’s star in the West. After he died on 30 August, effusive tributes to him poured forth from Western government officials, journalists, political commentators, and academics. Some who paid homage to Gorbachev expressed reservations , and a few observers were harsh or sardonic , but by far the most common sentiment voiced in Western countries was lavish praise.

A year before Gorbachev died, he provided his own assessment of his record as leader of the Soviet Union. In a retrospective essay published in the journal Demokratizatsiya , he sought to explain why he had acted as he did in 1985-1991 and what he had been trying to achieve. He defended his record, but he also acknowledged numerous shortcomings and argued that “if given a chance to start anew, [he] would have done many things differently.” He said, for example, that he should have moved much more boldly on economic reform, should have acted much earlier to try to restructure the multiethnic Soviet federation, and should have realized much sooner that the CPSU was “incapable of transforming itself and unwilling to participate in reforms.” Even though one can argue that Gorbachev did not go far enough in highlighting the severity of problems he inadvertently created, he was commendably forthright in admitting that he wished he had “done many things differently.”

Gorbachev’s retrospective essay was accompanied by assessments from several leading Western scholars, who offered differing perspectives on his record and legacy. Scholars in the future will continue to debate Gorbachev’s performance and impact. Despite his egregious flaws and failings, he will almost certainly be remembered in the West mainly for his spectacular achievements, especially in helping to end the Cold War. In the former USSR, popular and scholarly assessments of him will likely remain dour for a long while to come, but even in Russia as the years pass the contempt for Gorbachev will likely diminish and the admiration for him will likely grow.

Mark Kramer

Director, Cold War Studies Project, Davis Center

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The Gorbachev File

bush reagan gorbachev on governors island 1988

British and CIA Assessments, Presidential Letters and Summit Conversations Illuminate Perestroika and the End of the Cold War

First and Last President of the Soviet Union Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev Turns 85 Today

Washington, D.C., March 2, 2016 – Marking the 85th birthday of former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, the National Security Archive at George Washington University (www.nsarchive.org) today posted a series of previously classified British and American documents containing Western assessments of Gorbachev starting before he took office in March 1985, and continuing through the end of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The documents show that conservative British politicians were ahead of the curve predicting great things for rising Soviet star Gorbachev in 1984 and 1985, but the CIA soon caught on, describing the new Soviet leader only three months into his tenure as “the new broom,” while Ronald Reagan greeted Gorbachev’s ascension with an immediate invitation for a summit. The documents posted today include positive early assessments by Margaret Thatcher and MP John Browne, CIA intelligence reports that bookend Gorbachev’s tenure from 1985 to 1991, the first letters exchanged by Reagan and Gorbachev, the American versions of key conversations with Gorbachev at the Geneva, Reykjavik and Malta summits, German chancellor Helmut Kohl’s credit to Gorbachev in 1989 for the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, and the U.S. transcript of the G-7 summit in 1990 that turned down Gorbachev’s request for financial aid.

The Archive gathered the Gorbachev documentation for two books, the Link-Kuehl-Award-winning “Masterpieces of History”: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe 1989 (Central European University Press, 2010), and the forthcoming Last Superpower Summits: Gorbachev, Reagan and Bush (CEU Press, 2016). The sources include the Margaret Thatcher Foundation, the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, and Freedom of Information and Mandatory Declassification Review requests to the CIA and the State Department.

Leading today’s Gorbachev briefing book is British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s “discovery” of Gorbachev in December 1984 during his trip to Britain as head of a Soviet parliamentary delegation. In contrast to his elderly and infirm predecessors who slowly read dry notes prepared for them, Gorbachev launched into animated free discussion and left an indelible impression on Lady Thatcher. The Prime Minister, charmed by the Soviet leader, quickly shared her impressions with her closest ally and friend, Ronald Reagan. She commented famously, “I like Mr. Gorbachev. We can do business together.”

Soon after Gorbachev became the Soviet General Secretary, a Conservative member of the British parliament, John Browne, who observed Gorbachev during his visit to Britain and then followed information on Gorbachev’s every early step, compared him to “Kennedy in the Kremlin” in terms of his charisma. By June 1985, the CIA told senior U.S. officials in a classified assessment that Gorbachev was “the new broom” that was attempting to clean up the years of debris that accumulated in the Soviet Union during the era of stagnation.

But Reagan had to see for himself. For four years before Gorbachev, as the American president complained in his diary, he had been trying to meet with a Soviet leader face to face, but “they keep dying on me.” In his first letter to Gorbachev, which Vice President George H.W. Bush carried to Moscow for the funeral of Gorbachev’s predecessor, Reagan invited Gorbachev to meet. Gorbachev and Reagan became pen-pals who wrote long letters – sometimes personally dictated, even handwritten – explaining their positions on arms control, strategic defenses, and the need for nuclear abolition.

Their first meeting took place in Geneva in November 1985, where in an informal atmosphere of “fireside chats” they began realizing that the other was not a warmonger but a human being with a very similar dream—to rid the world of nuclear weapons. That dream came very close to a breakthrough during Gorbachev and Reagan’s summit in Reykjavik; but Reagan’s stubborn insistence on SDI and Gorbachev’s stubborn unwillingness to take Reagan at his word on technology sharing prevented them from reaching their common goal.

Through a series of unprecedented superpower summits, Gorbachev made Reagan and Bush understand that the Soviet leader was serious about transforming his country not to threaten others, but to help its own citizens live fuller and happier lives, and to be fully integrated into the “family of nations.” Gorbachev also learned from his foreign counterparts, establishing a kind of peer group with France’s Mitterrand, Germany’s Kohl, Britain’s Thatcher, and Spain’s Gonzalez, which developed his reformist positions further and further. By the time George H.W. Bush as president finally met Gorbachev in Malta, the Soviet Union was having free elections, freedom of speech was blossoming, velvet revolutions had brought reformers to power in Eastern Europe, and the Berlin Wall had fallen to cheers of citizens but severe anxieties in other world capitals.

German Chancellor Helmut Kohl wrote in his letter to Bush at the end of November 1989: “Regarding the reform process in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, the CSSR [Czechoslovakia], and not least the GDR [East Germany], we have General Secretary Gorbachev’s policies to thank. His perestroika has let loose, made easier, or accelerated these reforms. He pushed governments unwilling to make reforms toward openness and toward acceptance of the people’s wishes; and he accepted developments that in some instances far surpassed the Soviet Union’s own standards.”

In 1989, the dream of what Gorbachev called “the common European home” was in the air and Gorbachev was the most popular politician in the world. When he was faced with discontent and opposition in his country, he refused to use force, like his Chinese neighbors did at Tiananmen Square. And yet, the West consistently applied harsher standards to Gorbachev’s Soviet Union than to China, resulting in feet dragging on financial aid, credits, and trade. As Francois Mitterrand pointed out during the G-7 summit in Houston in 1990: “the argument put forth for helping China is just the reverse when we are dealing with the USSR. We are too timid […] regarding aid to the USSR. […].”

What Gorbachev started in March 1985 made his country and the world better. In cooperation with Reagan and Bush, he ended the Cold War, pulled Soviet troops out of Afghanistan, helped resolve local conflicts around the globe, and gave Russia the hope and the opportunity to develop as a normal democratic country. As with many great reformers, he did not achieve everything he was striving for – he certainly never intended for the Soviet Union to collapse – but his glasnost, his non-violence, and his “new thinking” for an interdependent world created a legacy that few statesmen or women can match. Happy birthday, Mikhail Sergeyevich!

Read the Documents

Document-01

This face-to-face encounter between British Prime Minister and the leader of a Soviet parliamentary delegation produced a conversation that both Thatcher and Gorbachev would refer to many times in the future. Gorbachev engaged Thatcher on all the issues that she raised, did not duck hard questions, but did not appear combative. He spoke about the low point then evident in East-West relations and the need to stop the arms race before it was too late. He especially expressed himself strongly against the Strategic Defense Initiative promoted by the Reagan administration. Soon after this conversation Thatcher flew to Washington to share her enthusiastic assessment with Gorbachev with Reagan and encourage him to engage the Soviet leader in trying to lower the East-West tensions. She told her friend and ally what she had told the BBC, "I like Mr. Gorbachev. We can do business together" - and described him to Reagan as an "unusual Russian.... [m]uch less constrained, more charming," and not defensive in the usual Soviet way about human rights.

Document-02

Vice President George H.W. Bush hand delivered this first letter from President Reagan to the new leader of the Soviet Union, after the state funeral for Konstantin Chernenko in March 1985 ("you die, I fly" as Bush memorably remarked about his job as the ceremonial U.S. mourner for world leaders). The letter contains two especially noteworthy passages, one inviting Mikhail Gorbachev to come to Washington for a summit, and the second expressing Reagan's hope that arms control negotiations "provide us with a genuine chance to make progress toward our common ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons." Reagan is reaching for a pen-pal, just as he did as early as 1981, when he hand-wrote a heartfelt letter during his recovery from an assassination attempt, to then-General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev suggesting face-to-face meetings and referring to the existential danger of nuclear weapons - only to get a formalistic reply. Subsequent letters between Reagan and the whole series of Soviet leaders ("they keep dying on me," Reagan complained) contain extensive language on many of the themes - such as the ultimate threat of nuclear annihilation - that would come up over and over again when Reagan finally found a partner on the Soviet side in Gorbachev. Even Chernenko had received a hand-written add-on by Reagan appreciating Soviet losses in World War II and crediting Moscow with a consequent aversion to war.

Document-03

This lengthy first letter from the new Soviet General Secretary to the U.S. President displays Gorbachev's characteristic verbal style with an emphasis on persuasion. The Soviet leader eagerly takes on the new mode of communication proposed by Reagan in his March 11 letter, and plunges into a voluminous and wide-ranging correspondence between the two leaders - often quite formal and stiff, occasionally very personal and expressive, and always designed for effect, such as when Reagan would laboriously copy out by hand his official texts. Here Gorbachev emphasizes the need to improve relations between the two countries on the basis of peaceful competition and respect for each other's economic and social choices. He notes the responsibility of the two superpowers for world peace, and their common interest "not to let things come to the outbreak of nuclear war, which would inevitably have catastrophic consequences for both sides." Underscoring the importance of building trust, the Soviet leader accepts Reagan's invitation in the March 11 letter to visit at the highest level and proposes that such a visit should "not necessarily be concluded by signing some major documents." Rather, "it should be a meeting to search for mutual understanding."

Document-04

Perhaps as a reflection of the internal debates in Washington (and even in Reagan's own head), it would take more than a month for the administration to produce a detailed response to Gorbachev's March 24 letter. The first two pages rehash the issues around the tragic killing of American Major Arthur Nicholson by a Soviet guard, before moving to the sore subject of Afghanistan. Reagan vows, "I am prepared to work with you to move the region toward peace, if you desire"; at the same time, U.S. and Saudi aid to the mujahedin fighting the Soviets was rapidly expanding. Reagan objects to Gorbachev's unilateral April 7 announcement of a moratorium on deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, since the Soviet deployment was largely complete while NATO's was still underway. The heart of the letter addresses Gorbachev's objections to SDI, and Reagan mentions that he was struck by Gorbachev's characterization of SDI as having "an offensive purpose for an attack on the Soviet Union. I can assure you that you are profoundly mistaken on this point." Interestingly, the Reagan letter tries to reassure Gorbachev by citing the necessity of "some years of further research" and "further years" before deployment (Reagan could not have suspected decades rather than years). This back-and-forth on SDI would be a constant in the two leaders' correspondence and conversations at the summits to come, but the consistency of Reagan's position on this (in contrast to that of Pentagon advocates of "space dominance"), not only to Gorbachev but to Thatcher and to his own staff, suggests some room for Gorbachev to take up the President on his assurances - which never happened.

Document-05

British MP John Browne, member of the Conservative party, was part of the Receiving Committee for Gorbachev's visit to London in December 1984 and spend considerable time with him during his trips (including to the Lenin museum). This long essay, sent to President Reagan, and summarized for him by his National Security Adviser, describes Gorbachev as an unusual Soviet politician-"intelligent, alert and inquisitive." Browne notes "that Gorbachev's charisma was so striking that, if permitted by the Communist Party system, Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev could well become the Soviet equivalent of the Jack and Jacqueline Kennedy team." On the basis of his observations in 1984 and after Gorbachev was elected General Secretary, Browne concludes that politicians of Western democracies are likely to face an increasingly sophisticated political challenge from Mr. Gorbachev both at home and abroad.

Document-06

In this long and wide-ranging response to Reagan's letter of April 30, the Soviet leader makes a real push for improvement of relations on numerous issues. The date June 10 is significant because on this day in Washington Reagan finally took the action (deactivating a Poseidon submarine) necessary to keep the U.S. in compliance with the unratified (but observed by both sides) SALT II treaty. Here Gorbachev raises the issue of equality and reciprocity in U.S.-Soviet relations, noting that it is the Soviet Union that is "surrounded by American military bases stuffed also by nuclear weapons, rather than the U.S. - by Soviet bases." He suggests that all previous important treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union were possible on the assumption of parity, and that Reagan's recent focus on SDI threatens to destabilize the strategic balance - yet again demonstrating Gorbachev's deep apprehension about Reagan's position on strategic defenses. The Soviet leader believes that the development of ABM systems would lead to a radical destabilization of the situation and the militarization of space. At the heart of the Soviet visceral rejection of SDI is the image of "attack space weapons capable of performing purely offensive missions." Gorbachev proposes energizing negotiations on conventional weapons in Europe, chemical weapons, the nuclear test ban, and regional issues, especially Afghanistan. He calls for a moratorium on nuclear tests "as soon as possible" - the Soviets would end up doing this unilaterally, never understanding that the issue is a non-starter in Reagan's eyes. Here, the Soviet leader also welcomes horizontal exchanges between government ministers and even members of legislatures. However, Gorbachev's position on human rights remains quite rigid-"we do not intend and will not conduct any negotiations relating to human rights in the Soviet Union." That would change.

Document-07

In their first face-to-face meeting at Geneva, which both of them anticipated eagerly, Reagan and Gorbachev both spoke about the mistrust and suspicions of the past and of the need to begin a new stage in U.S.-Soviet relations. Gorbachev described his view of the international situation to Reagan, stressing the need to end the arms race. Reagan expressed his concern with Soviet activity in the third world--helping the socialist revolutions in the developing countries. They both spoke about their aversion to nuclear weapons. During this first dinner of the Geneva summit, Gorbachev used a quote from the Bible that there was a time to throw stones and a time to gather stones which have been cast in the past to indicate that now the President and he should move to resolve their practical disagreements in the last day of meetings remaining. In response, Reagan remarked that "if the people of the world were to find out that there was some alien life form that was going to attack the Earth approaching on Halley's Comet, then that knowledge would unite all peoples of the world." The aliens had landed, in Reagan's view, in the form of nuclear weapons; and Gorbachev would remember this phrase, quoting it directly in his famous "new thinking" speech at the 27 th Party Congress in February 1986.

Document-08

The last session at Reykjavik is the one that inspires Gorbachev's comment in his memoirs about "Shakespearean passions." The transcript shows lots of confusion between just proposals on reducing ballistic missiles versus those reducing all nuclear weapons, but finally Reagan says, as he always wanted, nuclear abolition. "We can do that. Let's eliminate them," says Gorbachev, and Secretary of State George Shultz reinforces, "Let's do it." But then they circle back around to SDI and the ABM Treaty issue, and Gorbachev insists on the word "laboratory" as in testing confined there, and Reagan, already hostile to the ABM Treaty, keeps seeing that as giving up SDI. Gorbachev says he cannot go back to Moscow to say he let testing go on outside the lab, which could lead to a functioning system in the future. The transcript shows Reagan asking Gorbachev for agreement as a personal favor, and Gorbachev saying well if that was about agriculture, maybe, but this is fundamental national security. Finally at around 6:30 p.m. Reagan closes his briefing book and stands up. The American and the Russian transcripts differ on the last words, the Russian version has more detail [see the forthcoming book, Last Superpower Summits ], but the sense is the same. Their faces reflect the disappointment, Gorbachev had helped Reagan to say nyet , but Gorbachev probably lost more from the failure.

Document-09

Again, Margaret Thatcher informs her ally Reagan about her conversations with Gorbachev. The cover note from National Security Advisor Carlucci (prepared by NSC staffer Fritz Ermarth) states that "she has been greatly impressed by Gorbachev personally." Thatcher describes Gorbachev as "fully in charge," "determined to press ahead with his internal reform," and "talk[ing] about his aims with almost messianic fervor." She believes in the seriousness of his reformist thinking and wants to support him. However, they differ on one most crucial issue, which actually unites Gorbachev and Reagan-nuclear abolition. Thatcher writes, "[h]is aim is patently the denuclearization of Europe. I left him with no doubt that I would never accept that."

Document-10

This remarkable letter arrives at the White House at the very moment when Kohl is presenting his "10 points" speech to the Bundestag about future German unification, much to the surprise of the White House, the Kremlin, and even Kohl's own coalition partners in Germany (such as his foreign minister). Here, just weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the German leader encourages Bush to engage with Gorbachev across the board and to contribute to peaceful change in Europe. Kohl points that Gorbachev "wants to continue his policies resolutely, consistently and dynamically, but is meeting internal resistance and is dependent on external support." He hopes Bush's upcoming meeting with Gorbachev in Malta will "give strong stimulus to the arms control negotiations." Kohl also reminds Bush that "regarding the reform process in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, the CSSR [Czechoslovakia], and not least the GDR [East Germany], we have General Secretary Gorbachev's policies to thank. His perestroika has let loose, made easier, or accelerated these reforms. He pushed governments unwilling to make reforms toward openness and toward acceptance of the people's wishes; and he accepted developments that in some instances far surpassed the Soviet Union's own standards."

Document-11

Being rocked by the waves on the Soviet ship Maxim Gorky , President Bush greets his Russian counterpart for the first time as President. A lot has changed in the world since they last saw each other on Governor's Island in December 1988-elections had been held in the Soviet Union and in Poland, where a non-communist government came to power, and the Iron Curtain fell together with the Berlin Wall. After Bush's initial presentation from notes, Gorbachev remarks almost bemusedly that now he sees the American administration has made up its mind (finally) what to do, and that includes "specific steps" or at least "plans for such steps" to support perestroika , not to doubt it. Gorbachev compliments Bush for not sharing the old Cold War thinking that "The only thing the U.S. needs to do is to keep its baskets ready to gather the fruit" from the changes in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Bush responds, "I have been called cautious or timid. I am cautious, but not timid. But I have conducted myself in ways not to complicate your life. That's why I have not jumped up and down on the Berlin Wall." Gorbachev says, "Yes, we have seen that, and appreciate that." The Soviet leader goes on to welcome Bush's economic and trade points as a "signal of a new U.S. policy" that U.S. business was waiting for. Gorbachev responds positively to each of Bush's overtures on arms control, chemical weapons, conventional forces, next summits and so forth, but pushes back on Bush's Cuba and Central America obsessions.

Document-12

The bulk of discussion at this first session of the summit of the industrialized nations is devoted to the issue of how the club of the rich countries should react to the events unfolding in the Soviet Union and how much aid and investment could be directed to the support of perestroika . The summit is taking place at the time when Gorbachev is engaged in an increasingly desperate search for scenarios for radical economic reform, and fast political democratization, but he needs external financial support and integration into global financial institutions in order to succeed - or even to survive, as the events of August 1991 would show. Just before this 1990 G-7, Gorbachev wrote in a letter to George Bush that he needs "long-term credit assistance, attraction of foreign capital, transfer of managerial experience and personnel training" to create a competitive economy. Yet, the U.S. president throws only a bone or two, like "step up the pace of our negotiations with the Soviets on the Tsarist and Kerensky debts [!] to the U.S. government" (instead of forgiving or at least restructuring the debt), and "expand our existing technical cooperation." Bush concludes his speech by stating flatly "It is impossible for the U.S. to loan money to the USSR at this time. I know, however, that others won't agree." The leaders who do not agree are Helmut Kohl (in the middle of providing billions of deutschmarks to the USSR to lubricate German unification) and Francois Mitterrand. The latter decries the double standards being applied to the Soviet Union and China, even after the Tiananmen massacre. Mitterrand criticizes the proposed political declaration of the G-7 as "timid" and "hesitant," imposing "harsh political conditions as a preliminary to extending aid." He believes the EC countries are in favor of contributing aid to the USSR but that other members, like the U.S. and Japan, have effectively vetoed such assistance.

Document-13

On April 10, 1991, the National Security Council staff asked the CIA for an analysis of the Gorbachev succession, who the main actors would be, and the likely scenarios. The assessment opens quite drastically: "The Gorbachev era is effectively over." The scenarios offered have an eerie resemblance to the actual coup that would come in August 1991. This might be the most prescient of all the CIA analyses of the perestroika years. The report finds that Gorbachev is likely to be replaced either by the reformers or the hard-liners, with the latter being more likely. The authors point out that "there is no love between Gorbachev and his current allies and they could well move to try to dump him." They then list possible conspirators for such a move-- Vice President Yanaev, KGB Chief Kryuchkov, and Defense Minister Yazov, among others, all of whom whom participate in the August coup. The report predicts that the "traditionalists" are likely to find a "legal veneer" for removing Gorbachev: "most likely they would present Gorbachev with an ultimatum to comply or face arrest or death." If he agreed, Yanaev would step in as president, the conspirators would declare a state of emergency and install "some kind of a National Salvation Committee." However, the memo concludes that "time is working against the traditionalists." This turned out to be both prescient and correct - the August coup followed the process outlined in this document and the plot foundered because the security forces themselves were fractured and the democratic movements were gaining strength. But indeed, the coup, the resurgence of Boris Yeltsin as leader of the Russian republic, and the secession of Russia from the Soviet Union during the fall of 1991 did mark the end of the Gorbachev era.

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Les quatre principaux accomplissements de Mikhaïl Gorbatchev sur la scène internationale

Mikhaïl Gorbatchev

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« Un dirigeant doit être attentif aux affaires intérieures et avoir une influence sérieuse dans son pays , a déclaré Fiodor Loukianov, rédacteur en chef du magazine russe Global Affairs . Et si un leader, aussi populaire soit-il à l'étranger, ne bénéficie pas d'un soutien suffisant chez lui, l'exemple de Gorbatchev prouve que c'est une position faible » .

En effet, l'URSS de Mikhaïl Gorbatchev , en proie à de graves crises économiques, n'était pas un État stable et, malgré tous ses efforts, s'est effondrée, ce qui n'est guère un mérite en tant que leader. Cela conduit ainsi de nombreux Russes à douter de son héritage : en 2016, 58% pensaient qu'il avait « joué un rôle négatif dans l'histoire de la Russie ».

Ceci dit, alors que sa politique intérieure était discutable, Gorbatchev a apporté de nombreux changements sur la scène internationale (certains diraient même pour le mieux), étant donné qu'avant lui, la guerre froide était à son apogée et que Moscou et Washington étaient au bord d’un conflit armé. Voici ce qu'il a fait.

Retrait des troupes d'Afghanistan

La dernière colonne de troupes soviétiques traverse la frontière soviétique après avoir quitté l'Afghanistan. 15 février 1989

Pendant neuf ans (de décembre 1979 à février 1989), l’Union soviétique a porté le fardeau de la guerre en Afghanistan , où elle a essayé de garantir le maintien au pouvoir du gouvernement prosoviétique. La guerre d'Afghanistan est devenue « le Vietnam de l'URSS », comme l'a dit Zbigniew Brzezinski, ancien conseiller à la sécurité nationale du président américain Jimmy Carter, et a coûté la vie à 15 000 Soviétiques.

Gorbatchev y a donc mis fin : en février 1989, le contingent militaire soviétique a quitté définitivement l'Afghanistan. « Nous avons terminé ce sombre chapitre , s’est souvenu Gorbatchev 30 ans plus tard. Tout le monde [au gouvernement] était d'accord : c'est impossible de résoudre le problème afghan par des moyens militaires » .

Ce qui a suivi : Le gouvernement prosoviétique est tombé en un rien de temps, mais la guerre n'a pas pris fin, car les talibans (organisation terroriste) ont repris le pouvoir, ce qui a conduit les États-Unis à envahir l' Afghanistan en 2001. 30 ans plus tard, ce pays n'est toujours pas en paix.

Lire aussi : Trois facteurs majeurs qui ont contribué à la chute de l'URSS

Adoption de la « doctrine Sinatra »

Un groupe de jeunes citoyens de Tchécoslovaquie célébrant, le 11 décembre 1989 à Prague, la nomination du premier gouvernement non communiste en 40 ans.

En octobre 1989, commentant la nouvelle approche de Mikhaïl Gorbatchev à l'égard des États socialistes d'Europe de l'Est, le porte-parole du ministère soviétique des Affaires étrangères, Guennadi Guerassimov, disait en plaisantant : « Nous avons maintenant la doctrine Frank Sinatra. Il a une chanson, My Way [Ma Voie]. Alors, chaque pays décide de son propre chef de la voie à suivre » .

Cela signifiait que Moscou n'était plus désireux (ou capable) de soutenir les gouvernements communistes dans des pays comme la Pologne, la Hongrie, la Tchécoslovaquie. Quoi qu'il arrive, à partir de ce moment, l'Europe orientale était libre de choisir son propre chemin.

Ce qui a suivi : On ne sait pas si on s'y attendait, mais les pays du Pacte de Varsovie en ont eu assez du socialisme, à tel point qu'à la fin de l’année 1989, les gouvernements communistes ont chuté partout. En 1991, l'organisation militaire du Bloc de l'Est, le Pacte de Varsovie , a officiellement cessé d'exister.

Laisser tomber le mur de Berlin

Deux personnes se retrouvant au sommet du mur de Berlin lors de sa chute.

« M. Gorbatchev, abattez ce mur ! » , a exhorté le président américain Ronald Reagan en 1987, lors d'un discours à Berlin, une ville qui était coupée en deux par un mur séparant l'Allemagne de l'Ouest et de l'Est depuis 1961. Reagan savait à qui s'adresser : l'URSS était le sponsor politique de l'Allemagne de l'Est et avait un contingent militaire sérieux déployé dans le pays.

Or, Gorbatchev a réagi à son appel – non pas avec des mots, mais avec des actes. Fin 1989, l'existence du mur n'avait plus aucun sens : étant donné que la Hongrie avait ouvert ses frontières avec l'Autriche (la doctrine Sinatra en action !), on pouvait désormais aller de l'Allemagne de l'Est à l'Ouest en passant par la Tchécoslovaquie, la Hongrie et l' Autriche . Le 9 novembre 1989, les autorités est-allemandes ont donc finalement ouvert la frontière et le mur a été démoli.

« Non seulement nous n'avons pas essayé d'utiliser la puissance des bataillons soviétiques déployés en RDA, mais nous avons fait tout ce qui était en notre pouvoir pour que ce processus se déroule pacifiquement , a noté Gorbatchev en 2019. Comment empêcher la RDA de s'unir à la RFA si le peuple de la RDA le voulait ? ».

Ce qui a suivi : L'Allemagne s'est réunifiée complètement en 1990. La chancelière Angela Merkel a qualifié le jour de la chute du mur de Berlin de « moment de bonheur » pour tous les Allemands.

Lire aussi : Comment j’ai tenté d’assassiner Gorbatchev

5 Gorbachev and Economic Reform

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Gorbachev's two major failures were in economic reform and in resolution of the ‘national question’, although that statement has to be qualified by the observation that the problems involved were so intractable that the idea that a new leader could have come along and ‘solved’ them would be the height of naivety. The tension between two contradictory aims – improving the system and constructing the system on different principles – was especially acute in the economic sphere. It was in the attempted radical reconstruction of the economic system that Gorbachev encountered the most effective resistance on the part of agencies whose co‐operation was necessary both for the everyday running of the economy and the implementation of reform. As in other spheres of policy, Gorbachev's own views became more radical over time, and by 1990, partly under the influence of economist Nikolay Petrakov, he accepted that an essentially market economy (albeit one closer to a West European social democratic variant than to capitalism American‐style) was desirable. When a team of economists jointly appointed by Gorbachev and by Boris Yeltsin produced in 1990 a ‘500 Hundred Days Programme’ that would allegedly have created a market economy in the Soviet Union within that short time period, Gorbachev hesitated, at first supporting the proposals and then, partly under pressure from within the system, retreating from them. During 1991, Gorbachev attempted to keep in play several economic options; indecision and inconsistency in this area left the economy in limbo and weakened Gorbachev's authority.

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Class 12 Political Science Notes Chapter 2 The End of Bipolarity

CBSE Class 12 Political Science Notes Chapter 2 The End of Bipolarity is part of Class 12 Political Science No2 for Quick Revision. Here we have given NCERT Political Science Class 12 Notes Chapter 2 The End of Bipolarity.

Political Science Class 12 Notes Chapter 2 The End of Bipolarity

Soviet System

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The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) came into being after the Socialist Revolution in Russia in 1917. The revolution was inspired by the ideals of socialism and the need for an egalitarian society as opposed to capitalism.
After the Second World War, the East European countries that the Soviet army had liberated from the fascist forces came under the control of the USSR.
There was change in the economic and political system of the USSR. Then the Soviet economy became more developed than the rest of the world except the US.
However, the Soviet system became very bureaucratic and authoritarian. It made life very difficult for its citizens.
In the arms race, the Soviet Union managed to match the US from time to time, but at great cost.

Gorbachev and the Disintegration of the USSR

Mikhail Gorbachev, who had become General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985, sought to reform the system. He introduced economic and political reform policies of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness). But later his policies were criticised.
A coup took place in 1991 that was encouraged by Communist Party hardliners. The people did not want the old-style rule of the Communist Party and wanted freedom.
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, the three major republics of the USSR, declared in December 1991 that the Soviet Union was disintegrated.;
Capitalism and democracy were adopted as the basis for the post Soviet republics.

Reasons for the Soviet Union Disintegration There are several reasons which led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. These were

Internal weaknesses of Soviet political and economic institutions failed to meet the aspirations of the people.
The economy of the Soviet Union became stagnant. The Soviet economy used much of its resources in maintaining a nuclear and military arsenal. The Soviet Union too became stagnant due to rampant corruption, the unwillingness to allow more openness in government, and the centralisation of authority in a vast land.
A section of the society was not happy with the reforms of Gorbachev. It was believed that the reforms introduced by Gorbachev were at a very slow pace.
Another reason for the collapse of USSR was the rise of nationalism and the desire for sovereignty within various republics including Russia and the Baltic republics.

Consequences of Disintegration There are many consequences of the disintegration of USSR. They are as follows:

It led to the end of Cold War confrontations. There was no dispute of Socialist ideology and Capitalist ideology.
Power relations in world politics changed and thus it led to change in the relative influence of ideas and institutions.
The US became the sole superpower which also backed the capitalist economy making it the dominant economic system internationally.
The end of the Soviet bloc paved way for the emergence of many new countries. All these countries had their own independent aspirations and choices.
The international system saw many new players’ emerge, each with its own identity, interests and economic and political difficulties.

Shock Therapy in Post-Communist Regimes

The model of transition in Russia, Central Asia and East Europe from an authoritarian socialist system to a democratic capitalist system which was influenced by the World Bank and the IMF came to be known as ‘Shock Therapy’.
This process of transition was due to the Collapse of Communism.
There was a need to make a total shift to a capitalist economy which meant rooting out completely any structures evolved during the Soviet period.
Shock therapy also involved a drastic change in the external orientation of these economics.
It also involved a break up of the existing . trade alliances among the countries of the Soviet bloc.

Consequences of Shock Therapy

The shock therapy brought ruin to the economies and disaster upon the people of the entire region.
The value of the Russian currency ‘Ruble’ declined dramatically. People lost all their savings due to high rate of inflation.
The government withdrew subsidies which pushed large sections of the people into poverty. The middle classes were pushed to the periphery of society.
The construction of democratic institutions was not given the same attention and priority as the demands of economic transformation.
Most of these economies, especially Russia, started reviving in 2000, 10 years after their independence. The reason for the revival was the export of natural resources like oil, natural gas and minerals.

Tensions and Conflicts in Former Soviet Republics

There were tensions and conflicts in most of the former Soviet republics and many have had civil wars and insurgencies.
In Russia, two republics, Chechnya and Dagestan have had violent secessionist movements.
Tajikistan witnessed a civil war for almost 10 years till 2001. The region had many sectarian conflicts.
Central Asia too become a zone of competition between outside powers and oil companies.
Czechoslovakia was divided into two, the Czechs and the Slovaks thus forming independent countries.
Yugoslavia broke apart with several provinces like Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina declaring independence.

India and Post-Communist Countries

India maintained a cordial relationship with all the post-communist countries. The strongest relation of India is still with Russia.
Indo-Russian relation is an important aspect of India’s foreign policy. Both the countries share a vision of a multipolar world order.
India got benefits from Russia over issues like Kashmir, energy supplies, access to Central Asia, balancing its relations with China.
Russia stands to benefit from this relationship because India is the second largest arms market for Russia. Both the countries have collaborated over many scientific projects.

FACTS THAT MATTER

1. The Socialist Revolution in Russia in 1917 gave birth to USSR with inspiration of socialism, ensure a minimum standard of living for all its citizens and also the government subsidised basic necessities and productive assets were owned and controlled by the state.

2. Russia was the only republic among fifteen republics who dominates everything and people in the region.

3. Soviet Union lagged behind the west in technology, infrastructure and could not fulfil political aspirations of people. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 also weakened the system furthermore.

4. Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of Communist Party of Soviet Union in 1985 initiated the policies of economic and political reforms to democratise the system which were opposed by leaders within communist party and contradictory view of people.

5. The people of republic had been fed up with old style rule of Soviet bloc and in Dec 1991, under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin (an elected leader), Russia, Ukraine and Baltics declared themselves independent.

6. The formation of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) came as a surprise and the exclusion of these states was resolved by making them founder members of the CIS.

7. Russia was accepted as successor state of Soviet Union by inheriting a Soviet seat in UN Security Council, who accepted all international treaties and commitments of Soviet Union and carried out some nuclear disarmament measures with the US.

8. Now Soviet Union had been disintegrated on the grounds to maintain nuclear and military arsenals, awareness of people of their backwardness than western capitalism as well as alienation of ordinary people who were exempted from any kind of privileges.

9. The rise of nationalism and the desire for sovereignty within republics like Russia, the Baltic Republics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Ukraine, Georgia and others proved to be the most immediate cause for disintegration of USSR.

10. Disintegration of USSR resulted into the end of Cold War confrontations, created dominant capitalist system, emerged many new states and the advantage was taken by Central Asian countries of their geographical locations by maintaining relations with Russia, the West, the US, China and others.

11. The process of transition from an authoritarian socialist system to a democratic capitalist system in Russia, Central Asia and East Europe was influenced by World Bank and IMF came to be known as Shock Therapy.

12. Shock Therapy involved privatisation of property, private firms emergence, complete switch over to free trade and Foreign Direct Investment, Financial opening up, Currency convertibility as well as break up of existing trade alliances among the countries of Soviet Bloc to maintain relations directly with the West.

13. Shock Therapy resulted in the largest garage sale in history, declined value of Russian Currency ‘Ruble’, due to inflation, food was imported, destroyed Old Social Welfare System, Migration of educated and intellectual manpower and disparities due to privatisation between rich and poor regions of Russia.

14. The constitution of newly democratic institutions was drafted in a hurry where strong executives appointed themselves as presidents due to weak Parliament and lack of independent judiciary as in Russia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

15. Russia revived in 2000 due to export of natural resources like oil, natural gas and minerals which were available in abundance in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. And from where these pipelines crossed, were paid on rent.

16. Most of the former Soviet Republics had civil wars and insurgencies as in Russia, two republics Chechnya and Dagestan had violent secessionist movements, in Central Asia. Civil War took place in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Czechoslovakia was also split into two. Even countries and provinces like Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia are fighting over river water leading to instability and making life difficult for ordinary people.

17. The Central Asian Republics were rich in hydrocarbon resources for economic benefit as Oil Companies and outside powers had a competition to exploit these natural resources. Also, the US approached them to hire bases and territories during wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

18. Russia and India share a vision of multipolar world order, collective security, greater regionalism, negotiated settlements of international conflicts, on independent foreign policy and decision making through UN.

19. India is benefitted from Russia on issues of Kashmir, energy supplies, sharing information on international terrorism, access to Central Asia and balancing its relations with China. In return, Russia has also been benefitted from India on the ground of second largest arms market for Russia.

WORDS THAT MATTER

Soviet System: Soviet system was introduced after Russian Revolution in 1917 based on the principles of egalitarian society and planned economy controlled by the state.
Socialist Bloc: The east European countries were known as Socialist Bloc because these countries were liberated from the fascist forces and their political and economic systems were based on this bloc only.
Capitalist Economy: In this economy, land and productive assets are owned and controlled by the Capitalists.
Unipolar System: Affairs at international level are dominated by only one superpower.
Multipolar System: Affairs at international level can not be dominated by one superpower only, instead group of countries play an important role.
Egalitarian Society: It believes that all people are equally important and should have the same rights and opportunities in life.
Largest Garage Sale: It was resulted due to Shock Therapy to undervalue the valuable industries of USSR to sell them at throwaway prices.
Shock Therapy: The model of transition from authoritarian socialist system to a democratic capitalist system in Russia, Central Asia and East Europe under the influence of the World Bank and IMF.
March 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev electced as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; appoints Boris Yeltsin as the head of the Communist Party in Moscow; initiates a series of reforms in the Soviet Union.
1988 Independence movement begins in Lithuania; later spreads to Estonia and Latvia.
October 1989 Soviet Union declares that the Warsaw Pact members are free to decide their own future; Berlin Wall falls in November.
February 1990 Gorbachev strips the Soviet Communist Party of its 72-year long monopoly on power by calling on the Soviet Parliament (Duma) to permit multiparty politics.
March 1990 Lithuania becomes the first of the 15 Soviet republics to declare its independence.
June 1990 Russian parliament declares its dependence from the Soviet Union.
June 1991 Yeltsin, no longer in the Communist Party, becomes the President of Russia.
August 1991 The Communist Party hardliners stage an abortive coup against Gorbachev.
September 1991 Three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania becomes UN members (Later join NATO in March 2004).
December 991 Russia, Belarus and Ukraine decided to annul the 1992 Treaty on the creation of the USSR and establish the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan joined the CIS (Georgia joined later in 1993); Russia took ones the USSR seat in the United Nations.
25 December 1991 Gorbachev resigns as the President of the Soviet Union; the end of the Soviet Union.

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