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Republic Act No. 11479: The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 [Full Text]

Ang Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 ay inaprubahan bilang isang ganap na batas nuong July 3, 2020 sa layuning supilin ang terorismo sa Pilipinas.

Ang mga Panukalang Batas na pinagmulan nito ay ang House Bill No. 6875 at Senate Bill No. 1083.

Ilang mga petisyon laban sa Batas na ito ang mga isinampa na sa Korte Suprema ng iba’t-ibang grupo.

Narito ang kumpletong nilalaman ng Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020.

References:

• Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 (Wikipedia)
• Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 (Official Gazette)
• Philippines: Anti-terror act faces top court challenges

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S. No. 1083 H. No. 6875

Republic of the Philippines Congress of the Philippines Metro Manila Eighteenth Congress First Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-second day of July, two thousand nineteen.

[Republic Act No. 11479]

AN ACT TO PREVENT, PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE TERRORISM, THEREBY REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9372, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE “HUMAN SECURITY ACT OF 2007”

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Short Title. – This Act shall henceforth be known as “The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020”.

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is declared a policy of the State to protect life, liberty, and property from terrorism, to condemn terrorism as inimical and dangerous to the national security of the country and to the welfare of the people, and to make terrorism a crime against the Filipino people, against humanity, and against The Law of Nations.

In the implementation of the policy stated above, the State shall uphold the basic rights and fundamental liberties of the people as enshrined in the Constitution.

The State recognizes that the fight against terrorism requires a comprehensive approach, comprising political, economic, diplomatic, military, and legal means duly taking into account the root causes of terrorism without acknowledging these as justifications for terrorist and/or criminal activities. Such measures shall include conflict management and post-conflict peace building, addressing the roots of conflict by building state capacity and promoting equitable economic development.

Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of constitutionally recognized powers of the executive branch of the government. It is to be understood, however, that the exercise of the constitutionally recognized powers of the executive department of the government shall not prejudice respect for human rights which shall be absolute and protected at all times.

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – as used in this Act:

(a) Critical Infrastructure shall refer to an asset or system, whether physical or virtual, so essential to the maintenance of vital societal functions or to the delivery of essential public services that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on national defense and security, national economy, public health or safety, the administration of justice, and other functions analogous thereto. It may include, but is not limited to, an asset or system affecting telecommunications, water and energy supply, emergency services, food security, fuel supply, banking and finance, transportation, radio and television. information systems and technology, chemical and nuclear sectors;

(b) Designated Person shall refer to:

Any individual, group of persons, organizations, or associations designated and/or identified by the United Nations Security Council, or another jurisdiction, or supranational jurisdiction as a terrorist, one who finances terrorism, or a terrorist organization or group; or

Any person, organization, association, or group of persons designated under paragraph 3 of Section 25 of this Act.

For purposes of this Act, the above definition shall be in addition to the definition of designated persons under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 10168, otherwise known as the “Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012”.

(c) Extraordinary Rendition shall refer to the transfer of a person, suspected of being a terrorist or supporter of a terrorist organization, association, or group of persons to a foreign nation for imprisonment and interrogation on behalf of the transferring nation. The extraordinary rendition may be done without framing any formal charges, trial, or approval of the court.

(d) International Organization shall refer to an organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and possessing its own international legal personality;

(e) Material Support shall refer to any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities. weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (one or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation;

(f) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction shall refer to the transfer and export of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, their means of delivery and related materials;

(g) Proposal to Commit Terrorism is committed when a person who has decided to commit any of the crimes defined and penalized under the provisions of this Act proposes its execution to some other person or persons;

(h) Recruit shall refer to any act to encourage other people to join a terrorist individual or organization, association or group of persons proscribed under Section 26 of this Act, or designated by the United Nations Security Council as a terrorist organization, or organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism;

(i) Surveillance Activities shall refer to the act of tracking down, following, or investigating individuals or organizations; or the tapping, listening, intercepting, and recording of messages. conversations, discussions, spoken or written words, including computer and network surveillance, and other communications of individuals engaged in terrorism as defined hereunder;

(j) Supranational Jurisdiction shall refer to an international organization or union in which the power and influence of member states transcend national boundaries or interests to share in decision-making and vote on issues concerning the collective body, i.e. the European Union;

(k) Training shall refer to the giving of instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill in relation to terrorism as defined hereunder, as opposed to general knowledge;

(l) Terrorist Individual shall refer to any natural person who commits any of the acts defined and penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,11 and 12 of this Act;

(m) Terrorist Organization, Association or Group of Persons shall refer to any entity organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism, or those proscribed under Section 26 hereof or the United Nations Security Council-designated terrorist organization; and

(n) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) shall refer to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons which are capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties. It excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon.

SEC. 4. Terrorism. – Subject to Section 49 of this Act, terrorism is committed by any person who, within or outside the Philippines, regardless of the stage of execution:

(a) Engages in acts intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to any person, or endangers a person’s life;

(b) Engages in acts intended to cause extensive damage or destruction to a government or public facility, public place or private property;

(c) Engages in acts intended to cause extensive interference with, damage or destruction to critical infrastructure;

(d) Develops, manufactures, possesses, acquires, transports, supplies or uses weapons, explosives or of biological, nuclear, radiological or chemical weapons; and

(e) Release of dangerous substances, or causing fire, floods or explosions when the purpose of such act, by its nature and context, is to intimidate the general public or a segment thereof, create an atmosphere or spread a message of fear, to provoke or influence by intimidation the government or any international organization, or seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, economic, or social structures of the country, or create a public emergency or seriously undermine public safety, shall be guilty of committing terrorism and shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment without the benefit of parole and the benefits of Republic Act No. 10592, otherwise known as “An Act Amending Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code”: Provided, That, terrorism as defined in this section shall not include advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of work, industrial or mass action, and other similar exercises of civil and political rights, which are not intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person’s life, or to create a serious risk to public safety.

SEC. 5. Threat to Commit Terrorism. – Any person who shall threaten to commit any of the acts mentioned in Section 4 hereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years.

SEC. 6. Planning, Training, Preparing, and Facilitating the Commission of Terrorism. – It shall be unlawful for any person to participate in the planning, training, preparation and facilitation in the commission of terrorism, possessing objects connected with the preparation for the commission of terrorism, or collecting or making documents connected with the preparation of terrorism. Any person found guilty of the provisions of this Act shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment without the benefit of parole and the benefits of Republic Act No. 10592.

SEC. 7. Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism. – Any conspiracy to commit terrorism as defined and penalized under Section 4 of this Act shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment without the benefit of parole and the benefits of Republic Act No. 10592.

There is conspiracy when two (2) or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of terrorism as defined in Section 4 hereof and decide to commit the same.

SEC. 8. Proposal to Commit Terrorism. – Any person who proposes to commit terrorism as defined in Section 4 hereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years.

SEC. 9. Inciting to Commit Terrorism. – Any person who, without taking any direct part in the commission of terrorism, shall incite others to the execution of any of the acts specified in Section 4 hereof by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, banners or other representations tending to the same end, shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years.

SEC. 10. Recruitment to and Membership in a Terrorist Organization. – Any person who shall recruit another to participate in, join, commit or support terrorism or a terrorist individual or any terrorist organization, association or group of persons proscribed under Section 26 of this Act, or designated by the United Nations Security Council as a terrorist organization, or organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism, shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment without the benefit of parole and the benefits of Republic Act No. 10592.

The same penalty shall be imposed on any person who organizes or facilitates the travel of individuals to a state other than their state of residence or nationality for the purpose of recruitment which may be committed through any of the following means:

(a) Recruiting another person to serve in any capacity in or with an armed force in a foreign state, whether the armed force forms part of the armed forces of the government of that foreign state or otherwise;

(b) Publishing an advertisement or propaganda for the purpose of recruiting persons to serve in any capacity in or with such an armed force;

(c) Publishing an advertisement or propaganda containing any information relating to the place at which or the manner in which persons may make applications to serve or obtain information relating to service in any capacity in or with such armed force or relating to the manner in which persons may travel to a foreign state for the purpose of serving in any capacity m or with such armed force; or

(d) Performing any other act with the intention of facilitating or promoting the recruitment of persons to serve in any capacity in or with such armed force.

Any person who shall voluntarily and knowingly join any organization, association or group of persons knowing that such organization, association or group of persons is proscribed under Section 26 of this Act, or designated by the United Nations Security Council as a terrorist organization, or organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism, shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years.

SEC. 11. Foreign Terrorist. – The following acts are unlawful and shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment without the benefit of parole and the benefits of Republic Act No. 10592:

(a) For any person to travel or attempt to travel to a state other than his/her state of residence or nationality, for the pw-pose of perpetrating, planning, or preparing for, or participating in terrorism, or providing or receiving terrorist training;

(b) For any person to organize or facilitate the travel of individuals who travel to a state other than their states of residence or nationality knowing that such travel is for the purpose of perpetrating, planning, training, or preparing for, or participating in terrorism or providing or receiving terrorist training; or

(c) For any person residing abroad who comes to the Philippines to participate in perpetrating, planning, training, or preparing for, or participating in terrorism or provide support for or facilitate or receive terrorist training here or abroad.

SEC. 12. Providing Material Support to Terrorists. – Any person who provides material support to any terrorist individual or terrorist organization, association or group of persons committing any of the acts punishable under Section 4 hereof, knowing that such individual or organization, association, or group of persons is committing or planning to commit such acts, shall be liable as principal to any and all terrorist activities committed by said individuals or organizations, in addition to other criminal liabilities he/she or they may have incurred in relation thereto.

SEC. 13. Humanitarian Exemption. – Humanitarian activities undertaken by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Philippine Red Cross (PRC), and other state-recognized impartial humanitarian partners or organizations in conformity with the International Humanitarian Law (IHL), do not fall within the scope of Section 12 of this Act.

SEC. 14. Accessory. – Any person who, having knowledge of the commission of any of the crimes defined and penalized under Section 4 of this Act, without having participated therein, takes part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manner: (a) by profiting himself/herself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (b) by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects, or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; or (c) by harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal or conspirator of the crime, shall be liable as an accessory and shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years.

No person, regardless of relationship or affinity, shall be exempt from liability under this section.

SEC. 15. Penalty for Public Official. – If the offender found guilty of any of the acts defined and penalized under any of the provisions of this Act is a public official or employee, he/she shall be charged with the administrative offense of grave misconduct and/or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines and the Filipino people, and be meted with the penalty of dismissal from the service, with the accessory penalties of cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual absolute disqualification from running for any elective office or holding any public office.

SEC. 16. Surveillance of Suspects and Interception and Recording of Communications. – The provisions of Republic Act No. 4200. otherwise known as the “Anti-Wire Tapping Law” to the contrary notwithstanding, a law enforcement agent or military personnel may, upon a written order of the Court of Appeals secretly wiretap, overhear and listen to, intercept, screen, read, surveil, record or collect, with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic, mechanical or other equipment or device or technology now known or may hereafter be known to science or with the use of any other suitable ways and means for the above purposes, any private communications, conversation, discussion/s, data, information, messages in whatever form, kind or nature, spoken or written words (a) between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, as provided in Section 26 of this Act; (b) between members of a designated person as defined in Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 10168; or (c) any person charged with or suspected of committing any of the crimes defined and penalized under the provisions of this Act: Provided, That, surveillance, interception and recording of communications between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized.

The law enforcement agent or military personnel shall likewise be obligated to (1) file an ex-parte application with the Court of Appeals for the issuance of an order, to compel telecommunications service providers (TSP) and internet service providers (ISP) to produce all customer information and identification records as well as call and text data records, content and other cellular or internet metadata of any person suspected of any of the crimes defined and penalized under the provisions of this Act; and (2) furnish the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) a copy of said application. The NTC shall likewise be notified upon the issuance of the order for the purpose of ensuring immediate compliance.

SEC. 17. Judicial Authorization, Requisites. – The authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall issue a written order to conduct the acts mentioned in Section 16 of this Act upon:

(a) Filing of an ex parte written application by law enforcement agent or military personnel, who has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC); and

(b) After examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he/she may produce, the issuing court determines:

(1) that there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the crimes defined and penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed; and

(2) that there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that evidence, which is essential to the conviction of any charged or suspected person for, or to the solution or prevention of, any such crimes, will be obtained.

SEC. 18. Classification and Contents of the Order of the Court. – The written order granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals as well as the application for such order, shall be deemed and are hereby declared as classified information. Being classified information, access to the said documents and any information contained in the said documents shall be limited to the applicants, duly authorized personnel of the ATC, the hearing justices, the clerk of court and duly authorized personnel of the hearing or issuing court. The written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall specify the following: (a) the identity, such as name and address, if known, of the person or persons whose communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words are to be tracked down, tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded; and, in the case of radio, electronic, or telephonic (whether wireless or otherwise) communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words, the electronic transmission systems or the telephone numbers to be tracked down, tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded and their locations or if the person or persons suspected of committing any of the crimes defined and penalized under the provisions of this Act are not fully known, such person or persons shall be the subject of continuous surveillance; (b) the identity of the law enforcement agent or military personnel, including the individual identity of the members of his team, judicially authorized to undertake surveillance activities; (c) the offense or offenses committed, or being committed, or sought to be prevented; and, (d) the length of time within which the authorization shall be used or carried out.

SEC. 19. Effective Period of Judicial Authorization. – Any authorization granted by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 17 of this Act, shall only be effective for the length of time specified in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals which shall not exceed a period of sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the written order by the applicant law enforcement agent or military personnel.

The authorizing division of the Court of Appeals may extend or renew the said authorization to a non-extendible period, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original period: Provided, That the issuing court is satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest: and Provided, further, That the ex parte application for extension or renewal, which must be filed by the original applicant, has been duly authorized in writing by the ATC.

In case of death of the original applicant or in case he/she is physically disabled to file the application for extension or renewal, the one next in rank to the original applicant among the members of the team named in the original written order shall file the application for extension or renewal: Provided, finally, That, the applicant law enforcement agent or military personnel shall have thirty (30) days after the termination of the period granted by the Court of Appeals as provided in the preceding paragraphs within which to file the appropriate case before the Public Prosecutor’s Office for any violation of this Act.

For purposes of this provision, the issuing court shall require the applicant law enforcement or military official to inform the court, after the lapse of the thirty (30)-day period of the fact that an appropriate case for violation of this Act has been filed with the Public Prosecutor’s Office.

SEC. 20. Custody of Intercepted and Recorded Communications. – All tapes, discs, other storage devices, recordings, notes, memoranda, summaries, excerpts and all copies thereof obtained under the judicial authorization granted by the Court of Appeals shall, within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the written order or the extension or renewal granted thereafter, be deposited with the issuing court in a sealed envelope or sealed package, as the case may be, and shall be accompanied by a joint affidavit of the applicant law enforcement agent or military personnel and the members of his/her team.

In case of death of the applicant or in case he/she is physically disabled to execute the required affidavit, the one next in rank to the applicant among the members of the team named in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall execute with the members of the team that required affidavit.

It shall be unlawful for any person, law enforcement agent or military personnel or any custodian of the tapes, discs, other storage devices recordings, notes, memoranda, summaries, excerpts and all copies thereof to remove, delete, expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy in any manner the items enumerated above in whole or in part under any pretext whatsoever.

Any person who removes, deletes, expunges, incinerates, shreds or destroys the items enumerated above shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years.

SEC. 21. Contents of Joint Affidavit. – The joint affidavit of the law enforcement agent or military personnel shall state: (a) the number of tapes, discs, and recordings that have been made; (b) the dates and times covered by each of such tapes, discs, and recordings; and (c) the chain of custody or the list of persons who had possession or custody over the tapes, discs and recordings.

The joint affidavit shall also certify under oath that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part of any of such tapes, discs, other storage devices, recordings, notes, memoranda, summaries, or excerpts have been made, or, if made, that all such duplicates and copies are included in the sealed envelope or sealed package, as the case may be, deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals.

It shall be unlawful for any person, law enforcement agent or military personnel to omit or exclude from the joint affidavit any item or portion thereof mentioned in this section.

Any person, law enforcement agent or military officer who violates any of the acts proscribed in the preceding paragraph shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years.

SEC. 22. Disposition of Deposited Materials. – The sealed envelope or sealed package and the contents thereof, referred to in Section 20 of this Act, shall be deemed and are hereby declared classified information. The sealed envelope or sealed package shall not be opened, disclosed, or used as evidence unless authorized by a written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals which written order shall be granted only upon a written application of the Department of Justice (DOJ) duly authorized in writing by the ATC to file the application with proper written notice to the person whose conversation, communication, message, discussion or spoken or written words have been the subject of surveillance, monitoring, recording and interception to open, reveal, divulge, and use the contents of the sealed envelope or sealed package as evidence.

The written application, with notice to the party concerned, for the opening, replaying, disclosing, or using as evidence of the sealed package or the contents thereof, shall clearly state the purpose or reason for its opening, replaying, disclosing, or its being used as evidence.

Violation of this section shall be penalized by imprisonment of ten (10) years.

SEC. 23. Evidentiary Value of Deposited Materials. – Any listened to, intercepted, and recorded communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words, or any part or parts thereof, or any information or fact contained therein, including their existence, content, substance, purport, effect, or meaning, which have been secured in violation of the pertinent provisions of this Act, shall be inadmissible and cannot be used as evidence against anybody in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.

SEC. 24. Unauthorized or Malicious Interceptions and/ or Recordings. – Any law enforcement agent or military personnel who conducts surveillance activities without a valid judicial authorization pursuant to Section 17 of this Act shall be guilty of this offense and shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years. All information that have been maliciously procured should be made available to the aggrieved party.

SEC. 25. Designation of Terrorist Individual, Groups of Persons, Organizations or Associations. – Pursuant to our obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) No. 1373, the ATC shall automatically adopt the United Nations Security Council Consolidated List of designated individuals, group of persons, organizations, or associations designated and/or identified as a terrorist, one who finances terrorism, or a terrorist organization or group.

Request for designations by other jurisdictions or supranational jurisdictions may be adopted by the ATC after determination that the proposed designee meets the criteria for designation of UNSCR No.1373. ·

The ATC may designate an individual, groups of persons, organization, or association, whether domestic or foreign, upon a finding of probable cause that the individual, groups of persons, organization, or association commit, or attempt to commit, or conspire in the commission of the acts defined and penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act.

The assets of the designated individual, groups of persons, organization or association above-mentioned shall be subject to the authority of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) to freeze pursuant to Section II of Republic Act No. 10168.

The designation shall be without prejudice to the proscription of terrorist organizations, associations, or groups of persons under Section 26 of this Act.

SEC. 26. Proscription of Terrorist Organizations, Association, or Group of Persons. – Any group of persons, organization or association, which commits any of the acts defined and penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act, or organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism shall, upon application of the DOJ before the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals with due notice and opportunity to be heard given to the group of persons, organization or association, be declared as a terrorist and outlawed group of persons, organization or association, by the said Court.

The application shall be filed with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a preliminary order of proscription. No application for proscription shall be filed without the authority of the ATC upon the recommendation of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA).

SEC. 27. Preliminary Order of Proscription. – Where the Court has determined that probable cause exists on the basis of the verified application which is sufficient in form and substance, that the issuance of an order of proscription is necessary to prevent the commission of terrorism, he/she shall, within seventy-two (72) hours from the filing of the application, issue a preliminary order of proscription declaring that the respondent is a terrorist and an outlawed organization or association within the meaning of Section 26 of this Act.

The court shall immediately commence and conduct continuous hearings, which should be completed within six (6) months from the time the application has been filed, to determine whether:

(a) The preliminary order of proscription should be made permanent;

(b) A permanent order of proscription should be issued in case no preliminary order was issued; or

(c) A preliminary order of proscription should be lifted. It shall be the burden of the applicant to prove that the respondent is a terrorist and an outlawed organization or association within the meaning of Section 26 of this Act before the court issues an order of proscription whether preliminary or permanent.

The permanent order of proscription herein granted shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation. It shall be valid for a period of three (3) years after which, a review of such order shall be made and if circumstances warrant, the same shall be lifted.

SEC. 28. Request to Proscribe from Foreign Jurisdictions and Supranational Jurisdictions. – Consistent with the national interest, all requests for proscription made by another jurisdiction or supranational jurisdiction shall be referred by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to the ATC to determine, with the assistance of the NICA, if proscription under Section 26 of this Act is warranted. If the request for proscription is granted, the ATC shall correspondingly commence proscription proceedings through the DOJ.

SEC. 29. Detention Without Judicial Warrant of Arrest. – The provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any law enforcement agent or military personnel, who, having been duly authorized in writing by the ATC has taken custody of a person suspected of committing any of the acts defined and penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act, shall, without incurring any criminal liability for delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities, deliver said suspected person to the proper judicial authority within a period of fourteen (14) calendar days counted from the moment the said suspected person has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken into custody by the law enforcement agent or military personnel. The period of detention may be extended to a maximum period of ten (10) calendar days if it is established that (1) further detention of the person/s is necessary to preserve evidence related to terrorism or complete the investigation; (2) further detention of the person/s is necessary to prevent the commission of another terrorism; and (3) the investigation is being conducted properly and without delay.

Immediately after taking custody of a person suspected of committing terrorism or any member of a group of persons, organization or association proscribed under Section 26 hereof, the law enforcement agent or military personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest of the following facts: (a) the time, date, and manner of arrest; (b) the location or locations of the detained suspect/s and (c) the physical and mental condition of the detained suspect/s. The law enforcement agent or military personnel shall likewise furnish the ATC and the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) of the written notice given to the judge.

The head of the detaining facility shall ensure that the detained suspect is informed of his/her rights as a detainee and shall ensure access to the detainee by his/her counsel or agencies and entities authorized by law to exercise visitorial powers over detention facilities.

The penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years shall be imposed upon the police or law enforcement agent or military personnel who fails to notify any judge as provided in the preceding paragraph.

SEC. 30. Rights of a Person under Custodial Detention. – The moment a person charged with or suspected of committing any of the acts defined and penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act is apprehended or arrested and detained, he/she shall forthwith be informed, by the arresting law enforcement agent or military personnel to whose custody the person concerned is brought, of his/her right: (a) to be informed of the nature and cause of his/her arrest, to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his/her choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel of his/her choice, the law enforcement agent or military personnel concerned shall immediately contact the free legal assistance unit of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) or the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO). It shall be the duty of the free legal assistance unit of the IBP or the PAO thus contacted to immediately visit the person/s detained and provide him/her with legal assistance. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of his/her counsel of choice; (b) informed of the cause or causes of his/her detention in the presence of his legal counsel; (c) allowed to communicate freely with his/her legal counsel and to confer with them at any time without restriction; (d) allowed to communicate freely and privately without restrictions with the members of his/her family or with his/her nearest relatives and to be visited by them; and, (e) allowed freely to avail of the service of a physician or physicians of choice.

SEC. 31. Violation of the Rights of a Detainee. – The penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years shall be imposed upon any law enforcement agent or military personnel who has violated the rights of persons under their custody, as provided for in Sections 29 and 30 of this Act.

Unless the law enforcement agent or military personnel who violated the rights of a detainee or detainees as stated above is duly identified, the same penalty shall be imposed on the head of the law enforcement unit or military unit having custody of the detainee at the time the violation was done.

SEC. 32. Official Custodial Logbook and Its Contents. – The law enforcement custodial unit in whose care and control the person suspected of committing any of the acts defined and penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act has been placed under custodial arrest and detention shall keep a securely and orderly maintained official logbook, which is hereby declared as a public document and opened to and made available for the inspection and scrutiny of the lawyer of the person under custody or any member of his/her family or relative by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree or his/her physician at any time of the day or night subject to reasonable restrictions by the custodial facility. The logbook shall contain a clear and concise record of: (a) the name, description, and address of the detained person; (b) the date and exact time of his/her initial admission for custodial arrest and detention; (c) the name and address of the physician or physicians who examined him/her physically and medically; (d) the state of his/her health and physical condition at the time of his/her initial admission for custodial detention; (e) the date and time of each removal of the detained person from his/her cell for interrogation or for any purpose; (f) the date and time of his/her return to his/her cell; (g) the name and address of the physician or physicians who physically and medically examined him/her after each interrogation; (h) a summary of the physical and medical findings on the detained person after each of such interrogation; (i) the names and addresses of his/her family members and nearest relatives, if any and if available; (j) the names and addresses of persons, who visit the detained person; (k) the date and time of each of such visit; (l) the date and time of each request of the detained person to communicate and confer with his/her legal counsel or counsels; (m) the date and time of each visit, and date and time of each departure of his/her legal counsel or counsels; and (n) all other important events bearing on and all relevant details regarding the treatment of the detained person while under custodial arrest and detention.

The said law enforcement custodial unit shall, upon demand of the aforementioned lawyer or members of the family or relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the person under custody or his/her physician, issue a certified true copy of the entries of the logbook relative to the concerned detained person subject to reasonable restrictions by the custodial facility. This certified true copy may be attested by the person who has custody of the logbook or who allowed the party concerned to scrutinize it at the time the demand for the certified true copy is made.

The law enforcement custodial unit who fails to comply with the preceding paragraphs to keep an official logbook shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years.

SEC. 33. No Torture or Coercion in Investigation and Interrogation. – The use of torture and other cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment or punishment, as defined in Sections 4 and 5 of Republic Act No. 9745 otherwise known as the “Anti-Torture Act of 2009,” at any time during the investigation or interrogation of a detained suspected terrorist is absolutely prohibited and shall be penalized under said law. Any evidence obtained from said detained person resulting from such treatment shall be, in its entirety, inadmissible and cannot be used as evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.

SEC. 34. Restriction on the Right to Travel. – Prior to the filing of an information for any violation of Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act, the investigating prosecutor shall apply for the issuance of a precautionary hold departure order (PHDO) against the respondent upon a preliminary determination of probable cause in the proper Regional Trial Court.

Upon the filing of the information regarding the commission of any acts defined and penalized under the provisions of this Act, the prosecutor shall apply with the court having jurisdiction for the issuance of a hold departure order (HDO) against the accused. The said application shall be accompanied by the complaint-affidavit and its attachments, personal details, passport number, and a photograph of the accused, if available.

In cases where evidence of guilt is not strong, and the person charged is entitled to bail and is granted the same, the court, upon application by the prosecutor, shall limit the right of travel of the accused to within the municipality or city where he/she resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national security and public safety, consistent with Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution. The court shall immediately furnish the DOJ and the Bureau of Immigration (BI) with the copy of said order. Travel outside of said municipality or city, without the authorization of the court, shall be deemed a violation of the terms and conditions of his/her bail, which shall be forfeited as provided under the Rules of Court.

He/she may also be placed under house arrest by order of the court at his/her usual place of residence.

While under house arrest, he/she may not use telephones, cellphones, e-mails, computers, the internet, or other means of communications with people outside the residence until otherwise ordered by the court.

If the evidence of guilt is strong, the court shall immediately issue an HDO and direct the DFA to initiate the procedure for the cancellation of the passport of the accused.

The restrictions above-mentioned shall be terminated upon the acquittal of the accused or of the dismissal of the case filed against him/her or earlier upon the discretion of the court on motion of the prosecutor or of the accused.

SEC. 35. Anti-Money Laundering Council Authority to Investigate, inquire into and Examine Bank Deposits. – Upon the issuance by the court of a preliminary order of proscription or in case of designation under Section 25 of this Act, the AMLC, either upon its own initiative or at the request of the ATC, is hereby authorized to investigate: (a) any property or funds that are in any way related to financing of terrorism as defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 10168, or violation of Sections 4, 6, 7, 10, 11 or 12 of this Act; and (b) property or funds of any person or persons in relation to whom there is probable cause to believe that such person or persons are committing or attempting or conspiring to commit, or participating in or facilitating the financing of the aforementioned sections of this Act.

The AMLC may also enlist the assistance of any branch, department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and -controlled corporations in undertaking measures to counter the financing of terrorism, which may include the use of its personnel, facilities and resources.

For purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, otherwise known as the “Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits”. as amended; Republic Act No. 6426, otherwise known as the “Foreign Currency Deposit Act of the Philippines”, as amended; Republic Act No. 8791, otherwise known as “The General Banking Law of 2000” and other laws, the AMLC is hereby authorized to inquire into or examine deposits and investments with any banking institution or non-bank financial institution and their subsidiaries and affiliates without a court order.

SEC. 36. Authority to Freeze. – Upon the issuance by the court of a preliminary order of proscription or in case of designation under Section 25 of this Act, the AMLC, either upon its own initiative or request of the ATC, is hereby authorized to issue an ex parte order to freeze without delay: (a) any property or funds that are in any way related to financing of terrorism as defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 10168, or any violation of Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 or 12 of this Act; and (b) property or funds of any person or persons in relation to whom there is probable cause to believe that such person or persons are committing or attempting or conspiring to commit, or participating in or facilitating the financing of the aforementioned sections of this Act.

The freeze order shall be effective for a period not exceeding twenty (20) days. Upon a petition filed by the AMLC before the expiration of the period, the effectivity of the freeze order may be extended up to a period not exceeding six (6) months upon order of the Court of Appeals: Provided, That, the twenty-day period shall be tolled upon filing of a petition to extend the effectivity of the freeze order.

Notwithstanding the preceding paragraphs, the AMLC, consistent with the Philippines’ international obligations, shall be authorized to issue a freeze order with respect to property or funds of a designated organization, association, group or any individual to comply with binding terrorism-related resolutions, including UNSCR No. 1373 pursuant to Article 41 of the charter of the UN. Said freeze order shall be effective until the basis for the issuance thereof shall have been lifted. During the effectivity of the freeze order, an aggrieved party may, within twenty (20) days from issuance, file with the Court of Appeals a petition to determine the basis of the freeze order according to the principle of effective judicial protection: Provided, That the person whose property or funds have been frozen may withdraw such sums as the AMLC determines to be reasonably needed for monthly family needs and sustenance including the services of counsel and the family medical needs of such person.

However, if the property or funds subject of the freeze order under the immediately preceding paragraph are found to be in any way related to financing of terrorism as defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 10168, or any violation of Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 or 12 of this Act committed within the jurisdiction of the Philippines, said property or funds shall be the subject of civil forfeiture proceedings as provided under Republic Act No. 10168.

SEC. 37. Malicious Examination of a Bank or a Financial Institution. – Any person who maliciously, or without authorization, examines deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, or records in a bank or financial institution in relation to Section 36 hereof, shall suffer the penalty of four (4) years of imprisonment.

SEC. 38. Safe Harbor. – No administrative, criminal or civil proceedings shall lie against any person acting in good faith when implementing the targeted financial sanctions as provided under pertinent United Nations Security Resolutions.

SEC. 39. Bank Officials and Employees Defying a Court Authorization. – An employee, official, or a member of the board of directors of a bank, or financial institution, who after being duly served with the written order of authorization from the Court of Appeals, refuses to allow the examination of the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records of a terrorist or an outlawed group of persons, organization or association, in accordance with Sections 25 and 26 hereof, shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years.

SEC. 40. Immunity and Protection of Government Witnesses. – The immunity and protection of government witnesses shall be governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. 6981, otherwise known as “The Witness Protection, Security and Benefits Act”.

SEC. 41. Penalty for Unauthorized Revelation of Classified Materials. – The penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years shall be imposed upon any person, law enforcement agent or military personnel, judicial officer or civil servant who, not being authorized by the Court of Appeals to do so, reveals in any manner or form any classified information under this Act. The penalty imposed herein is without prejudice and in addition to any corresponding administrative liability the offender may have incurred for such acts.

SEC. 42. Infidelity in the Custody of Detained Persons. – Any public officer who has direct custody of a detained person under the provisions of this Act and, who, by his deliberate act, misconduct or inexcusable negligence, causes or allows the escape of such detained person shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years of imprisonment.

SEC. 43. Penalty for Furnishing False Evidence, Forged Document, or Spurious Evidence. – The penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly furnishes false testimony, forged document or spurious evidence in any investigation or hearing conducted in relation to any violations under this Act.

SEC. 44. Continuous Trial. – In cases involving crimes defined and penalized under the provisions of this Act, the judge concerned shall set the case for continuous trial on a daily basis from Monday to Thursday or other short-term trial calendar to ensure compliance with the accused’s right to speedy trial.

SEC. 45. Anti-Terrorism Council. – An Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) is hereby created. The members of the ATC are: (1) the Executive Secretary, who shall be its Chairperson; (2) the National Security Adviser who shall be its Vice Chairperson; and (3) the Secretary of Foreign Affairs; (4) the Secretary of National Defense; (5) the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government; (6) the Secretary of Finance; (7) the Secretary of Justice; (8) the Secretary of Information and Communications Technology; and (9) the Executive Director of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) Secretariat as its other members.

The ATC shall implement this Act and assume the responsibility for the proper and effective implementation of the policies of the country against terrorism. The ATC shall keep records of its proceedings and decisions. All records of the ATC shall be subject to such security classifications as the ATC may, in its judgment and discretion, decide to adopt to safeguard the safety of the people, the security of the Republic, and the welfare of the nation.

The NICA shall be the Secretariat of the ATC. The ATC shall define the powers, duties, and functions of the NICA as Secretariat of the ATC. The Anti-Terrorism Council-Program Management Center (ATC-PMC) is hereby institutionalized as the main coordinating and program management arm of the ATC. The ATC shall define the powers, duties, and functions of the ATC-PMC. The Department of Science and Technology (DOST), the Department of Transportation (DOTr), the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), the Department of Education (DepEd), the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the Presidential Adviser for Peace, Reunification and Unity (PAPRU, formerly PAPP), the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the BI, the Office of Civil Defense (OCD), the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), the Philippine Center on Transnational Crimes (PCTC), the Philippine National Police (PNP) intelligence and investigative elements, the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), and the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos (NCMF) shall serve as support agencies of the ATC.

The ATC shall formulate and adopt comprehensive, adequate, efficient, and effective plans, programs, or measures to prevent, counter, suppress, or eradicate the commission of terrorism in the country and to protect the people from such acts. In pursuit of said mandate, the ATC shall create such focus programs to prevent and counter terrorism as necessary, to ensure the counterterrorism operational awareness of concerned agencies, to conduct legal action and to pursue legal and legislative initiatives to counter terrorism, prevent and stem terrorist financing, and to ensure compliance with international commitments to counterterrorism-related protocols and bilateral and/or multilateral agreements, and identify the lead agency for each program, such as:

(a) Preventing and countering violent extremism program – The program shall address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism which include, among others: ethnic, national, and religious discrimination; socio-economic disgruntlement; political exclusion; dehumanization of victims of terrorism; lack of good governance; and prolonged unresolved conflicts by winning the hearts and minds of the people to prevent them from engaging in violent extremism. It shall identify, integrate, and synchronize all government and non¬-government initiatives and resources to prevent radicalization and violent extremism, thus reinforce and expand an after¬-care program;

(b) Preventing and combating terrorism program – The program shall focus on denying terrorist groups access to the means to carry out attacks to their targets and formulate response to its desired impact through decisive engagements. The program shall focus on operational activities to disrupt and combat terrorism activities and attacks such as curtailing, recruitment, propaganda, finance and logistics, the protection of potential targets, the exchange of intelligence with foreign countries, and the arrest of suspected terrorists;

(c) International affairs and capacity building program – The program shall endeavor to build the State’s capacity to prevent and combat terrorism by strengthening the collaborative mechanisms between and among ATC members and support agencies and facilitate cooperation among relevant stakeholders, both local and international, in the battle against terrorism; and

(d) Legal affairs program – The program shall ensure respect for human rights and adherence to the rule of law as the fundamental bases of the fight against terrorism. It shall guarantee compliance with the same as well as with international commitments to counter-terrorism-related protocols and bilateral and/or multilateral agreements.

Nothing herein shall be interpreted to empower the ATC to exercise any judicial or quasi-judicial power or authority.

SEC. 46. Functions of the Council. – In pursuit of its mandate in the previous Section, the ATC shall have the following functions with due regard for the rights of the people as mandated by the Constitution and pertinent laws:

(a) Formulate and adopt plans, programs, and preventive and counter-measures against terrorists and terrorism in the country;

(b) Coordinate all national efforts to suppress and eradicate terrorism in the country and mobilize the entire nation against terrorism prescribed in this Act;

(c) Direct the speedy investigation and prosecution of all persons detained or accused for any crime defined and penalized under this Act;

(d) Monitor the progress of the investigation and prosecution of all persons accused and/or detained for any crime defined and penalized under the provisions of this Act;

(e) Establish and maintain comprehensive database information systems on terrorism, terrorist activities, and counter-terrorism operations;

(f) Enlist the assistance of and file the appropriate action with the AMLC to freeze and forfeit the funds, bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and property of whatever kind and nature belonging (i) to a person suspected of or charged with alleged violation of any of the acts defined and penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act, (ii) between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or association as provided in Section 26 of this Act; (iii) to designated persons defined under Section 3(e) of R. A. No. 10168; (iv) to an individual member of such designated persons; or (v) any individual, organization, association or group of persons proscribed under Section 26 hereof;

(g) Grant monetary rewards and other incentives to informers who give vital information leading to the apprehension, arrest, detention, prosecution, and conviction of person or persons found guilty for violation of any of the acts defined and penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act: Provided, That, no monetary reward shall be granted to informants unless the accused’s demurrer to evidence has been denied or the prosecution has rested its case without such demurrer having been filed;

(h) Establish and maintain coordination with and the cooperation and assistance of other states, jurisdictions, international entities and organizations in preventing and combating international terrorism;

(i) Take action on relevant resolutions issued by the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; and consistent with the national interest, take action on foreign requests to designate terrorist individuals, associations, organizations or group of persons;

G) Take measures to prevent the acquisition and proliferation by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction;

(k) Lead in the formulation and implementation of a national strategic plan to prevent and combat terrorism;

(l) Request the Supreme Court to designate specific divisions of the Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Courts to handle all cases involving the crimes defined and penalized under this Act;

(m) Require other government agencies, offices and entities and officers and employees and non-government organizations, private entities and individuals to render assistance to the ATC in the performance of its mandate; and

(n) Investigate motu propio or upon complaint any report of abuse, malicious application or improper implementation by any person of the provisions of this Act.

SEC. 47. Commission on Human Rights (CHR). – The CHR shall give the highest priority to the investigation and prosecution of violations of civil and political rights of persons in relation to the implementation of this Act.

SEC. 48. Ban on Extraordinary Rendition. – No person suspected or convicted of any of the crimes defined and penalized under the provisions of Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 or 12 of this Act shall be subjected to extraordinary rendition to any country.

SEC. 49. Extraterritorial Application. – Subject to the provision of any treaty of which the Philippines is a signatory and to any contrary provision of any law of preferential application, the provisions of this Act shall apply:

(a) To a Filipino citizen or national who commits any of the acts defined and penalized under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of this Act outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines;

(b) To individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit any of the crimes mentioned in Paragraph (a) hereof inside the territorial limits of the Philippines;

(c) To individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit any of the said crimes mentioned in Paragraph (a) hereof on-board Philippine ship or Philippine airship;

(d) To individual persons who commit any of said crimes mentioned in Paragraph (a) hereof within any embassy, consulate, or diplomatic premises belonging to or occupied by the Philippine government in an official capacity:

(e) To individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said crimes mentioned in Paragraph (a) hereof against Philippine citizens or persons of Philippine descent, where their citizenship or ethnicity was a factor in the commission of the crime; and

(f) To individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said crimes directly against the Philippine government.

In case of an individual who is neither a citizen or a national of the Philippines who commits any of the crimes mentioned in Paragraph (a) hereof outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, the Philippines shall exercise jurisdiction only when such individual enters or is inside the territory of the Philippines: Provided, That, in the absence of any request for extradition from the state where the crime was committed or the state where the individual is a citizen or national, or the denial thereof, the ATC shall refer the case to the BI for deportation or to the DOJ for prosecution in the same manner as if the act constituting the offense had been committed in the Philippines.

SEC. 50. Joint Oversight Committee. – Upon the effectivity of this Act, a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is hereby constituted. The Committee shall be composed of twelve (12) members with the chairperson of the Committee on Public Order of the Senate and the House of Representatives as members and five (5) additional members from each House to be designated by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, respectively. The minority shall be entitled to a pro-rata representation but shall have at least two (2) representatives in the Committee.

In the exercise of its oversight functions, the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the authority to summon law enforcement or military officers and the members of the ATC to appear before it, and require them to answer questions and submit written reports of the acts they have done in the implementation of this Act and render an annual report to both Houses of Congress as to its status and implementation.

SEC. 51. Protection of Most Vulnerable Groups. – There shall be due regard for the welfare of any suspects who are elderly, pregnant, persons with disability, women and children while they are under investigation, interrogation or detention.

SEC. 52. Management of Persons Charged Under this Act. – The Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) and the Bureau of Corrections (BuCoR) shall establish a system of assessment and classification for persons charged for committing terrorism and preparatory acts punishable under this Act. Said system shall cover the proper management, handling, and interventions for said persons detained.

Persons charged under this Act shall be detained in existing facilities of the BJMP and the BuCoR.

SEC. 53. Trial of Persons Charged Under this Act. – Any person charged for violations of Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 or 12 of this Act shall be tried in special courts created for this purpose. In this regard, the Supreme Court shall designate certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts as anti¬-terror courts whose jurisdiction is exclusively limited to try violations of the above-mentioned provisions of this Act.

Persons charged under the provisions of this Act and witnesses shall be allowed to remotely appear and provide testimonies through the use of video-conferencing and such other technology now known or may hereafter be known to science as approved by the Supreme Court.

SEC. 54. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – The ATC and the DOJ, with the active participation of police and military institutions, shall promulgate the rules and regulations for the effective implementation of this Act within ninety (90) days after its effectivity. They shall ensure the full dissemination of such rules and regulations to both Houses of Congress, and all officers and members of various law enforcement agencies.

SEC. 55. Separability Clause. – If for any reason any part or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, the other parts or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall remain and continue to be in full force and effect.

SEC. 56. Repealing Clause. – Republic Act No. 9372, otherwise known as the “Human Security Act of 2007”, is hereby repealed. All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules or regulations or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.

SEC. 57. Saving Clause. – All judicial decisions and orders issued, as well as pending actions relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9372, otherwise known as the “Human Security Act of 2007”, prior to its repeal shall remain valid and effective.

SEC. 58. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO Speaker of the House of Representatives

VICENTE C. SOTTO III President of the Senate

This Act was passed by the Senate of the Philippines as Senate Bill No. 1083 on February 26, 2020, and adopted by the House of Representatives as an amendment to House Bill No. 6875 on June 5, 2020, respectively.

JOSE LUIS G. MONTALES Secretary General House of Representatives

MYRA MARIE D. VILLARICA Secretary of the Senate

Approved: July 03, 2020

RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE President of the Philippines

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VERA FILES FACT SHEET: Mga kailangan mong malaman tungkol sa panukalang anti-terrorism bill ng Senado

Basahin sa Ingles

Ipinasa ng Senado sa third at final reading noong Peb. 26 ang Senate Bill 1083 , o “Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020,” isang panukala na naglalayong i-update at ipawalang-bisa ang ilang mga probisyon ng Human Security Act ( HSA ) at “ palakasin ” ang kakayahan ng bansa na labanan ang terorismo.

Labinsiyam na mga senador ang bumoto pabor sa panukalang batas; tanging mga senador ng minorya na sina Francis “Kiko” Pangilinan at Risa Hontiveros ang bumoto laban dito. Sa pagpapaliwanag ng kanyang boto, sinabi ni Pangilinan na ang mga pagbabago sa HSA ay “nakakabahala” at maaaring gamitin ang batas na “isang mas masamang kasangkapan sa panunupil, sa halip na isang instrumento para hadlangan ang mga terorista,” habang si Hontiveros, sa isang pakikipanayam sa media, ay nagsabing ang “demokratiko kalayaan “ay hindi dapat isakripisyo “sa pangalan ng seguridad.”

Paano naiiba ang iminungkahing Anti-Terrorism law ng Senado sa HSA? Narito ang tatlong bagay na kailangan mong malaman:

1. Pinalalawak ng panukalang batas ang kahulugan ng terrorist acts.

Ang HSA, na ipinatupad noong 2007, ay tumutukoy sa terorismo bilang paglabag sa ilang mga probisyon ng Revised Penal Code — tulad ng piracy, paghihimagsik, insureksyon, kudeta, murder, kidnapping at serious illegal detention — para sa layuning maghasik ng “malawak at pambihirang takot at panic “sa mga tao upang “pilitin ang pamahalaan na bumigay sa kahilingang labag sa batas.” (Tingnan ang VERA FILES FACT SHEET: Bakit peligroso ang ‘red-tagging’ )

Sa ilalim ng Anti-Terrorism bill, sa kabilang banda, ang terorismo ay pagsasagawa ng mga tao sa loob o labas ng bansa ng ilang mga pagkilos, “anuman mang yugto ng pagsasakatuparan,” para matakot ang buo, o isang seksyon ng publiko, at lumikha ng isang “kapaligirang saklot ng takot” upang:

• pukawin o impluwensyahan [sa pamamagitan ng] pananakot ang pamahalaan o alinman sa mga internasyonal na organisasyon;
• ibagsak o sirain ang mga pangunahing istrukturang pampulitika, pang-ekonomiya, o panlipunan ng bansa;
• lumikha ng isang pampublikong emergency; o,
• pahinain nang husto ang kaligtasan ng publiko.

Ang mga gawaing ito, na may parusang pagkabilanggo ng habang buhay na walang parole, ay:

Pinalawak rin ng panukalang batas ang mga uri ng kasong terorismo:

Ang ilan sa mga pagkilos na ito ay dati nang isinasaalang-alang bilang paunang mga krimen sa terorismo at hindi mismo mga gawaing terorista. Sinabi ni Sen. Panfilo “Ping” Lacson, ang sponsor ng panukalang batas, na ang panukalang batas ay naging mas “proactive” at “direkta” dahil sa pag-alis ng mga predicate na krimen.

2. Pinalawig ng panukalang batas ang panahon ng detensyon ng pinaghihinalaang terorista matapos maaresto ng walang warrant at tinanggal ang P500,000 na multa para sa mga nagkakamaling mga opisyal.

Sa ilalim ng HSA, ang isang tao na naaresto nang walang warrant dahil sa terorismo ay maaaring makulong nang maximum na tatlong araw, at dapat na iharap, bago ang detensyon, sa pinakamalapit na hukom, na magpapasya kung ang suspek ay dumaan sa alinman sa pisikal, moral o psychological na pagpapahirap, bukod sa iba pang mga gawain.

Ang pagkabigo na palayain ang suspek sa tamang oras o iharap ang mga ito sa hukom ay magreresulta sa parusang pagkabilanggo sa loob ng 10 hanggang 12 taon.

Ang Sec. 29 ng panukalang batas, sa kabilang banda, ay naglalayong palawakin ang mga araw ng pagkakulong sa 14, na maaaring pahabain ng 10 pang araw, kung kinakailangan, upang mapanatili ang katibayan, maiwasan ang darating na pag-atake ng terorista, o maayos na magtapos ang pagsisiyasat.

Hindi nito isinama ang probisyon na nag-uutos sa mga tagapagpatupad ng batas na iharap ang pinaghihinalaang terorista sa pinakamalapit na hukom bago ikulong. Ang pagpapanatili sa suspek ng higit sa 14 na araw nang walang mga kondisyon para sa extension ay may parusa ng 10 taong pagkakabilanggo.

Ang parehong mga panukala ay nagbibigay ng mga karapatan sa nakulong, kabilang ang isang logbook sa mga pamamaraan at mga bisita ng nakakulong, ang kanilang karapatan na magkaroon ng abugado, ang kanilang karapatan sa privacy, at ang kanilang mga karapatan sa pagtanggap ng bisita.

Ang panukalang batas, gayunpaman, ay tinanggal ang probisyon tungkol sa danyos para sa hindi napatunayang kaso ng terorismo sa ilalim ng Sec. 50 ng HSA, na nagbibigay sa sinumang inaakusahan at hindi napatunayan na terorista ng P500,000 para sa bawat araw na ginugol sa detensyon. Sinabi ni Lacson na ang probisyon na ito ang dahilan ng pag-aatubili ng mga tagapagpatupad ng batas na magsampa ng mga kaso batay sa HSA dahil sa takot na magbayad ng multa.

3. Ang panukalang batas ay nagpapalawak ng panahon na maaaring subaybayan ang komunikasyon ng isang tao.

Kasalukuyang pinapayagan ng HSA nang hanggang 30 araw na pagsubaybay sa mga komunikasyon sa telepono ng suspek, kung may probable cause at ang tagapagpatupad ng batas o mga tauhan ng militar ay nakakuha ng permiso mula sa Court of Appeals. Ang panahon ng pag wiretap ay maaaring mapalawig o ma renew ng hindi hihigit sa 30 araw kung ang kaso ay para sa interes ng publiko at ang orihinal na aplikante ay humingi ng pahintulot para dito.

Ang Sec. 16 ng anti-terrorism bill, sa kabilang banda, ay pinalawak ang orihinal na 30-araw hanggang 60 araw, ngunit pinapanatili ang panahon at mga kinakailangan para sa isang extension.

Sa parehong mga kaso, ang mga komunikasyon sa pagitan ng mga abogado at kliyente, mga doktor at mga pasyente, mamamahayag at pinagkukunan ng impormasyon, at kumpidensyal na sulat kaugnay ng negosyo ay hindi pinapayagan na ma-record.

Mga Pinagmulan

Senate of the Philippines, Senate OKs bill repealing the Anti-Terrorism Law , Feb. 26, 2020

Senate of the Philippines, Senate Bill No. 1083

Official Gazette, Republic Act No. 9372

Interaksyon, Questions, fears over ‘human rights violations’ as Senate OKs new Anti Terrorism bill , Feb. 28, 2020

Senate of the Philippines, Explanation of No Vote of Sen. Francis “Kiko” Pangilinan on Senate Bill No. 1083 , Feb. 26, 2020

ANC 24/7, Anti-terrorism act may be used to target groups expressing dissent, says Hontiveros | Headstart , Feb. 27, 2020

National Union of Peoples’ Lawyers official Facebook page, Press Statement on the Passage of Senate Bill No. 1083 , Feb. 28, 2020

Senate of the Philippines, Sotto: Anti-Terror Act , Feb. 27, 2020

Panfilo ‘Ping’ Lacson, Interview on DZBB: Proactive na Tayo vs Terorismo, Feb. 28, 2020

Panfilo ‘Ping’ Lacson, Kapihan sa Senado forum, Feb. 27, 2020

(Ginagabayan ng code of principles ng International Fact-Checking Network sa Poynter, ang VERA Files ay sumusubaybay sa mga maling pahayag, flip-flops, nakaliligaw na mga pahayag ng mga pampublikong opisyal at kilalang personalidad, at pinasisinungalingan ang mga ito gamit ang tunay na ebidensya. Alamin ang inisyatibong ito at aming pamamaraan .)

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Vera files fact check: pahayag ni roque na ‘hindi hiningi’ ni duterte ang anti-terror bill nangangailangan ng konteksto; mali sa pagsasabi na naipasa ng senado ang panukalang batas sa nakaraang kongreso.

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Social media, bakit mahalaga ang anti-terror law.

Napirmahan na po ni Pangulong Rodrigo Duterte bilang batas ang Republic Act 11479 o ang Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 nitong Biyernes, July 3 matapos ang masusing pag-aaral ng mga abugado ng gobyerno.

Maituturing pong isa ito sa mga naging tampok na pangyayari sa unang linggo ng Hulyo dahil matagal itong inabangan ng maraming Pilipino.

Ang paglagda po ni Pangulo Duterte sa Anti-Terrorism Law ay isa pong patunay na seryoso ang kanyang administrasyon na matuldukan ang terorismo na matagal ng nagdudulot ng kaguluhan at karahasan sa bansa na ang mga biktima ay mga inosenteng Pilipino.

Isa po ang Pilipinas sa mga bansang nakakaranas ng terorismo. Patunay dito ang pagkakalagay ng bansa sa listahan ng Global Terrorism Index of 2019, dahilan kaya naman pursigedo ang Duterte administration na mawakasan na ito .

Sa pamamagitan po ng bagong nilagdaang batas, aasahan ang mga mas pinaigting na mekanismong ilalatag ng gobyerno para mahadlangan ang mga banta at mga pagtatangka ng mga terorista sa sambayanan kabilang na po ang mga dayuhang terorista na nagtatangkang magtatag ng kanilang lokal na grupo sa ating bansa.

May mga safeguards po ang bagong Anti-Terror Law na titiyak sa karapatang pantao at laban sa pang-aabuso.

Sinisiguro ko po na ang aking tanggapan, ang Presidential Communications Operations Office (PCOO) ay makikipagtulungan sa lahat ng ahensiya ng gobyerno para matugunan ang problema sa terorismo ng hindi malalabag ang karapatang pantao at rule of law.

Mayroon po tayong dating batas kontra-terorismo, subalit may mga butas ito kaya nabuo ang bagong Anti-Terror Act of 2020 para mas lalong bigyan ng ngipin ang paglaban sa mga terorista at tiyaking mapanagot ang mga ito sa kanilang mga kasalanang nagawa sa mamamayan at sa bansa.

Marami ang kontra sa bagong batas na ito dahil sa paniwala ng ilang grupo at oposisyon na gagamitin ito ng Duterte administration laban sa mga kritiko ng gobyerno. Pero walang batayan ang kanilang paniniwala laban sa Anti-Terror Law.

Batay po sa depenisyon, ang terorismo ay isang aksiyon ng isang tao o grupo sa loob o labas ng Pilipinas na ang layunin ay pumatay at magdulot ng matinding pinsala o maglagay sa panganib sa buhay ng isang tao o kaya ay manira ng mga pasilidad ng gobyerno o ng pribadong ari-arian sa pamamagitan ng mga armas, pampasabog, biologocal , nuclear , radiological o chemical weapons.

Wala pong pinipiling lugar, oras at araw ang mga terorista sa kanilang paghahasik ng karahasan kaya ito ang nais ng gobyerno na mahadlangan para sa kaligtasan at seguridad ng mga Pilipino.

Para po mas maintindihan ng mamamayan ang bagong batas, bibigyan ko po kayo ng mga halimbawa ng mga malalagim na kaganapan sa bansa na kagagawan ng mga terorista.

Isa na rito ang Marawi Siege kung saan sinakop ng mga terorista ang maunlad na lungsod ng Marawi, at winasak ang buong siyudad kasabay ang pagwasak sa buhay at ari-arian ng libo-libong mamamayan nito. Daan-daang sundalo at sibilyan ang nagbuwis ng buhay dahil sa kagagawang ito ng mga terorista.

Sa lungsod po ni Pangulong Duterte sa Davao City, ilang mga pag-atake po ang ginawa ng mga terorista na nagresulta sa pagkamatay ng maraming sibilyan. Kabilang na po dito ang pambobomba sa Davao airport noong 2003, pagpapasabog sa St. Peter’s Cathedral, pagpapasabog sa Sasa Wharf at noong 2016 bago pa lamang nakakaupo si Pangulong Duterte ay inatake ng mga terorista ang Night Market sa Davao City.

Bukod pa ito sa mga insidente ng karahasan at suicide bombing sa mga lugar ng Basilan, Sulu at Tawi Tawi.

Bakit ko po inisa-isa ang mga insidenteng ito? Para po malaman ng mga tao kung gaano kalala ang pinsalang dinulot ng mga terorista sa buhay ng mga pamilyang nawalan ng mahal sa buhay dahil sa kanilang mga ginagawa.

Hinihikayat ko po ang buong sambayanan na tumulong at suportahan ang adhikain ng gobyerno para magapi ang terorismo at magkaroon ng isang ligtas at mapayapang Pilipinas.

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Philippines

Terrorism in the Philippines in 2020

Siddharth Anil Nair analyses data gathered by IPCS’ Southeast Asia Research Programme for a project mapping the pandemic's social, political, security, and economic impact across the region

By the first quarter of 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had created conditions for greater population control and surveillance, allowing Southeast Asian states seeking to dismantle terror groups (TG) the opportunity to do so. While the pandemic had forced TGs to cease high-intensity operations (HIO), they were able to reconsolidate capabilities for such operations in the future.

New data gathered by IPCS’ Southeast Asia Research Programme for a project mapping the impact of the pandemic on various social, political, and economic issues in the region, allows a more rounded assessment of terrorism in the Philippines through 2020. Given that the project is evolving in real-time, the data collected so far indicates that the pandemic had a transient impact on terror operations; with a first quarter lull followed by an escalatory third quarter peak.

Terror and Counter-terror

The immediate impact of the pandemic, i.e. limits on movement, forced HIOs conducted by regional TGs to come to a standstill in the first quarter of the year. As a result, they turned to the online world to expand communications and recruitment operations. This in turn increased the number of low-intensity terror operations (LIO) in the Philippines –beheadings, drive-by shootings, and kidnappings.

Even the ceasefires like those announced by the government and the New People’s Army (NPA) in March 2020 simply stayed inevitable fighting. Immediately after the ceasefire deadline, NPA attacks on military and police patrols had resumed, e.g in April, NPA militants ambushed and killed Philippine Army (PA) soldiers in Aurora.

Some groups, like the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), were not afforded the ‘ceasefire treatment’. In March, a PA force was mobilised to Maguindanao to ‘pre-empt’ terror attacks. A week into the campaign, PA troops conducted a raid against BIFF militants resulting in massive casualties on both sides. Similarly, ASG militants were subject to seek-and-destroy and raid missions, with a number of open fighting events taking place across Sulu. In one instance, PA troops engaged close to 40 ASG militants in Patikul, resulting in the deaths of 11 militants and 14 soldiers.

PA missions remain focused on culling militant leadership and to some degree, these operations were successful. In June, PA troops searching for a BIFF commander were successful in neutralising militants and capturing him in Sultan Kudarat. Other operations were not as successful. An August raid to capture an ASG bomb expert resulted in the arrest of his supporters, but he was able to escape the security cordon – twice . Only two weeks after his escape, Jolo witnessed a twin bombing –a motorcycle bomb and a suicide attack –that killed 14 and injured 74.

Between these high-intensity attacks, TGs continued to carry out LIOs. In January, unknown perpetrators assassinated a retired police general in Pangasinan. In May, BIFF militants killed a government official in Maguindanao. Kidnappings , like those of Indonesian fishermen near Tawi-Tawi island, continued throughout the year.

2020: The Nature of Conflict in the Philippines

Terror and counter-terror operations rose in 2020 as compared to 2019. However, it would be incorrect to say that terror-based conflict in the Philippines in 2020 was of a low-intensity. Importantly, the proportion of LIOs remained lower than HIOs. The number of terror events also began to increase in the second quarter of the year.

Southeast Asian responses to the pandemic have been highly ‘securitised’. The need to fill-in immediate logistical and capability gaps such as population control, surveillance, and distribution brought security institutions in closer contact with civilian areas. In an environment already characterised by terrorism, best exemplified by the 2017 battle for Marawi, this contact was simply reinforced.

Similarly, Islamist TGs have invoked the pandemic as ‘divine intervention’ ; a diversion and punishment provided to continue to wage jihad against non-believers. ISIS-affiliates in Southeast Asia, now bolstered by the repatriation of fighters from Syria-Iraq, and following the fall of Raqqa, have taken over from their West Asian counterparts. With the fundamentalist conception of ‘Dar-e-Islam’ being set back, Southeast Asia has become the focus of global Islamist terror. ISIS-conceived provinces in the east may still remain a goal for TGs in the Philippines. Also, ongoing online recruitment and propaganda operations may have led to greater manpower, thus allowing more HIOs.

While indigenous Islamist TGs have not turned to social movements as a substitute for terror operations like their Indonesian counterparts, communist rebels, specifically the NPA, were more amenable to humanitarian calls for ceasefires, and even set up “humanitarian corridors” to allow the passage of COVID-19 aid. This isn't to say however that communist TGs, unlike Islamist groups, did not view the pandemic as an opportunity .

One question requires further data: who initiated these incidents? The answer can clarify whether terror or counter-terror operations increased in 2020. Available data suggests a 50:50 split; certain significant events, such as the August raid in Manila, have been noted as initiated by the PA. However, the presence of numerous ‘gun-battles’, ‘clashes’, ‘ambushes’ and ‘open-fighting’ cases blur the line for an accurate conclusion of whose operations were ultimately higher in number.

2020 was a peak year for terrorism in the Philippines: both HIOs and LIOs rose in number. State actors had an upper hand in mobilising and posturing forces before TGs. The pandemic also forced TGs to operate in a more lateral manner. While HIOs were ‘absent’ in the first quarter of 2020, its peak in the third quarter was comparable to—if not more than—its 2019 peak. In other words, the pandemic had a transient impact on terror operations in the Philippines last year.

Siddharth Anil Nair is Research Assistant with IPCS’ Southeast Asia Research Programme (SEARP).

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Terror in PH: Fewer deaths, softer impact seen

COMPOSITE IMAGE: JEROME CRISTOBAL FROM INQ FILE/STOCK PHOTOS

MANILA, Philippines—As stressed by the government in 2020, “terrorism is a grave challenge to security and the human rights of individuals; it leaves destruction of societies and lives in its wake.”

This was the reason that as the Philippines is still considered highly impacted by terrorism despite its improvement in the 2023 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), the government committed to having the country removed from the list of terrorism-affected countries.

Based on the GTI, which is produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), the Philippines improved its rank from 16th in 2021 to 18th in 2022 after having an overall score of 6.328, slightly lower than the previous 6.79.

GRAPHIC: Ed Lustan

As the IEP explained, the GTI scores each country on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 represents no impact from terrorism and 10 represents the highest measurable impact of terrorism.

This was “welcome[d] with great enthusiasm and optimism” by the National Security Council (NSC), which stressed the Philippines’ improved ranking compared to being among the top 10 countries worst affected by terrorism several years ago.

As stated by the IEP in the 2019 GTI, the Philippines was 13th most affected by terrorism in 2002, 8th in 2003, 10th in 2004, 12th in 2005, 14th in 2006, 12th in 2007, 8th in 2008, 9th in 2009, 9th in 2010, 10th in 2011, 11th in 2012, 9th in 2013, 11th in 2014, 12th in 2015 and 2016, 10th in 2017, 9th in 2018, and 10th in 2019.

It said “such notoriety, according to the same reports, was due to the atrocities mostly committed by the communist terrorist group New People’s Army and armed groups affiliated with known international terrorist organizations,” the NSC said.

‘Lowest level’

The IEP said the Philippines had its “lowest level” of terrorism since the inception of the GTI, having only 20 attacks and 18 deaths in 2022, a fall of 68 percent and 65 percent, respectively, compared to 2021.

Providing a comprehensive study of key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last decade, the calculation of the GTI score considers not only deaths but also incidents, hostages and injuries from terrorism, weighted over a five-year period.

The IEP also said the Philippines was one of the few countries that saw the largest decrease in the number of deaths from terrorism, next to India, Syria, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Iraq, Niger, and Afghanistan.

The Philippines, based on the GTI, saw 33 fewer deaths in 2022 compared to 2021. Afghanistan, meanwhile, had the most decrease at 866 fewer deaths, reversing 3 years of consecutive increases.

But despite the Philippines improving in its ranking, the IEP said it remains second worst affected by terrorism in Asia and the Pacific, next only to Myanmar, which was ranked 9th in the Index after having an overall score of 9.977.

The IEP said eight countries in Asia and the Pacific improved in 2022, while three deteriorated. This resulted in the impact of terrorism falling in the Asia-Pacific region for the fourth consecutive year.

This, as eight countries showed no change in score last year, while Myanmar (9.977), Japan (2.398) and Indonesia (5.502) were the only countries in the region to record a deterioration in the impact of terrorism over the past year.

“Overall, the region improved by nine percent within the last year, the fifth largest improvement of all the regions in 2022. The average impact of terrorism in the region is now at its lowest level since 2013,” the IEP said.

‘Waning insurgency’

As explained by the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, in late 2021, then President Rodrigo Duterte signed a law extending the transition period of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao until 2025.

“This has been seen as a positive move by grantees, given the slow rate of promised change in the region. A longer transition is seen as more likely to herald more inclusive representation,” it said.

READ: Anti-Terror Law constitutional except for two parts, says SC

Likewise, the NSC said “the Philippine government is on the right track and by that we shall continue all counterinsurgency efforts we started years back, focusing mainly on our local peace initiatives and good governance espoused by the NTF-ELCAC.”

The NTF-ELCAC, or the National Task Force Against Local Communist Armed Conflict, was established in 2018 to implement a whole-of-nation approach in achieving “inclusive and sustainable peace.”

The improvement in the GTI, it said, is a testament to the government’s unrelenting resolve to address the root causes of insurgency through the implementation of landmark measures, which include these:

• Bangsamoro Organic Law
• Creation of the NTF-ELCAC through Executive Order No. 70
• Aggressive campaign in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
• Anti-Terrorism Act

READ: ‘I don’t care about human rights’: Duterte and the failure to see human rights’ role in progress

Consequences of gov’t war vs terrorism.

However, these measures have consequences, rights group Karapatan said in its term-ender report that was published on Tuesday (April 18), detailing how Duterte “left an indelible legacy of impunity and a massive human rights crisis.”

It said while Duterte’s Oplan Kapanatagan merely adopted the previous administrations’ “whole-of-nation” approach, this was made more systematic, insidious and thorough with the institutionalization of NTF-ELCAC.

“Through its clusters, the NTF-ELCAC became the main machinery in a dangerous campaign of rabid red-tagging, vilification and harassment targeting activists, human rights defenders, environmentalists, peasant organizers, unionists, indigenous leaders, lawyers, and church workers by publicly vilifying them and their organizations as so-called ‘fronts’ of ‘communist-terrorist’ groups,” Karapatan said.

READ: Badoy says red-tagging not dangerous but 427 slain activists show otherwise

It stressed that the government made no distinction between actual combatants in the underground armed resistance and activists in the open legal democratic movement.

“This non-distinction was used as an excuse to attack leaders and members

of people’s organizations, progressive party-list groups, and vocal critics of the government.”

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From July 2016 to June 2022, 422 activists had fallen victims to extrajudicial killings, Karapatan said, with Bicol Region having the highest number of deaths at 64, followed by Southern Mindanao (63), Central Visayas (56), and Western Visayas (54).

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TERRORISM IN THE PHILIPPINES: THREATS AND RESPONSES BEFORE AND AFTER MARAWI SIEGE

2018, published in Marwill N.Llasos and Modesta Apesa H. Chungalao, eds., Perspective on Terrorism in the Philippine Context (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Law Center, 2018), pp. 51-77.

Though terrorism became a catchword after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on the United States, threats of terrorism in the Philippines pre-dated 9/11. In fact, terrorist personalities working for the Al-Qaeda planned the 9/11 attacks in the Philippines as early as the mid-1990s. These terrorist personalities established a very strong support network of local and foreign terrorist fighters used eventually by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the siege of Marawi City on May 2017. This paper presents a brief historical background of terrorist threats in the Philippines and how these pre-existing terrorist threats immensely contributed to the 9/11 attacks and subsequent violent attacks in the Philippines after 9/11. This paper also describes some responses of the Philippine government to terrorist threats after 9/11, particularly in the context of Marawi siege of 2017. This paper concludes with an analysis of continuing threats of terrorism in the Philippines.

Related Papers

SSRN Electronic Journal

Dion Lorenz Romano

Last June 1, 2020, President Duterte certified the Anti-Terrorism Bill as urgent. Subsequently, Congress adopted the Senate version and passed it in the shortest time possible. The bill was intended to provide measures for the protection of the ordinary Filipino from acts of terrorism, and should have been with support and approval under normal circumstances. But this time is far from normal, and the bill has attracted opposition not only from the left, but from a broader sector of society. This brings us to these questions: what were the compelling reasons to certify the bill as more urgent than say, the extension of the extraordinary powers of the President to address the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the ordinary Filipino and our economy? Is the bill aligned with our constitution? Will it solve the domestic security problems festering for decades? What drives the objections against the bill? But perhaps the most disturbing concern among most members of society – do we have ...

International Affairs Review

Anushka Kapahi

Kristina Sherman

Rommel Banlaoi

Threats of narcoterrorism have received very serious attention in the Philippine when the Philippine government under the administration of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte vigorously raised the menace in the aftermath of the 2 September 2016 Davao City bombing and the 23 May 2017 Marawi City siege. Though narcoterrorism has been a global problem since the 1980s, it takes almost four decades for the Philippine government to realize the gravity of this threat only in the aftermath of the siege of Marawi City by armed groups claiming to be part of the Islamic State (IS), more known initially as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). As a result, the Duterte Administration securitized narcoterrorism in his National Security Policy 2017-2022 and National Security Strategy 2018 declaring drugs and terrorism as national security threats. As a concept, narcoterrorism remains to be very nebulous. As a threat, it arguably presents panoply of complex security challenges for law enforcement not only for the Philippines but also for the international community. Other countries have been combating narcoterrorism for years with mixed results and unintended consequences. Based on great lessons learned from exemplary practices of other countries and cognizant of the Philippines’ own unique situations and experiences, the Duterte government needs to develop a more humane and socially responsible innovative anti-narcoterrorism approach that applies not only a strong law enforcement but also a decisive treatment through rehabilitation and care.

Verity: Jurnal Ilmiah Hubungan Internasional (International Relations Journal)

Rachel Kumendong

Since 2014, the Islamic State (IS) has emerged as one of the deadliest threats to world peace and security, as evidenced by the increasing number of terrorist attacks carried out by IS worldwide, and the number of fatalities caused by these attacks. IS established its strongholds in Iraq and Syria and is determined to create a global caliphate through the creation of IS wilayats across the world. In 2016, IS began to weaken and lose territory in the Middle East which resulted in it strengthening its power in Southeast Asia by forming a wilayat in the Southern Philippines.The presence of IS in the Philippines has been perceived as a national security threat in the country. President Rodrigo Duterte has formulated a national strategy to combat global terrorism in the country. This study aims to determine the strategy to eradicate global terrorism in the Philippines and explain the considerations behind the formation of that strategy. This research uses neoclassical realist perspective...

IJASS PUBLICATION

IJASS JOURNAL

Terrorism is often used as a means to achieve political goals, power, religious interests, and other similar ends. Terrorism is a form of threat that can lead to acts of violence, destruction, and chaos as a violation of the law generally carried out in a targeted and planned manner. The Philippines is one of the countries that has become a strategic target for terrorist acts. The threat of the theoretical group cannot be separated from the condition of the Philippine government which is not yet structurally and intellectually strong in dealing with this threat. In this paper, the author wants to examine the form of the threat of terrorism which is a serious nuisance to the security of the Philippines. So that it can be seen whether the increasing threat of terrorists in the Philippines is in line with the readiness of the government to deal with these threats. This research method uses a qualitative description. By focusing on the existing problems described descriptively, namely by using a qualitative method to make descriptive results able to form concepts in the form of more objective results. The short result of the research is that the largest terrorist group in the Philippines is Abu Sayyaf. As the seeds of terrorism in the Philippines started from the struggle of the Moro nation in seeking asylum for independence, it changed from an Islamic political movement, namely the National Liberation Front (MNLF) and then in the 80s it split into a more radical Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and that utilized by the ASG group (Abu Sayyaf Group). Both the MNLF and MILF deny ties to the Abu Sayyaf group. The two have officially distanced themselves because of his attacks on civilians and his alleged profiteering.

IAG and GCERF

This paper contends that in the aftermath of the Marawi siege, suicide terrorism has become the most favored means of attack by pro-IS fighters in the Philippines, particularly those associated with the ASG. This paper presents historical factors that give rise to suicide terrorism in the Philippines. It also examines the emergence of suicide terrorism in the Philippines culminating in the 2020 Jolo twin bombings. This paper also describes the persistent threats of suicide terrorism in the Philippines that can be addressed by innovative measures like preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE).

IPAC Reports

Sidney Jones

The latest report by the IPAC team examines the Jolo bombing and what it shows us about the state of leadership, capacity and organisation of the pro-ISIS elements that took over Marawi. It also explores the issue of foreign fighters in Mindanao. It argues that the most important counter-terrorism measure the government and donors can take is to ensure the success of the new autonomous region, BARMM.

Joanie Chung-Yin Yeung

The Philippines have seen some of the deadliest and most persistent armed insurgencies in Asia. The government’s counter-insurgency programs, mainly started under the Marcos administration in the 1960s, have faced tremendous challenges from various Islamic insurgent groups, namely the MNLF, MILF and the ASG (Abu Sayyaf). This thesis examines the major strengths and weaknesses of the government’s counter-insurgent policies from the 1960s to the present day. It will first explore its weaknesses: the problem of legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the Filipino Muslims due to its historical colonial legacies and its inability to safeguard Muslim communities from socio-economic backwardness and violent outbreaks which have repeatedly jeopardized the government’s efforts. The essay will then examine the strengths and prospects of the counter-insurgent strategies by looking at the consistency the government’s goal over the decades as well as its ability to win over numerous insurgents and the importance of exploiting the divisions among the groups.

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The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 – Why it matters

Last February 26, 2020, the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines approved on its third and final reading Senate Bill 1083 also known as the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020. Once enacted into law, it will repeal the Human Security Act (HSA) of 2007. More recently, the House of Representatives adopted the Senate version and has approved the same in just a matter of days following President Rodrigo Duterte’s declaration of its urgency. 

According to proponents, the bill will provide a strong legal backbone to support the government’s criminal justice response to terrorism. The Department of National Defense (DND) expressed its full support of the passage of the law which it says will empower defenders of the state to protect the Filipino people against those who aim to inflict harm. 

Critics are saying that the bill has many questionable provisions and that the timing appears off given the current problems brought about by the pandemic. 

Among the more vocal critics is Senator Francis Pangilinan who expressed concerns that some of the provisions of the bill may impinge on rights and liberty. He also noted that the definition of terrorism under the bill is vague and encompassing, which may allow abuses on the part of errant officials.

The National Union of People’s Lawyers (NUPL) said in a statement that the bill “criminalizes acts which have traditionally been considered legitimate exercises of free speech, freedom of expression, the right of peaceful assembly, and freedom of association.”

Citing experiences from other countries, Amnesty International Philippines explained that most counter-terrorism initiatives have disproportionately curtailed freedoms of expression and association, liberty and movement as well as the right to privacy. 

Then there are groups who say that the Senate did not do enough consultations with the private sector as they deliberated on the bill. This may be of serious concern to the private sector as there are many terrorist acts directed at businesses especially large multinational corporations.

For the past weeks, we have seen a lot of online discussions and movements on the ground in protest of the bill. In case you have not been paying attention because you feel this is not something that may affect you, we’ve compiled some of the things about the bill that you may want to know.

• One of the much discussed sections of the bill is the provision on imposing life imprisonment without parole for those who will be found to have proposed, incited, conspired, and participated in the planning, training, preparation, and facilitation of a terrorist act, including those who provide material support to terrorists. 
• The bill also penalizes with 12 years of imprisonment, those who will be found to have threatened to commit terrorism, proposed any terrorist acts, or incited others to commit terrorism. This also includes those who will be found to have been accessory in the commission of terrorism. 
• Likewise, those who will be found to have voluntarily or knowingly joined any organization, association, or group of persons known to be a terrorist group or organization shall be subject to the same penalty of 12 years of imprisonment. 

To read the full text of the bill go to: https://www.senate.gov.ph/lis/bill_res.aspx?congress=18&q=SBN-1083

Sources: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_Security_Act https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/The-Philippines-Anti-Terrorism-Act-of-2020-Five-things-to-know https://verafiles.org/articles/vera-files-fact-sheet-what-you-need-know-about-senates-anti

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Terrorism in the Philippines and U.S.-Philippine security cooperation

Subscribe to the center for asia policy studies bulletin, sheena chestnut greitens sheena chestnut greitens former brookings expert, associate professor, lbj school of public affairs - university of texas at austin @sheenagreitens.

August 15, 2017

• 14 min read

This commentary is adapted from the author’s Congressional testimony at the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific hearing, “ Black Flags over Mindanao ,” on July 12, 2017.

Events of the past few months—in particular, the prolonged standoff in Marawi, Mindanao—have significantly increased concerns about terrorist activity in the southern Philippines, and in Southeast Asia more broadly. The shape and focus of the U.S.-Philippine alliance has already been somewhat in flux with the ascension of relatively new leadership in both countries —Rodrigo Duterte having assumed the Philippine presidency in the middle of 2016 and Donald Trump’s inauguration in the United States taking place in early 2017. The evolution of the terrorist threat in the region emphasizes the importance of a productive, cooperative security relationship between the two countries. Accordingly, this commentary outlines six policy recommendations for how the United States should adapt its security cooperation with the Philippines to address the region’s changing security and counterterrorism needs.

The importance of the Philippines and Southeast Asia

The Philippines is important to American national security and foreign policy in Asia. The country is a former U.S. colony with deep historical and cultural ties to the United States, the world’s 12th largest country by population, a lively democracy, and the region’s fastest-growing economy with a robust trade and investment relationship with the United States. Since signing the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1951, the Philippines has been one of the United States’ two treaty allies in Southeast Asia. Regionally, it is one of our most important security partners in the Asia-Pacific, as the U.S. has sought to expand cooperation throughout the region, including with Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam.

There are two attributes of the U.S.-Philippine security relationship that distinguish it from most American security partnerships in East Asia. First, the Philippines has a complicated security environment , encompassing significant internal challenges. The country is a 7,000-island archipelago, much of it low-lying and especially vulnerable to natural disasters such as typhoons. This places significant demand on the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations. Throughout the Philippines’ history, it has also dealt with domestic challenges related to crime, militancy, piracy, and terrorism—including the world’s longest-running communist insurgency by the New People’s Army (NPA) as well as a decades-long Muslim separatist movement in Mindanao, the southernmost large island in the country with the  world’s third-largest Catholic population. The high salience of internal security challenges is relatively unusual among the United States’ treaty allies and partners in Asia.

As a result, the Philippines has long placed a heavy emphasis on internal security issues and capabilities. During the Cold War, the United States guaranteed the Philippines’ external security via the Mutual Defense Treaty, projecting power in Asia from the Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station; the AFP focused primarily on internal security. Under the previous president, Benigno Aquino III, the Philippines had begun to shift its focus toward external defense, embarking on a defense modernization program that, among other things, started the process of moving the land-heavy AFP toward more air and maritime capabilities. Aquino also pursued international arbitration to challenge Chinese actions in the South China Sea and increased cooperation with the United States and other regional security partners, such as Japan and Australia, in pursuit of those capabilities. Since assuming the presidency, Duterte has, to varying degrees, pulled back (or threatened to do so) from all of these initiatives—questioning the value of the U.S. alliance and the more recent Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), courting Chinese investment and infrastructure assistance, and declining to press Beijing on its actions in the South China Sea after the arbitration court ruled primarily in Manila’s favor in 2016. Duterte’s focus on internal security, therefore, is a return to the more inward focus that the AFP and Philippine government have traditionally held since 1945.  I will return to that issue in the section below.

Second, the U.S.-Philippine alliance generally functions best when it does so with full awareness of the domestic political dynamics in the Philippines. The Philippines is, by any survey you look at, consistently one of the most pro-American places on earth . There are strong people-to-people ties and broad and stable goodwill toward the United States among the public. Recent and repeated comments by President Rodrigo Duterte about the United States—often using colorful and inflammatory language—have, in the minds of many in Washington, complicated the ability of the United States to formulate and implement effective security cooperation with the Philippines. The difficulty, however, should not be overstated or presented as an issue that is solely to do with Duterte. His statements echo—albeit using very different language—a long tradition of concern on the part of the Philippine left regarding potential U.S. encroachment on Philippine sovereignty, and vacillation on just how closely Manila should tie itself to Washington. That same nationalistic sentiment contributed to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Philippine bases in the early 1990s (along with the volcanic eruption at Mt. Pinatubo), and that propelled activists to successfully advocate for the Philippine constitution to explicitly forbid permanent foreign military bases, meaning that American forces rotate through under a Visiting Forces Agreement signed in 1999. The 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement expanded the number of facilities available to that rotational presence, including Lumbia Airfield in Cayagan de Oro in Mindanao . These domestic political dynamics are important to navigate carefully—but they do not make the alliance unmanageable.

Recent changes in the Philippines’ security environment

During the past two decades, American security cooperation with the Philippines has focused primarily on counterterrorism or maritime security. From 2002 to 2015, the United States deployed several hundred special operations personnel to the southern Philippines for counterterrorism purposes. The primary focal point of that cooperation, the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTFP), was discontinued in early 2015 after U.S. involvement in a controversial operation, though the United States has, at the request of the Philippine government and military, provided intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and other technical assistance during the recent operations in Marawi.

As tensions have risen in the South China Sea, much of U.S. security cooperation in recent years has focused on maritime security, in keeping with the growing emphasis of the AFP on these missions. As part of this, the U.S. has refocused or added programs aimed at building the Philippines’ naval and coast guard capabilities, as well as strengthening the country’s maritime domain awareness. The United States has also regularly sent ships and personnel to the region for humanitarian missions, such as its assistance after Typhoon Yolanda struck the Philippines in November 2013, and the U.S. military’s ongoing participation in Operation Pacific Angel to deliver humanitarian assistance and training.

Over the course of the past year or so, however, concerns about terrorist activity in Mindanao have increased. These concerns have focused on “black flag” militant groups based in the southern Philippines, which have sworn loyalty to the Islamic State (ISIS) and received recognition from ISIS, and on the threat posed by ISIS-affiliated fighters returning to the region from fighting in the Middle East. In late November 2016, one of these ISIS-linked groups, the Maute group, occupied Butig in Lanao del Sur for five days. Fighting has been prolonged in Marawi, where ISIS-aligned fighters—principally from the Maute group, Abu Sayyaf, and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters—have coordinated to hold parts of the city in an urban siege that has now lasted over two months. At the time of writing, Mindanao has been under martial law for 60 days and the Philippine legislature has granted approval for it to remain so until the end of 2017. Almost 600 people have been killed in the fighting, around a quarter-million civilians have been displaced, and significant parts of the city have been destroyed. The Maute group was suspected of placing a bomb near the U.S. embassy in Manila last November and of bombing President Duterte’s hometown of Davao. The appearance of foreign fighters in Marawi—not just Malaysians and Indonesians, but reportedly also Saudi, Yemeni, and Chechen fighters—raises the possibility that Mindanao will become a central attraction for jihadists unable to travel to the Middle East or attracted to the operational, physical foothold being established in Mindanao. The collapse of a 2014 peace agreement between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has exacerbated this territorial and political challenge, as militants disillusioned with the peace process turn to more radical ISIS-linked organizations instead.

At the same time, concerns about kidnapping-for-ransom operations by the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf in the waters around the southern Philippines have also heightened. Western hostages have been executed when ransom demands were not met, while payments made for other hostages raise concern that these operations help bankroll ISIS-linked militants. The Philippine press reported last fall that Abu Sayyaf, which has pledged allegiance to ISIS, had raised at least $7 million in 2016 from its kidnapping operations. As a result of concerns about security in these waters and the safety of trade between the two countries, Indonesia temporarily suspended shipping and banned coal exports to the Philippines (70 percent of the country’s supply). These kidnapping-for-ransom operations, therefore, are not only a maritime security and law enforcement issue, but a matter for counterterrorism and trade throughout the region.

In short, the emergence of links between militant groups in Mindanao, including a resurgent Abu Sayyaf, and the Islamic State, especially in the context of the collapse of the 2014 peace agreement, led to a significant increase in the counterterrorism threat in the southern Philippines, and pose risks to the trade that passes through the Sulu Sea.

Recommendations for successful security cooperation 

The United States has compelling security interests in active security engagement with the Philippines and its neighbors in Southeast Asia. There are six major ways that existing security cooperation can be adapted to address the evolving terrorist threat.

First, active engagement by both the executive branch and by Congress to signal a U.S. presence, participation in, and commitment to the Philippines can have a real positive impact. Concern about Duterte is understandable, but the Philippines remains strongly pro-American and cognizant of the benefits of a robust security relationship. At present, that engagement can most productively be focused on the bureaucracy, military, legislature, local governments, civil society, and things like continued humanitarian missions that affirm the shared values underpinning the alliance. Broader engagement with ASEAN, including but not limited to a Congressional delegation to the region (including the Philippines), would indicate strong, bipartisan support for the efforts that administration officials have made thus far to signal the importance of the region and outline a vision of the U.S. role in a peaceful, prosperous, and free Asia.

Second, the United States could consider expanding maritime security assistance and continue its efforts to strengthen Philippine maritime domain awareness. Executed well, this has potential to simultaneously improve the Philippine government and military’s ability to address multiple priorities: conducting HA/DR operations, improving law enforcement and counterterrorism capabilities, and boosting external defense. It is important that, even as the Philippines deals with intensifying internal security and terrorist threats, it does not abandon efforts to strengthen its maritime capacities and defenses in the South China Sea. The Philippines received a significant portion of the Maritime Security Initiative’s 2016 funding, and given the exigency of current security needs, it makes sense for that trend to continue. Maritime capacity-building has the additional advantage of focusing on cooperation that doesn’t raise human rights concerns under the Leahy Amendment , and will allow the United States to contribute where security interests overlap, while still voicing strong support for democratic values such as human rights. This will help strike the right balance between recognizing the popular support that Duterte has had thus far, and strongly affirming the shared values upon which today’s alliance is based.

Third, if the Philippines requests it, the United States should be willing to examine options for re-activating formal counterterrorism cooperation with Manila, such as the previous Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines. With the U.S. military already providing technical assistance to the AFP, clearly defining the parameters of American forces’ involvement—insofar as possible given security considerations, of course—and proactively affirming that this presence will be consistent with the Philippine constitution may help avoid domestic sensitivities. It is not necessary or desirable for U.S. counterterrorism assistance to become a political football in Philippine domestic politics. Careful communication will help keep the focus on the important shared interest that our two countries have: preventing ISIS from establishing a physical foothold inside the territory of a U.S. treaty ally in Asia.

Fourth, the United States can support Manila’s efforts to cooperate with other U.S. security partners, including Japan, South Korea, Australia, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The launch of trilateral patrols and information-sharing among Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines in June were an important step to boost regional cooperation on counterterrorism and counter-piracy. Strengthening the Philippines’ naval, coast guard, and maritime law enforcement capability as described above is important to giving this cooperation teeth; partners like Japan, Australia, and South Korea can play an important role, heightening the impact of American assistance.

Fifth, the United States can identify productive forms of economic engagement with the Philippines and Southeast Asia. This includes not just focused trade agreements on travel goods, but efforts to strengthen regional financial tools for combatting terrorism. Like maritime capacity-building measures, these efforts can achieve multiple priorities—such as strengthening the regional financial architecture to counteract North Korea’s money laundering and revenue-generating activities in the region . It will be especially important to proactively limit the flow of funds from ISIS agents in the Middle East into Southeast Asia to limit the growth and operational capabilities of ISIS-affiliated groups. Boosting economic cooperation will also help the Philippines to navigate a dilemma increasingly faced by Washington’s East Asian allies: reliance on the United States for security, but China for economic prosperity.

Sixth, Washington must be thoughtful about, and should monitor closely, the political context in which ISIS-linked terrorism might unnecessarily be able to gain greater traction. There is little question that the collapse of the 2014 peace agreement between the government and the MILF, and the resultant failure to create the Bangsamoro region in Mindanao, have contributed to the splintering of individuals and factions away from the MILF and toward more radical groups. Despite Duterte’s stated support for the Bangsamoro region , it remains to be seen exactly how he—and the majority Catholic legislature—will approach this question, and what success Duterte’s efforts might have in bringing an end to the decades-long conflict in Mindanao. Regionally, the treatment of the Rohingya Muslim population in Myanmar is a grievance that could be a recruitment tool and rallying cry for Islamic militants across Southeast Asia. The Unites States should therefore closely monitor the progress of these issues, and express support for the development of effective, inclusive, long-term solutions to two of the region’s longest-standing points of tension.

The resurgence of terrorist threats in the southern Philippines, and especially the activities of groups with new links to ISIS, has raised new questions about the shape and focus of U.S. security cooperation with the Philippines. In crafting that cooperation, it is helpful for American policymakers to be aware of both the delicate balance between the internal and external security needs that Manila has long had to strike, and the domestic sensitivities that can trip up robust security cooperation. With these factors in mind, there are many areas in which the United States can adjust and strengthen its security cooperation with the Philippines, and can work together with Manila to prevent ISIS from developing a territorial foothold on the soil of a U.S. ally in Asia.

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The Philippines economy in 2024: Stronger for longer?

The Philippines ended 2023 on a high note, being the fastest growing economy across Southeast Asia with a growth rate of 5.6 percent—just shy of the government's target of 6.0 to 7.0 percent. 1 “National accounts,” Philippine Statistics Authority, January 31, 2024; "Philippine economic updates,” Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, November 16, 2023. Should projections hold, the Philippines is expected to, once again, show significant growth in 2024, demonstrating its resilience despite various global economic pressures (Exhibit 1). 2 “Economic forecast 2024,” International Monetary Fund, November 1, 2023; McKinsey analysis.

The growth in the Philippine economy in 2023 was driven by a resumption in commercial activities, public infrastructure spending, and growth in digital financial services. Most sectors grew, with transportation and storage (13 percent), construction (9 percent), and financial services (9 percent), performing the best (Exhibit 2). 3 “National accounts,” Philippine Statistics Authority, January 31, 2024. While the country's trade deficit narrowed in 2023, it remains elevated at $52 billion due to slowing global demand and geopolitical uncertainties. 4 “Highlights of the Philippine export and import statistics,” Philippine Statistics Authority, January 28, 2024. Looking ahead to 2024, the current economic forecast for the Philippines projects a GDP growth of between 5 and 6 percent.

Inflation rates are expected to temper between 3.2 and 3.6 percent in 2024 after ending 2023 at 6.0 percent, above the 2.0 to 4.0 percent target range set by the government. 5 “Nomura downgrades Philippine 2024 growth forecast,” Nomura, September 11, 2023; “IMF raises Philippine growth rate forecast,” International Monetary Fund, July 16, 2023.

For the purposes of this article, most of the statistics used for our analysis have come from a common thread of sources. These include the Central Bank of the Philippines (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas); the Department of Energy Philippines; the IT and Business Process Association of the Philippines (IBPAP); and the Philippines Statistics Authority.

The state of the Philippine economy across seven major sectors and themes

In the article, we explore the 2024 outlook for seven key sectors and themes, what may affect each of them in the coming year, and what could potentially unlock continued growth.

Financial services

The recovery of the financial services sector appears on track as year-on-year growth rates stabilize. 6 Philippines Statistics Authority, November 2023; McKinsey in partnership with Oxford Economics, November 2023. In 2024, this sector will likely continue to grow, though at a slower pace of about 5 percent.

Financial inclusion and digitalization are contributing to growth in this sector in 2024, even if new challenges emerge. Various factors are expected to impact this sector:

• Inclusive finance: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas continues to invest in financial inclusion initiatives. For example, basic deposit accounts (BDAs) reached $22 million in 2023 and banking penetration improved, with the proportion of adults with formal bank accounts increasing from 29 percent in 2019 to 56 percent in 2021. 7 “Financial inclusion dashboard: First quarter 2023,” Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, February 6, 2024.
• Digital adoption: Digital channels are expected to continue to grow, with data showing that 60 percent of adults who have a mobile phone and internet access have done a digital financial transaction. 8 “Financial inclusion dashboard: First quarter 2023,” Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, February 6, 2024. Businesses in this sector, however, will need to remain vigilant in navigating cybersecurity and fraud risks.
• Unsecured lending growth: Growth in unsecured lending is expected to continue, but at a slower pace than the past two to three years. For example, unsecured retail lending for the banking system alone grew by 27 percent annually from 2020 to 2022. 9 “Loan accounts: As of first quarter 2023,” Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, February 6, 2024; "Global banking pools,” McKinsey, November 2023. Businesses in this field are, however, expected to recalibrate their risk profiling models as segments with high nonperforming loans emerge.
• High interest rates: Key interest rates are expected to decline in the second half of 2024, creating more accommodating borrowing conditions that could boost wholesale and corporate loans.

Supportive frameworks have a pivotal role to play in unlocking growth in this sector to meet the ever-increasing demand from the financially underserved. For example, financial literacy programs and easier-to-access accounts—such as BDAs—are some measures that can help widen market access to financial services. Continued efforts are being made to build an open finance framework that could serve the needs of the unbanked population, as well as a unified credit scoring mechanism to increase the ability of historically under-financed segments, such as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), to access formal credit. 10 “BSP launches credit scoring model,” Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, April 26, 2023.

Energy and Power

The outlook for the energy sector seems positive, with the potential to grow by 7 percent in 2024 as the country focuses on renewable energy generation. 11 McKinsey analysis based on input from industry experts. Currently, stakeholders are focused on increasing energy security, particularly on importing liquefied natural gas (LNG) to meet power plants’ requirements as production in one of the country’s main sources of natural gas, the Malampaya gas field, declines. 12 Myrna M. Velasco, “Malampaya gas field prod’n declines steeply in 2021,” Manila Bulletin , July 9, 2022. High global inflation and the fact that the Philippines is a net fuel importer are impacting electricity prices and the build-out of planned renewable energy projects. Recent regulatory moves to remove foreign ownership limits on exploration, development, and utilization of renewable energy resources could possibly accelerate growth in the country’s energy and power sector. 13 “RA 11659,” Department of Energy Philippines, June 8, 2023.

Gas, renewables, and transmission are potential growth drivers for the sector. Upgrading power grids so that they become more flexible and better able to cope with the intermittent electricity supply that comes with renewables will be critical as the sector pivots toward renewable energy. A recent coal moratorium may position natural gas as a transition fuel—this could stimulate exploration and production investments for new, indigenous natural gas fields, gas pipeline infrastructure, and LNG import terminal projects. 14 Philippine energy plan 2020–2040, Department of Energy Philippines, June 10, 2022; Power development plan 2020–2040 , Department of Energy Philippines, 2021. The increasing momentum of green energy auctions could facilitate the development of renewables at scale, as the country targets 35 percent share of renewables by 2030. 15 Power development plan 2020–2040 , 2022.

Growth in the healthcare industry may slow to 2.8 percent in 2024, while pharmaceuticals manufacturing is expected to rebound with 5.2 percent growth in 2024. 16 McKinsey analysis in partnership with Oxford Economics.

Healthcare demand could grow, although the quality of care may be strained as the health worker shortage is projected to increase over the next five years. 17 McKinsey analysis. The supply-and-demand gap in nursing alone is forecast to reach a shortage of approximately 90,000 nurses by 2028. 18 McKinsey analysis. Another compounding factor straining healthcare is the higher than anticipated benefit utilization and rising healthcare costs, which, while helping to meet people's healthcare budgets, may continue to drive down profitability for health insurers.

Meanwhile, pharmaceutical companies are feeling varying effects of people becoming increasingly health conscious. Consumers are using more over the counter (OTC) medication and placing more beneficial value on organic health products, such as vitamins and supplements made from natural ingredients, which could impact demand for prescription drugs. 19 “Consumer health in the Philippines 2023,” Euromonitor, October 2023.

Businesses operating in this field may end up benefiting from universal healthcare policies. If initiatives are implemented that integrate healthcare systems, rationalize copayments, attract and retain talent, and incentivize investments, they could potentially help to strengthen healthcare provision and quality.

Businesses may also need to navigate an increasingly complex landscape of diverse health needs, digitization, and price controls. Digital and data transformations are being seen to facilitate improvements in healthcare delivery and access, with leading digital health apps getting more than one million downloads. 20 Google Play Store, September 27, 2023. Digitization may create an opportunity to develop healthcare ecosystems that unify touchpoints along the patient journey and provide offline-to-online care, as well as potentially realizing cost efficiencies.

Consumer and retail

Growth in the retail and wholesale trade and consumer goods sectors is projected to remain stable in 2024, at 4 percent and 5 percent, respectively.

Inflation, however, continues to put consumers under pressure. While inflation rates may fall—predicted to reach 4 percent in 2024—commodity prices may still remain elevated in the near term, a top concern for Filipinos. 21 “IMF raises Philippine growth forecast,” July 26, 2023; “Nomura downgrades Philippines 2024 growth forecast,” September 11, 2023. In response to challenging economic conditions, 92 percent of consumers have changed their shopping behaviors, and approximately 50 percent indicate that they are switching brands or retail providers in seek of promotions and better prices. 22 “Philippines consumer pulse survey, 2023,” McKinsey, November 2023.

Online shopping has become entrenched in Filipino consumers, as they find that they get access to a wider range of products, can compare prices more easily, and can shop with more convenience. For example, a McKinsey Philippines consumer sentiment survey in 2023 found that 80 percent of respondents, on average, use online and omnichannel to purchase footwear, toys, baby supplies, apparel, and accessories. To capture the opportunity that this shift in Filipino consumer preferences brings and to unlock growth in this sector, retail organizations could turn to omnichannel strategies to seamlessly integrate online and offline channels. Businesses may need to explore investments that increase resilience across the supply chain, alongside researching and developing new products that serve emerging consumer preferences, such as that for natural ingredients and sustainable sources.

Manufacturing

Manufacturing is a key contributor to the Philippine economy, contributing approximately 19 percent of GDP in 2022, employing about 7 percent of the country’s labor force, and growing in line with GDP at approximately 6 percent between 2023 and 2024. 23 McKinsey analysis based on input from industry experts.

Some changes could be seen in 2024 that might affect the sector moving forward. The focus toward building resilient supply chains and increasing self-sufficiency is growing. The Philippines also is likely to benefit from increasing regional trade, as well as the emerging trend of nearshoring or onshoring as countries seek to make their supply chains more resilient. With semiconductors driving approximately 45 percent of Philippine exports, the transfer of knowledge and technology, as well as the development of STEM capabilities, could help attract investments into the sector and increase the relevance of the country as a manufacturing hub. 24 McKinsey analysis based on input from industry experts.

To secure growth, public and private sector support could bolster investments in R&D and upskill the labor force. In addition, strategies to attract investment may be integral to the further development of supply chain infrastructure and manufacturing bases. Government programs to enable digital transformation and R&D, along with a strategic approach to upskilling the labor force, could help boost industry innovation in line with Industry 4.0 demand. 25 Industry 4.0 is also referred to as the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Priority products to which manufacturing industries could pivot include more complex, higher value chain electronic components in the semiconductor segment; generic OTC drugs and nature-based pharmaceuticals in the pharmaceutical sector; and, for green industries, products such as EVs, batteries, solar panels, and biomass production.

Information technology business process outsourcing

The information technology business process outsourcing (IT-BPO) sector is on track to reach its long-term targets, with $38 billion in forecast revenues in 2024. 26 Khriscielle Yalao, “WHF flexibility key to achieving growth targets—IBPAP,” Manila Bulletin , January 23, 2024. Emerging innovations in service delivery and work models are being observed, which could drive further growth in the sector.

The industry continues to outperform headcount and revenue targets, shaping its position as a country leader for employment and services. 27 McKinsey analysis based in input from industry experts. Demand from global companies for offshoring is expected to increase, due to cost containment strategies and preference for Philippine IT-BPO providers. New work setups continue to emerge, ranging from remote-first to office-first, which could translate to potential net benefits. These include a 10 to 30 percent increase in employee retention; a three- to four-hour reduction in commute times; an increase in enabled talent of 350,000; and a potential reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of 1.4 to 1.5 million tons of CO 2 per year. 28 McKinsey analysis based in input from industry experts. It is becoming increasingly more important that the IT-BPO sector adapts to new technologies as businesses begin to harness automation and generative AI (gen AI) to unlock productivity.

Talent and technology are clear areas where growth in this sector can be unlocked. The growing complexity of offshoring requirements necessitates building a proper talent hub to help bridge employee gaps and better match local talent to employers’ needs. Businesses in the industry could explore developing facilities and digital infrastructure to enable industry expansion outside the metros, especially in future “digital cities” nationwide. Introducing new service areas could capture latent demand from existing clients with evolving needs as well as unserved clients. BPO centers could explore the potential of offering higher-value services by cultivating technology-focused capabilities, such as using gen AI to unlock revenue, deliver sales excellence, and reduce general administrative costs.

Sustainability

The Philippines is considered to be the fourth most vulnerable country to climate change in the world as, due to its geographic location, the country has a higher risk of exposure to natural disasters, such as rising sea levels. 29 “The Philippines has been ranked the fourth most vulnerable country to climate change,” Global Climate Risk Index, January 2021. Approximately $3.2 billion, on average, in economic loss could occur annually because of natural disasters over the next five decades, translating to up to 7 to 8 percent of the country’s nominal GDP. 30 “The Philippines has been ranked the fourth most vulnerable country to climate change,” Global Climate Risk Index, January 2021.

The Philippines could capitalize on five green growth opportunities to operate in global value chains and catalyze growth for the nation:

• Renewable energy: The country could aim to generate 50 percent of its energy from renewables by 2040, building on its high renewable energy potential and the declining cost of producing renewable energy.
• Solar photovoltaic (PV) manufacturing: More than a twofold increase in annual output from 2023 to 2030 could be achieved, enabled by lower production costs.
• Battery production: The Philippines could aim for a $1.5 billion domestic market by 2030, capitalizing on its vast nickel reserves (the second largest globally). 31 “MineSpans,” McKinsey, November 2023.
• Electric mobility: Electric vehicles could account for 15 percent of the country’s vehicle sales by 2030 (from less than 1 percent currently), driven by incentives, local distribution, and charging infrastructure. 32 McKinsey analysis based on input from industry experts.
• Nature-based solutions: The country’s largely untapped total abatement potential could reach up to 200 to 300 metric tons of CO 2 , enabled by its biodiversity and strong demand.

The Philippine economy: Three scenarios for growth

Having grown faster than other economies in Southeast Asia in 2023 to end the year with 5.6 percent growth, the Philippines can expect a similarly healthy growth outlook for 2024. Based on our analysis, there are three potential scenarios for the country’s growth. 33 McKinsey analysis in partnership with Oxford Economics.

Slower growth: The first scenario projects GDP growth of 4.8 percent if there are challenging conditions—such as declining trade and accelerated inflation—which could keep key policy rates high at about 6.5 percent and dampen private consumption, leading to slower long-term growth.

Soft landing: The second scenario projects GDP growth of 5.2 percent if inflation moderates and global conditions turn out to be largely favorable due to a stable investment environment and regional trade demand.

Accelerated growth: In the third scenario, GDP growth is projected to reach 6.1 percent if inflation slows and public policies accommodate aspects such as loosening key policy rates and offering incentive programs to boost productivity.

Focusing on factors that could unlock growth in its seven critical sectors and themes, while adapting to the macro-economic scenario that plays out, would allow the Philippines to materialize its growth potential in 2024 and take steps towards achieving longer-term, sustainable economic growth.

Jon Canto is a partner in McKinsey’s Manila office, where Frauke Renz is an associate partner, and Vicah Villanueva is a consultant.

The authors wish to thank Charlene Chua, Charlie del Rosario, Ryan delos Reyes, Debadrita Dhara, Evelyn C. Fong, Krzysztof Kwiatkowski, Frances Lee, Aaron Ong, and Liane Tan for their contributions to this article.

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Israel Is Falling Into an Abyss

By David Grossman

Mr. Grossman is the author of numerous works of fiction, nonfiction and children’s literature.

As the morning of Oct. 7 recedes into the distance, its horrors only seem to be growing. Again and again, we Israelis tell ourselves what has become part of the formative story of our identity and our destiny. How for several hours Hamas terrorists invaded the homes of Israelis, murdered some 1,200 people, raped and kidnapped, looted and burned. During those nightmarish hours, before the Israel Defense Forces snapped out of its shock, Israelis had a harsh and concrete glimpse of what might happen if their country not only suffered a punishing blow but also actually ceased to exist. If Israel were no longer.

I have talked with Jewish people living outside of Israel who have said that their physical — and spiritual — existence felt vulnerable during those hours. But more than that: Something of their life force had been taken, forever. Some were even surprised by the magnitude to which they needed Israel to exist both as an idea and as a concrete fact.

As the army began to strike back, civil society was already enlisting en masse in rescue and logistical operations, with many thousands of citizens volunteering to do what the government should have been doing were it not in a state of feckless paralysis.

At the time of publication, according to data from the Hamas-run Gaza Ministry of Health, more than 30,000 Palestinians have been killed in the Gaza Strip since Oct. 7. They include many children, women and civilians, many of whom were not Hamas members and played no part in the cycle of war. “Uninvolved,” as Israel calls them in conflictese, the language with which nations at war deceive themselves so as not to face the repercussions of their acts.

The renowned kabbalah scholar Gershom Scholem coined a saying: “All the blood flows to the wound.” Nearly five months after the massacre, that is how Israel feels. The fear, the shock, the fury, the grief and humiliation and vengefulness, the mental energies of an entire nation — all of those have not stopped flowing to that wound, to the abyss into which we are still falling.

We cannot put aside our thoughts of the young girls and women, and the men, too, it seems, who were raped by attackers from Gaza, murderers who filmed their own crimes and broadcast them live to the victims’ families; of the babies killed; of the families burned alive.

And the hostages. Those Israelis who for 146 days have been held in tunnels, some possibly in cages. They are children and elderly people, women and men, some of whom are ailing and perhaps dying of insufficient oxygen and medication, and of hopelessness. Or perhaps they are dying because ordinary human beings who are exposed to absolute, demonic evil often lose the innate will to live — the will to live in a world in which such evil and cruelty are possible. In which people like those Hamas terrorists live.

The enormity of the Oct. 7 events sometimes erases our memory of what came before. And yet alarming cracks were appearing in Israeli society some nine months before the massacre. The government, with Benjamin Netanyahu at its head, was attempting to ram through a series of legislative steps designed to severely weaken the Supreme Court’s authority, in that way dealing a lethal blow to Israel’s democratic character. Hundreds of thousands of citizens took to the streets every week, all those months ago, to protest the government’s plan. The Israeli right wing supported the government. The entire nation was becoming increasingly polarized. What was once a legitimate ideological argument between right and left had evolved into a spectacle of profound hatred between the various tribes. Public discourse had turned violent and toxic. Talk was heard of the country dividing into two separate peoples. And the Israeli public felt that the foundations of its national home were shaking and liable to crash.

For those of you who live in countries in which the concept of home is taken for granted, I should explain that for me, through my Israeli lens, the word “home” means a feeling of security, defense and belonging that envelops one’s mind in warmth. Home is a place where I can exist with ease. And it is a place whose borders are acknowledged by everyone — in particular, by my neighbors.

But all these, for me, are still engulfed in a yearning for something that has never been fully achieved. At present, I fear that Israel is more fortress than home. It offers neither security nor ease, and my neighbors harbor many doubts and demands of its rooms and its walls and, in some cases, of its very existence. On that awful black Saturday, it turned out that not only is Israel still far from being a home in the full sense of the word, it also does not even know how to be a true fortress.

Nevertheless, Israelis are justifiably proud of the swift and efficient way they rally to offer mutual support when the country is threatened, whether by a pandemic like Covid-19 or a war. All over the world, reserve duty soldiers got on planes to join their fellow soldiers who had already been called up. They were going “to protect our home,” as they often said in interviews. There was something moving in this unique story: These young men and women rushed to the front from the ends of the earth to protect their parents and grandparents. And they were prepared to give their lives. Equally stirring was the sense of unity that prevailed in the soldiers’ tents, where political opinions were not important. All that mattered was solidarity and comradeship.

But Israelis of my generation, who have been through many wars, are already asking, as we always do after a war: Why does this unity only emerge in times of crisis? Why is it that only threats and dangers make us cohesive and bring out the best in us, and also extricate us from our strange attraction to self-destruction — to destroying our own home?

These questions provoke a painful insight: The profound despair felt by most Israelis after the massacre might be the result of the Jewish condition into which we have once again been thrown. It is the condition of a persecuted, unprotected nation. A nation that, despite its enormous accomplishments in so many realms, is still, deep down inside, a nation of refugees, permeated with the prospect of being uprooted even after almost 76 years of sovereignty. Today it is clearer than ever that we will always have to stand guard over this penetrable, fragile home. What has also been clarified is how deeply rooted the hatred of this nation is.

Another thought follows, about these two tortured peoples: The trauma of becoming refugees is fundamental and primal for both Israelis and Palestinians, and yet neither side is capable of viewing the other’s tragedy with a shred of understanding — not to mention compassion.

One more shameful phenomenon has come to the surface as a result of the war: Israel is the one country in the world whose elimination is most openly called for.

In demonstrations attended by hundreds of thousands, on the campuses of the most respected universities, on social media and in mosques all over the world, Israel’s right to exist is often enthusiastically contested. Reasonable political criticism that takes into account the complexity of the situation can give way — when it comes to Israel — to a rhetoric of hatred that can only be cooled (if at all) by the destruction of the state of Israel. For instance, when Saddam Hussein murdered thousands of Kurds with chemical weapons, there were no calls to demolish Iraq, to wipe it off the face of the earth. Only when it comes to Israel is it acceptable to publicly demand the elimination of a state.

Protesters, influential voices and public leaders should ask themselves what it is about Israel that provokes this loathing. Why is Israel, of the planet’s 195 countries, alone in being conditional, as if its existence depended on the good will of the other nations of the world?

It is sickening to think that this murderous hatred is directed solely at a people who less than a century ago were, in fact, almost eradicated. There is also something galling about the tortuous and cynical connection between Jewish existential anxiety and the desire expressed publicly by Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas and others that Israel cease to exist. It is furthermore intolerable that certain parties are attempting to force the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into a colonialist framework when they willfully and stubbornly forget that Jews do not have another country, unlike the European colonialists with which they are falsely compared, and obscure the fact that Jews did not arrive in the land of Israel in conquest but seeking safety; that their powerful affinity with this land is almost 4,000 years old; that this is where they emerged as a nation, a religion, a culture and a language.

One can imagine the malicious glee with which these people step on the Jewish nation’s most brittle spot, on its sense of being an outsider, on its existential loneliness — that spot from which it has no refuge. It is this spot that frequently dooms it to make such fateful and destructive mistakes, destructive for both its enemies and itself.

Who will we be — Israelis and Palestinians — when this long, cruel war comes to an end? Not only will the memory of the atrocities inflicted on each other stand between us for many years, but also, as is clear to us all, as soon as Hamas gets the chance, it will swiftly implement the goal clearly stated in its original charter: namely, the religious duty to destroy Israel.

How, then, can we sign a peace treaty with such an enemy?

And yet what choice do we have?

The Palestinians will hold their own reckoning. I as an Israeli ask what sort of people we will be when the war ends. Where will we direct our guilt — if we are courageous enough to feel it — for what we have inflicted upon innocent Palestinians? For the thousands of children we have killed. For the families we have destroyed.

And how will we learn, so that we are never again surprised, to live a full life on the knife’s edge? But how many want to live their lives and raise their children on this knife’s edge? And what price will we pay for living in constant watchfulness and suspicion, in perpetual fear? Who among us will decide that he does not want to — or cannot — live the life of an eternal soldier, a Spartan?

Who will stay here in Israel, and will those who remain be the most extreme, the most fanatically religious, nationalistic, racist? Are we doomed to watch, paralyzed, as the bold, creative, unique Israeliness is gradually absorbed into the tragic wound of Judaism?

These questions will likely accompany Israel for years. There is, however, the possibility that a radically different reality will rise up to contend with them. Perhaps the recognition that this war cannot be won and, furthermore, that we cannot sustain the occupation indefinitely, will force both sides to accept a two-state solution, which, despite its drawbacks and risks (first and foremost, that Hamas will take over Palestine in a democratic election), is still the only feasible one?

This is also the time for those states that can exert influence over the two sides to use that influence. This is not the time for petty politics and cynical diplomacy. This is a rare moment when a shock wave like the one we experienced on Oct. 7 has the power to reshape reality. Do the countries with a stake in the conflict not see that Israelis and Palestinians are no longer capable of saving themselves?

The coming months will determine the fate of two peoples. We will find out if the conflict that extends back more than a century is ripe for a reasonable, moral, human resolution.

How tragic that this will occur — if indeed it does — not from hope and enthusiasm but from exhaustion and despair. Then again, that is the state of mind that often leads enemies to reconcile, and today it is all we can hope for. And so we shall make do with it. It seems we had to go through hell itself in order to get to the place from which one can see, on an exceptionally bright day, the distant edge of heaven.

Translated from the Hebrew by Jessica Cohen.

David Grossman is the author of numerous works of fiction, nonfiction and children’s literature. His writing has been translated into more than 45 languages. His novel “A Horse Walks into a Bar” won the Man Booker International Prize.

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